

T H E
Courtiers Academie:

Comprehending seven severall
dayes discourses : wherein be dis-
cussed, seven noble and important ar-
guments, worthy by all Gentlemen
to be perused.

- 1 *Of Beautie.*
- 2 *Of Humane Love.*
- 3 *Of Honour.*
- 4 *Of Combate and single fight.*
- 5 *Of Nobilitie.*
- 6 *Of Riches.*
- 7 *Of precedence of Letters or Armes*

Originally written in Italian by Count Haniball
Romei, a Gentleman of Ferrara, and tran-
slated into English by I. K.


L'occhio Linceo, ha l'intendimento cieco



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To the Right Honourable and Chivalrous Knight, Sir Charles Blunt, Lord Mountioy, Knight of the most honourable order of the Garter, and Captain of her Maiesties Sea-fortresse, and towne of Portsmouth, I.K. wisheth the accomplishment of all perfect honour and felicitie.



Thinke it no waies requisite (right Honorable) to prosecute that overworn methode of exaltation consisting in an vnsauorie inculcation of their honour and praise, whose glorie by the shrill Trumpet of Fame, in euerie corner resounded by a blubbering and vnpolished penne, is both extenuated, it offering further no small offence, to the modestie of that Noble eare or eye which vouchsafeth either the hearing or perusing of the same. These worthie discourses written by no vnwoorthie Gentleman in Italian, grounded on the firme foundations of *Aristotelian*, and Platonical discipline, and yet accompanied with a liuely touch and feeling of these times, I thought no lesse woorthie to be offered to the view and censure, of noble and courteous constructions. Seeing some vnderstand not Italian at all, others pretend, beyond their knowledge, and those exquisite therein, do yet manie times meete with such ambiguities, as not willing to con-
tende too laboriously in that, which they onely retaine for

The Epistle Dedicatorie.

an ornament, giue no smal impediment to the beneficial impression, of the subiect they reade and meditate vpon. And in that the first Author suppoeth these discussions to haue fallen out in the Court of *Ferrara*, and in the noble assemblies of diuers Ladies & knights, couertly herein expressing an excellent forme of Court-like exercise: I haue presumed to intitle it, *The Courtiers Academie*. The onely interpretation of them, may in a man of my obscure humilitie be deemed a singular presumptiō, except your honorable and gracious patronage both protect them, as also me theyr vnperfect translator. What defects soeuer in the same appeare, proceeding either from my selfe or others, may graciously bee sheltered vnder the noble wings of your woonted clemencie, to whose Lo. of my first labours, I haue ouer-sumptuously offered dedication, no lesse vowing vnto the same, the propagation of all my future and faithfull endeouours.

*Your Lordships humble and thrise duti-
full poore affectionate,*

J. R.

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To the curteous and beneuolent Reader.



Esides many defects, the which acknowledging in my selfe (curteous Reader) craue thy benigne and favorable construction, there may bee also some imperfections, which either comming shorte, of the singularity of these times, or lightning on the view of malignant eies, may, besides a generall deprauation for the most part incident to al mens labours, turne me further to some bitter, and

particular reprehension. Translation therfore in generall by some vaine pretendants, in tongues, and languages, hath bin thought altogether a thing, not only vnnecessary, but further preiudicial, the chiefest reason leading them therewnto, being this, as I suppose, that knowledge being an ornament, most besitting those noble or honorable, who command ignorance agreeing best with the vulgar sort, who be subiect and obey: it is therfore requisite (say they) that high wisedome, and excellent workes, should be concealed from common sight, lest they through equal experience, and knowledge in things (according to the ordinary condition thereof) puffed up, shake off likewise that humility of spirit, which shuld comprehend them under the obedience of laws and magistrates. Neither in my opinion, for some arguments in booke discussed of, doe they greatly mistake, when this their opinion shal be grounded vpon so sound a consideration, rather then on a vaine ostentation in, themselves wherby they would willingly retaine, some colour of excellencie, by reseruing vnto themselves in a restrained tongue, that which peradventure therein they do not absolutely understand, or which howsoeuer by publication, may be an occasion of generall document, and instruction to al men: To leaue comparison of writers, and whether straungers or our selues haue therein attained to

The Preface.

greatest excellencie and iudgement : obserue the ciuilest amongst christen nations who perceining (no doubt) the instability of men in all arts and professions, proceeding from the Chaos of opinions, grounded on the conceits of particular men, thought good by this mean to reduce them to some reuiue of foundations and therefore we see them to haue infinitely travelled in the translation of Plato Aristotle Plutarch, and diuers other ancient writers into their vulgar tongues: as they themselves when they writ, made choise of their owne mother languages: and we see daily that managed horses yeeld sooner to the bit of a discrete rider, then rough, and vn-saddled coltes: and people well instructed, know best how sweet a thing it is to liue vnder gouernment.

In a growne storme of heavy misfortune, it was my hap, to put in with the harbour of a worthy gentlemans house, where amongst sundrie other relaxations for a distressed mind, a multitude of good, and commendable writers in the best languages was not the least, & coming to peruse these discourses, (although of too high a tenor for my humble fortune) partly by perswasion, as likewise, in that I could not call to mind any so important booke, touching these subiects in the English tongue, I attempted this homely, & unworthy interpretation of them, wherein if I haue presumed any thing, either aboue my own conceit, or the good opinion of others, impute it to the special desire I had, that all me honorable, euer by birth, or instructiō, might be partakers of so necessary & excellent discussions. alwaies craning pardon, of whatsoever defacement they endure, by my vnperfect and mother explanation: whatsoever Poesie you herein meet withal (as with some you shal) it being rather accidental, then any waies by the noble author at the first intended, you may the more gratically winke at my defects therein, as one, whom the oppression of fortune hath denied that serenity of mind, from whence (for the most part) that pleasant fury hath his deriuation, I haue therefore contended, only with bare rithming desinence voyd of all ornament, to expresse the meaning of such poetical citations as the author useth, they being ordinarily alleged out of Petrarch whose verse in my opinion, euen in Italian, is rather weighty or sententious than heroical. And therefore I remember I haue seen some of the same verses in this booke cited, by a good approved Laureate translated into English, the which, though they retained

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ved the pith and substance, of the first author, yet (excepting alwaies better iudgements then my owne) they came very short of that lofty and abundant profluente, with which many of our moderne Poemes are accompanied: considering withal, how too labored a transformation of words and sence, might haue offered my first author capitall iniury, seeing he setteth them downe but as authorities wherein matter, more then wordes is to bee required: No lesse doubt I also of reprehension, for some words I haue used beyond common use, propriety leading me therto, rather then any affectation which consisteth not in so tollerable and commendable liberty, but rather in a frivolumous accumulation of words: unnecessarily produced in dilating of any argument: yet if any may lay up in this our common treasury of language, any choise ornaments, for the decorum & coppy of our tongue, I know not who may better then they, conuersant in forraine writers, seeing besides a laudable emulation of others abundance, even very necessity in explication, inuiteth them thereunto: and therefore for want of better tearmes I haue bin drinen to use some forged words, as spirittally, virtually, armiger, and other, which otherwise I could not wel tel how to haue expressed. Another thing there is, the meditation wherof maketh my cares to glow, with an imaginative overhearing of some bitter taxation: especially it consisting in that discourse, whereof the least expectation wil not be had: for in the meane this author setteth downe for reducement of quarrels to peace, he hath prescribed a certaine forme of words, which no doubt to many will seeme ridiculous, as, favouring too much of feare, and pusillanimitie, which seuerer censure notwithstanding in my iudgement, may deserue mitigation, if not in respect of the dangerous abuse of armes in these times: at least yet in calling to minde, what in the former discourses hath bin enioyned euery honorable man, upon the instant of receiuing an iniury, to performe: the which once past, this voluntary, and kind accord, is not to spring from themselves, but rather from some other, who shall offer themselves to such vertuous solicitations, when it wil be requisite (as he himselfe saith) to so good an end, to use al commendable fallation, and by words of equiualent, and plausible signification to couer offences, preuenting by this meanes so many lamentable effects, as too ordinarily ensue, upon inueterate,
and

The Preface.

and prosecuted quarrells : These be not al, but the principallest occasions (as I suppose) which detraction in this my labor wil take hold of: the which notwithstanding curteous, and iudicial vnderstanders will so gratioously passe ouer, as that ther is no doubt but for al this, they wil find themselves wel satisfied by Patritio, in the explanation of true, essentiall, and sensible Beautie in Humane Love by Guirino, in Honour, Combate, and fighting for reputation by Gualinguo: in Nobility by Varano : in riches by Tassone, and last of al, in that high and worthy controuersie touching precedence of Letters or Armes, after resolute conflict, between Patritio, and Brancaccio noble champions for each partie, the deepe, and iudicial doome of gratioous Madam de Sala, will determine hercin al scruple, and attribute due right, and desert : And therefore as this worthie circumstance of Iustice, shineth like a bright beame in euery noble, or liberall minde, so doe I hope also for my labour, to reape curteous and fauourable construction, not onely of my own imperfections, but even of those also that necessarily depend on the error of impression, & if my poore battered name light into the fatal hands of malicious Impostors or odious scoffers: di buffoni mi beffo: and as it was said of that miserable Iacobine : C'est l'enfer, que les à créés.

To be commaunded.

I. K.





The first dayes Dis- course of Count Haniball Ro- mei, a Gentleman of Ferrara.

*In which the Ladyes and Gentlemen reasoning together, doo dis-
cusse, of Beantie.*



Hat most renowned Lorde *Don Al-
fonso d'Este*, the second of this name,
and through our happie fortune, at
this instant Duke of *Ferrara*, liueth
with so great magnificence, that his
hignes court seemeth rather a king-
ly and Royall Pallace, then the court
of a great Duke: for it is not onely
throughout replenished with noble Lordes and valiant
Knights, but further, is a receptacle for the most learned
and gentle spirits, as likewise for men that in euerie profes-
sion are most excellent. This Prince (out of question) in al
his actions verie respectiue, tempereth so his affaires with
leisure, and with so great order measureth & dispenseh the
time, that neither doth he weaken himselfe with the ouer-
burdensome meditation of matters serious, or languish and
weare away with the too great leuity of things delightfome

B

and

Of Beautie.

and pleasant. And therefore his highnesse hath allotted to euerie season his proper and particular entertainment, as to the Carniuale time or shrouetide, masking, Iusts, Turuey, feasts, Comedies, musick, and other such like contentments, the which with such peace and tranquility are embraced, as it is a wonder in that time to behold the generall exhilleration and Iubile of our Citie. In the Spring time they hunt the Foxe and flie their Faulcons in the great *Barco*, which enuironeth the north quarter of the City, where in certaine standing waters and marrish grounds, they finde many wilde ducks, for the flight of the Riuer. And there be certaine houses called *Sgarzare*, wherein Herons be enclosed and kept, being a most pleasant sight to beholde his highnesse, when with his court, he entreth into that large Medow, accompanied by the nobility of the Citie, mounted on goodly horses, and followed by the most excellent Duchesse, with all the Ladyes and Matrons of the noblest sort, riding in most sumptuous Coaches: where after they haue flowne at the riuer, they approch the *Sgarzare*, and let flie the Heron, who no sooner mounteth, but incontinently they cast off the Faulcon, who maketh after: and thus with singular solace they stand beholding this battaile in the aire, made by these two most hot and cruell foules. Then in the ardent heate of summer, his highnesse with the famous Duchesse and the whole court, retire themselves to *Belriguardo*, being questionlesse a royal Pallace, wherein are to be seene as manie roomes, as there be dayes in the yeare, with chambers, galleries, and hals so great, as therein men may conueniently play at ballown. There are also most beautiful gardens, abounding with al manner of fruit, waterd from the Riuer of *Poe*, by conueyances, which by his highnesse with wonderful art, were thither conducted, which neare the said Pallace cause certaine mills to grinde, with a faire and ample fish-pond, where there is alwaies found great store of fish: and the water in this pond being most cleare, it serueth very conueniently to swimme in, being as it were continually shadowed

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shadowed by verie high popplar trees, which do enuiron it. While his highnesse remaineth in this Pallace, he keepeth open Court, so that the Gentlemen and Gentlewomen of the City, are alwayes comming and going: as furthermore, al such are there lodged, that come for audience, and to negotiate with his highnesse, neare whom euer the Counsellors and secretaries are resident. Here the hottest part of the day is passed ouer with delectable entertainment: when towards the euening his highnesse with the Duchesse, Ladies, and Gentlemen (being a most excellent sight) goeth to fly the Sparrehawke) killing aboundaunce of Pheasant and Partrich, where of in those fields there is store and plenty. In the end of Autumne, his highnesse, the Lady Duchesse, and all the court, with other gentlemen and gentlewomen of the City, goeth to the sea side, where among other delightfome habitations, neare to Port Goro, in a parke called the *Mesola*, hee hath built a sumptuous pallace, the which parke his Highnes certainly with heroical expence, hath compassed with a wall, which is twelue miles in circuite, with foure gates, placed according to the foure quarters of the heauens, the which are kept shut, that the bealts may not go out, being likewise to open, as occasion requireth. Herein interchangeably they take diuers delights, sometime fishing in the sea by draught, and otherwhiles in hunting, and at al these pastimes the excellent Duchesse is euer present with all the dames and matrons, who with great contentment take pleasure in the chase. For the huntsmen enter with their dogges into the wood, and forcibly procure the wilde bealts to issue forth into certaine large open places made for the purpose, where there be dogges placed for the nonce, and Gentlemen, some on foot with long broches, others on horse backe, with speares and iauelins: and thus with notable agilitie, they kill boares, harts, and other, bealts, so that we may truly say, that in the world there is not a Prince enioyeth more excellent chase, or commodious fishing then here is. Afterwards in the euening the Court re-

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turned to the pallace; while supper, the time is spent in many pleasant entertainements: Wherefore his Highnesse, according to his wont, being the last yeere towards the end of Autumne in the said place, and the most famous Duchesse, accompanied with thrise noble Gentlemen, and gracious Dames, amongst whome was the honourable Lady Countesse of Sala, the two right illustrious and most beautifull sisters, the Lady *D. Marfisa*, and *Bradamante*; the Lady *Leonora Tieni* Countesse of *Scandiano*; the Lady *Isabella Bentinoglia* Marquesse of *Galtieri*; the Lady *Camilla Costabili*; the Lady *Lucretia Calcagnina*; the Lady *Victoria Tassona*; the Lady *Camilla Benelacqua*; the Lady *Lucretia Machiavella*; the Ladie *Camilla Mosti*; the Lady *Anne Strozza*; the Lady *Tarquinia Molza*; the Lady *Leonora Saccati*, with other Ladies and Matrons of account, besides the Gentlewomen of the renowned Duchesse. When his Highnesse desirous to go down to the sea side, to procure the nettes to be drawne, he made it knowne to the Gentlemen and Gentlewomen, that while they were abroad, his minde was, that euery one might lawfully betake himselfe to that contentment, which was to him most acceptable. Whereupon one part of the Gentlemen, the Lady *D. Marfisa* and *Bradamante*, and other Gentlewomen of the Court, accompanied his Highnesse, and the Duchesse to the sea side: but the greater part, especially of women, vnto whome the sea winde in the end of Autumne was not pleasing, went to the Pallace, to the end that with some delightfome entertainment, they might passe the time till the returne of his Highnesse. The Countesse of Sala for her quiet, had retired her selfe into her lodging apart, vnto whome all the Gentlemen and Ladies resorted, to manifest vnto her their fauour and good will, as also to bee partakers of her most gracious conuersation. The Ladie Countesse therefore, seeing so faire and honorable an assembly in her chamber, as she that is the inuentrice of fresh and honest contentments, me thinkes said she smiling, that soldiers can hardly keepe their ranckes without an head, and there-

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therefore, I would aduise, so it be pleasing to you Lords and Ladies, that by lot we chuse out amongst our selues (to auoid enuy) who ought to commaund, and that her empire may continue til the returne of his Highnes. This motion by the Countesse propounded, was of all the whole company commended. The lotte fell to the Lady Countesse of *Scandano*, and with great ioy she was crowned with a garland of Lawrell leaues. This vertuous Lady the Queene, peradventure of more than one heart, considering that in this noble course, there were the most learned and flourishing wittes of all the Court, desirous to heare them discourse of some matter that might be contenting, and acceptable to the whole company, spake thus : Amongst all the things which administer delight and wonder, it seemeth Beauty holdeth the chiefeest place, the which is so much the more admirable, in that she by few being perfectly knowne, is notwithstanding by euery one beloued, which thing I with my selfe hauing oftentimes considered, it maketh me enter into a singular desire to vnderstand, what maner of thing this is, which we terme Beauty; whether truely she be to be found in the world, or that we forge such a matter, in our fantasie, perceyuing euery day, by experience, that what to one seemeth deformed, to another appeareth beautifull. Seeing therefore a fauourable starre and gentle fortune haue exalted me to so great Empire, and that I may commaund ouer the diuine wittes, I determine to satisfie my honest desire : I enioyne you therefore Signior *Francesco Patritio*, vnder paine of the losse of my fauour, (the which hitherto I haue vouchsafed you) to discourse vpon Beautie, endeuoring in the best maner you can to giue me satisfaction.

This Signior *Patritio* is a Gentleman of *Dalmatia*, a man very learned, but especially in Platonicall philosophie, who hauing bene a little buffeted by Fortune, in the end retiring himselfe into the sanctuary of mēliterate (for so is the court of this Prince) he was with honorable regard, by his Highnesse embraced. Rising yp therefore, and making reuerence :

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This curtesie of your Maiestie, thrice famous Queene (said he) hath beene great and singular, hauing before any desert on my part vouchsafed me so great a reward, as to bee made woorthy of your Maiesties fauour. And whatso greuous punishment can be imagined, that to the losse of this, may be compared; but as with so gracious a gift I remaine comforted, so vpon some further consideration, I finde my selfe altogether perplexed & doubtfull, because in obeying your commandement, I am sure not to satisfie your desire, knowing my owne insufficiencie to intreate of so high a subiect, as is Beautie: and by disobedience I should incurre the penaltie set downe, the which I much more feare than death it selfe. To ouoyde therefore so greuous punishment, I will make no doubt to expose my selfe to so great an enterprise, hoping, that as those blessed intelligences, in their spheres, illuminations and motion, infuse that, whereof the beautiful of-spring of Nature in this inferior world is deriued, so that these resplendant intelligences which are heere placed so neare our hearts, reuerberating vpon me their most glittering beames will kindle light, and stirre vp motion in my obscure and dull vnderstanding: from whence conceits and words may spring, apt not only to discouer that participated of, but euen essentiall and true beauty. Notwithstanding we (most famous Queene) hauing Beauty before our eyes, leauing the first demand, pertaining onely to the blind, and searching out what thing this is which we call Beauty, I will affirme, that it is no other but a most pretious qualitie, which shineth in the vniuersall frame, growing from proportions or colours, or from the one and the other, together, brought forth by the chiefe Creator, to no other end, but with wonder and delight, to kindle loue in those mindes, which can comprehend it. Desiring therefore to make knowne, that this my definition is perfect, and vnder it that all things else be comprehended, it is necessary, that discoursing somewhat more deeply, I do shew the proper and particular beauty of all those things, which in the vniuersall

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uerfall frame of this world are of beauty capable. I say then, that as this great worke which we call the world, is known by sense, and by vnderstanding conceiued, so is it diuided into two partes, the one of which we terme the sensible, and thother the intelligible world: the sensible world hath two parts one subiect to vicissitudal generation and corruption, & it is this world which wee enioy, being so deare to vs, the other is the celestiaall world, subiect to no other transmutation, but onely locall motion: the corruptible worlde is contriued of the foure Elements, Earth, Water, Ayre, and Fire, as likewise of all things mixed: whereof some be perfect, and others vnperfect, and of the perfect some be liuing, other some without life: of liuing things, some haue onely the soule vegetatiue, others haue vegetation, and sence: and and the third sort enioy both vegetation, sence, and also reason. Imperfect mixtions, so called, because they want little of being simple, are the vapours, whereof all those imperfect mixtions are generate in which moisture beareth sway, as deaw, frost, mistes, clowdes, rayne, snow, tempests, and such like; and exhalation the mother of all such things, in which heate and drynesse preuaile, as are lightnings, thunders, thunderbolts, windes, falling starres, comets, and other like impressions, which are ingendred in the highest region of the ayre; the perfect mixtions without life, are stones, pretious gemmes, and mineralles: liuing things, retaining vegetation, are plants, hearbes, and all sortes of fruites: liuing things hauing both vegetation & sence, be vnreasonable creatures, of which som be imperfect, others perfect; the imperfect be those which haue no other sence, but feeling and imagination confused: and therefore they liuing halfe a life, are recounted betweene plants and liuing creatures, as oysters, muscles, sponges, and other such like creatures, fastening vnto stones: creatures perfect be all the other sorte, whether they be beasts on the earth, fish of the sea, or foules of the ayre; the liuing creature possessed with a soule vegetatiue, sensible, and reasonaable is onely man. The celestiaall world,

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world, although it be al of one selfe same substance, and that it seemeth at the first sight one heauen alone, yet notwithstanding by diuers motions wee learne, that it is distributed into ten spheares : the first of which ascending vpwarde, is the spheare of the moone, the second of Mercurie, the third of Venus, the fourth of the Sun, the fift of Mars, the sixt of Iupiter, the seuenth of Saturne, the eight of the starrie firmament, the ninth and tenth, the one of which (if the position of Astrologers be true) giueth motion trepedatiue, and the other motion diurnall, called therefore the first mouer. The intelligible world is comprehended by many and diuers orders of blessed soules and spirits, the lowest of which is mans soule, and after that ensueth the not erring intelligence, called the soule of the world and Nature, for the three effects, she produceth in this vniuersall frame, for in as much as she giueth life & preserueth the world, she is tearmed the soule of the world, and in that she imprinteth into matter with the scale of diuinitie, al formes generatiue and corruptible, she is called nature: lastly because she directeth euerie thing depriued of vnderstanding, to their ende, shee is tearmed intelligence neuer erring. This is she (most famous Queene) that procureth the birds with so great industrie to build their nests, she imprinteth naturall desire of generation in all creatures, and contemning their own proper commodity, with great care and labour to bring vppe their yong. She maketh the Bee and Ant to provide in summer, for the future wants of winter, and to conclude, it is shee that is alwaies intentiue to the good of the whole world. The Angelical spirits follow, being the most noble ornaments of the celestiall spheares, divided into many Hierarchies : the first of which wholly enflamed with diuine loue, is that of the Seraphins, the second of the Cherubins, all replenished with incomprehensible knowledge, in the third be the thrones faythfull secretaries of the celestiall minde: then follow Dominations, Powers, Principalities, the Angels and Archangels: aboue whome sitteth as perfect, the first

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first vnderstanding, being the most excellent & great God, who immouable, draweth and conioyneth all the other vnderstandings, as of them beloued & desired, to himselfe. As this vniuersall worke is diuided into two parts, the one corporeall and sensible, the other incorporeal and intelligible, so be there two beauties, the one sensible, the other intelligible. But in that the beginning of all our knowledge, is deriued from sense, we will first intreate of Beauty sensible: the which is no other but that most gracious qualitie, which shineth in bodies sensible, springing from proportion or colors or together both from the one & other, which administering delight, produceth loue in those minds that can comprehend it. And because bodies sensible are of two sortes, that is, simple, as the heauen and foure elements be, or compounded, as al bodies mixed are, we must obserue, that of all bodies simple, Heauen onely may bee termed beautifull, for the elements being incapable of proportion, light & colors, they cannot properly be called beautifull. Leauing them therefore apart with the mixed bodies, that com not much short of being elements, we will affirme, that sensible beauty only in heauen, and bodies perfectly compounded is comprehended, which notwithstanding is not all one, but as compounded bodies be diuers, so are there beauties distinct and different: in that some are compounded of like partes as stones, pretious gemmes and mincralles, others of partes vnlike, and in themselves dissenting, as plants, and living creatures. We wil then auerre, that both the beautie of heauen, and of compounded bodies of partes vnlike consisteth only in colours, for though the beautie of things compounded of partes different, consisteth in proportion and colours; yet of some the beautie consisteth principally in colors, as likewise of othersome in proportion. The beauty therefore where-with heauen is adorned, is no other but his most bright and shining colour, which doth not onely make heauen beautifull, but further, is an occasion, that al other sensible beautie is faire and apparant. The beautie of stones consisteth in
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their colours, as of marble, porpherie, alabaster, and such like. That of the diamond in his white and excellent colour, like to the starres, as also the beautie of the rubie is in his red and cleere colour. The beauty of mineralles also consisteth in colours; for gold in colour like to the Sunne, receiveth his brightnesse; and silver in whitenesse resembleth the Moone, and so all other mettall'es by their proper colours are esteemed faire and beautifull. Plants have their beautie in proportion, and colours; but more specially in proportion. That of hearbs and floures, consisteth rather in colour than proportion: but the beautie of creatures irrationall, is placed principally in the proportion and correspondencie, that the partes betweene themselves, have with the whole, and farre lesse depending on colour. Mans beautie consisteth in proportion, and in splendor of his proper and well placed colours: But in that I reserve the discussion of humane Beautie, to the end of this my discourse, we wil now leaue it. And that no Beautie may remaine vntouched, before we passe o-uer to the Beautie of the world intelligible, we will speake somewhat of artificiall Beautie, seeing things artificiall also are termed beautifull: and amongst those artificiall, I place Poesie, and Speach or Oration, the one being gouerned by Arte Poeticall, the other by the Art of Rethorike. And as we find quantitie both in the one and other, so in them both proportion, and colours Poeticall and Rethoricall are comprehended; yet these are not knowne by sense, but by the minde and vnderstanding, wherefore the beautie of Poesie and Oration, ought to bee called an artificiall intelligible Beautie, differing from other beauties artificiall, which by the sense of seeing onely are comprehended. The beautie therefore of things artificiall, being as it were the image of those naturall, consisteth as well in colour as proportion; yet in some we consider only proportion, as in statues, buildings and other like, which proceede from manuell Artes, in which there is little reckoning made of colours. In some other things the beautie remaineth in colour; and these bee
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such as depend on the Arte of Weauing, as clothes of silke, wooll, linnen, and such like. The beauty of plants is respected both in one and other, that is, in proportion and colors: And let this spoken, be sufficient for Beautie artificiall.

Now passing ouer to that Beautie which onely with the eyes of the soule is comprehended (being Beautie intelligible) beginning from the lowest, and is that which is found in the soule of man. I saye, that as the Beauty of humane bodie (as we wil shew) is placed principally in the superiour part, which regardeth heavenly light; so the Beautie of mans soule is found in the more eminent parte of the same, the which is exposed to diuine light. This is called vnderstanding, by which our soule conceiueth and knoweth, not only the being of things corporeall & sensible, but also by meane of thinges visible, raiseth it selfe to the knowledge of those inuisible, so that as we obserue the soule of man to be compounded of parts and diuers parcells, so the same soule from the consent of partes and colours, receiueth his excellencie: colours are no other but intelligible kinds, placed in the vnderstanding, which with colours haue the like similitude, as the visible colours themselues, and these may be termed intelligible; for as colours are not actually visible, neither can their beauty by bodily eie be seene, if first that eie, and those colours, be not by some light, and especially by the light of the first visible (which is the Sunne illuminated, to the forms and intelligible kindes of our vnderstanding (which is the eie of the soule) cannot be comprehended, if first that vnderstanding and those intelligibles, bee not by the light of superior vnderstanding cleered and illumined. These intelligibles, which placed in vnderstanding, do make it absolutely perfect and beautiful, be of two sortes: some be intelligibles of trueth, others intelligibles of good: those of good be decking our soules with prudence, fortitude, temperance & iustice, make them most beutiful: those of truth apparel them with two pretious habites, wisdom & sapience, through which habites, our soules becom like to diuine beuty:

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proportion, by which one parte of the soule with admirable symetry answereth to the other, is no other but a famous vertue, which maketh our soule so faire & beautiful, that if with bodily eyes it might be contemplated, it would produce in vs incredible loue, and wonderfull affection: this by the eie of the minde is onely discovered, being more excellent than a thousand bodily eyes; and therefore in those whose minde is not blinde, it bringeth foorth affections not onely wonderfull, but out of doubt such, as neither by the tongue can be expressed, nor by the mind comprehended.

According to order, the Beauty of the worldly soule followeth, called Nature, and intelligence not erring, whose beauty in like manner is obserued in colours and proportion. Colours are no other, but diuine Ideaes infused in the same soule: and proportion is nothing else, but an exemplar forme, of superior vnderstanding imprinted in the said soule, after whose image by the seale of diuinitie, it maketh matter deformed, beautifull. The beauty of Angelles diuided into diuers Hierarchies, as wee haue saide, is no other but Angelicall vnderstanding, garnished, and replenished with all formes intelligible by vnderstanding diuine. These of all vnderstandings, haue the greater proportion to receiue celestiaall splendor, as those who beeing alwayes present, do face to face beholde diuine Beauty: and therefore those Angelicali vnderstandings, are alwayes in action of intelligence, and are made beautiful, after such a sort, as of deformitie they are vncapable, which is not in humane intellect, by reason it is not euer in action of intelligence, and is capable as well of deformitie as beauty. For when the soule abaseth it selfe with cogitations, and intimation in the obscuritie of sensible delights, the conceit of Beauty remaineth extinct and darkened; but when it is exalted to the contemplation of things supernall, exposing it selfe to celestiaall light, then procureth shee her owne native beauty, to be cleere and excellent. Hitherto (most famous Queene) we haue intreated of sensible and intelligible Beauty,

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Beautie, in as much as it is Beautie participated of.

Now remaineth it vnto vs to discourse of true & essential Beauty, by mean of which al things created are so much the more fayre, by how much the more they are partakers of it. This is found in the first vnderstanding, beeing the most mighty and excellent God, creator and giuer of all Beauty: because he alone is absolute perfection, perfect wisdom, and incomprehensible Beauty: especially not to be comprehended by our vnderstanding: the which at contemplation of diuine essence, remaineth no lesse obfusate, then is the eye of a Bat in beholding the sun. Hauiug therefore to discusse vpon so high a subiect, I will endeouour to the vttermost of my wit and capacity, to direct your maiestie to the contemplation of essentiall and true diuine Beautie, by those meanes which are granted vnto vs by the Creator: For he hath not equally distributed his Treasures. Angelicall vnderstanding is replenished by the chiefe creator, essentially with all formes intelligible, and to it is permitted the cōtemplation of diuinity face to face. Intellect humane, in as much as it is vnited to the material body, deprived of all intelligibles, (as a plaine & smoothe boord) is yet in potential power to receiue all the formes & intelligible representations, the materiall & sensible, by theyr own Ideas, and the immaterial and insensible by anothers, or in anothers likenes & similitude: & therefore al our knowledge proceedeth from sence, things sensible being the true meanes which guide to the knowledge of those intelligible, being as it were similitudes and representations of them. By these representations therefore & similitudes, I wil seeke to make known diuine & true Beauty, the which consisteth, though in a most supereminent manner, in colour & proportion, for it is a thing most certaine, th at this sensible light is no other but a bright colour, colour being likewise nothing els, but a shadowed & obfusate light, seeing it is generate, not only by the mixtion of the first qualities, but also by light and shado: wthere is this differēce, that the shadowie light is not

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of it selfe in visible act, but to that is procured by bright colour, whereas bright colour is not only of it self, alwaies in visible act; but further, is an occasion that al other things be visible, scene, & by al mens eyes beheld. And therefore the sun adorned with this bright colour, is the first visible, the first scene, and first seeing, deservedly called by *Heraclytus* the eie of the world.

This bright sensible colour, which is the sunnes beauty, easily guideth to the knowledge of brightest colour intelligible, which is the Beautie of the first vnderstanding, being as it were the Image and similitude of it: for as sensible colours can neither bee visible nor scene, without the most bright colour of the sun, so intelligible colours, which be those intelligible forms, cannot haue actual intelligence, nor be conceiued, without the presence of most bright color diuine: And as the eies should not be actually seeing without celestial light, so Intellects, which be no other but incorporeal eyes, should not actually be intelligent without diuine splendor & brightnes: for as the light of the sun is of it selfe visible, & by it selfe scene, so the most bright colour diuine is of it selfe intelligible, and by it selfe vnderstood. And as the sun by his most bright color is the first visible, first seen, and first seeing, so the first vnderstanding, which is god, most mighty and excellent, with his most glittering shining colour, and light essential, is the first intelligible, first vnderstood, and first intelligent. The Sunne by his resplendent light, exceedeth all the celestiall bodies in Beauty: the first intellect (excepting alwayes, if it bee lawfull to make comparison, betweene the finite and infinite) through his diuine splendor, and most glittering light is in the intelligible world, of al intellects the beautifullest, and most supereminent: and as the light of our material fire, in these inferiour parts, representeth the Sunne; so is the light of the sunne in the worlde celestiall, the true similitude of diuine light and brightnesse. And therefore the diuine Philosopher, defineth light to be no other then an influence
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of diuine essence, into al worldly things infused, not being any thing throughout the vniuersall woorke, wherein some shadow of light doth not appeare and shine. These be the meanes and similitudes (renowned Queen) which shew that the Beautie of the first Intellect consisteth in his proper colour, being the same light which beautifieth, and is diffused throughout the whole world. It remaineth that I procure you to vnderstand the other part of diuine and essentiall beauty, which is proportion. Yet let not your highnesse imagine, that these beauties which I place in God, be in themselves diuers, as also distinct, from diuine essence, as wee see in other vnderstandings. For in God there is nothing which is not diuinity of it selfe, and therefore in God Idea, light, wisdom, iustice, be no other but God himselfe; notwithstanding they are diuers by our vnperfect manner of vnderstanding: because therefore we vnderstand proportion as diuers from his light, we will so expresse it. Proportion then, which is in God parte of his Beauty, is no other but the Idea and exemplar forme of the whole world, in that diuine intellect, in which vniuersall frame, al the parts being together, within themselves wholly correspondent, they are in that diuine vnderstanding with greater proportion then in the world. As in the Architects vnderstanding, the modell and exemplar forme of buylding is much more fayre and excellent, then in the buylding it selfe: In that the forme of Building may receiue impediment from matter which euer resisteth Ideall reason, but that which is in the Soule being pure and Immateriall, can haue no defect. So that as the Beautie of the buylding and of al the parts thereof, dependeth on the exemplar forme, which in the vnderstanding of the Architect, and therefore this in the Building is called Beautie participated of, and that in the Architects vnderstanding, Beautie essentiall.

So the Beauty of this worldly Frame, and al the parts thereof dependeth on Ideal forme, in minde diuine comprehended:

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ded, and therefore that is termed Beautie participated off and this in the minde of the diuine Architect, is true and essentiall beauty, which consisteth as I haue sayd, in Ideall proportion, and his shining light, which is not onely the true light, that illuminateth man comming into this world, but further, is that which causeth the vniuersall frame to be resplendant and beautifull. The diuine Prophet sheweth (and it is true) that God hauing created in fise dayes all other things which are comprehended in the whole world, he finished his labour the sixt day in the worke of man. I hauing therefore dilated of the whole world in the first part of my discourse, as also of al the parcels thereof, and in the second of corporeal Beauty sensible: in the third of Artificial beauty: in the fourth of the Beauty of Intellects, and in the fift of essentiall Beauty diuine, in imitation of diuine wisdome, I determine in this sixt and last part, to conclude with the Beauty of the shape humane. Throughout the whole world diuine Beauty obscureth al other pulchritude. The Sun exceedeth in beauty al bodyes celestiaill, and Beauty humane excelleth all the other of this inferiour world, and therefore we may say with the holy scripture, that God created man after his owne Image, seeing that in man the beame of diuinity doth appeare and shine. This heauenly creature whome we call man, was compounded of soule and body, the which body, hauing to be the harbour of a most fayre and immortall soule, was created without couering of hide, bristles, feathers, skales, brutish tusks, or hornes, neyther with bil, or clawing talents, but most exquisite, with his eyes towards heauen, and was placed in the midst of the world, to the end that as in an ample Theater, hee might behold and contemplate the workes of the great God, and the Beauty of the whole world: as also there was granted vnto him a perfect tongue & speech, that enflamed with loue diuine, and replenished with admiration, he might praise, and with words extoll diuine beauty. In humane body we find proportion & colours, more then in all other bodies

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bodies compounded of parts vnlike, because in it that proportion is comprehended, which representeth the whole corporeal sensible world, as also the colours that beautifie this sensible world; the one of which is white, like to heavenly light, and the other is red, like to the shining colour of material and visible fire: and therefore man was worthily called a little world, seeing the body of man is no other but a little modell of the sensible world, and his soule an Image of the world intelligible. The beauty therefore of humane body, consisteth in due measure of proportion, that is, in fayre and goodly lineaments, and in colours wel disposed: and further, which falleth not out in any other body compounded of parts vnlike, his beauty principally is discovered in one part alone: & this is in the superiour part, which regardeth towards the light of the Sunne: whose beautie is that, which by meane of the eye procureth Loue. Moreover (which likewise in no other kind of creature is founde) Beautie humane is in women, in farre greater excellencie obserued, then in men, which was thus dispensed with great prouidence by the cheefe creator. For hauing graunted woman vnto man for a companion, he endowed her with excellent beautie, for production of Man, and to enflame in him a desire to generate that fayre and beautifull. This *Anacreon* confirmeth, saying, that as running is the ornament of an horse, and wisedome of a man; so beautie is the proper honour of a woman: And the Philosopher in the first of his *Rhetroyke*, doth in such sort appropriate beauty to a woman, as he setteth it downe principally amongst feminine vertues, saying, that the vertues of a woman be beauty, honestie, and desire to take paines, without avarice. And in the same booke speaking of the beautie of man, he placeth in the visage of man, together with the aspect, terrible, regard and countenance, to the ende that, prouoked in fighting, he might be a terror to his enemies, which doth clearly manifest that beautie is not in man in so great perfection as in a woman, because his beautie, procureth as wel

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terror as loue, whereas Beauty in women doth alwaies generate loue, & neuer procureth feare. If I were willing to describe the beauty of visage humane, I might much more easily poynt it out with my finger, the expresse it by my tongue. Yet for al this I wil not forbear to affirme that to form perfect Beauty in humane visage, foure things fitly concur, proportionable feature, color wel disposed fauor & presence: to goodly feature & color, faire & comly presence addeth such excellencie, as without it al other Beauties languish & weare away. This was wel known and commended by *Petrarch* in the countenance of his *Lauretta*, in the sonnet that beginneth;

*From time to time she seemeth more to mollifie,
By hue Angelical and her sweete simpring smiles,
And by the fauour that her face doth dignifie,
With rolling eyes also, disciplining wanton wiles.*

Whether this be a beame of the soule, which glittereth in the countenance after the same sort as the beames of the intelligēces, shine in their proper heauens & spheares, or that it be an harmony of shadowed colours & lineaments, I dare not affirme, but cōfesse my self to be ignorant, & wil remain bound to him, that shal make me capable hereof. How much fauor importeth to the perfection of beauty humane, from hence we easily conceiue: for without fauor, beauty would neither be gracious, nor accepted of: for she accompanied with fauor, hath force to draw to hir self, al those minds which can comprehend her; & without fauor beauty may be sayd to be vnperfect: therefore the ancients fained the Graces to be the waiting maids of *Venus*; by this inferring, that beauty ought euer to be accompanied by fauor, & from hir neuer to be separate. Presence principally is discovered in the sweet and comly motions of the body, for the body standing immouable, is not apparant, and for my part I would say that presence is no other then a certaine faculty and agilitie, which the body hath to obey the soule.

It remaineth vnto me (most excellent Queen) for conclusion of this my discourse, that I declare vnto your highnesse, that

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that humane beuty to on other end, hath by the chiefe creator bin produced, amongst al beuties sensible, most excellēt, but to kindle this honest & holy loue diuine, which vniteth humane creature with his creator. For mā wholly astonished in beholding humane Beauty, raiseth vp his mind to the cōtemplation of Beauty true & essential, whereof this is a shadow and similitude. This discourse of *Patritio* was by the Queen commended, as also by the other Ladies, when *S. Giovan Battista Guirini*, a gentleman most iudiciall in choyce and excellent learning, added. Questionlesse *Signior Francesco* hath so plentifully discoursed of Beauty, that little more may be adioyned thereunto; notwithstanding, in euery part I am not satisfied, if he loose not some doubts which holde bound my mind. For he hauing shewed, that Beauty consisteth in proportion or colours, or in one and the other together, hath from this his beauty excluded some things, which are esteemed faire; into which being altogether simple, proportion cannot fall, it being no other but that symetrie and commesuration which the partes haue betweene themselves cōformable together to the whole: for we say, a beautiful colour, a faire light, a faire voyce, a faire sound, & such like: our Italian word *Bello* being vsed in commending of al these excellencies, & in these there is neither proportion nor colors. But further, he auerring that the beauty of bodies compounded of parts vnlike, is the proportion that the parts haue between themselves, & with the whole, he manifestly contradicteth his friend *Plotinus*, principal of the *Platonicall* family, who maketh plaine demonstration, that beauty cannot be in proportion: and amongst many other arguments, this, in my iudgement, is not of little importance, for sayth hee, if proportion were beautie, it would follow, that the partes which compounde the whole, should not bee beautifull; for no composition being in them, there is likewise no proportion, and they not being faire, how can the whole bee beautifull, considering that of parts not beautiful, an whole Beauty cannot be compounded: notwithstanding

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ding the consequent is false; for the parts which compound the whole, are & be termed faire, we vsually saying, a fayre hand, a faire foot, a faire eie, a beautiful nose, & such like; this word *Bello* seruing for to commend al these perfections: the antecedent therefore is false, which is, that proportion is beauty. Furthermore, he also vnmindful of his *Plautinus*, hath only entreated of that sensible beauty, which is the proper object of the sence of seeing, & hath not placed that in the number of Beauties, which is the object of hearing, that being of so great price, as *Plotinus* maketh it, like to the beautie of the soule: and this is melody or musick which so greatly delighteth, there being no doubt but that also is tearmed by the title of fayre, we saying for the most part, excellent musick, singular harmony, & pleasant consent. I expect therefore *Signior Francesco*, that you resolving these my doubts, doe cause your beautie to appeare, much more resplendant and glorious, then that altogether beautifull.

Very wittily and learnedly sayd *Patritio*, according to the custome of his pregnant wit, doubteth *Signior Guicini* how I haue forborn to put in the number of things beautiful, some other which also are called by the same name, as also moued by the authority of *Plotynus*, he doubteth that proportion is not the beauty of bodies compounded of parts different, as moreouer, melody is to be numbred amongst beauties sensible. I answering therefore to his first doubt said, that beauty is a quality as we haue affirmed, & therefore cannot of it selfe consist, but is necessary that it be resident to a subiect, & this shalbe substance. For substance as the sound thereof importeth, is that which by it selfe subsisteth, and not the quality or accident. Colour therefore being an accidēt which cannot stand by it self, it cannot be the subiect of beauty, but rather the beauty of the subiect. Wherevpon we speaking properly, this propositiō wil not be true, that color is beautiful, except we vnderstand it in this sort, that it maketh another thing beautifull. As phisicke is sayde to bee healthfull, because it healeth another, it is also vnproperly spoken when

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when wee say, a fayre voyce, or a faire sounde: for besides that there can be no sensible beauty: but that which is comprehended by the sense of sight, sound and voyce, hath in a certayne maner the sayd proportion with Musically consent as hath the colour, with the body coloured: for as by colour, beauty is represented to the eyes: so by sound and harmony, the voyce representeth melodie to the eares: whereupon as we cannot say a beautiful color, so can we not likewise terme the voyce to be faire, I say speaking properly: but in steede heereof, wee might better terme, a melodious, or good voyce, and a good or sweete sound. I haue not in like manner placed in the number of things beautiful those which be the objects of hearing; for onely proportion in bodies, according to *Platoes* minde, is called Beauty: and in number it is termed harmony in humors health, and in the minde vertue. For as it would be no proper but translated speech to say in steede of, beauty of the body, harmony of the body, and for the health, the beauty of the humors, so would it be improper to say, the beauty of number, or health of number, in that the science it selfe, which intreateth of Musike, termeth his proper subiect, number harmonious, and not beautiful. That harmonie, which is the object that most delighteth hearing, is not properly beauty, as that of bodies, it is by this manifest; for beautie of bodies is absolutely a work of Nature, shining of it self, without the help or adoperation of Art: But harmonie is not wholly a worke of Nature, but dependeth of science, and art humane, which the vnderstanding retaineth, by musically habite; and therefore in Musike it seemeth, that not onely sense, but also vnderstanding is wakened and delighted. Further, beautie in bodies, is alwayes in action, neither needeth it humane art to be seene, but sodainly at the apparance of light doth discover it selfe; harmony, notwithstanding it be alwaies potentially in number, neuertheless without humane Art, it cannot be in action, nor be heard: Yet this (and with *Plotynus* leaue be it spoken) is much different from beautie, by the argument of

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Plotynus himselfe, which is, that proportion in bodies compounded, of partes vnlike, cannot be Beautie. For though I esteeme him as Prince and chiefe of all the Platonists, neuerthelesse, desiring to haue trueth my friend, I can not in this conforme my selfe to his opinion: For hee considered not, that the different partes which compound the whole, are also framed themselues, of partes and parcelles vnlike: For the hand is compounded of fingers, and the fingers of ioynts and nayles, and in it doe we behold well disposed colours, and due proportion, as likewise in the feete and all other members, in which out of doubt, we finde proportion of the parts and whole: and therefore when we call the beautiful, we respect them not as parts, but also as entire wholes, & compounded. I further affirm, that as of matter & forme, the body heauy, and light, is compounded, although neither the matter nor forme, is either heauy, or light; so will it bee no such great inconuenience, that of partes not faire, an entire beautiful should be compounded. *Guirini* seemed to be satisfied with the answer of *Patritio*, who now withdrew himself, to giue place to the L. *Laura Penevra*, that by commandement of the Queene, had taken the Harpe into her hand for musike: When the ladie *Tarquimia Molza*: go not away said she, Signior *Patritio*, for I haue also a doubt to cast, neither do I thinke that the Queenes mind is, I should here rest discontented, as I must needes, you not satisfying me, in my own I cannot say, but even in the generall doubt of euery one: for who is there, especially among vs women, which knoweth the reason (speaking of beautie humane) why shee with vs is so rare, & deformitie so frequent, and yet the quite contrary shuld be, if that were true which you haue spoken: That Nature the ministresse of diuine prouidence, and disposer of all formes, doth imprint them in matter, according to example, in vnderstanding diuine: how can it therefore be, Signior *Patritio*, that Nature, who hath euer before her eyes, the true modell of Beautie, after the Image whereof she intendeth to form the thing beautiful, like an vnskilful Painter, or Grauer, should for the most part impart deformitie.

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This doubt Lady, answered *Patritio*, is not smally importing: being vndoubtedly worthie of your most noble conceit, notwithstanding I wil endeavor my selfe herein, to giue you satisfaction. It is a thing certaine, that Beautie proceedeth from forme, and deformitie from matter; the which, as it is of his owne proper nature vnformall, so al deformitie hath from it deriuation: For matter resisteth Ideall reason, so that in her she cannot produce the perfect forme shee intendeth: and from hence commeth it, that the Grauer can neuer set forth Beautie in Marble, answerable to the immateriall impression of her in his minde: for the marble makes resistance to his chizel, hand and art. Applying this then to our purpose I say, that the matter whereof humane creature is formed (and it is pure bloud, mixed with mans seede, in the wombe of the woman) in which the great mother Nature determineth to introduce the Image of diuinitie, is not alwayes one, and the selfe same, but sometimes by the mother, otherwhiles by the father, and often by the variabilitie of celestiall influence, we find it diuersly disposed. Hereupon it appeares, that one more, another lesse, resisteth Ideall reason. By how much therefore matter is of greater resistance, by so much the more looseth forme his beutie; as on the contrary it obtaineth the more, the lesse it maketh resistance: And therefore diuine *Plotinus* defineth Beuty to be no other, but the floure of forme subduing matter. It seemes you, replied the *L. Tarquinia*, would charge the heauens, with beautie or deformitie, seeing it is they that dispose matter, to greater or lesse resistance. Without doubt, answered *Patritio*, as of the cause instrumentall, the beauty and deformitie of celestiall influence dependeth; so likewise doth all other effects of this inferior world: for celestiall heat, is the principal instrument of nature, as also vitall heate, is the instrument of nature in mans procreation, which by the father in seede impressed, hath proportion with the starry element: and therefore if nature would introduce like forme, vnto Ideall beautie, it is necessary, many things should agree to subdue
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the resistance of matter: as these poynts would be requisite, that the fathers seede be well disposed, that the heate of the womb be temperate, as also that celestial heate be gratioously infused by the fauourable starres: As *Petrarch* affirmeth, speaking of his faire *Laura*, in the Song

Garments of greene, yet bloody, rawny, and obscure:
Saying in the seuenth Stanza:

O gracious starres, which feruor did infuse,
Into the flanke that was so fortunate,
When this faire childe, the world came to peruse,
Whom for a starre on earth we celebrate:

And as followeth likewise in the fift Stanza of the Song:

Silent I cannot be: and feare preuaileth not.

When he saith:

The selfesame day, when she was bound in world below:
Those starres which in vs haue most happy influence:
In places high, and choice, themselues did soone bestow,
One with another, in friendly correspondence:
Venus and *Ioue* her sire, with gracious milde aspect,
Aboue the faire and princely houses did possesse:
When all disastrous lights, euill fortune that detect,
Were all in heau'ne extinct, and darkened questionlesse.

And as further foloweth: being therefore necessary, that so many things should concurre together for generation of Beautie, no maruell (most gentle Lady,) though Beautie so seldome, and Deformitie so often manifesteth her selfe: The cause of Beautie and Deformitie set downe by *Patritio*, seemed very probable to the Lady *Tarquinia*, and when all the attendants and standers by, imagining, that in the like argument, no other thing was to be sought after. The excellent Duchesse, a princeesse of rare and strange capacitie, making *Patritio* once againe to stay. You haue yet further, said she, to satisfie my doubt, which proceeds from hauing by you bin affirmed, that the beautie of humane body consisteth in

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proportion and colours: I desire therefore to know which holdeth the chiefest place, because by this meanes I shall also come to knowledge, which is the greater defect in beauty, either disproportion, or deficiency in colours. Reason, said *Patritio*, perswadeth me most noble Lady, to yeeld the chiefest place to proportion, notwithstanding sense maketh me stand doubtfull, ever obseruing, that the countenances of these faire Ladies, and of all women, do more shine and glitter through the abundance of colours, than by great proportion. Although I, if it so please your Maestie, will discusse this probleme, by allegation of reasons, both for the one and other part: and without giuing definitiue sentence, will leaue sufficient armes to euery one, to defend that best pleaseth him. And there is no doubt, but tastes bee diuerse; whereupon euery one enamoured will commend that parte in which his beloued is more excellent: for this may be perceyued in *Petrarch*, who sufficiently praiseth the colours of his *Lanretta*, because her colours exceeded farre her proportion. He called therefore her faire haire, tresses of gold, her forehead more beautifull than the heauen, he compared the eye liddes to ebonie, the cheeks to frosts, snowes, and roses; the lippes to rubies, the teeth to pearles, as wee reade in all those Sonets which contain the beauty of *Laura*: where we see not so much as one word, hauing relation to feature or proportion. The maner of handling this controuersie pleaseth me well, replied the L. Duchesse, seeing euery one may reason to their owne minde: yet giue you the onset, and begin first from proportion, the which out of doubt naturally exceeds colors, as do the elements things mixed. When *Patritio* therefore, had a litle pawsed with himself, he said: Among all beauties sensible, that seems the most perfect beauty, which is neerer to beauty intelligible, as also of that most participating. Proportion is such: therefore amongst all beauties sensible shee is the greater: and consequently where shee is found, is that, which to beauty, giueth greater perfection. Proportion questionlesse hath greater similitude wyth intelligible beautie, because it can not bee proportion without order,

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and order is proper to reason, which reason is no other, but a similitude of beautie intelligible, and of the selfe diuine intellect: but further it is the more principall parte of beautie sensible, which reacheth delight, not onely to sense, but also to the minde, and such proportion: for by the order and disposition of parts, the footesteps of reason do in hir appeere, and therefore shee is very conformable to the nature of the minde, being apt to delight, and rauish it, with vnspeakeable contentment: Further, proportion is the principal cause of beuty, throughout the vniuersal frame, aswel of the world corporeal and sensible, as of the intelligible: considering that by proportion, it is created, and by the same preserued; therefore it deserueth the chiefeft place in the beauty of humane body, which is no other but a model of the great world, Except we should foolishly beleene, that the worlde was made by chance, we must necessarily conceiue, that with speciall prouidence, it was built by the diuine architect, as also it is necessary to place in the same diuine mind, the Ideal forme, as we haue said of the world, by others termed the worldes Archtype, euen as it is necessary that the model and Idea of the building, should be in the minde of the Architect. Now the principal and most perfect part, as well in the minde of diuine, as humane Architect is proportion, because in it order and disposition are comprehended. According to this Ideall proportion therefore was the whole worlde by God created, and first of figure circular; because to containe this vniuersall worke, that of al other figures was most proportionable, and the heavenly spheares were with so great proportion framed, as likewise to euery one, motion, with so singular proportion dispensed, that in moouing (as the diuine Philosopher affirmeth) they procure celestiaall harmony: euery starre hath his proportion to receiue light from the Sunne; and the Sunne proportionably to euery one of them, dispenleth & infuseth of his light; and both the stars, and Sunne, with so great measure and proportion, doe infuse their light and heate into these inferiour bodies, as with maruell,

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maruel, and wonder from them, springeth the beutie of this inferior world. Such proportion we finde in the elements, as well in quantitie as qualitie, as if of this their proportion, the least part were but disproportioned, one element would conuert al the other into his proper Nature, or els the world would be confounded into Chaos. Proportion causeth harmonic in number, in bodies beautie, in humours health, in minde vertue; as contrariwise disproportion, procureth in numbers discord, in bodies deformitie, in humors infirmity, and in the minde vice: But who is it that wil doubt proportion to be the cause of all delights, as well sensible, as intelligible, in that the good which delighteth, is no good, if it bring not with it proportion, neither is there any thing that desireth to be vnited with good simply, but with a good to it selfe proportioned; and from hence proceedeth the saying of *Heraclytus*, that euery thing is rauished with his own contentment, the which standes in vnion of good, to it selfe proportioned: and this is that which properly of all things is beloued and desired.

To conclude, as there can not bee good in the vniuersall world, without proportion, so can ther not in the litle world which is man, be any beauty without proportion: and, as good can not without proportion procure desire; so can not beautie without proportion cause loue: In that loue is not generate in the louer, but by symetrie, which the thing beloued hath with the louer: by al these, and other reasons, which might be produced, we may conclude, that all perfection springeth principally from proportion: and therefore that it in humane body is a part more excellent, than is the beutie of colours. Me thinkes saide the Duchesse, the doubt is after such a manner cleered, as wee neede not proceede any further, and that the palme is due rather to beautifull feature, than to faire and well disposed colours. It is a thing iust and requisite, renowned Lady, sayd *Patritio*, before iudgement to attend the partie, for his allegations are not to be contemned, and therefore that louer who is made a seruant

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to beautiful tresses, to black eyes, to coloured cheekes, to ro-
sie lips, to a white hand, wil alleage in defence of colors, that
the beautie which is part, or rather proper offspring of the
most perfect of all beauties sensible, ought to bee the selte
same, which bringeth principally the name of beautifull
to that subiect wherein it is found; but colours are such, ther-
fore by colours humane body shall principally bee called
beautifull: that colours be such, it is a thing manifest: for
light is the greatest of all beauties sensible, as that which is
no other but a beame & influence of diuine essence, disper-
sed ouer the wole world (as I haue said) this being graunted
to the most perfect, of all bodies sensible, which is the sun,
to the end that by it, it might not only be beautifullest of all
other creatures, but that it should also bee the meane and
principal cause, of the apparance of all other beauties: co-
lours are so conioyned with light, and light with colours, af-
ter such a sort vnited, as we terme light a bright color in a bo-
dy illumined, & color a shadowed light in a colored body: in
no poynt differing, but that light is a colour without adum-
bration, & color a light shadowed, whereupon those colors
which haue least adumbration, as is white, haue the greater
similitude with the purity of light: Light then beeing the
greatest beauty of the world, and colors part of light, and
of light created, in al reason they ought to obtaine the chie-
fest place in humane beauty.

This louer wil farther argue, if the proper obiect delec-
table to the sight, is no other but beauty, colours being more
delightfome then proportion or figure, should also haue in
them greater beautie. That colours be such, it is proued, for
colours are proper sensibles of the sight, but figure and pro-
portion sensibles common: & by the opinion as wel of the
Peripatetikes, as Academikes, proper sensibles doo more
moue & delight sence, then common. Neither want there
philosophers of authority, as was most learned *Pfellus*, which
hold opinion, that common sensibles are rather knowne by
reason, stirred vp by the senses, then by the sense theselues.

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To conclude, he will thus reason, grounding himself vpon that proposition, which runneth currant through all vniuersities, and is this: that which is the cause that another thing is such, is much more the like it self: as for example sake: If fire be the cause that all other things are hot, then shall it of all other things be the hottest: I will therefore affirme, that if beautie of colours, is a cause that the beautie of figure and proportion is apparant, then must they likewise needes bee of more apparant beautie: as light is of all other beauties the fairest, in that light is the cause of the apparance of all beauties sensible: and there is no doubt, but colours are the cause of the apparance of proportion, considering that common sensibles cannot be cōprehended, but by sensibles proper: by the testimony of women theselues, of whom beauty is the proper ornament: the said reasons may be confirmed, they being priue, that colours in beauty humane holdeth the cheefest place, and are of themselves apt to produce Loue: they imploy all their industrie in the beautie of colours, by making their haire like the shining colour of gold, the cheekes like to white lillies and red roses, the lips to rubies, the teeth to the orient whitenes of pearle, with which beauties shadowing some other of their disproportions, they yet appeare, & are called faire, kindling notwithstanding by such hart, in the harts of mē amorous flames. He further adde the authority of the doctors, of the Moysaical law, who desirous that mē leauing their bestial appetites, shuld be inamored of women, set down by publike decree, that it shuld be lawful for women to paint their faces, and that fathers to daughters, brothers to sisters, & husbands to wiues, shuld be enioyned to allow money for the buying of colours: these wisemen conceiuing, that there is not a beauty more preuailent to imprint loue in humane breasts, then that of colors: & thus wil this intangled louer with the beutie of colors cōclude, that colors are the most principal poynts of humane beauty. Heere *Patritio* held his peace, and on a sodaine great murmuring did arise, one defending one parte,

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and others another, which the Queene obseruing, she pointed to the Lady *Laura Peuerara*. This is a Gentleman belonging to the Duchesse, borne in *Mantua*, to the glorie of that City, married to Count *Hamibal Turcho*, one of the principallest Gentlemen of our Citie: who, as she doth easily with her beautie kindle loue in any one that beholdeth her, so with her honest customes and modestie, she doth so assuage others flames, that al amorous affection, is resolved into singular and special reuerence, whereupon by all those that know her, she is no lesse reuerenced then beloued. Being come therefore before the Queene with her Harpe, she sung so sweetly, as it seemed the soule at the sound of that diuine harmony rauished, would haue flowne out from the body of euery one that heard her: when musicke being finished, the Lady Duchesse dwarfe came running, and made it knowne that the Court was at hand: whereupon the queen rising vp, the Ladies and knights after order giuen for prosecution of these discussions begun, the day following went to meete his highnes, and the rest of the day while supper-time, was passed ouer in diuers recreations, and pleasant sports. After supper they trode certaine measures, which finished, his highnesse rose vp, and euerie one retyled himselfe apart to his Lodging.

The



Of humane Loue.



The second daies discourse:

*Wherein, an argument arising amongst
the Ladies and Gentlemen, they discusse
of Humane loue.*



He day following, his highnesse with the renowned Duchesse, and parte of the Court, went into the wood of *Elisea*, where was prepared a very pleasant chase, the huntsmen with their nets hauing enclosed a sufficient number of boares, whereof that wood aboue all others doth greatly abound: and the vsuall company placed in order, returned to the Chamber of the Lady Countesse of *Sala*, from whence taking, by chance, the Lady *Isabella Bentiuoglia*, a matron, adorned with most noble qualities, shee was crowned Queene, who after a little silence, spoke in this manner: I beleeeue not, that amongst vs there can any one be found of so dull a conceit, which did not yesterday find great contentment in the discourse of *Signior Patritio*, hee hauing explaned vnto you, what beauty was, from whence she deriued her original, and to what end shee was graunted vnto mortall men, by the omnipotent Creator. The which hauing well considered, I thinke it not much from the purpose, to prosecute the method & begun, giue some occasion to these pregnant and learned wits, to extend
forth

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forth such like delights, which also vnto vs may be a singular benefit and commoditie: For what greater pleasure may be tasted, then to satisfie that naturall desire we haue to vnderstand. *Signior Patritio* sayd yesterday, that beautie was the mother of loue, and therefore, as of the mother I remained out of doubt, so am I desirous to haue some notice of the sonne, and in effect to knowe, what thing this is which wee tearme loue: for in the description that *Plutarch* thereof maketh, I am but little satisfied: it seeming vnto mee a meere fable to say, that he is a blind boye, winged, and naked, with a bow in his hand, & arrowes by his side, as likewise it is no lesse vanitie to affirme that he is a curteous child, or froward old man, & that he springeth from idlenes and humane iolitic. I command you therefore *Signior Guirino* (if my fauor be with you of any worth) that you dilate vpon this subiect, because I am assured, that al will attende you with great pleasure and contentment, for the desire euerie one hath to knowe the Tyrant, or rather this greedie deuourer of humane hearts. A most grieuous burden (thrice excellent queene) doth your maiestie lay vpon my shoulders (answered *Guicino*) in sodainly enioyning mee to entreate, of so high an argument, as loue is, in contemplation whereof, the most refined wits haue bin confounded. Neuerthelesse, to make known how deare the fauor of so great a Queene is vnto me, I wil couragiously attempt the enterprise, hoping that loue himself, vnto whom from my cradle I haue dedicated my life, wil stirre vp my inuention, and moue my tong, so that conformable to your highnesse entention, I may make his noble essence & other mysteries vnto him appertaining, most perspicuous and manifest.

Here *Guirino* staying & pausing a little with himself, begun afterwards in this manner. Our soule (most excellent queen) being deriued from true and essential beautie, there is in it such an inclination, and knowledge of beauty impressed, that no sooner by the eye, beautie discouereth it

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it selfe vnto her, but sodainely without any reasonable action reioycing with her selfe, shee is greatly delighted. Hereupon it proceedeth, that there is not so harsh a spirit and capacitie, which at the presence of some beautifull thing, bee it naturall or artificiall, stayeth not with wonder and delight to beholde it, although hee can neither comprehend the proportion, order, or any other part of this Beauty. But in that (most illustrious Queene) as yesterday *Signior Patritio* made manifest, Beauty humane, (as the liuely image of diuinitie) surmounteth all other in this inferior world, therefore deseruedly is it that, which with his present apparence, hath force to enflame and kindle loue in the soule of man. Of which loue humane (seeing your maiestie so commandeth) I haue determined to discourse, laying apart that generall argument, whereof others superfluously haue entreated: it being rather a certaine inclination, which euery creature hath to his owne particular good, then a true & infailible loue. Whetherfore we wold attain to the perfect knowledge of any thing, these foure things especially we are wont to seek out: first whether that, after which wee seeke, be extant: secondly, what it is: thirdly, from whence it hath his originall: and lastly, what end it hath. Now therefore, I supposing, (which of all these Ladies and gentlemen will bee graunted vnto mee) that loue is: I will passe ouer vnto the other three sought after, the which I intend to make manifest vnto you, in the description I shal set downe of Loue: but before I go any further, I thinke it not amisse to lay open some definitions. two of diuine *Plato*, & one take out of *Aristotle*, for taken out I may verie well say, because hee neuer hath defined it. *Plato* therefore in his book called *Phedro*, saith, that loue is no other thing, but a desire of vnition with that which is Beautifull, and in his *Conuuiuius*, as also in *Diotima*, he affirmeth, that loue is a desire of bringing forth that which is beautifull: In like manner, out of the wordes of *Aristotle* in his Rhetorick, may be gathered, that loue is no other but a desire of interchaungeable affection.

Of humane Love.

The words of *Platoes* first definition be true, but yet being too much restrained, they declare not sufficiently the nature of love: the second is onely proper to one kinde of humane love, and therefore cannot bee taken for a generall definition. That of *Aristotle*, notwithstanding it bee vniuersall, and hath his verification, as well in love as in good will, beeing in a manner the end both of one and other, yet is it somewhat defectiue, because there wanteth the efficient cause, as in it no mention being made of beautie, which properly doth generate and preserue love: but in that the defect of these definitions will be made manifest, in the consideration of that I intend to propound. I will in this proceed no further, but come to define humane love, according to the power of my slender wit: and admit I preuaile no further, yet by this meanes shall I giue occasion to these learned vnderstandings, to thinke better on it. I affirme, that love is no other but a forcible perturbation of humane mind, stirred vp by some knowne beautie, through a secret conformitie of Nature, which the lover hath towards the thing beloued, resolving with himselfe in desire, to be vnited with this beautie in love corporeal. That love is a violent perturbation of our soule and minde, it may be confirmed by the authority of *Plato* in his *Commiio*, where he termeth love a great spirit or *Demon*: and if the authoritie of so great a Philosopher were not sufficient, yet might these noble Ladies giue ample testimoniall thereof, who peradventure haue felt more then once, and often doo feelee the same, in whose delicate & chaste breasts be the most liuely and feruent flames of love, as likewise these amorous yong Gentlemen, amongst whome peradventure, more then one may be found, who at the presence of such a splendor and beautie, murmuring to himselfe, may say.

*If this be not blind love, what may I then, call this my fir?
But Love if that it be, O God, what manner of thing is it?*

There is no doubt but among al the passions and affecti-
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ons of minde, loue holdeth the cheefest place, there being no other affection that maketh alteration, as well in the body as minde, then loue doth, as *Petrarch* wittily expresseth, describing in a sonnet his amorous passion, when hee sayth:

*I find no peace, and yet to warre, dare not be bold:
I feare, and hope, I burne, and yet like ice am cold.*

And in another place,
I feare and tremble, fric, and freeze.

That to procure loue, it is necessarie that beautie, as a cause efficient, should be knowne, it may be proued by the Philosophers authoritie, in the ninth of his *Moralles*, where he affirmeth, that it is impossible any one should bee enamored, without hee be first drawne vnto it by beautie: and the reason also hereof is in readinesse, in that knowledge euer goeth before affection, which is no other but a sodaine motion of the sensatiue facultie, & cordial spirits, procured by a delectable or odious apprehension, resolving either into desire of vnion or seperation; whereupon ensueth either pleasure or greefe. I haue also placed that little clause, as necessarie in the definition of loue, through a secret conformitie of nature, that the louer hath with the beloued. For it is not possible that any should be enamored, except in finding a woman conformable in beautie to his owne proper disposition, the which is testified by the testimony of *Plato* in *Lyfide*, where he cōcludeth, that we are enforced, to loue that which is cōformable to our nature: as also by the authoritie of diuine *Petrarch*, in the second *Stanza* of that excellent Sonnet, in the sweete time of my first yeares, where hee saith:

*I say that from the day Loue first assailed mee,
Were many yeares yspent, and fast away did flee,
So that my youthful hue I changde for graue and sage,
With frosen thoughts my heart was burden'd by that age.
Which had my heart to Adamant conuerted quite:
Nor teares my breast did wet, with cruel lones despight,
I broke not yet my sleepe, and what was not in me,*

Of humane Loe.

*I doe finde most strange in others when I did it see:
 Alas what am I now? and what haue sometimes beene?
 By end the life, at eueing wee the day esteeme.
 This cruell boy marke wel, of whom I do complaine,
 That untill then my garments onely did remaine,
 Hit with his dart: he therefore with his wity snare,
 A mighty Dame did catch, when she was vnaware,
 With whom I neuer could, or euer can preuaile,
 By force, wit, penitence, but with these three do faile:
 These two haue me transforme into this state you see,
 Of me a liuing man making a Laurel tree,
 Which planted in cold ground, without leaues cannot be.*

Here Petrarch sheweth, that hauing in his dayes seene many faire women, (as it is likely) hee neuer was enamored, but rather had an heart made of Adamant, till by that mightie Dame hee was surprised, whose Beautie was conformable to his owne proper Nature, and therefore this sweete conformitie is one of the principallest and most essentiall causes of Loue; which hath his originall of no other thing, then from the celestiaall influences in humane generation: because these infuse seperately, into euery thing, as well without life, as liuing, and especially into mans bodie, a peculiar and particular temperature, by which euery man is in some thing different from another in complection. From whence springeth diuers inclinations and appetites, in that it cannot bee denied, but that the sensible faculty, hauing alwaies his operation ioyned with the body, followeth the temperature of the body; and therefore it is no maruaile (as the Poet sayth) if euery one be transported by his particular delight, and that the beauty which is apt to raiuish the minde of one, scarcely toucheth another. This loue, which is no other, but that most vehement passion wee spoke of, resolueth into a desire of vniting it selfe, in reciprocall loue, with the thing beautiful: and here let vs obserue, that though a man hath the greater parte of his affections common with other creatures,

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creatures, yet is he from them verie different: for in other creatures, affection, desire, action, if they be not hindered, they moue as it were in one moment, in that they want reason, which should struggle with sence. But in man, though affection sodainely mooueth, yet it is not so readily transformed into desire, or quickly mooued to action, in that this cannot be without the consent of reason: the which as a mistress, oftentimes permitteth not affection to breake forth into desire, or so incontinently to proceede to action: If therefore loue be willing to resolue into desire, of necessity reason must thereunto consent, it beeing sence that perfectly knoweth the hope, which is the true foundation of this desire. Therefore when any rare beautie or pulchritude conformable to our appetite, discovereth it selfe, it is not in our power at that instant, to resist amorous affection: but if this beauty be placed in too high a subiect, as in a Princess, hope of vnion and loue reciprocall, failing in vs by the light of reason, affection is not conuerted into amorous desire, but rather into speciall reuerence. By this true conclusion, we may coniecture how vainely it was spoken by our Poet;

*Although thou hast thy heart placed full high aboue,
Waile not, though die thou doost, and languish in her loue.*

For it had beene a truer sentence to haue said:

*Who placed hath his heart mounting too neare the skie,
May well lament, if he languish through want, and die.*

That loue changeth himselfe into desire of answerable affection, these amorous and valiant Gentlemen, will serue me with most certaine and infallible testimonie, who stirred vp by such a desire, to make themselves woorthy of the reciprocall loue of their affected mistresses, couet euer to performe gentle and liberall actions: and there is no doubt, but in the heart of euery noble louier, the principallest desire is, to be beloued mutually, and that he had rather be deprived of the vnion of loue reciprocall, than by vnion to lose the mutuall and interchangeable affection of his deere affe-

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sted: and this may suffice for the definition of loue. Yet wil I not forbear, to admonish these most beautifull Ladies, that they be not too presumptuous in the title of Mistresses, as though they themselues might not likewise come to bee louers: For though their hearts be built of plaister of Adamant, yet be they not so hard, but that Loue sometimes with his golden arrow may pearse them; therefore when I say, in-
amoured, I intend aswell women as men; and by a Louer, I giue to vnderstand, both the one and the other. By the same way and meane, that amorous passion, in humane harts is ingendred, as by beautie being an obiekt to the sight, and therefore is the mother thereof; so may we affirme with the authoritie of *Petrarch*, that the eies be guides vnto the path of loue: and therefore in the first *Terzetto* of his Sonnet, hee saith, there was a day when the Sunne was darkened.

Loue, me unarmed altogether found:

And ope did make the way, by eies, my heart to kill,

Which to my teares were foordes, from whence they did distill.

And in the fift Stanza of the Sonet: so weake the threed is, whereupon my yrkesome life depends:

And also with my heart, let both those lights feele smart,

Which to the path of loue did guide me, to depart:

And not onely the louers eies, as the way, but those also of her beloued doe necessarily concur, to the imprinting of this amorous passion, as affirmeth the same Poet in the Sonnet, Loue hath me set, as white vnto the shaft, saying:

Your eies this mortall blow, did towards me direct,

Gainst which prenailes no time, nor place can well protect:

And in the Sonnet:

O cruell starre, if heauens in vs haue any force,

And cruell woman, of whose eies I take remorse:

As eke the bow whereto I for a marke did rest.

That made the wound whereby, with loue I do not iest.

And in the Sonnet:

When by the eies into the heart profound,

Of humane Loue.

*A woman doth her linely image send:
Then all things else depart away full round,
And vertue, which the soule doth comprehend:
Then leaues the rest of all the members straight
Immoveable, much like a ponderous waight.*

We therefore concluding with the Poet will say, that the eyes be those that swallow downe the Idea of the beauty beloued, and transport it to the Louers heart; whereupon the minde incited by that most delectable contentment, enters into contemplation, and feeling of that influence wherewith it is moued, and by litle and little set on fire, especially when vnto this there commeth the reuerberation against them of those most glittering beames, lent forth from the eies of the beloued: so that fresh fewell added to the former fier, all these together inflame with amorous heat. And as it is not in our power (most noble Queene) to resist amorous affection, as that which in a moment altering the vitall spirites, maketh impression in our sensible facultie, so not being able without the consent of reason, to breake forth into desire, it is in our power to bridle, and induce it to a mediocritie; which if we doe not, it is no more humane loue, but made like the loue of sauage beasts, is termed bestiall. Wherefore as this disordinate loue is the nourishment of all vices, so temperate loue, is the principall originall of all vertues. Leauing therefore apart this brutish loue, which deserueth rather the name, of a luxurious and furious storme, then of true loue, we will diuide humane loue into three seuerall kindes, different one from another, in respect of the end to which they are directed.

The first and excellentest of all the rest, like vnto the diuine of-spring of that celestiall *Venus*, wherein the Seraphins immeasurably burning, do enflame with like affection all the rest of the Angelicall spirites, is called diuine loue. This was defined by *Plato* in his *Phedro*, to bee no other then a diuine furie, which reduceth to memorie the forme

Of humane Loue.

forme of true beauty, in that farre from all brutish action, in the onely contemplation of his faire and deare beloued, he resteth satisfied; who beholding beauty as the Image of Diuinitie, raiseth vp by that meanes his minde to meditate on that beauty which is perfect and celestially. This diuine louer desireth that his deere affected should be set on fire, with so holy, chaste, & immaculate a loue towards him. With such loue, not onely yong men, but olde, religious, and men married may be inamored; and it is in the highest and most perfect degree of temperance. The second kind, without contaminating chaste thoughts, reioyceth onely in beholding, discoursing, and conuersing with his beloued, as also by her to be mutually affected. This is discrepant, from that in the diuine louer, insomuch as admiring humane beauty, without lifting vp the mind to that from whence she had her beginning, hee meditateth on this beauty humane, not as the Image and representation of Diuinitie, but as if it were most true and essentiall beutie, and reioyceth in this contentment: this is called chaste loue, and is in the second degree of temperance. It seemeth kissing vnto this Loue, is permitted for a reward; in that a kisse is rather the coniunction of soule then body, for by meane of a kisse, a most pleasing passage, of the lieliest spirits being procured both from the one and others heart, the soules of louers remaine so bound together by the vndiuided knot of loue, that of two ther is made one, which compounded after this maner, gouerneth two bodies, and therefore those chasteely enamored, desire to attayne to a kisse, as being a true connexion of the soule. Wherefore the diuine Philosopher in his *Connuio*, speaking of one inamored with chaste loue saith, that kissing, the soule commeth into the lippe, from whence it flieth out, and is receiued.

The third kinde of humane loue, is that, which resolueth into desire of vnition, with the thing beautifull, not onely in minde, but also corporally, yet by lawful and honest meane; and this loue is that, which is the beginning of thice sacred Matrimony, and in this, not onely an vnion of reciprocall loue,

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loue, but also a desire of eternitie is discovered; for by meane of this lasciuious loue, a man communicating his owne proper kinde, beeing fraile, maketh himselfe eternall. Thus much *Plato* gaue to vnderstand, when he said, Loue is a desire of bringing forth that which is beautifull: although this definition hath by others beene diuersly interpreted, they supposing, that the diuine philosopher vnderstoode it by that loue, wherewith *Socrates* loued faire and goodly yong men; which resolued into a desire of generating in their gentle wittes, his noble conceits and morall vertues. There followeth (most excellent Queene) and with this I will finish my discourse, as the shadow a body, so this loue, a most cruell passion, which many times with his bitter poyson, appalleth and infesteth the happy state of the flouer: This is wicked iealousie, which is no other but a passion that assaileth and freezeth the inamoured heart by imminent danger of leeing, or to be hindered in the mutuall affection of his beloued: This taketh beginning and nourishment, from the louers vnderstanding the want of some perfection in himselfe, which in his corriuall is abundant and plentiful.

Heere Signior *Guirino* held his peace, and iudging that hee had sufficiently satisfied the commaundement of the Queene, would haue retired himselfe. When the Queene beckened vnto him, that he should sit still, and commaunded the Lady *Tarquinia Molza*, with all the other gentlewomen, that they should moue questions to Signior *Guirino* in the argument of loue, that by this gentle exercise, they might beguile the time, till the comming of his Highnesse.

This noble desire of your Maiestie, aunswered then the Lady *Tarquinia* smiling, is vnto me singular good happe, and fortune, seeing by this occasion I hope to reduce my minde to tranquillitie, which now is greatly troubled for that which Signior *Guirino* hath sayd, holding opinion, that loue is procured in vs, by a secret conformitie of nature, which the flouer hath with his beloued, and that this conformitie depen-

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death on the heauens: which being true, how shall I be free from this amorous storme, notwithstanding I now ride to my great contentment in safe porte and harbour? for howe shall I be able to auoyde, that a beautie conformable to my Nature presenting it selfe before my eies, I may not enter into this tempestuous sea of loue? I beseech you therefore by your wonted curtesie (Signior *Guirino*) explaine vnto me, whether loue commeth by election or destinie. You should (Madam *Tarquinia*) bee ouer highly conceited in your selfe, answered *Guirino*, and too cruell against loue, if as you are alwayes beloued, so you should be secure from being inamored, and that destiny could not chastice your ingratitude: that loue proceedeth from celestiaall influence, it is confirmed by *Petrarch*, and especially in the fift Stanza of his Sonnet, or sestine, which beginneth thus: *To any creature that doth harbour on the earth, saying:*

*I thinke that in the wood there feedeth no such beast
By night, nor yet by day, that is, so faire at least
As she whome I doe seeke, by shadow, and the sonne
Not weary, for my sleepe, when morning it doth come,
So though my mortall body on the earth doth moue,
Yet doth my firme desire come from the starres aboue.*

Here hee confesseth that his firme and constant loue towards *Laura*, proceeded from the starres, that is, from celestiaall influence, and in the seuenth Stanza of the Song. That my old sweete, yet wicked Lord, speaking in the person of Loue, he saith thus:

*As each one by his star, doth seeme to be ordainde,
From seruile loue of maides, I could not be detainde.*

And in the Sonnet, It may be some will thinke that in commending her: in the third Terzetto hee saith:

*Thy state diuine, by mortall tongue cannot expressed be:
Loue by election doth not drawe, but euen by destinie.*

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To absolute this doubt, and not leaue you perplexed, I say that loue is planted in the heart of man by destinie, but it taketh there no roote, but by election: This is euident by the definition of Loue: For he by a knowne beautie is incited, through the secret conformitie of nature, that the Louer hath with his affected, so that it is not in our power, whe conformable beautie discouereth it selfe to effect, that in vs amorous passion should not bee mooued, as likewise wee cannot procure, that others affections, whose subiect is the part irascible, may not exercise their force, amidst feare, and such like: but in that these affections cannot resolue into desire, as we haue said, if reason do not thereto consent, from whose agreement springeth election; it followeth that loue cannot change into desire, or take roote in mans heart, but by election, which is an action of free will, neither can it by the stars be violated, or haue hinderance, as *Petrarch* speaking of himselfe affirmeth, in the last Stanze but one of his song: Alas that I am ignorant where hope is to bee found, saying:

No planet doth mee thus condemne to waile,

When that my sight is dimde by mortall vaille;

What fault is in the starres, or things in beauty that preuaile?

The Poet coueting to infer, that though the starres encline, yet inforce they not a man, to offer himselfe as it were a pray to loue, but all proceedeth from our election. I am but slenderly comforted, aunswered the Lady *Tarquinia*, in this your conclusion, for if it bee true which both *Petrarch* and *Ariosto* affirme, that loue depriueth libertie, and that he can be brideled with no bit (election being an action of freewil,) shall haue no place in his Kingdome, and in trueth experience sheweth, that Loue manageth his Empire with violence, and where there is least hope of vni-on and Loue reciprocall, there banishing reason from

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her feate, he principally maketh triall of his force. Vnhappie *Mirrha* was inflamed with the loue of her owne father, miserable *Canace* with her brother *Macareus*, and vnbridled *Phedra* with the loue of most chaste *Hippolytus*, being overcome by amorous passion: *Pasiphae* for loue of a Bull frequented the woods, and that incontinent young man *Guido* animated, by this most cruell tyrant defiled in the Temple, that most beautifull statue of *Venus*: and who will say, that the foundations of these loues were layed in any action of reason, and not confesse, that these infortunate louers were prouoked to this disordinate loue, rather by destiny than election? To conclude therefore, that loue taketh roote in mans heart, by election, in my iudgement is no other, but to open the eyes of loue, and of a blinde boy, to make him a wakefull and vigilant olde man. My conclusion, learned Lady, (answered *Guirino*) ought to giue you so much the more consolation, by how much for the most part it falleth out to be true, and after such a manner true, as those vnaturall and sordide affections, which so greatly amaze you, are recounted but for wonderfull accidents. Vndoubtedly they were bestial inamorations, as brutish likewise all those shal be, which are rooted in humane heartes, without the action of reason: of which you are not to presume in your selfe, in whome reason vseth to commaund, and sence to obey. For vertue hauing already taken certain possession of your most beautifull minde, it will be easie for you, euer to extinguish the disordinate flames of Loue; but if destiny set before your eyes, conformable beauty, you beholding it as the representation of diuinity, and iauished with diuine loue, will presently transforme your selfe into the same diuinity.

I am contented to accept (*Signior Guirino*) of these last wordes, answered the Lady *Tarquinia*, no lesse for commendation, then consolation, neither will I vrge further: Then the Lady *Camilla Canala*, a matrone of magnificent presence and high witte, tooke occasion to propound a doubt; I would also willingly know said she, seeing loue is planted

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in humane hearts by destinie, and taketh roote by election, whether it be in the Louers power to extirpate it, for of this I greatly doubt. You haue great reason to doubt (saied *Guirino*) for by the Philosophers consent, it is much more hard to resist the appetite of desire, then of anger. And *Plato* in his *Timeo* affirmeth, that cupiditie giueth no eare to reason, but no sooner is stirred vp by sence, then that immediatly she is rauished, by these viewed representations: in which opinion *Plutarch* agreeth. Loue then beeing the principall affection of the part concupiscent, and yet notwithstanding the beauty of the beloued being to the louer represented by sence and imagination, as it hath annexed vnto it I knowe not what manner of violence, which forcibly rauisheth the soule of the louer, so is it impossible that the louer taken by that baite, should cleare himselfe, as *Petrarch* affirmeth of himselfe, saying:

The more I hope my heart will shun this cruell baite,

The more on beauties hooke to fasten, I awaite.

And in another place also, speaking of himselfe, he clearely sheweth, that it is not in the louers power to breake the amorous cord, but in that sonnet especially.

If I rauish't with fond desire, do make great haste,

To follow her that flieth away from me so fast:

And loosed from the bonds of loue, doth runne full swift,

Before my snailing pace, that scarce my foote can lift:

And calling backe my selfe into securer path,

Shee to attend me then, the lesser pleasure hath:

And vaine it is to spurre, or yet to flie away,

When I by loues desire made restine, needes must stay.

And in the other sonnet.

Oh pleasant libertie, what triall I haue had

Since thy departure, to conceine that state so bad

Wherein I haue remainde, since first I tooke the wound,

Of which there neuer could yet any cure be found:

Of humane Loue.

*These eyes did then delight so greatly in their woe,
As reasons bridle could not curbe their doing so.*

And in the second Stanze of the song, when destinie will haue it so, he saith:

*So mighty was that fond desire, which me transported hence,
That reason dead her bridle seru'd for small vse or defence.*

And in the sixt Stanze of the Sonnet:

If I do meditate in thought, she doth me straight assaile.

This sheweth euidently, that seeing loue hath possession of mans hart, it is in mans power to acquite, himself of him, saying:

My folly I perceine, and truth do plainly see,

Though daseled, cruel Loue by meanes inforceth mee:

That neuer suffereth him in honour's path to treade,

That thereinto doth thinke hee will him surely leade:

And presently euen now, into my heart doth come,

A light, yet sharpe disdain and troublesome:

Which euerie thought that was before conceald:

Doth in my forehead place, to ul men then reueald:

What mortall thing on earth should wee so dearely loue:

Like to immortall God, who hath his throne aboue?

Vnhappie he, that greatest honor doth attaine,

In this: which often reason also doth reclaime:

That drawne by senses, leaueth eftsoones the rightway.

But yet in hatred, or in hope, she doth gainsay,

Bad customes to dissolve, but forward doth aduaunce,

Painting out that, whereon mine eyes casting a glaunce:

May make me thinke her borne, my death for to procure,

Because she pleas'd her selfe, and me too much, most sure:

Ariosto concludeth the same, in the Stanze which begineth.

Now out alas, whereof iustly may I lament,

But of Desire, which hath me overstifly bent.

Where he addeth:

And who can bridie that, which neuer had no raine,

Assured that to death at length she will me traine,

Because attending greefe, augmented is my paine.

Of humane Loue.

Notwithstanding, I little regarding the authoritie of these Poets, seeing they haue but weake mindes, I holde the contrarie for trueth: and that we haue power to free our selues of amorous passion, when, or in what maner soeuer we please: and to the end most gentle Lady, together with these other Gentlewomen, you may comprehend the truth, examining the matter a little more deeply, I say, that the most excellent and great God (principally Architect, of this worldly frame) hauing with al beautie bedecked the celestiall regions with angelicall Spirits, furnishing the heauenly spheares with soules eternall, and hauing repienished this inferior part with all manner of plantes, hearbs, and liuing creatures. The diuine maiestie desirous to haue an artificer, who might consider the reason of so high a worke, admire the greatnesse, and loue the beauty thereof, in the end made man, being of al worldly creatures the most miraculous, but this diuine workman hauing before the creation of man, dispensed proportionably of his treasures to al creature, & euerie kind of liuing thing, prescribing vnto them infallible laws, as to plants nourishment, to liuing creatures sence, & to Angels vnderstanding, & doubting with what maner of life he shuld adorne this his newe heire, this diuine artificer, in the ende determined to make him vnto whom hee could not asigne any thing in proper, partaker of al that, which the others enioyed, but in particular, wherupon calling him vnto him, he sayd: *Liue O Adam*, in what life pleasest thee best, and take vnto thy self those gifts which thou esteemest most deare. From wil this so liberall a graunt (most gracious Lady) had our free his original, so that it is in our power, to live like a plant, liuing creature like a man, & lastly as an Angell: for if a man addict himself only to feeding and nourishment, hee becommeth a Plante, if to things sensuall, he is as a brute beast, if to things reasonable & ciuil, he groweth a celestial creature: but if he exalt the beautiful gift of his mind, to thinges inuisible and diuine, hee transfourmeth himselfe

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selfe into an Angel; and to conclude, becommeth the sonne of God. To affirme therefore, that wee haue not power to free our selues from loue, after he hath planted his roote in our hearts, is no other but to reiect the most high gift granted vnto vs by the chiefe creator, for our great perfection, and to say that we can liue no otherwise then creatures irrationall, which are wholly bent to sensualitie, is a matter altogether false, seeing by the act of reason, we may reduce all affections to mediocritie, and pacifie these disordinate motions of our mind: and amongst the rest, this of loue. The Lady *Camilla* was satisfied with this solution, which althogh it was commended, yet gaue it some yong men not liking thereof occasion to mutter, that the empire of loue was vtterly destroyed, and that after their so wonderfull excesse, hee should not haue authoritie, to make them so much as a safe conduct, or couer them vnder his great wings, they holding that sentence true:

That easily then all scuse we admit,

When Loue of blame, is worthie thought and fit.

But the Lady *Syluia Villa*, whose turne it was now to speak by propounding her doubt, caused silence: and her question was, whether long distance and seperation increaseth or diminisheth loue. That distance increaseth loue (answered *Guirino*) is very conformable to reason, by howe much the want is greater, by so much the more is desire augmented: The Louer therefore by reason of seperation, being more destitute of vnion, causeth his amorous desire to be the greater, or at least impaireth it not at all. As *Petrarch* affirmeth in the last *Terzetto*, when time and place before mine eyes I set, saying.

That sunne which on mine eyes alone doth shine,

With splendant beames doth scorch me often time,

Being the same at night, it was early in the morne,

Which far off doth me burne, with grieffe, and eke with scorne.

And fresh in memorie, each houre doth represent,

The knot, the time, the place of my most fond intent.

The

Of humane Loue.

Here *Petrarch* sheweth that his being in *Italy* farre from *Laura*, did not extenuate his loue, in that the beauty thereof burned so much the more ardently, and remained alwaies the more fresh in memorie, and confirmed. Notwithstanding I (most famous Lady) to resolute this doubt, make this arbitrement, that if this separation be but for short time, it doth not diminish, but rather increase loue, through the hope of sodaine returne: but if it bee for any long time or continuance, it doth not onely impaire, but vtterly extinguish loue, which is plainly manifested by this reason: for by what meane loue is procured, by the selte same it is preserved. Loue therefore hauing production in mans heart, by meane of the eyes and sight, wee may with good reason conclude, that the sight of his deare beloued, is that, which sweetely nourisheth loue: and therefore we see, that one nor other thing, louers are more ententive, then to behold their affected: whereas by great distant separation, the foode and nourishment of loue failing, of necessitie pining away through want, hee must needes bee weakened, and in the end perish. The Lady *Syluia* remained satisfied, and Madam *Camilla Costabile* peceiuing all the companie to expect hir proposition, without further delay, mooued this question: whether ielousie were a token of great loue. Whē, *Guirino* replied, it seemeth noble Lady, that ielousie is a signe of speciall loue, for we vsually say, that whoso greatly loueth, hee is not without feare, ielousie being no other but a maruailous feare, as before wee affirmed. To resolute therefore this doubt, I say that the heart of him greatly enamored, is the proper subiect of this most bitter passion, which we terme ielousie, yet doth it not so presently take impression, which is a manifest signe, that the great heat then beginneth to qualifie: and when ielousie proceedeth so far that hope remaineth dead, by the victorie feare hath obtained, then that so feruent loue, enclining by little and little towards his contrarie, is transformed into hatred and disdain. Ielousie therefore is a signe of affectionate

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loue past, & slender affectiō present. This answer pleased the Lady *Camilla*. And the Queene beckened to the Lady countesse of *Sala*, that she should moue her scruple: This most beautifull, and in all her actions and gestures a most gracious Lady, besides her other rare qualities, is so readie of vtterance, and full of ingenious conceits, that she procureth the astonishment of all them that behold, or attend her. After shee had therefore paused a while, shee spoke in this sort. You haue defined loue to be no other but a desire of vnion; if this were true, it would likewise follow, that in things beloued, after the vnion and possession of beautie, loue shuld rest extinguished: for where there is no want, there can bee no desire, and yet experience teacheth the cōtrarie, that after enioyance of the beloued, we yet in loue make further progression. My question therefore shall bee, whether after possession of beautie, loue remaineth extinguished.

This doubt (most excellent lady, is of no smal importance) answered *Guirino*) because it dissenteth frō reason, that we shuld desire the things we haue already in our power. Notwithstanding I would affirme, (alwaies excepting better iudgemēt) that loue may be maintained liuing in two wants, the one is in the wāt of simple vnion, & the other in want of vnion perpetual: after enioyance of beauty, the first want of simple vnion ceaseth, and then ariseth the want of perpetuall vnion, for when wee enioy a thing present, yet are wee by and by in want, of that which is to come, which want is of force, to maintaine liuing this desire, that wee terme Loue: and therefore in that State, loue is no other but a desire of perpetuall enioying the thing beloued. With this excellent distinction *Guirino* satisfied the Lady Countesse and all the standers by: when the Lady *Camilla Benelacqua* cast out her doubt after this manner: In the definition of Loue, you affirmed, that it sprung from the knowledge of Beautie: this in my iudgement bringeth with it some difficulty, in that we see by experience, that some contemning the

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the thing truely beautifull, grow enamoured with that, which to all others seemeth deformed and odious, therefore necessarily you must affirme, that either deformitie to another may seeme beautie, or else that not alwaies beautie, but deformity also sometimes, may be the mother of loue: cleare therefore vnto mee this doubt, that your definition remaine not vnperfect. As things materiall and corruptible, sayre Ladie, answered *Guirino*, can neuer bee so beautifull, as that in them some defect may not be discovered, so doe they neuer carrie with them such deformitie, that some steppes of beauty may not appeare, for the euill disposition of matter cannot so greatly resist the Ideall forme and reason, but that in it the excellencie of the diuine artificer will discover it selfe. They therefore, which vnto many seeme deformed, are neuer without some beautiful poynt, which beeing neuer so little, when it shall be conformable to anothers nature, in such a one will it be of such force to stirre vppe Loue, and there is no doubt but our mindes, as in the rest, so also in loue, are verie diuers, and therefore some are enamoured with a beautiful mouth, and sweete smiling countenance, others with a fayre breast, or iuory necke, some with delicate and white hands, others with the breath and comely grace, or some other hidden beautie in a woman: who no sooner baite theyr wings on this louing limetwigge, but blinde in all other deformities of their beloued, beholding onely that parte wherewith theyr minde is contented, they deeme their owne mistresse of all other most woorthie, to bee beloued and serued: and so likewise, the least blemish in any faire woman may preuaile so farre in his minde, vnto whose nature and disposition it shall bee disproportion-able and displeasing, as contemning all other perfections, hee shall iudge her vnwoorthie of any mans loue. This therefore is true, that loue proceedeth from knowne beautie, because of deformitie, hatred, and of beautie, loue is the legitimate offspring.

Of humane Love.

This answer was commended: and the Lady *Leonora Sacrat*i further replied: tell me *Signior Guirino*, if love bee the selfe same with desire, why doth your definitions, lately deliuered, call it in question, and yet *Leon* the Jew in his third dialogue of love, saith, that love is no other but a desire, which is also conformable to experience, seeing wee love because we desire, and desire because we love. *Leon* the Jew, a man questionlesse of quicke and excellent witte, answered *Guirino*, hath in this committed an error, as one that contradiceth himselfe in the first Dialogue, wherein hee distinguisheth love from desire: but to resolve your doubt, I auerre, that if we consider love as an affection, it is as different from desire, as the beginning from the middest: seeing love is that sodaine and first motion, which groweth in mans minde through apprehension of conformable beauty, which without consent of hope, disturbeth that minde, and altering the heart and desire grounded vppon hope, followeth love, it being a meane to attain to the end, which is vnion with beautie. Notwithstanding, love is taken for desire, because after the first motion it is transformed into desire, and then it is true that we love, because we desire, and desire, because we love. The L. *Leonora* replied no further: but *Madam Tarquinia Molza*: It seemeth, added shee, that this your conclusion is contrarie to the Philosopher, for he in his *Politikes* saith thus, that none can love, except he first be delighted with beautie, and he thus delighted in beautie, loveth not sodainely, but then loveth, when he desireth, the thing beloved being absent, and hath to it as great a zeale being present.

Out of these wordes wee collect, that desire preceedeth and followeth not love. Wee must obserue (learned Ladie) (answered *Guirino*) that the Philosopher speaketh not of love in this place, as it is a perturbation, and that first motion by vs before spoken of: but intendeth it by loving action, desirous to inferre, that the Lover is not brought to such a ste, before Love bee resolved into a desire of
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the thing beloued ; and this is so farre from being contrary, as that it is conformable to all our positions. The Ladie *Tarquinia* highly commended this cleere explication of *Aristotles* wordes, and vsing no further speech, the Lady *Victoria Tassona* propounded her doubt after this sort. Hitherto you haue discoursed of loue, we giuing attention, not knowing as yet, whether loue be a good or discommendable thing, when notwithstanding this most principally shuld be taught: for all our desires and actions being moued from the knowledge of good and euill, we flying alwayes known euill, and following the good: who is hee that would not auoyde loue, if he thought it wicked, or would not folowe it, esteeming it good: resoluē me therefore of this doubt, whether loue be good or wicked. *Petrarch* wittily disputeth, (answered *Guirino*) vpon this probleme, in the Song,

That my old Lord, Wicked, though sweete he seeme,

Made to appeere before the Queene on hie:

Whom of our parts diuine, men gouernesse do deeme,

Hauiug her seate aboue the lofty azurde skie.

Where hee faining to cite loue, before the tribunall of reason, accuseth him as wicked and peruerse: and loue defendeth himselfe; in the end of which conflict, reason hauiug heard, both the one and other part, leaueth the controuerisie vndecided, saying:

Suffice it; that to your complaints,

I haue attended well:

But yet more time this strife requires,

All error to repell.

Notwithstanding the reasons are not of light importāce, by which our minds should be induced to beleue, that loue is a wicked thing. First, in that it is an exceeding perturbation of our mind; and perturbations being contrary to tranquillitie, which is one of the principallest conditions of humane felicitie, being good of it selfe, and to be desired, and therefore of necelsitie al those of themselues are wicked and odious: secondly, because he depriueth vs of libertie: thirdly,

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for that further he cōtending with reason, auoydeth al good operations: As *Petrarch* affirmeth, complaining himselfe, of loue, in the third Stanza of this vnderwritten Sonnet, saying:

*These haue me made lesse for to loue my God,
Then that I ought, and lesse my selfe also,
One woman hath me scourged with this rod,
That equally, all thoughts procure me woe.*

And a little more vnderneath,
*Thus am I now dispoilde of my sweete libertie,
By my most cruell foe, whome I accuse and flie.*

And in the triumph of loue:
*Of vs I will now speake, and first of that great man,
That of our life and libertie dispoile vs can,
The same whome all the world calles Loue, as I doe learne
But bitter, as you see, and better shall discerne,
If of your quiet thoughts, he proue the soueraigne fire,
As in our hearts his thoughts do kindle burning fier.*

And further, loue is a cause, that loosing our selues, wee are transformed into another, as *Petrarch* affirmeth of himselfe in the Song by me cited.

*These two haue me transformd into the state you see,
Of me, a living man, making a Lawrell tree,
Which planted in cold ground, without leaues cannot be.*

And in the third chapter of loue:
*Of my great enemy the path I searched out,
And seeking her to finde, I was transformd throughout:
As louer to be lou'd, possessed out of doubt.*

Ariosto also supposeth, that Loue, for the most part, is a wicked thing, when he saith:

*Loue we do not therefore so wicked alwayes find,
But that sometimes he helpes, as well as hurtes the minde.*

Notwithstanding most gentle Lady, I am of a contrary opinion, and hold, that loue is a most excellent thing, and necessary to a good and happy life: but I vnderstand not this by bestiall loue: For this vndoubtedly is wicked, and that

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that which depriueth of libertie, and auoydeth all good operations, there being no greater seruitude then sin: and this peraduenture *Petrarch* vnderstoode when he said:

These haue me caused lesse to loue my God,

But speaking of other sorts of loue, all are good, and profitable to a man: and comming to the first, which for his excellencie, is called diuine loue: this is most excellent, in that being a desire of vnition, with the thing beutifull, as the true Image of Diuinitie, by meane of humane creature, it listeth vp the minde to loue beautie, and is inflamed with incredible loue towards his Creator. Neither can that loue be termed wicked, which bursteth out into desire, of generating by honest meane, the thing beautifull, in that being ioyned with a desire of eternitie, of al other, it procureth the greatest good to mākind. But what shal we say of the other kind of loue, placed in the second degree of temperance? may we peraduenture affirme it wicked, seeing farre from all brutish action, in the contemplation of beautie onely, and reciprocal affection of his deare beloued he contents himselfe? This is that perfect degree of loue, which enflameth the hearts of men to glorious enterprises. Wherefore *Petrarch* calling to minde his error, in this Sonnet vnder alleadged, when he so rashly indignified Loue, in the sixt Stanza, and also in the rest of the Sonnet he faineth himselfe by loue, taxed of ingratitude, saying:

*My mortall foe, with bitter frumps assayes,
But, woman, marke the other part, alwayes:
Which shal the truth declare with faithfull heart,
How thus ingrate, this man came to depart:
In youth he did apply, himselfe to selling
Wordes wholly vaine, and lies eke eftsoones telling:
And as it seemes, he was no whit ashamde:
Mou'd by this meane, to make me eke be blamde,
With my delight, which doth most pure remaine*

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*From his desire, which would me gladly staine:
And in sweete life, which he vexation calles
Some follies to lament, he freshly falles,
When by my help, he glorious doth remaine,
Which of himselfe, he neuer could attaine.*

*And a little afterwardes in the same Song:
Under my wings I did him so conuoy,
That Knights and Ladies in his speech tooke ioy,
And afterwards him to that fame did bring,
As that mongst ripest wittes his name did ring:
And of his wordes, conseruaes they did make,
Who in his speech so great delight did take:
Though now in court some sycophant he be,
Or with the vulgar sort in base degree.*

*And in the last Stanza sauing one, hee affirmeth that this
loue is acceptable to God and men.*

*Neuer was nightly dreame, so fond and vaine,
As that opinion, which he doth retaine
Of vs: whome now he perfectly doth know
Fauourd of God aboue, and men below:
This lofty fire, for this laments I throw.*

We will conclude therefore, that loue is a good and sweet thing: and more, whosoever findeth not himselfe inueigled with some of these louing snares, is but a sottish man, and of the common sort. It remaineth that I answer the contrarie arguments, for better vnderstanding: Bee it therefore knowne vnto you, that the perturbations and affections of the minde, are no other but sodaine and forcible motions of the concupiscent & angry faculties stirred vp by the knowledge of things delightfull or noysome, as I haue said, these being procured by Nature her selfe, who doth nothing in vaine, or which is not conformable to diuine prouidence, and therefore cannot be saide to be wicked; for that were no other than to reprehend God, and Nature her selfe, who

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gaue vnto man the vertue of the angry and concupiscent faculties : affections therefore in themselues, are rather good and necessary to the creatures and man, than wicked ; for without them, the parts indiuiduall, and kinde, could not be preserved, considering that these moue the creature to action, yet may they be wicked in a man, when resolving into desire, they obey not reason, for then they become brutish: wherefore affections touching man, may be compared to a horse, who bridled, is very good and profitable, but hurtfull without bit; because easily hee carrieth the rider away headlong, affections being greater benefite to man, then to other vnreasonable creatures : for man without affections, should be also without vertue, vertue being no other, then an habit, imprinted in our angry & concupiscent faculties, by meane of which all other affections are easily reduced to mediocritie, and therefore, as S. *Augustine* saith, to a Christian, concupiscence and anger be necessary, to stirre vpp temperance, continence, tollerance, and fortitude. And the same Saint in the fourteenth booke of the cittie of God affirmeth, that affections agree wel, with the beloued of God; saying: that the Cittizens of the holy cittie, who liue according to God, in the pilgrimage of this life, do feare, are angrie, desirous, sad, and merry: but because in these, loue hath a good ordination, in them all these perturbations are moderate and good: wherevppon that shrill Trumpet of truth said: be angrie, but sinne not: to which opinion conforming my selfe, I also saie; loue O yee gentle yong men, and be enamoured you faire, and most gracious Ladies, for loue is a good thing; but sinne not. This excellent conclusion, was with great contentment, especially of the yong gentlemen accepted and praised: but after their whisperings were somewhat ceased, the Lady Countesse *Tieni*, a woman of most lustie conceit, whose turne it was to propound, bethinking herselfe a little. At last: I would willingly know saide she, whether the beloued, be bound to reciprocation in loue, and by what reason: if we enter into consideration

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of Loues definition, which you Signior *Guirino* haue made, this seemeth an Injunction, not onely of coutesie, but also of necessitie. For that secret conformitie of nature, which is betweene the louer and the beloued, as it forceth him inamored to loue, so ought it to vrge in her affected, an answerable loue. For besides that (crediting me) things of conformable nature, should haue a conformable desire, and inclination. Yet further, if wee attribute any thing to *Dant* a Poet of great authoritie, wee will be ready to affirme that Loue is so iust a Lord, that he exempteth none beloued from louing, but with his mighty power, and burning firebrands he enflameth the hearts of all them beloued, with loue mutuall towards their louers. Notwithstanding how may wee credite this, beholding the teares and hot sighes of these inamored yong Gentlemen, who shew manifest tokens of the crueltie of their ingratefull Mistresses? Putte mee therefore out of this doubt. *Ariosto* and *Petrarch* were of contrary opinion to *Dant*, answered *Guirino*, who in diuers places affirme, that Loue doth not force and binde the beloued to affect; but on the contrary, seldome are the desires of her beloued, correspondent to those of her louer: and therefore *Ariosto* complaining himselfe, saith:

*Wherefore doth Loue vniust, so seldome frame our will,
To answer him with loue, with loue whom we do kill,
Perfidious wretch, from whence doth it proceede,
That thou with discordance, two seuerall hearts dost feede?*

And a little after:

*Why dost thou laugh and ioy, feede, and maintaine thy life:
Precuring from the eyes, fountaines of teares by strife.*

And *Petrarch* maketh the subiect, of one parte of his Sonnets and Songs, sometimes of the crueltie and ingratitude of his *Laura*, otherwhiles of the treachery of loue, and especially in the Sonnet,

There was a day when sunne obscured darker

Saying

Of humane Loue.

Saying in the last Terzetto:

*Loue me (alas) unarmed, altogether found,
And ope did make the way, by eies, my heart to kill,
When I transfix'd by his greenous mortall wound,
Made of my eies wet foordes, from whence teares did distill
Yet as I thinke by that, he little honour gaind,
Wounding me in such state, wherein I was detain'd,
You armed, not his bowe, once to beholde constrain'd.*

And in the Sonnet by me cited, he sayth, speaking of loue:

*This cruell boy markt well of whom I now complaine,
That untill then my garments onely did remaine,
Hit with his dart: he therefore in his wily snare
A mightie Dame did catch, when she was vnaware,
With whom I neuer could, or euer can preuaile,
By force, wit, penitence, but with these three do faile.*

And in the third Stanza of the Sonnet which beginneth:

In time when heauens are furiously encline,

Hee saith:

*Ah cruell Lone, that dost me thus enforce,
Of this wilde beast, causer of my remorse,
The voyce to follow, pace, and eke the path,
When she unbound, doth flie farre from thy wrath.*

For absolution therefore of this doubt, I say that the natural conformitie which is betweene the louer and beloued, is a conformitie betweene the obiekt and forcible power, for the beloued with her beautie, concurrerh as obiekt, and there is but seldome conformitie betweene the one and others power: And therefore it may easily fall out, that the beautie of the affected may bee apte and conformable, to moue the minde of the Louer, when in very deepe

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the beautie of the Louer, shall not haue the like conformitie in the minde of the beloued, or be preualent to kindle in her amorous passion. For this cause the Poets fained, that Loue had two sorts of darts, that is some gilded, and others of lead, and that those gilded had power to enflame, & those of lead to congeale & freeze: as also that he pearced louers with his golden shafts, when the beloued, were for the most part stricken with the leaden ones, and therefore *Petrarch* willing to cleare himselfe, sweareth saying:

*If I may saie so much, Loue with his golden dart
Chargeth on me, when those of lead, fall to her part.*

Notwithstanding she beloued, is bound by election, perceiuing the loiall and faithfull seruice of her seruant, to retourne the like mutuall affection, which not doing, she falleth into the errour of ingratitude, in that shee beloued receiueth secret honour and commendation, by this affection of hir louer, she shewing in that most notable perfection, & such, as that it vrgeth him to be enamored, to loue and serue her, and so much the more she must holde herself bound, if she perceiue herselfe beloued with one of those kindes of loue before rehearsed: for if shee obserue her selfe affected with this brutish and fordide loue, she is no waies bound to answerable affection, neither for this shal she be deemed ingrate, but rather in hating such a louer, she deserueth praise and commendation. The Lady Countesse replied no further: And Madam *Camilla Mosti* propounded her doubt, which was, whether it were better to loue or bee beloued. That to loue is better (answered *Guirino*) may be affirmed by the Philosophers authoritie, for to loue is action, and with some contentment, being good, but from the beloued there proceedeth no action: and moreoner it is better to knowe then be knowne, and the Louer knoweth, but shee affected as hauing loue made to her, may bee deprived of knowledge, and therefore thinges without life may be be-
loued

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loued, but neuer loue: finally, the louer in louing, exerciseth the work of charitie, which doth not the beloued: And therefore the Philosopher affirmeth, that to delight in louing rather than to be beloued, is a more commendable thing, and a signe of greater excellencie in good custome and fashion. On the other side, it seemeth, that to bee beloued is greater perfection; for to loue, being the same as to desire, proueth want of perfection in the louer, wherein the beloued doth abound: and further, by how much the final cause is more perfect thā the efficiēt, so much doth the beloued exceed in perfection the louer, in that she affected concurreth as the louing and desired end, and the louer is procured to loue, in fauour of her affected, or to receiue from her some perfection. Now clearing this doubt, I say, that this word to loue, may be interpreted in two senses; one is, to desire vnition with the thing beloued, to the ende to obtaine perfection from it; the other, in desiring to giue vnto the thing beloued some perfection. In the first sense, as riches is better than pouertie, so is it better to be beloued than affected.

And in this manner are the kindes of humane loue sette downe by me; for the louer seeketh vnion with the beloued, to obtaine perfection from her beautie, whereof hee hath want. After this sort likewise dooth the creature loue his Creator, seeking vnition with him, for to participate of his perfection. In the second sence, it is a thing much more excellent to loue, than bee beloued: for in the louer wee suppose plenty, and in the beloued penury. With this loue God loueth the creature, and desireth to vnite it with his diuine Maiestie, to reach vnto it full perfection. With this loue the Prince loueth his subiects, and the greater his inferior, to giue and not receiue perfection.

Out of this wee haue spoken, you (most honourable Lady) shall gather this singular conclusion, that all loues haue their originall from aboundaunce or defect, as the diuine Philosopher affirmeth in his *Conuuiuius*, and in his booke

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called *Lyside*, faining that *Pore*, which signifieth riches, is the father, and *Penia*, which importeth pouertie, is the mother of loue. For loue springeth either from the penurie of the Louer, or wealth of the beloued, or from want in the beloued, and superaboundance in the Louer. The Lady *Camilla* commended the answer, and all the other Gentlewomen, wishing within themselves, to be rather rich affected, then poore inamored. The Lady *Lucretia Machiauella* propounded this excellent question: whether is more feruent, the loue of a man towards a woman, or of a woman towards a man?

Most gentle Lady answered *Guirino*, the reasons are not of small moment, by which wee may conclude, that women exceede in loue, whereof the first is perfection, which women receiue from vnition with man, as by the Philosopher it is confirmed, where hee entreateth of vniuersall beginnings of things naturall: who desirous to shew the great desire, the first matter hath of vnition with forme, sayth, that shee desireth forme, as the female desireth the male: and this is in no other respect, but because matter requireth perfection from forme, as doth the female from the male. Woman therefore attayning perfection from man, and not man from woman, so amorous desire in her is more eminent then that in man. But further, if wee shall but consider the proper subiect and abode of loue, wee shall finde that it is in soft and delicate hearts, the which continually are nourished with sweete and pleasing cogitations, as diuine *Petrarch* heere testifieth, speaking of loues originall, when he sayth:

*From idle mind, and wantonnesse humane
He springes: nourisht with thoughts, though sweet, yet vaine,
And of vaine folke, doth Lord and God remaine.*

Women therefore beeing naturally soft, delicate, and v-
sually

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usually idle, being nourished with sweete and pleasant cogitations: and on the contrarie, men beeing sterne, and for the most part, entangled in serious meditations, wee may conclude, that loue taking greater nourishment in the heart of a woman, becommeth also more preualent and vigorous. Although I, notwithstanding these reasons, do hold the contrarie for trueth, and that amorous passion is much more vehement in man then in woman: and I am moued thereto by this most probable supposition, that the more preualent cause, bringeth forth the more forcible effect. The beautie then of woman beeing farre more excellent then that of man, as Signior *Patritio* yester day shewed: and beauty being the cause which produceth loue, it will follow, that the beautie of a woman shall bring forth in mans heart amorous affection: much more ardently, then shall the beautie of a man, in the heart of a woman: and therefore reason willeth, that the name of beloued be attributed to the woman, and the name of Louer to man, being proper to a woman (and reward of her beautie) to be beloued and serued of man, mans property consisting in louing and seruing her, as his naturall mistresse. That this is true, experience teacheth, for a woman seldome pricked forward with amorous affection, is moued to loue a man, or if shee loueth, shee doth it but to auoyde the vice of ingratitude, knowing her selfe to bee beloued, and faythfully serued.

It is no maruaile then, if in the heart of a Woman, this fire beeing alwayes so slenderly kindled, it is in possibilitie by euerie blast of disdaine, to bee extinguished, and that shee is so apt to change, will, and minde. Answering therefore, vnto the contrary reasons, and first to the authoritie of the Philosopher, I say it is true, that the first matter desireth forme as the female the male. For as the female, which in this respect representeth Nature, desireth the male, not for her owne perfection, because shee
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is most perfect, but for the conseruation of her proper kinde, and for generall perfection, so matter desireth not forme for her perfection, because she in her owne essence is perfect inough: neither being matter, hath it neede of forme, but she desireth the vnion of forme, for generall perfection, to the end this composition might be made. To the other reason I answered, that the heart of women is farre more soft and delicate then is mans, and shee is idle, nourished with sweete and pleasant cogitations, but I denie these to be the principall harbourers of amorous passions, although indeede they bee easie and pliant subiects of compassion. For the tender and gentle heart of a woman not being able to endure the feruent sighes, teares, and lamentations of her faythfull Louer, is procured to satisfie him with mutuall affection, by compassion rather subdued, then amorous passion.

I doubt Signior *Guirino*, replied the Lady *Machianella*, that you haue rather procured your selfe diminution, then attribution of our fauour, your demerite deseruing the one so much more aboue the bond wherein we are tyed to render the other, as the meanest blame you haue imputed vnto vs, exceedeth the vncertain commendation mixed therewithal: and truly this is a new kind of reprehension, when vnder praise lieth hidden deprauation: but who knoweth not that vnder commendation of our beauty, you haue priuily expressed the rebuke of tyranny? and by shewing how we become louers by election, you haue made vs as it were altogether rebellious to loue. But which is worse, you haue described vs for flitting & inconstant, which blame vndoubtedly doth so far exceede the prayse of compassion, as the vice of infidelitie surmounteth the natural vertue of pietie: & al is vntrue: for wee are not tyrannous, nor rebellious fro loue, but leuing, more constant and faithfull then men. You Ladie, answered *Guirino*, haue interpreted my wordes in sinister sence, for the commendation is true and properly belonging to you, and the blame is vncertaine, and
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not by your fault. I confesse, that vnder the name of your beauty I haue expressed tyranny, conforming my selfe with *Socrates*, who was wont to say (speaking of humane beautie) that she was a tyrant that raigned but a smal time. This most wise Philosopher, desirous to inferre, that beauty in the manner of a tyrant, doth violently deuoure and drawe vnto her selfe all those mindes, which may comprehend her, exercising ouer them all, tyrannicall empire. Therefore you can not auoyde, but being faire, you must also be tyrants, neither can this be ascribed vnto you for discommendation, seeing it is a particular priuilege granted vnto you from God and nature, to the end, that by meane of loue, you might by authoritie by vs men, be loved and serued. This secret and naturall vice of tyranny which is in you, haue I yet after such a sort tempered with pietie, that it shoulde not seeme greuous vnto you, to bee called Tyrants by nature, and gracious Queenes by election; neither haue I made you altogether rebellious to loue, though I haue attributed vnto you rather the name of beloued than louing, hauing also shewed that it is greater perfection to be beloued, than loue: and notwithstanding it is true that you are ready to change your will and minde, this is in you rather a vertue than vice, being a manifest signe, that amorous affection can not preuaile so farre with you, but iust disdain may much more, neyther doe you make your selues so seruile, but that still you reserue your princely authoritie, which neither can nor will support the least contempt: and your selfe (Ladie) giueth heere of ample testimony, who not for any offence, but vpon suspition, that amongst diuers praises of women, I had sowed some little seede of blame, al angry on a sodain, haue changed your minde and opinion towards me, declaring me, not onely vnworthy of your owne fauour, but also of the gracious respect of al these ladies: Notwithstanding confident in my innocencie, and in their iust and mercifull authoritie, I liue in hope, that more than euer heere tofore they will grace me with their fauour.

Of humane Love.

This playster (answered the Lady *Machianella*) will not a whit mollifie the impostume of my iust wrath: for I affirme it is false, that wee women are tyrants or rebellious to Loue, beeing certaine, that in louing we are more faithfull and constant then men, which you also would confesse, if you were not of a malignant minde: seeing fidelitie and constancie themselves bee of the Feminine, and not of the Masculine gender. Al the standers by, smiled at this replication, and the Lady *Victoria Bentinoglia*, whose beauty the Graces themselves accompany, said,

You Signior *Guirino*, haue heere by the authoritie of *Petrarch* confirmed, that the lover transformeth himselfe into the beloued, of which I am verie doubtfull, as not being able to imagine, what manner of transformation this should bee, neither will I bee so foolish to beleene that *Petrarch* after the manner of *Daphne*, transformed himselfe into *Laura*. I am desirous therefore, that you would verifie vnto mee your saying, manifesting vnto mee, howe it may bee that the lover should bee transformed into the beloued. When *Guirino* answered: your desire is noble (most gentle Ladie) wherein to satisfie you, it is necessarie that I discover some secrets, which to the Philosophers are onely knowne. You shall therefore vnderstande, that we cannot perceiue before the instrument of sence, bee first made like to the thing perceiued. Which similitude notwithstanding, is neither reall nor materiall, but wee call it Spiritall and immateriall: as for example, I cannot perceiue or see your faire and gracious forme, if first mine eyes (the sensible instrument of sight) doe not so draw it into it selfe, as that it becommeth like to the same.

Notwithstanding, you (faire Lady) beholding in mine eyes, may see your goodly shape, as in a most cleare glasse: For betweene the glasse and the eye there is no further difference, but that the glasse is an eie without life, and the
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eye is a liuing glasse. Nowe this your beautifull Image, is transported, by meane of the most subtile vitall spirites, and imprinted in the inward organe, that is, the intrinsecate part of the braine, which also becommeth like vnto her, and from thence receiued into my soule, my soule her selfe taketh of you the whole similitude, so that we may say, that while I see and behold you present, my soule wholly transfused into you, is no other but the true pourtraiture of your selfe.

This which by prooffe is verified in exterior sense, is also as true in sense interior, which is that vertue of the sensitiue facultie, called fantasie, or imagination, which is of force to contemplate and perceiue objectes, although they be absent, by those imaginations which remaine imprinted in the interior organ or member: whensoever therefore our soule imagineth any thing, she becommeth like vnto it, and further, spirittally transformeth herselfe into the thing imagined: the same that happeneth to sense, falleth out likewise to vnderstanding, vnderstanding beeing in a manner altogether like to sense: for while the vnderstanding conceiueth and beholdeth any thing, it is transformed into it, and becommeth the same: and therefore happie are those, who employ the beautifull gift of the minde, to contemplate diuine and high things; for in that state, they become diuinitie it selfe. By this which I haue expounded vnto you (most honorable Lady) you may easily comprehend the transformation of the louer into the beloued. For it is not a reall, but a spirittall transformation: For the true louer bearing always the representation of the beloued imprinted in his soule, and neuer ayning his thoughtes, but towards his beloued object, in that state hee cometh to bee transformed into it. Whereuppon the diuine Philosopher in his *Communis*, describing the force of Loue, saith, that Loue, with such a strong knotte knitteth louers together, that of twoo hee maketh one alone, willing to inferre, that those, who absolutely giue themselves ouer

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in prey to amorous passions, are after such a sorte ententive on their louing cogitations, as it may be affirmed, that the soule disioyned from the body, liueth in the beloued: & therefore no meruaile, though the bodies of Louers depriued of vitall vigor, do consume and languish: The which heere *Petrarch* auerteth of himselfe, in these *Terzetti* of this Sonnet: At euery pace I turne my selfe about, saying:

Sometimes amidst my mournings sad and dull,

A doubt ariseth how these members can

Liue, so remote from spirite, wonderfull:

But answered Loue, remembrest not thou, man,

That this is priuiledg'd to Louers art,

From other qualities humane, apart.

With this answer the Ladies and Knights remained very well satisfied, who expected with great desire to vnderstand. this meruailous Metamorphosis. And his Mistress *Lucretia Calcagnina*, a Matron, adorned with all gentle fashion, made her doubt in this sorte. It happeneth oftentimes, that after a long and colde conuersation betwixt man and woman, in the ende either one with the other, or both of them are enflamed with loue reciprocall, the which as it is true, so bringeth it that into doubt by you spoken, that the Louer is presently enamoured, as conformable beautie discovereth it selfe vnto him: for I would reason thus: either that the beautie so often contemplated, is to the Louer conformable, or not, if it be conformable, wherefore doth it not in a moment cause loue? but if there be no such conformity, how can it procure this after long time? cleare mee this doubt. When *Guirino*: Two manner of waies grarious Lady, may your doubt be resolved. First I alleadge, that in diuers respects, how long soeuer their conuersation be, it may happen, that to the Louer those beauties may be concealed which were more apt to enamour him, seeing a fine foote, a beautifull leg, a faire arme, a quicke and lively gate, or other excellencies of the body hitherto couered, & sudainly or by chance perceined, may kindle amorous flames: I will also

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also affirme, that not onely the singularities of body, but those of the minde also, may procure loue: and because these do not so sodainely discover themselves, to the eye of the soule, which is the reasonable part, and that by little and little, with long obseruation seeth and beholdeth, therefore not so sodainely, but after long conuersation, they enflame the louer, so soone as he knoweth them, and after he is enflamed, with that which before with his bodily eyes he sawe, and was not therewith contented, then with delight he reioyceth and is glad: for as the beauty of the body is of force to conceale from the louer the defects of the minde, and to make them appeare lesse waightie, so the perfections of the minde, after they haue with sweete and honest contentment fastned on the louer, are of vigor to transforme the deformities of the bodie beloued, and make it to the louer seeme beautifull, or at least, not brutish.

This aunswer was taken for sufficient, when the Ladie Countesse of *Sala*, I would willingly know sayd she, whether a louer at one time may loue two mistresses: and this my question ariseth, in hauing seene diuers times by experience, that they are seldome louers, who are content with one loue alone. No seruant (most honourable Lady (answered *Guirino*) can serue two Masters, neither can one Louer at the same instant, serue more then one mistris, which by many reasons is manifest: And first because the beauty of two subiects is either equall, or else we discover the difference of more or lesse: If they be equall, neither of the one nor of the other can he become louing: for finally, loue being no other but desire, and desire of it selfe being vndetermined, it is necessary, that placed between two objects, it should be determined by the better, or the worse, by the more beautifull, or more deformed, otherwise it would be alwaies immoueable: and therefore *Iohn Barcone* a Philosopher, and most learned diuine, was wont to say, that if the horse were in a way equally distant from two barly fieldes of like goodnesse, he

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should be in danger to die for hunger, for his appetite would not be moued more to the one then to the other corne. Hee therefore, who were in the presence of two women, equally faire, not being able to bend his desire, mooued through knowledge of sence, more to the one then the other, should rest immouable, and consequently, would loue neither the one, nor the other: but if there were a difference of more & lesse, desire inclining it selfe, would bee enflamed with the more beautifull, and the other should take no place: but further, if the Louer transformeth himselfe into the beloved, as before wee saide, not being able to transforme himselfe into two, but into one subiect only, so shall he bee able to loue but one subiect alone: to conclude, as that which hath taken place within, is an impediment to the other, but exterior, which would surprise him: so that object which shall haue taken the possession of the louers heart, will forbid any other that attempteth to pearce thereinto: the which *Petrarch* sheweth in diuers places, to be true in him selfe, and principally in the Sonnet:

A thousand times sweet warlike mistress mine.

Speaking of his heart, now possessed by his *Laura*, saith:

And if in him some other mistress hope,

In vaine it is: when minde hath no such scope.

And in the sonnet:

Shaming sometimes, although she holde her peace:

Saith:

Calling to minde the day, when first I did thee see:

For neuer will there one, to me so pleasing bee.

And in the sonnet:

Full of that sweet, unspeakable delight:

Hee saith:

This custome hath so crept into my minde,

Her to beholde, whom I so glorious finde:

That any other, if I chance to see,

This custome makes her odious seeme to mee.

And

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And in the sonnet:

Seeing that for my hire, this way is mee debarde:

He saith:

And to one Image I addicted was,

Which Zeuxis did not make nor Phydias,

Nor yet Praxiteles who caru'd so well,

But one for art that did them all excell.

Touching experience of those louers, which are not contented with one loue alone, it is altogether false, because they are no true Louers but treacherous rebels to loue, as those, who caried away with a furious storme of lust, fancy rather beaftiall, then humane loue. The answer pleased the Lady Countesse, and all the other Gentlewomen. But Madam *Sylvia Villa*, a yong damozel of most beautifull and gentill prefence, seeing you conclude, saide shee, that a Louer cannot loue two Mistresses, shew mee also if one beloued of two seuerall friends, to auoide ingratitude, ought to content both Louers with intercourse of affection? From the former conclusion answered *Guirino*, proceedeth the absolution of this present doubt. For the beloued, not being able to performe correspondencie in loue, except she also become enamored, and it beeing in the Louers power to affect but one subiect, shee can loue and fauour but one alone; for doing otherwise, shee shall not only, not auoyde the vice of ingratitude, but defrauding the first louer, of his part in that whole, which is his in all reason, shalbe most vnthankfull. The Lady *Sylvia* comended this answer, when Madam *Anne Strozza*, a Matron, whose fauor is accompanied, with modest affabilitie, propounded after this manner: Men inamored amongst many wordes, which they viter, intermixed with teares and sighs, they are wont to their beloued, with oath to affirm, that they affect them aboue themselves: on which wordes, hauing many times mused, I euer found my selfe in greater doubt the before, neither can I be resolved whether

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it may be true, that the Louers affection towards his Mistress, is greater, then to his owne self. Tell me therefore *Signior Guirino* your opinion. It is requisite answered *Guirino*: before I resolue you, that you most noble Lady be aduertised, that doubt hath no place in the loue, whereof wee haue entreated, which is a desire of vnion, and supposeth indigence of the thing beloued, for with this loue towards our selues we cannot be affected, notwithstanding the fable of *Narcissus*, first because vnion presupposeth two at the least, secondly because of our selues wee can haue no want. Therefore your demaund hath place in that loue, which we terme good will, which is no other, but a desire of giuing, or seeing perfection in some subiect; touching which wee haue to consider, that all loues haue originall from the affection towards our selues, the which is such, and so great, that all things created contend euer to worke in fauour of themselves, and hee that should further say, that the creator fashioned the world for no other cause, but to please himselfe, should not speak much amisse, which being true as it is, how vaine are the wordes of flattering louers, when they affirme that they loue their mistresses better then themselves: But because there is no lie so great, as in it there may not appeare some shadow of truth, it may so happen, that the louer desireth some sort of humane good more in his mistresse, then in himselfe, as riches, honour, and such like, and in this sence it may bee true, that he could wish better to his beloued, then to himselfe. But he desireth such good to please himselfe, it cannot therefore be sayd, that he loueth his mistresse better then himselfe. But wee see by experience replied Lady *Anne*, that some louers deprived of the hope of their beloued, haue also suffered the priuation of life, and wee reade that the faithfull wife of *Ametus*, refused not to offer her selfe to voluntarie death for the loue of her husband: which is a manifest signe, that the louer may affect his beloued aboue himselfe. And if we may credit *Petrarch*, it may bee sayde, that the louer may not onely loue his mistresse

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stresse aboue him selfe, but hating him selfe, may plant all his affection in her : as hee affirmeth of him selfe in the sonnet,

I finde no peace : saying :

My selfe I hate, and loue an other best.

Be assured (noble Lady) answered *Guirino*, that violent killers of them selues, do that for no other end, but in a loue to their own persons, and to please them selues, being of opinion, that death shuld be to the as an ease, of some insupportible griefe: and the wife of *Ametus* (supposing the fable to be true) without doubt perfourmed that louing offer, in fauour of her selfe, either as desirous of glorie, or to auoide the sorrowe which by the death of her husband, she thought in her selfe insupportable : neither want there examples of men most studious of glorie, who to acquire immortall fame vnto them selues, haue embraced voluntarie death as we reade of *Curtius*, of the *Decij*, of *Attilius Regulus*, and other noble Romaines, whose attempts out of doubt were vndertaken, more for their own contentment, then for loue of their coutrie. So that I thinke there is not so simple a woman, which beleeueth such vaine wordes, produced by Louers for their owne contentment, and by such like dissimulations, to obtaine reciprocall affection, from their affected. This opinion of *Guirino* was by the gentlewomen approued true, not without some secret heart-burning of the gentlemen enamored: and neuer a gentlewoman remaining to propound any more questions, the Queene spoke after this sorte : Although doubt is htle best in princely Maiestie, being a manifest signe of ignorance, the which of all other defects in Princes is most reprochfull, overcome notwithstanding with a naturall desire of vnderstanding, I desire it may bee lawful for me, *Signior Guirino* to demand of you, if in the Lover not beloued, loue can long time indure. To doubt saide *Guirino*, most renowned Queene ; proceedeth rather from equalitie of contrarie reason, then from ignorance : & to be circumspectly doubtfull, may rather bee ascribed to abundance, then want of knowledge : Your highnes there-

L

fore

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fore in doubting, hath not only, not offended royall Maie-
 stie, but by moving a most excellent question, hath giuen
 triall of your noble conceit, and by fauouring me, exercised
 your high and magnificent curtesie. Therefore before I an-
 swer your Maiestie, I will declare the fable recited by most
 singular *Themistius*, in his sixt oration. The goddesse *Themis*,
 saith he, being before *Venus*, who had brought forth *Cupide*,
 hauing highly commended the beauty of that winged child,
 added: sincere loue may well be borne, but that he should
 grow by himselfe alone, vnderstand O *Venus*, it can no wayes
 be: Therefore if you desire that this your deare sonne, may
 encrease to his proportionable greatnesse, beget and bring
 forth another like to him, for such will the nature of these
 two brothers bee, that in beholding one another, both of
 them will grow alike, and looke how much shal diminish in
 one, no lesse will there impaire in the other. *Venus* perlwad-
 ded by this most wise goddesse, produced *Anterota Cupides*
 lawfull brother. By this fable wee may easily comprehend,
 that loue alone cannot endure in the louers heart, and for
 his maintainance and reduction, to his due stature, it is ne-
 cessary, he beholde, and sport with his brother *Anterota*.
 Yet, Signior *Guirino*, experience teacheth the contrarie, an-
 swered the Queene: for euery day, we see diuers enamored,
 without hauing the least signe of interchaungeable affecti-
 on, obstinate altogether in amorous enterprife, & peraduen-
 ture confident in the saying of *Dant* before repeated:

By loue, beloued, eake, from loue, are not exempt.

And *Petrarch* himselfe, though his *Lauretta* were froward
 and ingrate vnto him, notwithstanding as an obstinate Lo-
 uer, burst forth into these verses.

Yet line I still in hope, remembering this alwayes,

That moistned drops, at length, though with some long delaies,

In tract of time do pearce, the free, and marble stone.

And heart so hard none is, which will not straight way mone,

Mou'd

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*Mon'd with unfained teares, and loues vncessant flame,
Nor will so freezing colde, which heates not by the same.*

There be two sortes of Louers not beloued againe, answered *Guirino*, the one finding alwaies in his Mistris, a pride correspondent to her beautie, without receiuing at any time the least signe of loue, but euer discovering in her countenance, a duskish cloude of disdaine; he most unhappily loueth. In the heart of such a Louer (most renowned *Queene*) affection cannot continue, but giuing place to wrath, anger, and disdaine, flying away, it departeth, being vnpossible, that it alone should wrestle long with reason, accompanied by these other most forcible affections. The other sorte, seeing the brow of their deare beloued, sometimes faire, and sometimes cloudie, the Louer doubtfull within himselfe, & feeding vppon a sweet aire of hope, affecting, seruing, and entreating, maintaineth himselfe long time. Such a Louer was *Petrarch*, as he describeth himselfe in the verses recited to your highnes, and in other songs and sonnets, but especially in the sonnet:

*I finde no peace: saying:
Prisoner I am, to such an one,
as neither opes nor shuts:
Nor holdes me fast, nor yet the snare,
with loues requitall cuts.*

Guirinos answere was of the *Queene* accepted, and by the standers by approoued for good, it seeming to all impossible, that where hope cannot bee settled, loue should there make any long residence: and with this ending the discourse of loue, the *Queene* commanded that they would practise some pleasant conceits of diuination and fortune-telling, as amongst women they vse to do: and while they were intenued on this pastime, the Duke, and Lady Duchesse, priuily entring into the pallace, they suddely caused to be put into the chamber, where this noble cōpany were assembled a Doe, takē quicke in the nets, which hopping here & there,

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leapt vppon the Gentlewomen. Whereuppon verie fearefull of this terrible creature, each one without tarrying for another, ranne all out into the great Hall, whome the excellent Duchesse meeting, with the other beautifull Huntresses, in a sodain their feare was turned into laughter: and after a while, the huntsmen arriuing with a mightie winde of hornes, and crie of dogges, his highnesse commanded, that the chase should be brought into the hall, which being doone, there were many boares layed out, whereof some were so great, that the women durst not beholde them. The rest of the day was spent in discoursing vppon such accidents as fell out in their Game, the gentlewomen taking no lesse contentment to heare of that, then did the Hunters in recounting their owne exploits, in encountering and killing these terrible beastes. Euening beeing come, his highnesse caused a most pleasant Comedie to bee recited by the *Gelosi*. These bee certaine Coemedians, who requested euerie yeare by his highnesse, are wont to come in the end of Autumne, and hee taketh them along to the sea side, as also the whole Carneuale or Shrouetide, to their great gaine, and contentment of all the Citie, they employ themselves in Commicall representations, and are verie apte in imitating all manner of persons and actions humane, but especially those, which are fittest to procure laughter, in which poynte they are so prompt and excellent, that they would make *Heracitus* himselfe to laugh. The Comedie ended, they practised certaine pastimes, and beeing late, his highnesse rose vp, and each one departed to their severall lodgings. The day following was passed ouer by his highnesse in another pleasant and delightfome chase, in which they killed Harts, and wilde Goats, with other beastes, to the singular contentation of the Ladies and Gentlewomen which were present. At the selfe same time, the vsuall companie beeing retired into the accustomed roome, the Ladie *Camilla Costabili*, was by chance, drawen Queene, a Matrone
of

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of stately presence, and adorned with most gentle customs, who not to lette slippe the accustomed wont of entertaining the time, and iudging that the entreatie of honor, would be delightfome and profitable to euery noble spirite, in that honour many times is badly obserued, by not knowing the nature therof, therefore she commanded Signior *Gualengno* a gentleman, not onely most skilfull in handling his weapon, but also learned, and very iudicial in thinges appertaining to honor and combate, who desirous to please the Queene, without other replie began in this maner.

L 3

The





The third daies discourse:

*Wherein is contained a discussion
of Honour,*



Most notable and eminent subiect,
doth our Queene this day propound
to be entreated of, which is Honor, it
being with humane life in such sort
connexed, that there is not any
condition or qualitie of men, to
whō the knowledge of honor is not
commodious: but aboue all others,
it is so necessarie in a man noble and ciuill, as without it, be-
ing ouershadowed, as it were with the obscure darkenesse
of ignorance, for the most part, in steede of honour, hee im-
braceth infamie. This is that ardent heate which enfla-
meth the minde of man, to glorious enterprises making
him audacious against enemies, and to vices timorous. And
therefore *Plato* in his *Phedro*, compareth the minde of a man
to a Chariot, whereof reason is the coach man, the affecti-
ons of the mind the horses, & desire of honor the whip: The
diuine Philosopher minding to inferre, that reason without
honourable desire, and feare without reproch, are not able to
bridle the most fierce passion, of the angry and concupiscent
faculties, and to direct man to vertue. I will therefore ende-
uour my selfe, most famous Queene, to discourse of Honor,
seeing your highnesse so commaundeth me, although to my
self I am not ignorāt, that so high & excellent a subiect, very
farre

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farre exceedeth the power of my wit, hoping these valorous knights, most faithfull subiects to Honour, will be readie to supply my defects. Honour (excellent Queene) being aboue measure desired by mā, it is a thing manifest, that in the nūber of humane goods, some be appertaining to the body, as beautie, health, strength, agilitie; and some to the minde, as vnderstanding, wisedome, knowledge, prudence, and arte, as also other goods there be externall belonging to fortune. Amidst these therefore, Honour, out of doubt, cannot bee numbred amongst those goods, that appertaine to the bodie or mind, but rather is accounted amongst them, in our felues not resident; as are likewise riches, principalitie, power, friendes, a faire and modest wife, children, nobility, and such like. Vniuersally therefore wee will affirme, that honour is the most precious of all goods externall. But because this word Honor signifieth not one alone, but two honors of diuers nature in themselves, not being able to assigne such a definition, as wherein both may bee comprehended. I will diuide them; and one (as a new forger of these words) I will tearme naturall and imperfect; the other acquired honour, and perfect. By not concerning that honors are of two kinds, & diuers of themselves, & not one, al they which hitherto haue entreated of Honour, haue fallen into most manifest errors: and amongst other, the learned Bishop of *Caserta*, (prouided, if it bee true, that the booke of Honour, set forth vnder the name of *Possennino*, were by him made, as of himselte he affirmeth) is led into a most notable errour; For he in the same booke hauing defined honour, & wrong interpreted the sence of *Aristotle*, in his book of Rhetorike, after a long discourse, vpon the same, he groundeth his combat; not obseruing, that combat is wholly contrarie to the nature of that honor by him discuffed and defined. At this time therefore, I not swaruing frō the order of nature, which is to go from the imperfect to the perfect, wil first intreat of honor naturall, and conclude in honor acquired: which is one of the principall circumstances of humane felicity. I say therefore

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fore that honor naturall, is a common opinion, that he honored, hath neuer failed in iustice, nor valor. I term it honor natural, because man bringeth it from his mothers wombe, and preserveth it vnspotted, except through some greivous offence or suspition, he loose this good opinion. This was defined by *Fausta Longiano* in his Combate, to bee no other than an incorruptible state of Nature, as though to possesse this honor, it were sufficient to maintaine our selues, such as wee were borne. This is that honour (most excellent Queene) whereof there is so great fame, and wherein there is not any one, which professeth not himselfe to haue his part, as surely hee hath, though in no other respect, at least yet in his mouth, in that hee will neyther say nor doe any thing wythout the licence of honour, or except honour permit. This is that which giueth occasion euery day, of bralles, hatred, and rancours: and vppon which was grounded, in times past, wicked combate. I affirmed it to be an opinion, and not a science or knowledge: For science is grounded on trueth and necessity: Opinion vpon probability and accident, For we may well haue an opinion, that one is an honest man, but wee cannot affirme it, wythout vnderstanding so much, because externally he may be good, and in secret, wicked.

This opinion which is termed honour, is grounded vpon a secret supposition, that man is good, if there appeare nothing to the contrary; and notwythstanding this hath in it difficulty; especially for that which the Philosopher sayth, in the second of his Ethickes, that vertues and vices in a man, are neither naturall, nor against nature, and that good and wicked habite, not by nature, but by custom is acquired: notwythstanding by that which hee addeth in his sixt Booke, it seemeth this supposition may be graunted, because he affirmeth that man is borne with a certaine vertue, by meane of which, he seemeth apt to iustice, fortitude, and temperance, seeing in a man, by vertue of his mind, there are naturally some principall notes, by which we may worthily

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thily presume, that hee is rather good, then wicked: and I haue set downe these two parcels, that haue not failed in iustice nor valor, differing from other defects, for that God onely being immaculate and without fault, it is necessarie that man, accompanied with some imperfection, must offend, notwithstanding those sinnes are tollerable, which sometimes through humane fragilitie wee cannot but commit, and therefore the Philosopher in the seconde of his Ethikes sayth, that he cannot be termed vicious and wicked, which a little swarueth from comelinesse and honestie, minding to infer, that those sinnes, although they giue testimonie after a certaine manner, that wee haue not performed vertuous habite, yet are they not sufficient to make him loose his honour, but rather those, which are committed against iustice and fortitude. And that euerie one may the better vnderstand how honour is preserved and lost, I haue not thought it much from the purpose to declare, what it is to faile in Iustice; and what in Honour. To faile in Iustice therefore, is no other but to performe the things, which by good lawes are forbidden, and seuerely punished, to iniurie another against reason, and by sinister meanes, rashly to commit manslaughter, murther, theft, rapines, treasons, adulteries, and sinne against nature, to be an heretike, conceiuing sinisterly of God and diuine things, to practise vsury, and to bee addicted vnto vnlawfull gaine: to bee a false witnesse, to the preiudice of the goods, life, or honor of another: finally, he is sayd to haue failed in Iustice, who hath extremely offended against any vertue: seeing that of Iustice vniuersally all things depende. To want valour is no other, but basely to carrie our selues in daungers, as that should bee, to abandon the colours, or battaile, by flying away, or else to leaue our friend and companion in daunger, not to hazard our liues for defence of religion, and of holy Christian Church, for his prince, for his countrie, for father, wife, children, and such like: as also hee manifesteth vilitie, who easily swalloweth in-

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iurie, without by his owne proper valour, shewing himselfe
 therewith mooued. And let this by mee spoken, suffice, to
 make knowne the nature of this honour: the which truely
 may be termed imperfect Honour, in comparison of that by
 proper valour acquired. This Honour principally is inci-
 dent to beneficence (vnderstanding this word not onely for
 bountie or liberality, as many times wee doe, but as beeing
 deriued of the Latine words *bene* and *facio*, to doo well or
 good) it being the most excellent of all other vertuous ac-
 tions. And it is by the Philosopher, two manner of wayes
 defined, in the first booke of his Rhetorike, saying: Honor
 is a signe of beneficent opinion: and in the fourth of the E-
 thikes, Honour is the reward of vertue: the first definition
 hath respect rather to the honourer, then to the honoured,
 because it is a signe of opinion which the honourer hath,
 of the beneficent inclination of him honoured. The se-
 cond rather concerneth him honoured, then the honourer,
 in that it is a rewarde of vertue, which in him honoured is
 founde. Going about therefore to describe the Nature of
 this Honour, called by me Honour acquired, I will affirme,
 accepting both the one & the other of these definitions, that
 acquired honour is no other, then a reward, manifesting an
 action of beneficence, there being no action so famous, nor
 that maketh man more like to god, then to be beneficial, the
 which the ancients plainly shew, who esteemed their great
 benefactors worthy to be put into the number of the gods,
 consecrating vnto them temples, dedicating altares, erecting
 Statues, offering sacrifices, and such like honours, neither
 was *Iupiter* called by the Latines, the cheefe of the Gods for
 any other occasion, but because administering all things, he
 is the head Benefactour, as for the like reason by the
 Græcians hee was called Ζεύς as it were *Zon*, which is as
 much to say as life, being he that giueth and preserueth
 life in al things of the world. But because this rewarde,
 which manifesteth action of beneficence, may be giue more
 waies then one, the Philosopher in the first of his Rhetorike
 diuideth

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diuideth this honour into diuers parts, which notwithstanding I comprehend vnder these two heades: considering that of honour, some be permanent, and others not. Permanent we call those, which after wee haue giuen them, remaine to the perpetuall honour of him honoured, as Statues, Images, Temples, Altars, Sepulchers, Crownes, publike stipendes, hymnes and such like which cause, not only men to bee honoured, but also make them glorious, and are neuer attributed but to gods, and to men heroycall, who haue perfourmed great and publike benefices.

Honours not permanent, we terme them, which after their performing, remaine not in action: and these by the Philosopher, are called, barbarous customes, and by vs much frequented, as to giue the place, to bow, to kisse the hand, the hemme of the vesture, the knee, the foote, putting off the hat, and such like: and these honours are not only done to them, who haue bin beneficiall, but also to those, who either for their riches or vertue, are of power to benefite. Out of the definitions by me set downe, as also from that, we haue hitherto discoursed, it may easily be discerned, how different one honour, is from another; in that natural honour, may rather be saide to bee, a former disposition of true honour, that by valor is acquired, then honour absolute, and perfect: and therefore it hath the selfe same proportion, to true honour, as the facultie vegetatiue, hath with the sensatiue: for as vegetation may from sence bee separte, and is of it selfe apt to bring forth, one sorte of living creatures, as bee plants and fruites; so this honour may stand, nay and for the most part is from the other separte; and yet be sufficient of it selfe to forme, an vnperfect sorte, of men honoured, considering all those, who are iudged, not to haue failed in Iustice and valor, are called honourable: And as in the living creature, the vertue vegetall, is first in nature and operation before the sensatiue, being as it were a former disposition vnto sence, so this honour, preceedeth euer, honor

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perfect, being vnto it a former disposition. And as the sensitive facultie without the vegetative can not stand, so can there not be honour acquired, where there is not honor naturall, conceiuing that he which is reputed a wicked man, is of any honor vnworthy. But moreouer, its a thing manifest, that this honor whereof euery one maketh profession, is without labor acquired, in that man bringeth it from his mothers womb; but true honor is obtained, by excellent endeavour and industrie, and by the selfsame means is preserved. Of honour naturall, it being grounded vppon contingent, as wel the bad as good may thereof be partakers. Of honor acquired, it being a manifest signe, and reward of vertue & her operations, only the man vertuous and excellent, is thereof possessor. Naturall honor consisteth not in any exterior act, because in this the honorer performeth not, and the honoured receiueh nothing: but perfect & true honor is knowne by exterior action; by reason in this the honorer, by rewarding, giueth some signe thereof, as also the honoured, by receiuing it: moreouer, honor naturally hath his contrary positive, which is infamy: and, honor acquired, his contrary priuative. And, to the end your Maiestie may vnderstand these philosophical termes, you shalbe aduertised, that contraries positive, be those, which haue both their reall being in the nature of things; but of contraries priuative, the one hath his reall being, and the other hath no existence at all, as for example sake: heat and cold, are contraries positive, because in that subiect which is not hote, there is alwayes found colde; and where no colde is, heat hath there his reall being. Light and darkenesse be contraries priuative, because light one'y hath his reall being, but darknes hath nothing in existence, as that which is no other, but the bare essence of light. Therefore honor naturall hath positive contrary; for where hee is not, there is reall infamy: but honor, which is the reward of beneficence, hath his priuative; for where he appeareth not, yet infamy doth nor there take place, or dishonor, but only his priuation or absence. For one that hath neuer a statue erected

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rected to him, nor crowne giuen him, publike gifts, or magistracie, to whom no preeminence is giuen, or cappe moued, neither is by any such like obseruations honored, shal not, for all this remayne infamous or dishonored, nor in question of honor can not be excepted against, but we will say, that he is only deprived of that honor which is the reward of beneficence, this being a part of humane felicitie. This is as much as I can or am able to deliuer (renowmed Queene) vpon this subiect of honor, wherein, if I haue bin deficient, let these other honorable Knights pleade for me.

Stay a little Signior *Gualinguo*, answered the Queene, for ther is a skirmish prepared against you, wherein it shal greatly help you, to be a good and well trained souldier. Then she commanded all those gentlemen, who were there present, that they would moue doubts, & contradict *Gualinguo*, in the argument of honor, after the same methode, as the Gentlewomen had done in the discussion of loue; and the Gentlemen beholding one an other with silence, as they who sitting round about, knew not from whome the beginning was expected, the Queene smiling vppon the illustrious Lord *Don Cesare d'Este*, (who vnderstanding of the excellent discourses that passed in the chamber of the Countesse, withdrawing himselfe closely from the chace, was come in all haste with the Lord Marquesse, to finde out the company) made a signe vnto him, that he should mooue his doubt; and his most honorable Signiory, in whom, in his greene yeeres, a most bright beame of heroicall vertue doth shine, gratioufly obeying the commaundement of the Queene, beganne in this maner.

You (O Knights) if I doe carry well in minde, haue grounded this opinion, which is termed Honour, vppon a secret supposition, that a man, if there appeare nothing to the contrary, is good. Which supposition I holde to bee very doubtfull: yea and further, that some notable signe of vertue not appearing, hee may bee coniectured rather a wicked than good man: considering that humane nature

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of it selfe, enclineth rather to vice than vertue. Which by this may be imagined, because the way of vertue is asprous, hard, and laborious; so that as a thing myraculous, men point at him who arriueth to the end, and becommeth perfectly vertuous: and on the contrary, the way that conducteth to vice, is so easie, plaine, and pleasant, as the number of them is infinite which walke by it, and become vitious; this being a manifest signe, that naturally we are not enclined to vertue, but to vice: because things difficult, and that seldome happen, are farre from the condition of nature. Experience furthermore sheweth, that wee rather encline to vice than vertue, in that there is none of vs (for what preuaileth it to lie) which in himselfe hath not triall, with howe great violence he is drawne to vice, and howe hardly hee abstaineth from sensible contentments, how troublesome continence is vnto him, and patience bitter. Which being (as it is) true, so shall your supposition be false: for as all things hauing no impediment, do rather worke according to their inclination, than against their nature, so must we presume not knowing any other, that man for the most part, is rather wicked, than good: the which is confirmed, by the answer of *Pythagoras*, who being demaunded, what was most true, made answer, that men are wicked. The supposition therefore being false, so shall the opinion of an others valour, and iustice be vntrue; for the foundation failing, the building falleth downe; Notwithstanding I attend your answer. The reasons of your renowned Segniory, answered *Gualenguo*, introduced against my supposition and opinion, are so preuaient, as I may wel say the conclusion pleaseth me not a whit; for I know not well how to answer the argument: and certainly our naturall fragilitie is such, as that it neuer ceaseth to make triall of occasion while it be brought in subiection vnto vice, neyther could diuine *Paul* effect, although he were diuinely illumined, but that he was driuen to say, I perceiue in my members, and flesh, an other lawe, repugnant to the lawe of my minde, which subdueth mee to the lawe of sin: Yet,

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Yet, notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that my supposition is true, as also that man in his naturall estate, is inclined to vertue, and not to vice, being good and not wicked: the which I hope with so liuely reasons to make manifest, as every one shall bee out of doubt. I say therefore, that all things comprehended in this vniuersall frame, hauing their originall from God, as God is chiefe bountie and goodnes, so are all these partakers of this bountie, and therefore al are good in the first instant of nature. To affirme therefore, that man is wicked by nature, is no other but to auerre, that amongst all the creatures of the whole worlde, the sensible image of the insensible God (for so is man) is wicked: a matter repugnant to trueth, and the authoritie, as wel of holy diuines, as philosophers, who are of opinion, that in this inferior world, amongst all liuing creatures, only man may be vertuous and happy; and as fire should not be light, if of his nature he did incline to the centre, so a man should neyther be vertuous nor good, if naturally hee were inclined to vice. Furthermore, if Nature, the ministresse of God, dooth not onely generate, but guideth al things generated to their end, and therefore heavy things descend, and those light ascend, as also beasts and liuing creatures, so soone as they are generate, by nature herselfe, they are directed to their end & perfection: how can it be, that man should only rest by her abandoned; and which is worse, not onely abandoned and contemned, but further instigated, to his ruine and imperfection. Man by the beautiful gift of the mind is true man, who as he is diuine, so will wee affirme with the Poet, that;

Like to his Maker he, doth heauenly state retaine.

And therefore hee desireth that onely which is best and diuine, neyther can hee, knowing the true and principall good, with euill: by which reason the diuine Philosopher beeing mooued, subscribed to the opinion of the Stoickes, affirming in all his conclusions, that man is by nature good, and against nature wicked, and that hee as

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all other things is inclined to this end which is best : and the Philosopher sayth , that man is neuer wicked, but when he is affected against Nature, which commeth to passe, when in himselfe hee hath not ciuill gouernment, and that which should obey, commaundeth : which is sence, ouer reason. If wee shall also further consider, that man naturally is thirsting after knowledge, as the Philosopher affirmeth in the Proemium of his diuine Philosophie, wee may easily iudge, that to vertue and not vice, hee is naturally disposed : for of vice there can be no science, it being nothing in existence, but otherwise a meere priuation, as affirmeth great *Dionysius* in the booke of Diuine Titles, and likewise the *Academikes*, and *Peripatetickes*. If we therefore (most famous Lord) haue respect to the Creator of man, hee is his owne Image, if to the gift of Nature, he is most apt, if to the end of euery thing created, man amongst mortall creatures is onely capable of cheefe good, hauing onely the vse of reason; and good consultation to him alone is proper : wherefore notwithstanding the reasons by your Segniory alleadged to the contrarie, wee must conclude, that naturally he is enclined to vertue, and not to vice: and that it is to be presumed, that he is good, and not wicked. To which reasons, I being to make answer, we must consider, that in man three natures are comprehended, one common to al liuing creatures, which is vegetable : another common to creatures and man, and that is sence : the third common to man and things Diuine, and this is reasonable Nature. By the first, man is like to plants, by the second, to other liuing creatures, by the thrid, he commeth to be true man, and a diuine creature, and therefore man by participation, is in the midst betwixt mortall and diuine: for in respect of body and sence, he partaketh of mortalitie, but touching his mind he is diuine and immortal : as in man these three natures are discovered, so finde we in him likewise, three natural inclinations; one called properly naturall, and dependeth on the vn-satiabable knowledge of vniuersall nature, which mooueth
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all things depriued of knowledge, to those operations, that may conduct them to their proper ends; and therefore this is not subiect to the internall vnderstanding of man, that is, to sence, and the mind, because she gouerneth, augmenteth, nourisheth, mooueth the pulses, the spirits, the hearts: and performeth such other like offices, without the consent of reason and wil: the second is called liuing Inclination, which is deriued from the knowledge of sence, and in a man is naturally subiect to reason: the third is reasonable Inclination, and taketh his originall from the knowledge of the minde: this in true man, naturally commaundeth ouer the inclination of sence.

These foundations beeing firme and reall, I gather two conclusions: the first, that man in the incorruptible state of his owne nature, is alwaies enclined to vertue, abhorring vice, following honest contentment, and auoydeth that dishonest: the second is this, that man, as he is a creature conioyned with matter and sence, enclineth naturally to sensible contentments, and to vice accidentally: the first conclusion is cleare, by that which I haue before spoken. For man, produced from God, cannot bee but like to his beginning, & conceiuing by his proper nature, that honest good is the true and chiefest good, which consisteth in vertuous action, it is not possible that naturally he should will his contrarie. The seconde is manifest by this: for anie man, how wicked soeuer, neuer doth euill in fauour of vice, but of contentment: the theefe therefore steales not to bee a theefe, but to possesse and enioy that whereof hee hath want, and the adulterer committeth not adulterie, to be accounted an adulterer, but this hee doth in fauour of lust, and venereous contentment, the which contentment if hee could attaine vnto without vice, it would be much more acceptable and pleasing vnto him: for if a man should take contentment in vice, and not in vertue, true man should not taste in himselfe, the incredible contentation of vertuous action; which questionlesse is such, as maketh him blessed

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and happie. Neither should the miserable man bee so afflicted by his owne conscience, the which without any other helpe, bringeth vnto him most grieuous punishment. Man therefore runneth into vice accidentally, that is, by how much the more the vice is conioyned with excesse of pleasure or griefe. That vice is contrarie to the naturall inclination of man, it may by this reason bee prooued, because before the vice of intemperance, proceedeth that same semy-vice of incontinence, which is no other but a precedent battaile, that externall maketh with internall Man, bestiall with reasonable Nature: and except reason be made drunke, and subdued by sence, man falleth not into vice. This battaile out of question, should haue no place, if a man were naturally inclined to vice, for where there is naturall inclination, there can neither be fight nor resistance: and if any should obiekt, that by the semi-vertue of continence, which preceedeth temperance, the contrarie may bee concluded: I answer, that in this there is speciall difference, because the incontinent after vitious action, repenteth himselfe, and is daunted in minde, but the man continent after vertuous action, is merrie, and comforted: the one is tossed with troublesome thoughts: the other reposeth himselfe with all quiet and tranquillitie, no otherwise then doth the earth, when after great violence, in the end shee vniteth her selfe to the Center, whether shee enclineth.

But moreouer, man more then of any other outwarde good, is desirous of honor, prayse, & glorie, he shunneth and abhorreth more then any other euill, dishonour, and infamie: acquiring therefore vnto himselfe, honour and prayse, by meane of vertue, but infamie and dishonour, by meane of vice: it is necessary, that man naturally shuld bend to vertue, and contemne vice: for it would be inconuenient to loue the effect, and hate the cause. But notwithstanding all this, it cannot bee denied, but the number of vitious, is infinite: and contrariwise of vertuous, the number to be so small,

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small, that good *Diogenes* seeking with a light in the day time amongst a multitude, could not find one: this proceeding from no other, but because the way vnto vice is easie, and that vnto vertue hard and difficult. Of which, if we be desirous to search out the reason, wee must discover a little further, and consider what maner of thing vertue is, as what is vice, and howe it may be sayde, that both the one and other habite is acquired. I say then, that vertue is no other, but an habite, imprinted in the sensible facultie by true and direct reason: by meane of which, that facultie easily yeelding to reason, reduceth all his affections to mediocritie, and is conuersant either about pleasure or griefe: and vice is an habite imprinted in sence, by peruerse reason, by whose meanes, declining from right and direct reason, it easily bursteth forth into heighth, & excesse of pleasure and griefe.

Although man (as I haue shewed) bee naturally inclined to vertue, yet is he neither vertuous nor vitious by Nature, as wee haue said, but acquireth both the one and the other habite, by custome that is with frequent, and like reiterated actions. Furthermore, we must obserue, that man is neither capable of vice nor vertue, before he be a perfect creature & perfect man: vnto which perfection hee arriueth in the beginning of the fifteenth yeare of his age, for then hee is a perfect creature, beeing able to generate another like himselfe, and is perfect man, hauing the true vse of reason: but while that time, he liueth rather the life of euerie living creature, then of man, performing no one action with prelection, but ouer-guided with pleasure or anger, and therefore as in that state, he cannot be either vitious or vertuous, so hee is not then woorthie of punishment, rewarde, praise, or reproach. Man therefore living first an irrational, before a reasonable life, and aiming all his operations, to the contentment of sence, this by little and little, procurereth in him a former disposition to vice, and contrary to vertue, so that wee may say with the Poet:

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*From whence it sure proceedes, that nature quite doth swarue,
From proper course, the lawes of custome to objarue.*

Whereupon, being necessarie for introducing vertuous habite, to take away first wicked impressiō, and tame sence by little and little, which after the manner of an vntamed and euill customed Colt, neuer ceasing to spurne against reason: therefore the way of vertue is hard and vneasie, whereas contrariwise, that of vice is pleasing and readie. This other difficulty also offereth it selfe, that vertue is in the meane, and vice is that which mooueth it selfe from mediocritie: one way onely directeth to vertue, but those that conduct to vice, are infinite, which is plainly shewed by the example of the Archer, for hee can hitte the white but one way only, but to misse it, there be waies infinite. Finally, from the small number of vertues, wee may assigne this reason: for as to exercise and performe a vitious habite, few things suffice, so to acquire and practise verue, there bee many instruments, and circumstances necessarie. And first, liberall birth, and good temperature of the bodie, is not of small importance: for vnderstanding not beeing able to worke, except stirred vppe by sence, as also sence cannot performe his dutie, if the members and body bee not well disposed, as good temperance aideth the senses, so doth it helpe vnderstanding: and from hence commeth it, that one man more then another, as the Philosopher affirmeth, seemeth borne to temperaunce, iustice, and fortitude: further then this, discipline and good education are so necessarie, that without these it is impossible, or at least verie hard, that a man should become vertuous: For in Children and boyes, the right vse of reason wanting, (being the Chariot of vertues) and they ever being by folly surprised, it is requisite, that the right reason of fathers and mothers, should be that which should supply their defects, and by little and little inure them vnto vertue. The Philosopher vnderstanding well of how speciall importāce it was to a wel instituted commonwealth, liberally to beget
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and bring vp children well, hee concludeth the Treatise of his Politiks in procreation, and good education of children, teaching all those meanes and rules, which are necessary, for to dispose and assweat them vnto vertue: And *Lycurgus* the Spartane, amongst other his laws, made this one most wholesome and good, that to all actions of boyes, their Maisters should be assistant, who had an eye, that euen in their pastimes children should not commit any vniust acte; holding this for a firme conclusion, that of wicked children sprung vitious young men; and of youth vitious, men impious, as also of flagitious men, olde ribawdes: and to this conclusion consenteth the diuine philosopher, in the sixt of his common-wealth; and *Aristotle* in the first of his Politickes, and sixt of his Moralles, they affirming that a man euill brought vp, prooueth worse than any wilde beast. Riches also is of great moment, to the acquiring and practising of vertue, for as it is harde without wealth to apply our selues to liberall Artes, so is it likewise difficult where pouertie is, that there should be good education, and consequently, vertue. For worldly want, is the mother of Arts moechanicall, & wealth of Artes liberall, and of noble and vertuous actions. It being therefore necessary, that these three things should concur together, to the attaining of vertue, that is, temperance, good education, and riches, it being difficult in one man, to find these three vnited, of necessitie (most famous Lorde) the vertuous must be few, & vitious many in number. Wherefore then, replied *Don Cesar*, may we not suppose, that man is rather in the number of many wicked, than of a few good, especially beeing so hard and difficult to prooue good and vertuous.

Because every thing, if it be not hindered, continually worketh, rather according to the inclination of his speciall forme, than generall, answered *Gualenguo*, and reasonable nature, beeing the speciall forme of man, by which from other creatures hee is different, and irrationall condition, his forme generall, wee must suppose, not knowing to the

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contrarie, that hee worketh rather according to reason, then beaſtiall, for notwithstanding the contrarie, many times happeneth, this is not by the proper nature of man, but becauſe matter and ſence make reſiſtance. Therefore of beeing more men vicious then vertuous, the ſame reaſon may bee aſſigned, which Signior *Patritio* the other day alleadged, from the greater number of deformed, then beautifull: For as in forming corporall beautie, matter reſiſting Ideall reaſon, procureth, that Nature, oftentimes, againſt her intention, giueth deformitie, ſo in framing vertue which is the proper beautie of the minde, matter making reſiſtance to Ideal humane reaſon, is a cauſe, that ſhee againſt her intention many times, runneth into vice, being the true deformitie of the minde.

The moſt noble Lord! *Don Caſar*, without any further motion, ſhewed himſelfe herewith to bee ſatiſfied. And Signior *Cauallier Bernieri* who ſate hard by him, doubted after this manner: If the priuate ſuppoſition of another mans valor and bountie, were true, this inconuenience would enſue, that an insolent fellow, whoſe flagitions were concealed, might bee an honourable man, and yet (if the Philoſopher in his *Ethickes*, be worthie of credit) honor agreeth not but with an honeſt man. Whenſoeuer a man (anſwered *Gualinguo*) committeth a malificence, ſuddenly of himſelfe he falleth into the pena'tie of infamie. Yet doth he delaie his puniſhment, ſo much the longer, by how much the ſlower he is in reuealing his offence. A wicked man therefore, though of himſelfe he bee vnworthy, may yet bee honourable, becauſe hee looſeth not that inward ſuppoſition of his being good, except hee make it euident and manifeſt, that he hath failed in Juſtice, or valor: And this is no greater inconuenience, then is that, when a theefe by the law is not puniſhed, his offence beeing concealed.

Touching the authority of the Philoſopher, it is true that the honeſt man is only worthy of honor, yet this is no hindrance

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drance but that one flagitious may be therof na vnworthy possessor. Put the case, replied the Knight, that one had committed a flagition, or performed some villanie, of which, only one or two had notice; shall this man therefore bee infamous? Cleaving to our foundations layde, sayde *Gualenguo* this man shall be dishonorable, and infamous, may not with all men, but onelie with those, who shall be acquainted with this malefact. This woulde bee a marvellous inconuenience, objected *Bernieri*, because it woulde followe, that in one instant time, the same man shoulde bee honourable, and infamous. It woulde bee inconuenient, answered *Gualenguo*, whenas at the selte-same time, and for the like respect, he were honourable and infamous, but being in diuers considerations, it is not onely, no inconuenience, but moreouer necessary, because they to whome the offence is knowne, loose the good opinion they had of him; and they thereof ignorant, reserue it inuiolate, while hee maketh manifestation thereof. And this is one of the principallest imperfections, that this our honour hath annexed vnto it, in that an vnworthie man may easily bee partaker of it, which to perfect honour is not incident. *Bernieri* replied no further, and the noble Signior *Aldarano* Marquesse of *Carara*, a Lord adorned with most noble customes, and of good Letters, very studious, propounded his doubt, the which was, Whether that an honest man might bee infamous.

When *Gualenguo*: There is no doubt (noble Lorde) but an honest man, eyther through false calumniation, or vppon presumption of maleficence, may loose the good opinion, the worlde hadde of him; which hauing lost, he falleth into infamy. But this is a great inconuenience, replied the Marquesse, that he who neuer failed in iustice, nor valor, may be infamous.

The nature of this honor, is subiect to these & such like inconueniences, answered *Gualenguo*, yet is it a thing very difficult, that an honest man shuld lose his honor, as also it is not

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a thing so easie, that a man wicked should auoyd infamie, for time in the end discouereth truth. Notwithstanding sometimes it may happē, that an honest man, may enter into a bad fame, yet must he endeuer in all his actions, not only to be blamelesse, but also free from all suspition of offence, hauing alwayes his eyes open, that hee giue no occasion of scandale, or presumption to the worlde to iudge euil; for the enuious and malignant take occasion of euery probabilitie, to staine the honor of an honest man.

The Marquesse was satisfied with this answer, and the Count of *Scandiano*, a most valorous Knight: Mee thinkes sayd he, that you, sir Knight, haue very vniustly placed the adulterer in the number of men dishonored, because custome is contrary; seeing that men, are not onely, not ashamed to commit adultery, but as of an enterprise honourable, they haue no sooner performed it, as that therof they vawnt, and make great boast: neyther is it intended, that any one should euer be refused, in comparison of honour; for being an adulterer, notwithstanding that of these, the number be infinite. I am desirous therefore, that you would giue me to vnderstand, how it may be, that an adulterer should be infamous. A man, answered the Knight, committeth adultery in two sortes, in one, when he being bound, falsifieth the oth of matrimony, frequenting with a loose woman. And in this, although he be worthy of some blame, yet looseth he not his honour, because he iniurieth none but his owne wife: in the other, when married or vnbound, he vseth the company of a woman married. And this man remaineth dishonoured, because he sinneth extreamely against the vertue of Temperance, and faileth in iustice, hee beeing a greuous iniurier or destroyer of an other mans honour, the which (as I haue saide) of all other goods externall, is the most pretious: and therefore deseruedly by the lawes, is there imposed on adultery a greater penalty, than on theft, because the adulterer endamnsieth in honor, and theft but in goodes. And although men, through euill custome, are not ashamed to be esteemed

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seemed for adulterers, yet is this no obstacle, but that they are worthy of infamy: or that in combat they may not be excepted against, when by men honest, it shall be objected vnto them, as well as theeves. Seeing a man, replied the Count, looseth not his honour, but when hee conuerseth with a married woman, I would willingly vnderstand, if the like happeneth to a woman, which is, that she shall not forgo her honor, but when she ioyneth with one married: for in my iudgement, a womans condition, in this should not be worse than a mans. A woman, sayde *Gualenguo*, as in many other things, so in this, is of harder condition than a man: first, in that if she be married, with her owne, shee also staineth the honour of her husband: secondarily, for that she being (as the Philosopher affirmeth) by reason subiect to man, committeth the greater iniury; considering that the iniurie is greater, of an inferiour towards his superior, than of a superior towards an inferior: thirdly, because shee may bring into her house other mens children, dispossessing the proper childrē of her husband, of his goods: fourthly, for that a woman, offendeth extreamely against her owne proper and principall vertue, which is honestie. A woman therefore cannot after this maner, accompany with others than her husband, reseruing still her honour, but thus dooing, shee incurreth infamie. *Scandiano* seemed to bee well resolved.

When Counte *Guido Calcagnino*, moued this question. You saide, that he, who flying, abandoneth his colors, forgoeth his honor: I further desire to know, Whether a valiant souldier, seeing all others forsake the colors, may with honor flie, and remoue himselfe from daunger: or ought, for maintenance of his honour, to remaine dead by his auntient or colours. And *Gualenguo*: according to the lawe of *Lycurgus*, and of the valiant Spartanes, the souldier should bee bound rather to die than abandon his ensigne for any accident whatsoever; and therefore the seuer and rigorous mother was wont to deliver vnto her sonne, that went to battell, his shield with these words, *Eyther with this, or in this*: giuing him to vnderstand
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thereby, that either he should returne victorious, or remaine dead: I am notwithstanding of opinion, that when an honorable man hath performed his duty in fighting, and yet for all this, seeth all the other souldiours betake themselves to flight, and knoweth himselfe not able to resist the force of the enemies; such an one retiring himselfe into safety, looseth not his honor, but rather, they that first fled remaine dishonored. If one, replied *Calcagnino*, should abandon his friend or companion, in danger, esteeming himselfe not sufficient to defend him, by reason of inequalitye in number, should he in this case loose his honor? If his friend, answered *Gualenguo*, with armes in hand turned himselfe to defence, and he on the contrary made away, there is no question but he should loose his honour, neyther would the excuse of inequalitye help him a whit, for the valiant man is not daunted in sodaine daunger, but the slaue and villaine. I would not haue thought, added the Count, that a man had beene tyed to do more than hee can, but that rather, he had bin rash and heady, which esteemeth too much of his owne force, as one should be, who to saue his frind, did fight against ten men seuerall. And *Gualinguo*: he that without any other necessitie should make choise to fight at one instant against ten, should certainly be rather presumptuous than valiant; but an honorable man beeing in company with his friend, ought not to forsake him, though he sawe himselfe incountred by ten seuerall swords, but must rather feare the losse of honor, than of his life. By the selfesame reason, replied *Calcagnino*, whosoever were in battel, he ought to stand, though all the rest fled.

The case is much different, sayd *Gualinguo*, because he in the field withdrawing himselfe from danger, and other men flying, doth not abandon, but is abandoned; whereas contrariwise, one that leaueth his friend in daunger, is he that forsaketh, and is not left, or abandoned: wherefore he commeth to faile in valour, and manifesting, that hee esteemeth more his life, than his honor, hee remaineth infamous. *Calcagnino* held his peace, and Count *Palla Strozza* a most valiant souldier,

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dier, doubted after this maner: You haue placed him amongest men dishonourable, who with his proper valour, makes no shew of being touched with an iniurie: Put the case one were iustly iniured, should he, to auoyde the losse of honor, manifest himselfe therewith prouoked? Out of doubt hee ought, answered *Gualinguo*, and if he knowing himselfe to be in the wrong, replied *Strozzi*, should offend him iniurying, failed he not in iustice, and so consequently, should hee not loose his honor, this honour being principally grounded vpon the opinion of the world? *Gualenguo* returned: A man, how good or wicked soeuer hee bee, must respect none other thing, but to preserue this opinion, if hee desire to be an honorable man: For honour perisheth not before this opinion be lost; and opinion cannot be lost before some defect be manifest and made knowne: the iniured therefore, notwithstanding he knoweth himselfe to be iustly offended, must labour that the worlde haue no notice of it; and this hee shall do, by reuenging the iniurie in proper valor: for by not failing in volour, his defect in iustice shall be concealed: but on the contrary, if he shall beare the iniury, not to commit an vniust fact, the world wil iudge, that hauing wanted valour, he also failed in iustice: and that therefore he is woorthy of iniurie and contempt.

By this your conclusion, added *Strozzi*, a great inconuenience would follow: that one to auoide the losse of honor, ought to maintaine an vniust quarrell, a thing not approued by any of these, who haue intreated of honor and combat; they holding it for sure, that to fight hauing the wrong on our side, is no other but to prouoke the iust iudgement God, in that by many experiences it is wel known, that they who haue maintained the wrong, haue either beene slaine, or vanquished by their enemy, although he in force were inferior vnto them: wherevpon they affirme, that he which acknowledgeth his offence & requireth pardon, is lesse dishonorable then he, that moued by a diabolical spirit, obstinately seeketh to couer it within the listes. All they answered

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Gualinguo, which hether to haue written of honor and combat, are fallen into manifest errors, by not hauing entirely knowen, the nature of this honour: for maintenance whereof, there is euery day braules, and wherevppon combat is grounded: for then amongst other things, they would not haue saide, that an honorable man ought not to maintaine an vniust quarell, for preservation of his honor: and notwithstanding what they said, is conformable to a Christian, who neuer ought to enter into an action, which offendeth God: yet for al this, it is not conuenient for them, who value the honor of the worlde: for such like men desiring to be honored, must indeuour by right and wrong, not to lose that opinion, and supposition wherewith they are borne, but questionlesse this is as oftentimes lost, as a man manifesteth to the world, that he hath failed in iustice or valor. And how can it be, further vrged *Strozza*, that an honest man going against his own conscience, should maintaine an vniust quarell? An honest man, saide *Gualinguo*, can neuer maintaine an vniust quarell, for reason will euer with him be at hand, but an honorable man may well fight being in wrong, to auoide the losse of honor. Then an honest man, & an honorable man, be not all one, added *Strozzi*: and *Gualinguo*: By the foundations I laide, it may bee cleare vnto you, that an honest man, and an honorable, bee not the selfe same things: and in this they haue beene deceived, that write in the argument of honor and combat: for it may bee, that an honorable man, shall not likewise be honest; as also that one may be a man honest, and not honorable, as wee haue sufficiently declared. What intend you by a man honorable? saide *Strozzi*: By a man of honor, answered *Gualinguo*, I meane all those whatsoever they bee, good or wicked, who haue not lost the good opinion that the worlde conceiued of them.

Therefore I conclude, that an honorable man, is tyed in right or wrong by his own proper valor, to repell an iniury, and also to maintaine an vniust quarell, lest he remaine dishonored.

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honored. *Strozzi* saide no more. And although this position, at the first appearance, seemed to all the standers by, a paradox, yet was it by the greater part of the Gentlemen approoued for most true. When Count *Hercules Benelacqua*, vnto whom by order it belonged to propound; seeing honor, saide he, is both in right and wrong to be maintained, I would willingly vnderstand, if an honorable man, after he hath valiantly fought within the listes, and brought to that point, as he cannot longer defend himselfe, ought rather to yeeld, then permit, that his enimie kill him. This, answered *Gualinguo*, is not a doubt of small importance: and the opinions of famous and learned men be in this point diuers: the greater part affirming, that the combatant ought rather to die, then yeeld: for in any case, a man of honor should alwaies preferre death, before infamous safetie. And this the Philosopher testifieth in the 3 of his morales saying, A valiant man ought much more to feare infamy then death: and also in another place of his Morals: that an honourable man, should rather choose a short life honourable, then a life long, but contumelious. And vpon this foundation, the Stoikes in some cases, permitted the violent killing of ones selfe, to auoyde a dishonorable life. As also the Lacedemonians, who in fortitude and wa-like valor, excelled al other Grecians, commaunded their souldiers that they should neuer yeeld, they holding it for certaine, that they which died with weapon in hand, might rather be esteemed slaine, then subdued: & therefore their great captain *Leonidas*, who with three hundred souldiers, defended *Thermopolis* against the innumerable armie of *Xerxes*, was not ouercome, but killed, neither were the three hundred Fabians vanquished, but slaine. Diuine *Plato* esteemed it so contumelious a thing, to yeeld, as that in his commonwealth he ordained, that there should be no redemption for him that yeelded, but that hee might bee set as a prey to the enemy: and in the twelue of his lawes, he made one most seuer, gainst those, who in bataille surrendered themselues, as vanquished, affirming, that

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free men should more feare to bee made slaues, then haue any dreade of death it selfe. He therefore that yeeldeth within the lists to his enemye, remaining his slaue, and de- priued of honour, whereas being killed, he may rather be ac- counted slaine, then subdued: it seemeth, that brought to that necessity, he ought rather to endure death, then euer to yeeld himself, yet for al this, I hold the contrary opinion to be true, & I am moued by this firme foundation: For in Combat, the cause is no lesse lost by death, then by submissiō; but betwixt submission and death there is this difference: that he who yeeldeth, looseth onely his honour, but the other remaining dead, looseth both honour, life, and that is worse, his owne soule: neither will any denie me, but that hee had rather choose one alone, then all these three euilles together, and no man is bound to do more then his force wil extend vnto. Whereas it is a rash part, and altogether aduerse to nature and humane conditiō, for no benefit to suffer death, without ob- taining by the same any thing honest: I will further af- firme, that hee which in the Lists hath not failed in valour, although vrged by necessitie hee yeeldeth himselfe, hee re- maineth not wholly dishonoured: nay and sometimes it hap- peneth that the vanquished, with men of vnderstanding, re- taineth a better opinion then the victor, in that the vertue of the mind, is knowne rather in aduerse then prosperous for- tune, and a man giueth testimony of himselfe, and his valor in blood, wounds, and eminent danger of death. Finally, I will further alleadge, that a man not being borne so much for himselfe, as for his Country, ought not without vrgent necessity, to deprive his country of a valiant champion. The reasons alleadged to the contrary are true. Supposing with the Philosopher, (which is false) that chiefe good cannot be without worldly honor; but because they are grounded on a supposition diuers from ours, they no waie preiudice our po- sition: For they suppose, that with an honorable death, a mā shunneth infamy, & that his former life remaineth vnspot- ted, but if I imagin the ruth, his whol life past remaineth no lesse infamous by death, then by yeelding himselfe, because

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he which dieth, be he defendat or assailant, resteth in opiniō to haue failed, either in iustice or valor, & consequētly is dishonored. This opinion of *Gualingnos*, was confirmed by the greter part of the gentlmē, & those in points of honor most iudiciall : when the illustrious Signior *Hippolito Bentiuoglis* : if I carry well in minde, the Philosopher affirmeth in his Rethoricke, that not only hee which offendeth our selues, offereth vs iniurie, but also he who wrongeth those thinges belonging to vs: as our father, son, brother, friend, or such like, I would know, if in point of honor we are bound to reuenge such an iniurie. When *Gualingno*: that such an iniurie should tie vs to reuenge, it is requisite there depend vppon it these conditions; first, that it be performed in contempt of vs, & through no manifest fault of him offended; further, that he iniuried, be impotent, for if he were sufficient to reuenge of himselfe, by taking vpon him the burden of his honor, hee should come to dishonour himselfe; therefore the Father is not tied to reuenge the iniury of his strong & able childe, as neither the Sonne his Fathers wrong, when of himselfe he is sufficient to answer the offender: and to conclude, the strong & mightie, standeth bound to answer for the weake, and impotent, considering the iniurie is done in despight of him, that can reuēge himself, when it is not offered throgħ any manifest fault of him offended: for otherwise to reuenge his cause who is iustly offended, were no other, but to faile in iustice, & therefore I say by manifest fault, because if it were secret, he is by al means to endeuor to keep it close, that hee offended rest not infamous. Cōsidering that we are, not only bound to protect our selues, but also the honor of the that belong to vs. *Bentiuoglie* was satisfied, & count *Alfonso Turchi*: You, if I vnderstood well, said he, haue recounted heresie among those defects that deprive of honor, and this, in my opinion, hath in it some difficulty, seeing honor & dishonor agree with action, & not with opiniō, & sin or maleficence, as the Philosopher affirmeth, in the sixt of his Ethikes, is not properly of knowledge, nor of opinion, and it is cleare, that heresy is no other but an opiniō, which thogh it be false

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false, yet shall not hee herewith possessed, rest infamous, and the reason is readie, made by the same Philosopher in the third of his Ethikes: for honour, dishonor, reward, and punishment, follow those actions that depend on free will, and are in our power, but the sin of heresie is not in our power, seeing we cannot enter into what opinion wee would, but are enforced to beleue what the minde iudgeth to be true, or like to truth.

Although heresie (answered *Gualinguo*) as it is an opinion, can neither giue nor take away honor: notwithstanding in as much as it is a beginning to work against holy laws, & Catholike decrees, it maketh a man more then all other sinnes, infamous, when either by tongue, or exterior actions she commeth so manifest her selfe. Distinguishing therefore, I affirme that heretikes are of two sorts: the one secret, who neither with words nor deeds, discover their Heresie: and these, though they loose the fauour of God, yet do they not forgoe their honour, for the reasons aboue cited: The other kind be manifest, which impudently strue against the lawes and institutions of holy Christian Church: & further, seeke to drawe this and that man into their peruerse opinion, by scandalizing the world, and therefore loose their honour, they being held in the opinion of the world, to haue failed in iustice, and to be most notable destroyers of soules health, the which of honest men ought to be preferred before all other goods. Vndoubtedly sayd Count *Alfonso*, these sorts of men, are not onely worthie of eternall infamie, and in comparison of honour to bee excepted against, but for chasticement, are right woorthie of the fire. I am also in doubt, saide *Scipion Saccati*, neither can I see, how it may be, that an vsurer should loose his honour; as also I cannot perceiue, in what respect hee faileth in iustice or valour: but I call to minde a Dialogue of a great learned man, wherein he prooueth, that vltie is necessarie to liue well and happily. It is necessarie, answered *Gualinguo*, that husbandmen should be great vsurers, as *Virgill* teacheth,

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reacheth, and that they should labour, that the earth may render an hundred for one, and after this manner doth learned *Spocone* entend it in his dialogue: but the vsurer whom I place among men dishonored, is not such a one: but rather one that is vniust, and who practiseth against good lawes, seeking vnlawfull gaine, and vsing monye contrarie to his proper nature. And wherefore against his proper nature, replied *Sacrat*? Because, answered *Gualingno*, mony by the law, was to no other ende found out, but to make contracts equall, in the exchange of things, wherevpon he that vseth it without any change, imploiethe it contrarie to his nature, and against the ordinance of the law: But such a one is the vsurer, because he changeth not his mony for commoditie, but mony immediatly for mony, and therefore vsurie by the Grecians was termed *Focos*, which signifieth one begottē; for as the childe is like him that begot him, so mony imploied by the vsurer, is like the mony, which without any permutatiō, but only with the benefit of time, it bringeth forth. The vsurer deseruedly therefore is put in the number of those infamous, because by an euill meane, he wasteth other mens goods. *Sacrat* said no more: When Count *Heracle Tassone*: seeing honor is lost by failing in iustice, or valor, I would further vnderstand, whether of these two defects deeplier wound honor. Questionlesse honour cannot be lost but in defect of Iustice, answered *Gualingno*, neither doth want of valor, touch honor in any other respect, but because with such a defect, there is annexed iniustice, or the character thereof. I vnderstand you not after my minde, saide *Tassone*: and *Gualingno*: He which through viltie hazardeth not his life, for Religion, his Countrie, Prince, and Friends, cōmitteth an vniust fact: for a man not being borne to himselfe, but for all these, defraudeth his Countrie, Prince, Religion, and Friends, of that which is their proper good: and therefore as vniust hee is worthy of infamie: hee likewise, that is not moued with an iniurie, besides that he infringeth the lawe of Nature, which permiteth euery one to repell

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force with force, he carrieth also with him the character of iniustice. And how can this be, replied *Tassone*, if to suffer injury as the Philosopher affirmeth, is free from vice, & to offer it, is vicious & vniust. The Philosopher saith wel, answered *Gualinguo*, but yet this taketh not away my positio, for though the suffering of iniurie, be without vice, yet giueth it some testimonie of vice in the patient, for that by this act of supporting iniury, he sheweth himself worthe of contempt, and consequently, vniust, and wicked; for only the wicked man is worthy to be ignominious. Seeing honor is not lost, added *Tassone*, but through want of iustice, and defect of valor is a kind of iniustice, this word Valor, in the definition of honor, seemeth to be superfluous. The common sort, said *Gualinguo*, not knowing, that iustice comprehendeth all vertues, & iniustice all vices, and ordinarily distinguishing between base actions, and those of iniustice, to make men learned, as also vnlearned, conceiue the nature of this our honor: the word valor is not only not superfluous, but necessary, and so much the more, by reason common opinion holdeth base & cowardly men, more infamous then those vniust: and in euery one, want of valor is more obserued, then that of iustice.

Nay, said Count *Hercules*, the abuse is growne so far, as all men valiant of person are esteemed honest men, although in the rest they be most dissolute. This hapneth answered *Gualinguo*, because the common sort, which know not the inward vertues of the mind, measureth the goodnes and valor of a man, from the force of his body, & not from the power of his mind, little obseruing, that as man by the vertue of the mind, exceedeth the creatures, so in strength of body, by many beasts, he is excelled. *Tassone* said nothing else, but count *Hercules* Most, objected: tel me fir knight, if this our honor once lost, may be recovered again. Let euerie one take heed, said *Gualinguo*, of loosing his honor, for being once iustly lost, it can neuer be recovered: and I said iustly, because lost otherwise, it may rather be termed honour suspended then lost, as it happeneth to those honest men, who by false suggestions

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enter into the euill opinion of the world, seeing it may come to passe, that time in the ende discovering the trueth, they may recouer their good name. You impose too seuer a law vpon honor. Signior *Gualinguo*, replied Count *Hercules*, in that it onely being once lost, you giue out, it cannot be recovered: for my part, I iudge it scarce reasonable, that one bad action cannot by many other good be recompensed, for this is no other, but to bring an offender into extreame desperation: by which meane honour, that in a man ought to be the principall cause of doing well, would be an occasion for him to multiplie his flagitions, without ever reforming them. By my definition of honour deliuered, you should bee out of doubt (answered *Gualinguo*) that honour iustly lost, cannot be recovered. For if it be true that honour is a firme opinion in him that honoureth, that he honoured hath not failed in iustice nor valor: one that hath only failed once, & is known for the man, cannot come within the compasse of this definition, because then it should not be conuertible with the definite, and would be no other, but as if we should ascribe a reasonable soule to an asse. But if men, added *Mosti*, should turne to haue as good an opinion of such an one, as at the first, might he not, recouering the priuiledge of honour, come within this definition? If we should grant, said *Gualinguo*, that an asse had winges, we might conclude, that hee were a birde and fowle, therefore I say vnto you, that this case in him can hardly be admitted, who hath iustly lost his honor, because they who haue notice of his defect, although they would, yet could they not of such an one retaine so good an opinion, as at the first, if they lost not also theyr owne memories, the which is hard, or at least verie difficult. For men for the most parte, being enuious and maleuolent, they are vnmindfull of vertuous actions, keeping them close, but they reserue fresh in memorie another mans misdeedes, and continually with their tongues blaze it abroad: and touching this seuer and strict law of honor, I say it is seuer, but yet iust, and likewise those lawes be iust, though

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austere, that cut off the liues of malefactors, or their members, the which things, though they be irrecoverable, yet cannot these chasticements hold malefactors in: but if the feare of losse were recompenced with the hope of recouerie, who seeth not how great the number of wicked men would bee, and of those ready to worke mischief.

The law of honor then, is the cause of wel doing, & not of multiplying flagition, because the greater sort of men hold their honor so deare, as that they dare not do euill, for feare of the losse therof, knowing that it once only being lost, can neuer be recovered. But for al this, I do not affirme, that a mā who hath ceased the honor of the world, should vppon this multiply in flagitions, without euer reforming himselfe; but rather the cōtrary, that a mā after the recouery of the former good opinion, cannot do better, then manifest to the world in all his actiōs ensuing, that he is penitēt & turned to a better life: for though it may wel be, that he shall hardly be able to returne to his first degree of honor, yet he may become a good man, & shun continuall reproach. And how should it come to passe, replied *Adisti*, that proouing a good man, he should not likewise become honourable: I pray you tell me, is not an honest man worthy of honor? If you deny this, you frame a paradox against the Philosopher, who affirme, that onely the honest man is woorthy of honour. An honest man, answered *Qualinguo*, is two maner of wayes vnderstood: One is, he that neuer crackt his credit, but is wel knowne for such an one, and this man is truely worthy of honor, and deservedly honored: The other is he, who hauing once or twice failed, and knowne for such an one, in the end amendeth, and becommeth good; this man is not absolutely woorthy of honor, neither can he be counted honorabe, but only in comparison of a man impious. Count *Hercules* was content with this last distinction: when Count *Gherardo Benelacqui*, I saw saide he, in the booke of *Possennio*, intituled, of Honour, amongst many other, this one notable disputation, whether honor consisteth in the honorer, or him honoured, and not-
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withstanding he greatly laboreth to ressolue this difficultie, yet my conceit was not therewith satisfied; for by one reason it seemes to haue residence in the honorer, seeing in him is placed that opinion, which you auerre to be honor. On the other side, it appeareth rather to be in him honored, seeing he giueth denomination to the subiect, and that as milke for the whitenesse is in it, commeth to be termed white, so the honored is so called, for the honor in him selfe vnderstoode: I desire therefore to heare you vpon this poynt.

This doubt, answered *Gualingno*, hath giuen diuers occasion of discussion, and especially *Possenuino*, but because what he saith, nothing toucheth this honor whereof we intreat, but rather that which is acquired by beneficence, we wil leaue it apart: therefore standing on the foundation of our naturall honor, we must obserue, that a mā supposed good, if nothing appeere to the contrary, honor proceedeth from the apparent image of the vertue of the honoured, imprinted in the fantasie of the honorer: and because good opinion is the proper essence of honor, we will say, that honor essentially is in the honorer, & in the honored virtually (to vse these terms) essentially in the honorer, because in him remaineth the opinion; virtually in the honored, for that in him is the hidden vertue, which of it selfe causeth imagination in the fantasie of the honorer, procuring opinion. This answer well pleased Count *Gherardo*, and replying no further, Signior *Hercule Gilioli*: There riseth in my mind a doubt, sayd he, which springeth from that before you affirmed, man to bring with him this honor, from his mothers wombe: If this be true, I cannot see how honor should essentially be in the honored, seeing hee enioyeth it not from his birth, and if in him it bee essentially, how can it be recounted amongst goodes external? Man, as I haue saide, answered *Gna*. bringeth with him honor frō his mothers womb, because he is borne with that inward supposition, that he is good, neither is it requisit, that to preserue this supposition, he labour greatly, in that it sufficeth only, he neuer extremely offend against any principal

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vertue. And for that of this supposition, in the end groweth
 opinion, in him honouring, which is honor, therefore it is
 saide to be essentially in the honourer. Yet is not to him as
 his owne, but as a thing appropriate to the honored. I af-
 firme therefore, that notwithstanding the honored is borne
 with possession of honor, yet makes not this, that in him ho-
 nor should essentially be: for if that were true, we might con-
 clude, that riches likewise were essentially in the wealthy
 man, seeing he is borne to possession of them, and that they
 were not to bee placed amongst goodes externall. Signior
Hercules held his peace, and the Lord *Cesar Brancaccio* whom
 now it concerned to propound, musing a little with himselfe:
 Me thinkes, saide he, that this our honor, (and ours I call it,
 seeing Nature and Fortune offereth vnto vs, without our in-
 dustrie) giueth occasion of doubt in this, I not hauing hi-
 therto heard any one question propounded, pertaining to
 that true honor, which by vertue and valour is obtained, as
 though the Knight had so amply entreated, as that nothing
 remayned whereof you might doubt; I notwithstanding am
 not altogether satisfied: for if it be true, that this honor is a re-
 ward that sheweth and exalteth the woorke of beneficence,
 and that not onely those are honored, who haue performed
 benefites, but he also is esteemed, that is likely to be benefici-
 all, this inconuenience insueth, that a wicked fellow, who ey-
 ther hath, or is likely to benefit, may be worthy of honor, as
 on the contrary, an honest man vnworthy, because he neither
 hath, and is altogether vnable to performe any benefit. The
 man wicked, said *Gualingo*, can in no sort be woorthy of ho-
 nor, although he either hath, or may performe a benefite, al-
 ways prouided, that he be knowne for flagitious: first, in that
 he deprived of naturall honor, is incapable of any other: se-
 condly, because the woorke of beneficence simply sufficeth
 not, to make one worthy of honor, being requisite, that such
 an action should be perfourmed by an honest man, and to no
 other end: for he that should place a benefite to thend to reap
 therof gaine or delight, such an one should not be worthy of
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honor, neither could he be thought ingrate, that were vn-
mindful of such a benefite, or should not therof make any de-
monstration; but an honest man & so knowne, doing benefite,
is worthy of honor, because he is beneficiall to no other but
an honest end: neither can any be vertuous or good, which
is not apt to performe benefites. If a vertuous man, replied
Brancaccio were in calamitie or pouerty, how could he be be-
neficiall? And *Gual*: The means of benefiting be diuers: for
we may do good to the body, to the soule, by good examples
setting forth morall vertues and knowledge, or with phisick
procuring health to the body: Finally, as it cannot chuse, but
the Sun must needes heate and illuminate, so is it impossible,
that a vertuous and good man should not be beneficiall, and
consequently, vnworthy of honor.

If they added *Brancaccio*, that for profit, benefite, and not
for honestie were not worthy of honour, the Doctours that
reade publikly, the Physitions that administer health to the
body, advocates that defend goods and titles, and other like
vertuous men, who notwithstanding do great good, should
be vnworthily honored: seeing all these practise their ver-
tue for profite. And *Gualinguo*: If these were principally
moued by profit, and not honesty, out of all doubt they could
not be worthy of honor, but if practising for honestie, toge-
ther they attaine profite, they shal not for this be vnworthy:
and especially the Doctours, who reade publikely, for they
are publikely payd, and publike stipends, are in the number
of poynts honorable. By good reason also Physitions are ho-
nored, because in them there is vertue, and their end is sup-
posed honest, in that they set not their labor at sale: and not-
withstanding they extend forth the hand, to receiue that
which is giuen them, yet do they this, because a gift is accoun-
ted as a point honorable, and a reward of beneficent and wel-
doeing action: and therefore as the Philosopher sayeth, a
gift is equallye desired by the ambitious, as by the co-
uetous, of the ambitious for honour, of the couetous
man for profite. At this last answer, the Ladies and Knights
smiled,

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smiled, and Signior *Brancaccio* replied no further. But Signior *Scipion Gilioli* took occasiō of the doubt propounded by Signior *Guilio Cesar*: I would willingly know, sayd he, seeing a wicked man by the worke of beneficence, cannot make himselfe worthe of honour, whether he may honour another or no: by one reason it seemeth no, in that hee cannot giue what hee hath not: but the wicked man hath no honour: on the other side, if a wicked man shall receiue some singular benefit, from one honest and good, hee may in recompence erect vnto him a Satue, make Himnes in his commendation, offer him presents; and such like honours. A bad fellow, answered *Gualinguo*, can in this do no honour to an honest man, who is truely honoured, but rather by such like ostentations hee dishonoureth him, especially when the man depraued doth him this honour: for hauing receiued some benefit, either in his body or goods: for an honest man cannot doo good to the body or goods of one wicked, without giuing scandale of himselfe, seeing hee is woorthy of honour, that doth good for honesties sake, and to a party honest.

You said, replied Signior *Scipione*, that a man might many waies be beneficiall, that is, to the body, goods, and soule: put we the case, that a good man, by doctrine, good examples and admonitions, do cure vpon the sicke soule of one wicked, reducing him to better life, and that hee for such a benefit shuld erect vnto him a statue, as they do who hauing escaped a shipwrack, erect altares and statues, to God & religion, should not this be honour to a vertuous man? Without doubt it shuld, & that most great, said *Gualinguo*, in that of al benefits hee hath performed the greatest, which is, the health of the soule. Then inferred *Gilioli*, a man wicked may performe a most special honor, & yet not long since you denied it. I said, answered *Gualinguo*, that a depraued man could not giue honour, but hee which hauing receiued the health of his soule, doth honour, honoureth not as hee was wicked, but as hee is a good man, and therefore the honour he offereth

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reth is not to bee despised, for though it bee not honest, that a good man should further the bodie or goods of one wicked, yet is it most honest to procure vnto him the health of his soule: and whosoever performeth such a benefit, maketh himselfe worthie of honour; Signior *Scipione* vsed no further speech. When Signior *Alessandro Andriasi*: You sir Knight, haue defined this honor whereof we intreate, to be the rewarde of beneficence, if this definition were true, it would follow, that the inferior could not honour the superior, for as it is proper to the superior, to giue, and not receiue rewarde, so is it proper to the inferior, to receiue and not giue. And *Gualenguo*: rewarde may be considered, after two sortes, which be, as it is profitable, or as it is honorable: as profitable it concurrerh not with the definition of honor, but as it is honorable it therein taketh place. In this sort therefore considered, it may be thus giuen by the inferior, as vnto him also from the superior: for the recognisance of vertue, is common both to the one and other. Yet is there this difference, by reason that what by the greater is giuen to the inferior; besides being a note and testimonie of vertue, it sheweth also supereminencie in the superior, and therefore requireth thankfulness and gratitude: but that from the inferior to the greater, containing durie, is a signe of humilitie, and is called reuerence. This excellent distinction pleased all the standers by, and *Andriasi* replying no further. Signior *Galiazzo Fiaschi*: I remember said he amongst other matters I saw in the booke of *Posseuino*, this conclusion, that honor consisteth more in desert, then possession; whereof I doubt: and vpon this expect your opinion. And *Gualenguo*: *Posseuino*, or the author of that booke, as many other thinges, so doth he maintaine this conclusion against *Aristotle*, from whom he sheweth himselfe altogether dismembred, and seperate: for if it were true, that honor consisted, rather in deseruing, the possessing thereof, that likewise shuld be false, which the Philosopher affirmeth in the first of his *Ethickes*. That honor is not our owne, but depē-

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deth more of the honorer then him honored : neither could honor be recounted, amongst goods externall, or of fortune: for though it be in our power, to make our selues worthy of honor, yet is it not in our power to receiue or possesse it: seeing through the ingratitude or ignorance of them, in whose hands iust distributiō lieth, we are oft times deceiued. Therefore conformable to this, *Cicero* cited this notable sentence:

Virtue for guide, but Fortune for companion, I would haue.

Minding to infer, that if the vertuous man haue not Fortune for his companion, he cannot haue possession of honor : and that vertue without fortune, is of it selfe vnto it insufficient: the opiniō of *Cicero* was held for truth. When *Cavalier Guirino*: Seing you sir Knight haue concluded with the Philosophers and *Ciceros* authoritie, that honor consisteth rather in possession thē desert, I desire to vnderstād further: whether a vertuous & prudent mā, ought to seek & demand that honor, whereof he knoweth himselfe meritorious, or holding his peace, to attend while fortune accompany his valor and defect, with honorable charge, leauing al other meanes : In that by one reason it seemeth he should not : for in seeking after them, he incurreth suspect of ambition, which ought to be abhorred of an honest man: on the other side by not laboring and suing after it, hee is in danger to be thereof depriued, and consequently, not to be known for vertuous: considering that honor is the ensigne of vertue : as by effect wee see, that som are esteemed of valor, by enioying magistracy, titles, and other such like honors, notwithstanding that in them selues, they haue not the least shadow of vertue. Then *Gualinguo* : It is the propertie of a vertuous and wise man, not to shew himselfe desirous of honor, neither to seeke or craue it, but directing all his actiōs to honestie, by this mean to make himselfe worthie of honor; yet ought he not to liue so contemptibly, as after the manner of *Diogenes* Cinicke, to manifest, that he holdeth honor in scorne, but rather whensoever occasion presenteth it selfe, he ought with modestie to accept of those honors that befit him, that he incurre not
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the vice of pusillanimitie. If it be true, replied *Guirini*, that honor is deserued by vertue, and by fortune acquired: I cannot see, why a vertuous man may not seek at the hands of fortune, the honor he deserueth, considering that fortune is not moued except she be sought vnto & vrged: we being wont for this cause to say, that she is not fauorable, to the timorous and slothfull, but to the bolde and aduenturous: and it is an opinion approued by all the Philosophers, that a wise man is the framer of his owne fortune: And I know some gentlemen, which to others also are wel inough knowne, vertuous, prudent, and of great desert, yet for that they haue (as wee sayde) bin euer colde, and not vrged fortune, nor sought the honors they deserued, liue in their Cittie without any renoume: wherevpon by Court impostors, this their modesty is esteemd pusillanimitie, not to say plain stupidity: whereas on the contrary, euery day we see men of smal desert, raised to great honors, by hauing beene audacious, and assaying all means, as wel lawfull as vnlawful, but specially in procuring to themselves their fauor, that could bestow on them honor or riches. And if wee do but thinke vpon the examples, as well of the ancientes, as men of these times, we will conclude, that valiant men ought to seek, and hunt after honors, that they may be known to be the men they are. For beginning from the Romaines, as they were vertuous, & of great valor, so did they demaund, and by all meanes affect honors: vnto them, it not seeming sufficient, to deserue it, except they also fished for it: with great sute therefore they required the Pretorships, Consulshippes, Pontificacie, all Magistracies, & other dignities that appertained to honor, as also the Generals of armies or Consuls were wont, returning into their countrie laden with spoile of their enemies, with al instance to demaund triumph: and oftentimes this beeing denied them, they raised sedition in the commonwealth, which surely they would neuer haue doone, but that they knewe, that to seeke and hunt after honour, is proper to a vertuous man, and to one that deserueth:

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and to come to more moderne examples, let vs see, whether in the most famous Venetian commonwealth, honours and magistracie be by the nobility required: in such sort, as it seemeth no whit inconuenient for any gentleman whatsoeuer of singular vertue, to demaund Magistracie, with that theyr manner of supplication, which they call *Broio*; and yet for all this are they not counted ambitious, but rather doing otherwise, they should bee esteemed loftie and proude: as if for this receiued honour, they were rather bound to their owne proper vertue, then to those, who graciously dispensed it vnto them. But what neede wee to vse any more preualent example, do we not reade that the master of good customes, *Aristotle* himself with his followets hauing plucked *Plato* now old, out of his chaire, went and sate in it himself, not respecting to dishonour his maister, for the exaltation of himselfe with that honour, whereof he thought he was worthy? I will not therefore thinke, that to seeke honor is any heresie at all, or a thing vnworthie of a vertuous and wise man. The vertuous man, said *Gualinguo*, directeth al his actions to honestie, and not to honour, for though there were no honour in the world, yet would he performe honest actions, considering that humane felicitie consisteth in vertuous and honest action, and not in honour, as the Philosopher affirmeth in the second of his *Ethikes*: nay, and as often as hee should performe honest actions, to no other end, but to obtaine honour, and not honest reputation, such an action of it selfe should neither be vertuous nor worthie of honour. But the ambitious man making small reckoning of honesty, is hee that alwaies worketh in fauour of honour, seeking that honour which is not conuenient for him, from the place with him not befitting, & with the means for him, no waies requisite.

I would haue thought, said *Guirino*, that Honour and Honestie haddde beene the selfe same thing, especially, the Philosopher hauing placed it amongst things honest, or at least so, that the one cannot stande without the other: in such sorte, that wee cannot endeuour in fauour
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of honestie, without hauing an eye vnto honour: as likewise, he that did attend honor, shuld haue regard to honesty. And *Gualinguo*: although there is nothing honest, which is not also worthe of honour, and notwithstanding honour properly agreeth with things honest, yet honour without honestie, and honestie without honor may be found: for as one may deserue, and not possesse honour, so may he vnworthily enioy honor that deserueth it not, considering that the possession of honour is in the handes of Fortune, and not of vertue, as hath beene said. By the definition of honour replied *Guirino*, it seemeth that honour and honestie are inseperable: for if honour be a signe of honest action, it will follow, that where honour is, there must likewise be honestie, as also where honestie is, there must needes be honour: as (for to vse the example of *Possenino*) where is the signe, there is the Inne, neither without the signe can the Inne stand: and where ashes be, there either is, or hath beene fire, for ashes is a manifest token of fire, as milke is of pregnancy in a woman. If honor (said *Gualinguo*) were as necessarie a signe of honestie, as ashes of fire, or milke of child quickning and pregnancie, this argument would quickly bee concluded, but though honour be a signe and reward of beneficence, yet it is no necessarie token of honest action: for it may be honour, though vnworthily, where vertue is not, or vertuous action may stand without deserued honor, when she findeth her selfe by fortune abandoned: & to prosequute the example of *Possenino*, as many times there be Innes, & especially in *Spain*, which haue nothing good in them but the signe or garland, that deceiue strangers, seeing within there is neither bread nor wine, nor any of those things that are the proper sustentations of an Inne, so may diuers be found, that not hauing in themselves any vertue, possesse by the stroke of blind fortune, the exterior ensigne of vertue, which is honor. But to returne from whence we haue digressed, I affirme, that to seek possession of honor by any other mean, then by the desert of vertue, is not a thing honest nor conue-

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nient for a vertuous and good man, so that with a quiet mind he ought rather to suffer the deprivation thereof, then by demanding it, to manifest himselfe ambitious, and desirous of honor, retaining alwaies in memorie this infallible proposition, that to require honour, annihilateth the desert of vertue. And therefore the Philosopher in the third of his Politikes sayth, that he who demandeth magistracie, sheweth himselfe rather ambitious, then deserving it, and he addeth, that magistracies should rather bee given to those that modestly refuse them, then to such as impudently require them: which being true, the modestie of those gentlemen, by you and others knowne to be vertuous, ought not to bee taxed, although they liue a private life, not practising euerie day, after the manner of men ambitious, and that shamefully beg honours. But rather that Signior or prince is to be blamed, in whose handes it lieth to dispence rewardes, punishments, honours, grace, and fauours. For if hee knoweth not the desert of euerie subiect, but espetially of such as bee noble, who of themselves are worthie to be regarded, he incurreth like blame, as the shepheard that knoweth not his sheep: but if he know them, and yet distribute his honors & fauors, to flatterers, ignorant, and presumtuious men, litle esteeming the modest and vertuous, he sheweth himselfe vniust, & vnworthy of principality. And touching the example of the Romanes, if we mesure wel their actiōs, we shal find that in their common-wealth they were rather good citizens, then vertuous & good men. I would haue thought (*saide Guirini*) that a good citizen & an honest mā had bin al one: And *Gualinguo*: In the best common-wealth it is al one, because her end is honest: but in that common-wealth which preferreth profit before honestie, a good man & good citizen be not al one: And such an one was the Romane common-wealth, shee euer hauing had this scope, to signiorize ouer others, and therefore the Romanes, notwithstanding they were good Citizens, and profitable for the common-wealth, yet surelie they were not vertuous nor good men, but rather ambitious, they seeking the honour, not of honestie, but of profit:

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and that this is true, by a decree of the Senate it may be prooued, which thus disposed, that triumph should not be granted, but vpon the augmentation of empire, and not for recovery only of things lost: as also, that no captaine might triumph, if in one battaile only, he had not at the least put six thousand men to the sword. Whether such an action be absolutely honest, or worthy of honor, I leaue to you to iudge: for my part, I would say, that to shedde humane blood, for the wicked desire of Empire, were an action rather wicked and dishonest than woorthy of honour: which being true, the examples of the Romaines, ought not to remooue vs from our opinion, seeing they ambitious, sought honor, from whence it befitted not, and after a manner no wayes conuenient: but if they had beene truely good and vertuous, they would neuer with sute haue demaunded magistracie and honours, being an action much more worthy of an honest man with modestie to be refused, thā to be accepted of ambitiously. And to vse the example of the selfe same Romaines, tell me in good earnest, whether of these two iudge you to be the honestest action? That of *Fulvius Flaccus*, who to auoyde enuy, refused triumph, by others so much aspired after: or that of *Q. Valerius*, who blinded with ambition, contended with *Lutatius* about triumph, not respecting how it was not honest, that a Pretor in triumph should be equall with a Consul? And which act was more worthy of commendation, that of *Julius Caesar*, in vsurping the perpetual Dictatorship, or the other of the great African, who hauing bin entertained with honors correspondent to his deserts, & the Senate determining further, to erect vnto him an image, where the people vsed to assemble, one in the Senate house, another in the *Reghera*, or place of orations, as also to place his image in the Capitoll, where were the statues of the gods, adorned with triumphant ornaments, and further to make him both Consull and Dictator for terme of life: he neuer would consent, that any of these honours might be attributed vnto him, neyther by decree of the Senate, nor voyce of the people.

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sent that any of these honors, might be attributed vnto him; neither by the decree of the Senate, nor voice of the people. Vndoubtedly this valiant man, did no lesse shew the greatnesse of his minde, in refusing so great honors, than before he had done in deseruing them: whereas on the contrarie, the minde of *Cesar* puffed vp and full of ambition, by vsurping the highest of all honours, did not a little obscure the desert of his renowned valour, making him to be knowne, as questionlesse he was, for a man ambitious and wicked.

Concerning your moderne example, of the Venetian Signiorie, as that most noble common-wealth is a:med with excellent lawes, so is the practise of *Broio* (as a course scarce honest) by law forbidden. And about reformation hereof is the office of Censorship conuersant: for truth whereof, they graunt no magistracie to them, who openly demand it, but to those that are chosen: and therefore, before they create a magistrate, they first call out by scrutiny, those that are to haue the election; and he to whose lot the golden *Ballot* falles out, is the Elector that propoundeth and nominateth him, whom he thinketh worthy of the magistracie; and that of al he may be knowne for such an one the *Ballotini* go about (for so are they called that cary about the box with these *Ballots*) declaring with an high voyce, the honours and magistracies that before they haue perfourmed. It cannot be denied, said *Guirino*, but that common-wealth gouerned by the Holy-ghost, is furnished with excellent lawes: notwithstanding the practise of *Broio* is so inueterate, that there is no Magistrate chosen, but by this meane: as also, they praecoccupy to be nominated and elected: yea and openly giue one to another the tickets of their names, surnames, and offices, they haue gone through. This abuse, answered *Gualinguo* is not rashly permitted, but with great iudgement, seeing thereout they reape a benefit, that tendeth to the preservation of the common-wealth, considering that by this *Broio*, the Nobilitie is vnited, conioyning themselves together in loue, procured by this mutuall and interchangeable benefite: and by sur-

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surname, knowing one another, they are warie to offend in any case: so that I assure you, those gentlemen, do more feare one of those ragged pelets of paper, then do souldiers the leaden bullet of the hargabuse. Surely I remaine satisfied, saide *Guirino*, that a vertuous and good man, ought not to prosecute honor, but with desert of vertue, and vertuous action. And Count *Cesar Tassone*: Seeing an honest man must not shew himselfe so much as desirous of honor, yet I would willingly vnderstand, on whether of these two hee ought to bee most ententive, ether to receiue honour, or to doe honor to another: for my part I wou'de thinke, that honor being a signe which sheweth vertue, an honest man, to make himselfe knowne for the man he is, ought rather to couet by honor amongst others to be famous, then he himselfe to honor another, considering that to honor another, seemeth a token of submission, and noteth I know not what kinde of supereminencie in him honored. A good man, answered *Gualingno*, ought rather to be carefull in doing honor, then in receiuing honor from another, and the reason is in readines: for though wee be not honored by another, yet lose we not the desert of honor: but on the contrarie, we not honouring those, to whom wee are bound to render honor, we wholly manifest our selues vniust, and vnworthy of honor: Furthermore, to do honor, and especially to him that deserueth, is an honest action, and euer proper to a good man: but in receiuing honor, the honored performeth nothing honest: and notwithstanding it be a signe of vertue in the honored, yet is it no such necessary token as wee haue said; for a wicked man may also receiue honor, although he be vnworthy. *Tassone* commended this answer. When Signior *Francisco, Patritio*: You sir Knight haue given me but small occasion to doubt, yet would I willingly, somewhat more exquisitely vnderstand, how it can be, that the honor by you termed natural, and as it were imperfect, should be a former disposition to perfect honor, considering you explained it from this point very diuers. And *Gualingno*:

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The honour which is our owne, and whereof euery one maketh profession, is out of doubt a former disposition to that honor, which with vertue is acquired: for whosoever wanteth the good opinion of the worlde, is incapable of all, but especially, of perfect honor, as a liuing thing wanting vertue vegetatiue, cannot haue sense. If perfect honor, said *Patritio*, (for so will we call that, which is the reward of vertue) cannot consist without the imperfect, wherefore haue you said that the imperfect honor hath no parte in felicitie, but onely the perfect? Vnperfect honor said *Gualinguo*, may be vnderstode by it selfe alone, (as many times we finde it) or else as conioyned with that perfect: of it selfe alone it hath no part in felicitie, because felicitie dependeth on operation according to the best and most perfect vertue: and this is not deriued from excellent operation, but from not performing very vitious action: and therefore it bringeth not with it felicitie, but maketh a man indifferent, neither happy, nor miserable; but when wee consider it, as vnited with perfect honor, then we may say, that it is a disposition and preparation to felicitie.

Patritio was satisfied, and Signior *Hercules Varani*, who hath no small taste of learning, propounded after this manner: The Philosopher sheweth in the first of his *Ethickes*, in the place aboue cited, that felicitie is not honour, because felicitie is our owne, and honour is not: and rendring hereof a reason, he vseth these formall words: It seemeth honour is rather in the performer, than in him that receiueth it. Out of which wordes, some moue this question; whither honor, be in the honorer, or honoured: & amongst others, *Possesina* maketh a large discussion, concluding that honour, is both in the one and other. In the honorer, because hee dooth his ducie, in honouring him that deserueth: and in the honoured, as receiuing the reward of vertuous operation. Nowe of this honour wherewith we are borne, you haue sufficiently shewed howe it is both in one and other; but of perfect honor we stand in doubt.

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And *Gualinguo* : It is no lesse improper, for to search whether this honour, bee in him honouring, or the honored, than it would bee to demandaund, whether the Statue were in the Grauer, in the procurer of it to be wrought, or in him whose image it representeth : therefore I say, that honour as a rewarde, is neither in him honoring, nor the honored. And what sence will you apply to the wordes of the Philosopher, replied *Varani*? When *Gualinguo*: The Philosopher would inferre, that honour being no other, than that reward, which sheweth operation of vertue, it dependeth of the giuer, as of the cause efficient, which is he honouring, and not of the other honoured, being hee that receiueth it: seeing it is in our power to deserue it, but not to receiue it, as wee haue saide: yet to honourable action, hee honoured concurrerh in a more eminent manner, than the honorer; in that he thereto concurrerh as the ende, hee honouring performing honor, in fauour of the other honored: but if by this reason, honour were formally, both in the honorer, and honored, by the contentment, which of honourable action, is both in the one and other, as affirmeth *Possenuino*, this would bee false which the Philosopher saith, for the contentment of receiuing honour, being greater than of performing it, it would by this meanes come to bee, more in the honored that receiueth, then in the honorer, that performeth it. And how can it be added *Varano*, that in receiuing there should be greater contentment, than in perfourming, considering (as the same *Possenuino* affirmeth) that it is a thing more excelent to do, than suffer: but he that receiueth, suffereth? This proposition also of *Possenuino*, answered *Gualinguo*, is false, speaking absolutely, for being alwayes true, it would follow that the creature in reasonable action were more excellent than the Creator. But to the end we erre not in this, it must be obserued, that to giue, and receiue, is considered two manner of wayes: one, when wee performe or giue simply in honesty, without hauing receiued, or so much as hoped for any benefit. And in this kind, it is much more excel-

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lent to giue thē to receiue, and the contentment of him that giueth, is much more, then of the other that receiueth, for in the giuer, abundance appeareth, but in the receiuer, indigence. The other kind is, when we giue in recompence of a receiued benefit, & especially the reward of Vertue, which is the honour of this world: and in this respect vndoubtedlie it is a matter of greater excellence to receiue then giue, because it noteth abundance of perfection in the receiuer, and want in him that giueth: and so consequently, it is a greater contentment to receiue after this maner, thē to giue: conformable to which our opinion, the Philosopher in the second of his Rhetorick, saith: The performer of a benefit is much more ioyfull in beholding him benefited; then is the receiuer in seeing his benefactor: and to conclude, by how much the cause finall is more noble and excellent then the efficient, so much more excellent is it to receiue, then to giue honour.

And therefore the most mightie God concurrerth with honour, as of all other things the most eminent, being the end, in fauour whereof all things do moue. Signior *Hercules* approoued this answer: and Signior *Francesco Villa*, thus propounded: You, sir knight, haue defined honour vniuersally to be the most precious of all goods externall, which being true, it would follow, that Praise, Honour, Glory, and Fame, should be the selfe same things signified by these diuers names, or being different, your proposition would bee false, for glorie is much more esteemed then honour, which seemeth to be most precious, as that which onely agreeth with God. And *Gualin*: Your doubt Signior *Villa*, is no lesse excellent and gracious then your selfe, wherefore resolving it, I say, that if wee consider the foundation, and from whence they take their originall, praise, honour, and glory, be the selfe same things, neither doth one in perfectiō exceed another, seeing al of them are grounded vpon vertue, and from her are deriued. And therefore the Romans so ioyned together the Temple of Vertue and Honour, as to the
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Temple of Honor one could not passe, vnlesse first he wen by that of Vertue: but if we consider these termes in themselves, they are of diuers signification: for speaking properly, we praise habites and vertues, but attribute honour to the actions that of vertue depend, and glorie to the excellence of vertue and actions together: distinguishing therefore euerie one of these termes, we wil affirm, that praise is a speech, which sheweth and exalteth another mans vertue, the which in two sorts is afforded, with liuely voyce, and in writing, as also by poesie: and this by the Græcian is called *Encomion*, and hath his place with honour permanent: Glorie, the faithfull heire as it were, of Praise, is no other but a common and approoued opinion, of another mans excellent vertue and Heroycall acts, and from honour is different, because this, without any other signe or reward, may be preserved in memory with men, through infinit ages. Fame, notwithstanding it seeme the same that is Glorie, that also being a publike rumour, that bringeth forth vniuersall opinion, yet is it from Glorie different, first, because shee in one instant hath her force, and many times is falacious: but Glorie is euer firme, as not framed but with long time. Moreover, glorie is alwaies taken in good parte, Fame sometimes well, otherwhiles euill, whereupon wicked men also are saide to be famous: and therefore Fame of *Virgill* is described, to be an horrible monster, then which there is nothing more swift. It seemeth also that Fame agreeth most with the dead, but Glorie belongeth also to the liuing. For the excellent Philosophers, and great Captaines, nowe long since dead, are sayd by Fame to be exalted to the starres, but glorie the liuing also enioy.

Signior *Villa* was pleased with this answer, and the Ladie *Tarq. Molza* drawing neare, a woman of most pregnant capacitie, seeing how in that noble assembly there was not anie, who would further propound with the fauor of the Queen, spoke after this sort: It appeareth Sir knight, that you haue handled this argument of honour, in fauour onely of

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men, as though women therein, had no part at all: seeing all those aduertisements by which honor is preserved, do in a manner pertain altogether to men, and little or nothing to women; because for my part I will not be of opinion, that a woman looseth her honor, if with her proper valor she repel not iniurie, or fight not for her Countie, Prince, children, or husband, performing other such like actions, as belong vnto fortitude. Forbear not therefore to instruct women, how they may preserve their honor: And *Gualinguo*: Although in women, most gentle Lady, all those vertues are found, which proportionally are correspondent to the vertues of men, notwithstanding it seemeth, that for preserving their honor, their condition is farre better then mens: for Honor feminine is preserved by not failing onely in one of their proper particular vertues, which is honestie. If a woman therefore, replied Lady *Tarquinia*, should committe a theft, manslaughter, or faile in any other part of Iustice, should she not for such a fact be infamous? And *Gualenguo*: Although such offences, in men and women, are by the laws equally punished, yet as often as in a woman they are not accompanied with the act of dishonestie, they make her not infamous. Therefore it was not lawfull with the Hebrewes nor Romaines, to refuse their wiues, as also at this day the seperation of mariage bed is not permitted, but for crime of dishonestie, seeing in a woman, this offence is so grieuous, as with her owne, shee staineth also the honour of her husband.

This is a great matter you acquaint me withal, added *Molza*, neither can I perceiue how it may bee, the definition of honor, remaining firme, wherein you conclude, that honor is lost through our own, and not for anothers defect: the adulterie therefore of the wife, being of a wife the defect and offence, and not of her husband, shee only ought therefore to bee infamous.

The wife, answered *Gua.* being in her husbands power, and vnder his gouernment, it appereth shee cannot offend, without

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without some fault in her husband, as he that either by consent, or euill gouernment, hath beene the occasion of such a defect: and therefore it cannot bee that the adulterous wife, should not in some part offend her husbands honour, because such a man, cannot bee in that good opinion hee first was, with them who haue notice of this offence, for they iudge him ignorant, of small worth, and worthy of that contempt his wife and adulterer procure him. And if the husband, saide *Molza*, knewe not the adulterie of his wife, but had thereof all the conuenient care hee might, and yet for all this, his wife should bee so malicious, as hee not ware thereof, to set a creast on his head: should the husband for this lose his honour?

A man not beeing able, answered *Gualenguo*, to auoide all snares and deceits, nor to preuent those thinges, whereof he hath no knowledge, should not altogether loose his honour, notwithstanding, it could not otherwise in some sorte be, but that he should be touched, and shake his reputation with those men, who were acquainted with his wifes adulterie: yet could he not in comparison of honor be excepted against, vnlesse it were prooued, that he tollerated his wifes dishonestie, for some benefit he hoped for in simplicitie, or through folly; suffering her to go into places dishonest, or to conuerse with women of euill name, or where there were daunger that shee might committe adulterie; for certainly hee is a foole, that putteth fire to rowe and thinketh it shoulde not burne.

To retourné therefore to our purpose, a woman desirous to preferue her honor, ought to haue an eye to preferue her honestie, and not onely to bee free from offence, but also from suspition of offence: the which shee shall conueniently doo, if shee accompanie her wordes, laughter, lookes, and carriage of her person, with that graue and reuerent maiestie, as is be seeming a chaste and modest Matrone, and aboue all, to auoide the familiar conuersation

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uerfation of any man, be his condition whatfoeuer, except her father, fonne, and brother : For honor hauing his foundation and proper effence in the opinion of the worlde, it is not fo much loft for offence, as by probable prefumptions of offending. With this aunfwere, by the Queene commended, and by all thefe moft chafte and vertuous Ladies confirmed, they ended the difcourfe of honor; and the Lady *Laura Peuerara* was called, who with fingular delight to the hearers, fung vnto the Harpe an amorous Sonnet. But the court and huutfmen arriued, the Queene & company retired them felues into the lodging of the Duchefle, where, with diuerfe entertainements they fpend the time while Supper; which finished, and certaine dances exercifed, the night being well fpend, the Duke rofe vp, and referring ouer his fih-
ing to the day following they all betooke
themfelues to their reft.

The



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The fourth daies discourse:

Wherein is discussed, the iniquitie of Combate, and single fight for maintenance of reputation, with the meane to accommodate quarrels, and reduce vnto peace priuate enmities.



TH E whole Court and his Highnesse, beeing ready in the morning to haue gone to sea, there sodainly rose a most furious winde, which hauing incontinently, as it were, obscured the ayre, with thicke and darke cloudes, helde the whole company in suspence, till dinner time: Finally, by all those ex-

perienced, the time being thought vnfit, eyther to drawe the nettes, or practise other manner of fishing, as also to be dangerous, for going on the sea; the Duke, after the tabies were taken away, and the rayne euen now ready to descend, gaue libertie to the Ladies and Gentlemen, to betake themselues to that entertainment of time, which best stode with their contentment: some therefore went to cardes, some to tables, other some to chesse, and diuers spent the time in plesant discourses. Signior *Gualinguo* was set downe by himselfe alone, al melancholy, leaning his cheek on his hand: which Count *Alfonso Turchi* perceuing, as he who is desirous to vnderstand (especially such matters as appertaine to knighthoode) going to count *Scandiano*, count *Hercules Benelacqua*, and count *Guido Calcagnini*, who stood beholding at a window the tempestuous sea: Let vs go, saide he, to Signior *Gualinguo*, who sitteth there altogether idle, and procure we him to discouise a little more particularly touching Honour and Combate. For although yesterday, he entreated thereof, yet stode he

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altogether vpon generalities, not extending himselfe greatly to particulars, which in my opinion, are of no small importance. This motion wel pleased the other three Gentlemen, it seeming vnto them, that they could not spend the day in more pleasing or profitable entertainment. Approaching therefore neare *Gualinguo*, sir knight, said Count *Alfonso*, if we be importunate, blame your owne vertue, and the desire wee haue to vnderstand : Yester euening in fauour of the Queene, to our great benefit and contentment, you made it knowne, that there were two honors, in themselves diuerse, the one of which might be called perfect, grounded vpon an opinion, for the most part false ; and the other truly perfect, as grounded vpon true apparant valour, and vpon the most excellent of all vertuous operations. To day seeing the time forcibly keepeth vs in the house, we desire, that in fauour of your selfe, you wil discourse of combate: for those who write of combat, not hauing distinctly known the nature of honor, doubtlesse, they haue not thereof sincerely intreated.

Although to this houre, answered *Gualinguo*, there hath not any written sufficiently of Combate, and that for this, many abuses haue bene introduced into the Titles of honor; yet in this, neither I can, or ought to giue you satisfaction : first, because the Treatise thereof is superfluous, Combate now being no more in vlc, but remooued out of christian commonwealths, by Popes and christian Princes, as a thing certainly, I will not say barbarous, (in that amongst Barbarians wee neuer finde it accustomed) but impious and prophane: secondarily, as a man expressing the trueth, I neyther can nor ought to dilate, but in discommendation of it, shewing contriary to the vanitie of Doctour *Paris de Putco*, and *Possenuino*, that it is vniust, and worthy to be wholly banished out of the commonwealth, as a destroyer of humane felicity; if you wil not according to our desire, said *Alfonso*, discourse thereof, at the least yet, may it please you, by vs demanded, to answer to those points, wherein we do doubt, & haue not vnderstanding. And *Gualinguo*: I wil not refuse to make answer,

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swer and resolute you to my power, if you shoulde thereof haue any wrong or sinister opinion. You intreating of honour, added Count *Alfonso*, sayde, that Combate was wholly grounded vpon that honour, wee bring with vs from our mothers wombe, and whereof euery one maketh profession, it beeing honour imperfect: and that it hath nothing to doe with that honour which is a parte or circumstance of felicitie. Of this I stand in doubt: For besides that *Possentino* holdeth the contrary, hee grounding Combate vpon that honour which is a signe of beneficent opinion: further then this, also it seemeth there is some reason, that a man in combate, putting his life to compromise, ought rather to expose it for honour perfect, than imperfect: especially perfect honour, being part of felicitie, vnto which, as to his proper end man directeth all his operations. And *Gualinguo*: What I told you yesterday is true, that Combate hath not to do with that honor, which is a part of felicitie, & reward of beneficence: the which I will make you conceiue, by the definition it selfe of Combate, which in my opinion ought to be such: Combate is a battaile betwixt twoo of equall interest, in some poynt of honor, in the end whereof the vanquished incurreth infamy, and the victor remaineth possessed of Honour: Wee hauing therefore shewed that infamie is not contrary, to perfect honour, which with valour is acquired, it followeth that the honour in Combate debated, neyther is, nor can bee perfect honour: but that honour, which is proper contrary to infamy.

This also is made manifest by the two meanes, wherewith quarrels are protested: For hee which challengeth, called therefore the Assailant, offereth to proue vpon him chalenged, who in this respect is termed Defendant, that he hath committed some of those offences, that depriue of honor, and that therefore he is infamous: in the other kinde, the assailant offereth to proue himselfe a man of honor, and that hee is vnwoorthy of the iniury and contempt, which the Defendant hath offered him, being as much as if he shoulde

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say, that he would proue vpon him, that himselfe neuer faile in iustice, nor honor. For by such defects a man commeth into contempt: and to stand vpon vse and custome, wee neuer do, nor shall finde, that any quarrels haue beene vndertaken, about perfect honor, or that any for this haue come to combat: for certainly it would be a ridiculous matter, if any should offer to proue, that he is a man, worthy of a statue, Image, crowne, a publike gift, to be reuerenced, giuen place vnto, celebrated with hymnes, or honored with such like honors, as also it would be as far frō reason, for a man to proue one infamous, not because he had offended, but in that hee neuer receiued any of those honors by me recited. And to answer that you spake touching *Posseuino*, I know not how he came to be so blinde, as hauing defined honor, and entreated thereof, as the reward and signe of beneficence, he afterward hath so vnadvisedly thereupon grounded Combate, minding that the honor contended vpon, within the listes, should be that, which is the reward of beneficence, neither can wee say, that he intended it by any other honor: for besides that in all his booke he hath not discusse or knowne any other honor but this, which is a part and proper condition of felicitie; he yet further in the beginning of the fift Booke manifesteth himselfe cleerely, saying that the honor, which is the end of Combate, is explained and defined in that part of Politickes which handleth Customs; and that therefore the Treatise of Combate, is a matter pertaining to the Moralist, and not to the Ciuilian: and why might not this honor saide count *Alfonso Turchi*, be the reward of the victor in the listes? considering that to such a one after victorie, great honors were done, he being accompanied out of the field, with sound of drum and trumpet, and denounced valorous of all men: and finally, the armes hung vp in the church, wherewith he had fought, to the perpetual glory of such a fact: which armes, after the nature of a statue, represented the image of the victors valor. Relying on the definition of perfect honor, said *Gual:* by vs recited, & by the same *Posseuino* confirmed, after *Aristotles* opinion

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pinion it cannot be the reward of the victor in the listes; for he performeth no act of beneficence, but to himselfe, overthrowing his enemy: but rather in respect of the world, he performeth a worke of maleficence, and therefore is worthy of blame: because hee offendeth the life and honour of his neighbour, and deprieth the common wealth of a champion.

And touching those, which you tearme honors within the listes these be no true honors, in that they neither are, nor can be the rewards of beneficence, as also it is no perfect honor, to hang vp our armes in the church of God: first because he that is conqueror, not to himselfe, but to the glorie of God hangeth them vpp: and though he had done it in fauour of himselfe, yet could this be no honor vnto him, in that, though by our selues, we may be made worthy of honor, yet of our selues, as we haue proued, wee cannot bee honored: for then it would follow, that for the selfe same respect, and at the selfe same time, one may be both honorer and honored, which is impossible: I hauing many times considered, saide Count *Guido*, of hanging vp in the Temples the armes of the Champions in combate, dedicating them to God: I could not but with wonder rest scandalized with so great an abuse, especially God in his holy law, hauing commaunded, that menquellers, should be removed from his aulrar; for what thing could be more impious, and prophane, then to present before God the vniust sword, all begoared and tainted in humane blood, and which before had destroyed the image of God, and dispeased the honor and life of his neighbour. The holy Ghost euer be praised, who yet in the end hath vouchsafed, to breath vppon the soules of christian Princes, and hath removed vniust combate, which was the occasion of so many euils. Questionlesse it was a singular fauor, proceeding from the diuine bountie and goodnesse of God (saide Count *Hercules*) to root out of the world so great an abuse. But to returne to *Pesseuino*, of whom sometimes, I was wont to be enamoured, I now know, that there can no

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excuse bee found, but that, his error is to be blamed: seeing it is manifestly proued by the selfe same definition, hee deliuereth, of Combate, that the honour contended of in the listes, is not that honour hee defined, and whereof in his booke, hee hath intreated, which definition hee setteth downe with farre greater circumstances, then you do yours, wherfore of necessitie either yours must be defectiue, or his superabundant, he affirming combate to bee a voluntarie encounter, betwixt two men, by which the one armed entredeth to proue vpon the other, by his owne proper valor, not therein any way hindred, and in the space of a day, that he is an honorable man, and not worthie to be contemned, nor iniured: as also the other hath a determination to proue the contrarie. Out of doubt by these last words in this definition, it cannot be entended by perfect honor, and by beneficent actiō acquired, seeing he mindeth not to proue, that he hath performed any great benefite, that he is worthy of a statue, crowne, or some other such like reward: except peraduenture *Posseninos* minde was, or that he supposed, the man vnworthie of contempt, to be also worthie of the rewarde of beneficence. Notwithstanding *Possenino*, answered *Gualin*: endeuoreth to shew, that this his definition, is most perfect, as in it being nothing superfluous or improper, and that it might be a perspicuous beginning to the vnderstanding of all thinges, that appertaine to combat: yet to himselfe ouermuch affected, he is deceiued, for hee hath prapostered it with words superfluous, defectiue, and improper.

Now in all affection, sir Knight I beseech you (said Count *Alfonso*) be it not vnto you displeasing, to examine this definition by points and parcels, to the end, we may vnderstand the truth, for I for my part euer iudged, that *Possenino*, by this definition had better exprest the nature of combate, then any other, that hitherto had written. Beginning at the first worde (answered *Gua.*) encounter or conflict, wherof in this definition, he maketh a generall vse: it is not a worde proper, but translated; for it is drawne from hewing down trees,
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Overthrowing houses, walles, towres, and such like : and it is a thing certaine (as the Philosopher teacheth) that translated or metaphoricall wordes, as we call them, are not apt to expresse the essence of things : and therefore they should neuer be placed in definitions, especially, when there bee wordes proper to serue the turne : and although without preiudice to truth, we should grant, that it were not a word translated, yet could he not denie, that he, when he might haue placed in his definition, a kinde more neare, hath vsed one more vniuersal and remote, considering that conflict or encounter, is much more remote and vniuersall, then is their word battaile, seeing euery battaile may bee saide to bee a conflict, but yet euery conflict may not bee a battaile : except *Possenuino* were of opinion, that to overthrowe walles, trees, houses, or such like things, were to be termed a battaile. Having therefore in this definition placed the kinde remote, for that nearer to the nature of the thing, it seemeth he made but small accout of his maisters precepts in his Logicke; and the error he hath committed, is no lesse, then being to define man, he hath defined him for a creature, and not for a reasonable substance. But for all this he sheweth, replied Count *Alfonso*, with iudgement to haue set downe these wordes : saying : from hence wee may gather that all both wise and ignorant, doe call such an encounter or conflict if we so please, Combate ? Although this be false (said *Gualinguo*) as I will shewe you, yet admit it were true, that Combate ordinarily were called a conflict, it should not for all this bee set downe in the definition of Combate, this being a worde translated improper, and insufficient, to distinguish the nature of Combate : For as authoritie coupled with reason, maketh great prooffe, so of reason abandoned, it is insufficient, neither shall wee euer finde, that the Philosopher without reason hath preuailed by authoritie : but this is farre from truth, that such a like battaile, is by all men called a conflict : And beginning with excellent Doctor *Paris de puteo*, who is the ancientest
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and of greateſt authoritie, he calleth combat a ſingle battaile, and neuer termeth it an encounter or conflict, and notwithstanding *Mutio Inſtinopolitano* ſometimes hath named it a conflict, yet when he aſſigneth the proper definition thereof, he ſaith, that combat is a battaile, of body to body, for prooſe of truth: and *Ariosto* ſpeaking of battaile hand to hand, calleth it not an encounter, or conflict, but ſingle fight, ſaying:

Fine, or ſix dayes, this ſingle fight deferred was.

And that which followeth: by this authoritie, one may vnderſtand, that *Poſſenino* hath erred in ſaying, that both the wiſe, and ignorant, call combat a conflict: but rather any one of iudgement, hauing an eye to the latine, which ſaith, ſingle fight: and to the Greeke which termeth it *Monomachia*, ſignifying the ſelfe ſame, will define it a battaile, and not a conflict. But to come to that other word voluntarie, it is ſuperfluous, improperly placed, and not neceſſarie, as he affirmeth, to diſtinguiſh a battaile made by force & in this point, he hath no better vſed *Ariſtotles* doctrine, then before in other places he hath done. But how is it ſuperfluous, replied Count *Alfonſo*, are there not many that fight by constraint? It is ſuperfluous (answered *Gualinguo*) becauſe without it, the definition may ſtand, ſeeing ſuch a chance can neuer happen, that two combatantes within the liſtes ſhould fight, by force, in that manner hee ſpeaketh of, and alwaies when there is a battaile, it is ſuppoſed to be voluntarie; but further, he hath vſed this word voluntarie, vnproperly, in hauing applied it abſolutely; for although combat be voluntary, yet is it not abſolutely voluntary, but hath euer mixed with it ſome circumſtance, not voluntarie. I reſt altogether perplexed (ſaide Count *Alfonſo*) neither can I imagine, how combat ſhould be, either voluntarie, or violent. To manifeſt this vnto you (returned *Gualinguo*) and withall, to diſcouer the error of *Poſſenino*, it is neceſſary, that I giue you diſtinctly to vnderſtand, what actions bee abſolutely voluntary, and what not voluntary, and which mixed, that

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that is which haue ioyned with the a little force or cōstraint : and this I will do the more willingly, in that all this I am to tell you, wilbe no smal assistance, to the vnderstanding of vertuous operations : for no action can be tearmed vertuous, or vitious, worthie of honor, or deseruing blame, demeriting reward, or punishment, if it be not absolutely voluntarie.

I assume therefore that to be absolutely voluntarie, seuen conditions are required, as the Philosopher very well teacheth in his Moralles; the first is, that the beginning be in him that worketh, and not external or without him : the second is, that he vnderstand his owne action : the third, concerning what, or for what cause he worketh : the fift, after what sorte : the sixt, to what end, that is, in fauour of whom : the last, that he performe such an action, voluntarily, and not with grieve : whensoever therefore, any of these conditions shall faile, out of doubt the action, cannot absolutely be termed voluntarie, but shal either, not be voluntary, or retaine with it, some part or circumstance of constraint. Help my vnderstanding (said Count *Alfonso*) with some example, to the end I may better comprehend these circumstaunces of absolutely voluntarie. And *Gua.* behold an example, we may commit an error, not vnderstanding the matter, as hee doth, that putteth away a false crown esteeming it good : this action may be tearmed not voluntarie, for if he had knowne so much, being an honest man, he would not haue spent it : and therefore is worthie of pardon, and not of punishment : In like sort we may erre, not knowing the matter, or cōcerning what wee worke, as if one should offend his Father, esteeming him an enemie, in such maner as vnhappy *Oedipus* did : wee may likewise erre by not knowing the instrument wherewith wee worke, as if one should strike with a speare, beleeuing it to be without a head, or with a marble stone, taking it for a pumix : Fiftly wee erre about the maner how : as if one thinking to strike softly, shoulde smite hard. Sixtly, we erre concerning the end, & of all other errors it is the greatest, as if a Phisition to heale his patient, should lance

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an impostume, and by such incision procure him to die: lastly, that action is not absolutely voluntary, but hath somewhat not voluntary mixt with it: when one worketh hauing knowledge of al the circumstances aboue named, & yet inforced, & with grief, performs such an action, as it hapneth to him, who to saue his life, casteth his goods into the sea. Now by absolute voluntary, we may conceiue that, not voluntary, which is in two maners: that is, by force or ignorance: by force is that, when the beginning of the action consisteth not in the performer, but is extrinsecall and without him, as if one taking my arme by force, should strike another therewith: and therefore this action is violent, because the actor consenteth not thereunto, neither as agent nor patient: by ignorance is he, that worketh, not knowing any of those circumstances by me recited: and this, though alwayes it be not voluntary, yet is it not euer vnwillingly performed, but sometimes it hapneth, that they be performed both voluntarily, and not. How can it be, said count *Guydo*, that one thing may be, not voluntary, & yet voluntarily acted. When after an operation, performed ignorantly, replied *Gualin*. there insueth not grieffe, or repentance, but rather ioy and contentment, that is an action not voluntary, voluntarily performed: as if one should shoot an arrow, where he thought some wilde beast lay hid, and with this should kil his enemy there in couert, it might be said, that this man vnwillingly, had voluntarily slaine him, he after the fact remaining ioyful, and wel satisfied; but when repentance followeth such operations, in such a case they are not voluntary, and against wil performed. There be other actions, which (as I haue said) be termed mixed, because they haue annexed to the, some respects voluntary, som not voluntary: for voluntary they are, as not being performed by force.

For the beginning of the action is in the actor, who is priuy to the circumstances by me rehearsed; but yet haue some consideration in them of not voluntary, insomuch, as they are performed for feare of greater ill, or for hope of some good, & so vnwillingly performed: being such actions as no man of
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sound minde woulde vndertake: as if a tyrant hauing in his power, the father or children of some one, should command him to performe som infamous fact, with this condition, that performing it, his father and children should be free, and on the contrary not accomplishing it, they shuld be put to death. The like is as I said by them, who for feare of shipwrack, cast out their goodes: for simply there is no man, that of his own proper will, casteth away his goodes: this granted, wee may easily conceiue, that this word voluntary, placed by *Possuino*, in his definition of Combate, cannot be intended by absolute voluntarines, as himselfe (it seemeth) vnderstands it: for notwithstanding in him that fighteth, the internal beginning of such an action consisteth, & that it is not performed by ignorance, yet hath it some circumstance of not voluntary annexed to it: first, because it is done for feare of greater euill, as would be the losse of honor, which the professor thereof preferreth before his own life: secondly, in that no man of right sense, would chuse to put his life, honor, & soul, to cōpromise, as combatants do within the lists. *Poss.* hath erred, by improperly placing this word voluntarily in his definition; neither can this alegation excuse him, that he put it in, for difference of conflict made by force; seeing all conflicts are forcibly attempted after the same maner I haue declared, they beeing performed for feare of greater euil: but if he meant to place it as a difference, of violent, & not voluntary; which is of that when the beginning of operation consists not in the actor, it would be superfluous, for such an instance can not be imagined in combatants within the lists: vnlesse *Possen.* meant that the wind shuld face to face blow the combatants one against an other with their armes, the one by the other to be brused. But proceeding further, after hee hath said, that combate is a voluntarie incounter or conflict, he addeth: wherein one intendeth to proue vpon another, that he is an honorable man, and vnworthy to be iniured or contemned; as likewise the other mindeth to prooue the contrary.

In this last clause there be two errors; first, that there being

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two kindes of quarrelles, for which the assailant, chalengeth combat, he hath made mention, only of one: the second is, that he hath improperly placed this word, to prooue, in the person of the defendant, which is proper to the assailant. I would haue thought, said the Count of *Scandiano*, that quarrelles had not beene onely of two sortes, but rather infinite, for which men fight: Although the quarrelles may be infinite, answered *Gualenguo*, that procure combat, yet are they all reduced to two heades, as likewise iniurie and impeaching another mans honor, be of two sortes: for iniurie is either committed in words or deeds: in iniury of deeds, the assailant being euer the partie iniured, he entendeth to prooue vpon the defendant, that he is an honorable man, and vnworthy to be contemned: and so consequently, that the defendant, in offending him, hath carried himselfe, as an vniust and wicked man; the defendant minding to maintaine the contrary. In the iniurie of wordes, the Assailant is for the most part him iniurying, who by the iniured repelled with a lie, is inforced to auerre his saying: and therefore he entendeth to aprooue vpon the defendant, that he hath failed in iustice or valor, and that hee deserueth not to bee in the number of men honourable, the defendant determining to maintaine the contrarie: Yet *Possenino*, in his definition comprehendeth not the second manner, which respecteth the iniurie of wordes, but onely the first, hauing relation to iniurie in deedes, and therefore in this point is defectiue. The vsing of this worde. To prooue, in the person of the defendant, was no lesse error, saide Count *Alfonso*, because vnto the assailant it is so proper, as that there haue beene some (whose opinion notwithstanding I do not commend) who setting downe precepts for the forming of billes, haue aduised the defendantes, that in answering, they should not vse this worde, to prooue, because by this meanes, of defendants, they should make themselves assailantes, and bee preiudiced in the election of armes.

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Although after a confused maner, said the count *Scandiano*, I vnderstand these termes, Assailant, and Defendant, yet I desire to haue of them more full and ample knowledge, as also wherefore to prooue, is proper to the assailant, and to sustaine and maintaine to the defendant: These termes (answered *Gualinguo*) are taken out of the ciuil lawe, wherein hee that demandeth and mooueth strife, is named the Assailant, and the chalenged Defendant: So that in Combate the challenger is called, Assailant, and he challenged Defendant: And as by the Ciuil law, it concerneth him Plaintife, to prooue by testimony or writings wherefore hee pretendeth to vsurpe the Defendaunts goodes: So in Combate it belongeth to the Assailant, to proue wherefore he vsurpeth the Defendants honor: And thetefore it is necessary that the first prouocation proceede from the Assailant, in assaulting the Defendant, to which Defendant as a Castell, it sufficeth to sustaine the assault: wherefore as well in combat, as in ciuill lawe, the state of the Defendant, is better than of the Assailant: in that the Assailant not subduing, looseth, and the Defendant not loosing, ouercommeth. It seemeth further, saide Count *Guido*, that *Possenino* thought it necessary to insert this word Armes, in the definition of combate, saying: that the one wil prooue by Armes, and as foloweth: whereof I am doubtfull, especially by the Lombards lawe, who were the authors of combate, seeing they allow not, that the Combatants shoulde vse other armes in Combate, than staues, and if armes were graunted, this was onely in quarrels that imported some offence against the maiestie of the Prince. And *Gualinguo*: If *Possenino* by armes intendes onely those which are made of yron, or Steele, which cutte, pricke, and kill, out of doubt, it is superfluous, seeing without such armes quarrels may be ended, and an enemye vanquished, within the lists. It seemeth, saide Count *Hercules Beuelacqua* that hee expresseth himselfe, because he saith, he putte in armes in that definition, for the difference betwixt them, and prooffe of testimony, & other means, as with fistes,

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buffetting, and other such like offences, which are not properly termed combat: In my opinion also that other circumstance is not necessarie, but rather superfluous (in the space of one day) saying, that the assailant in the space of a day mindeth to proue, that he is a man of honor. Wherefore is that superfluous, said Count *Alfonso*; would you that there should be no end of the defendants fighting? And *Gualinguo*: Questionlesse, it is superfluous, for though they should fight out the battaile, till one were slaine, (which sometimes, by consent of the defendant, they do) yet could it not therefore be saide, that such a battaile were not combat. *Possenuino*, said *Turcho*, in the beginning of his fift and last booke of Honor, moueth a question, which hath, and will euer bee readye to procure disputation amongst the curious, and that is, whether the treatie of combat, appertaineth to militarie discipline, to politicall customes, or to the wisdom of the lawes: and finally it seemeth, that with most effectuall reasons hee concludeth, that the treatie thereof properly appertaineth to politicke customes, and morrall philosophy, being altogether alienate from professors of the law, and souldiers: and our countrie man *Pigna*, was of the same opinion, as he affirmeth in his booke intituled of honor, and men heroicall. Touching this also I would willingly vnderstand your minde, that relying on *Possenuino* and *Pigna* I continue not still deceiued, as I was wont. In very deed, said *Gualinguo*, you should bee deceiued, if you entred into any such opinion, for politick customes neither, can, nor ought in any sort, to entreat of combat, combat being a thing vniust, & contrary to their foundations. *Possenuino*, replied *Turcho*, doth yet by liuely reasons shew, that combat hath relation to politicke customes, as that which intreateth of iniuries, and determineth honour, which is the ende of Combat; for combat is ordained to no other end, but to repel iniuries, and recouer honor: and more, by politicke customes, we conceiue, who is honorable, and who not, as who is iniuried, and who not: and not by the policy of lawes, and magistrates, which discusse not of ver-

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tue, vices, honor, or felicitie: but supposing all these things
 with good lawes, & feare of punishment, enforce malicious,
 & ignorant men, to liue according to vertue. By that I haue
 otherwise said, answered *Gualin*. in the discourse of honour,
 as also by that I am to declare vnto you, it will bee an easie
 matter to conceiue the sophistications of *Possenius*, who de-
 sirous to entreat of combate, with morall foundations, and
 according to *Aristotle*, is fallen into a sea of errors, & manifest
 contradictions, giuing to vnderstand, without other additi-
 on, that combat is no point of morall discipline, as it is onely
 moral: for the morall Philosopher hauing felicitie for his
 scope, as he which entendes no other course, but to shew the
 meanes whereby a man may become happy, cannot dispose
 of these things which are contrarie to felicitie, except by the
 same meanes he considereth of vice, that is, as of a thing wor-
 thy to be discommended, and by them altogether to bee a-
 uoyded which desire humane felicitie: neither preuaileth it
 to say, that moral philosophie defineth that honour, where-
 vpon combat is grounded, for I haue proued vnto you, that
 the Moralist considereth nothing at all, nor neuer defineth
 this honor wherevpon combat is grounded, but onely that,
 which by beneficent action is acquired: for this by waye of
 combat can neither be acquired, or preserved, as he foolish-
 ly affirmeth, as also it were to small purpose to say, that by
 Ethicks wee knowe, who is honorable, and who not: for al-
 though this be tru, yet is it not to be vnderstood by that ho-
 nor, wherof euery one maketh profession; but by that, which
 to a few is participated, being the reward of excellent acti-
 on, & a principal circumstance of felicitie: for he that vnder-
 standeth such an action, vnderstandeth likewise who is wor-
 thy: and touching that he addeth, howe the Moralist in-
 treateth of iniurie; for repelling whereof combat is introdu-
 ced: I say, the consequence is nothing worth: for the Mo-
 ralist discourseth of iniuries for instruction, how to knowe
 the iust from the vniust, and not that such iniuries, are by
 combat to be repelled, seeing iniustice and iniurie is to
 be

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be returned with iustice, as the lawes commaund, and not by vniust meanes, as is combate. But before you numbred the supportation of iniurie amongst vices, said Count *Guydo*, and not reuenging the same with proper valor. The Pereparetike (answered *Gualinguo*) doth not spoile a man of affections, like the Stoicke, for man being partaker of the sensitive facultie, can not be insensible: but woulde, that with reason moderating them, he might reduce them to the state of mediocritie: it is therefore necessary, that a man in the same instant hee is offended, should be angry, and therefore at the same time it shall bee lawfull for him to make that reuenge he can, and which honestie permitteth: which not doing, he runneth into the vice of stupiditie, or pusillanimitie (if wee may vse such wordes:) And if hee could not, replied *Turchi* at the same instant returne due reuenge, eyther through inequality of party, or some other impediment, to repell the iniury, and not seeme sottish, shall it not bee lawfull for him, to haue recourse to combate, and to attempt the recouery of honor, by his proper valor. It is not requisite for him, answered *Gualinguo*, to haue recourse to combate: for as I told you, he must not repell iniurie, with a meane vniust, but iust, according as the lawes commaund: Wherefore occasion once past, it is not conuenient, that in cold blood, as we vsually say, he performe any other matter with his proper valor: for in such a case, the condition of the iniurier is far worse, than of him iniuriéd. How may it be said count *Guido*, that the offerer of iniurie, should be of worse condition in honor, than he that receiueth it: I of my selfe following common opinion, should haue beleued the contrary: considering the iniurier vsurpeth the honor of him iniuriéd, and necessarily vrgeth him to recouery of the same. The condition of the iniuriéd is lesse wicked, said *Gual*: because, to receiue iniury, sheweth no more but impotencie, & is without vice: but to offer it, is a thing vitious, and blame-worthy, considering he faileth in iustice, and therefore looseth his honor. In like maner, the receiuer of iniury looseth his honor, said *Cal-*
cagnino,

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Calcagnino) by failing in valor, and shewing himselfe worthy of contempt. To receiue iniurie, is not to faile in valor (answered *Gualinguo*) but so to receiue it, as thereof to make no iust reuenge. And what vnderstand you by iust reuenge, replied *Calcagnino*? And *Gualinguo*: the reuenge shalbe iust, when at the same instant hee is offended, hee shall attempt to repell the iniurie with his proper valor: and it is iust, for he doth that, which by naturall and ciuill law, is permitted vnto him, which make it lawfull, to repell force, with force: and when through inequality of partie, or other impediment, he cannot performe this, hee is bound after the fact, to haue recourse to the magistrate, and by them to seeke reuenge, rather then by combate, to the end that Magistrates, and lawes, seeme not in Citties to be created in vaine. Hee that in such a case shuld runne to the Magistrate (saide count *Hercules*) would giue notice of small valor, and shewe himselfe worthy of contempt, and consequently, to be but slenderly honored. No man remaineth dishonored (saide *Gualinguo*) but hee which offendeth against iustice, or fortitude, as wee haue said: therefore he which in receiuing iniurie, hath committed no vile fact, looseth not his honor, although afterwarde, he seek reuenge at the hande of the Magistrate: neither for this, doth he faile in valor, but he should faile in iustice, if contemning the lawes, and Magistrates, hee assayed reuenge of himselfe, and should attempt against the lawes. I beseech you tell mee vnfaignedly, hee that goeth about to recouer his goods, and seeketh reuenge of the theefe, faileth hee in valor, hauing recourse to the Magistrates? I know you will say hee doth not, because the laws so commaunde: and wherefore then would you haue him to faile, which assayeth to recouer his honour, and seeketh reuenge from the Magistrate, seeing the laws so commaunde, and that they punish them seuerely, who attempt by any other meanes, as contemners of the Magistrates, and laws, which chastice with no lesse penalty impeachers of another mans honor, then the offence that theeuers commit.

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Me thinkes sir Knight, said the count of *Scandiano*, you are contrarie to your selfe; for yesterday you saide, that a man of honor, ought by al meanes to repell iniurie, not to seeme worthy of contempt: & that he ought not only to enter into combat, but further was bound to maintain an vniust quarrel, for the concealing of his defect, seeing honor is not lost before offences be reuealed: and now you would haue him seek recouerie of his honor, & reuenge not by his own proper valor, but from the hands of the magistrate: and there is no doubt, but relying on the worlds iudgement, hee that attempted to recouer honor, by this means should bee noted for vile & cowardlike. There is no contradictō in my words (answered *Gualinguo*) if in sinister sence they be not interpreted. I then said, and now affirme, that a man of honor ought by all meanes to endeuer to maintaine possession thereof: but aboue all, by iust means, as these be I haue here set down vnto you: and if they were not sufficient, through some euill custome, and that he were in danger to lose his honour, hee ought not refuse then to fight, notwithstanding the quarrel were vniust, & enter into the lists, if cōbat were in vse: & this is one of the principallest imperfectiōs, that this honor hath, by me rightly termed, imperfect; wherfore whosoever thereof maketh professiō, he ought by right & wrong to procure the preservation of it; as was yesterday sufficiently shewed: only I wil say, that the moral philosopher determineth not of this honor, he being of himselfe, and alone, as a thing vnperfect, hardly capable of humane felicitie, and consequently lesse ought to censure, or entreate of vniust combat, seeing vppon this, honour is altogether grounded, and hath his foundation.

You (replied the Counte *Scandiano*) euer terme Combate vniust, yet haue you made no demonstration of the iniustice thereof; and notwithstanding, this I haue seene, some places cited out of *Aristotle* by those that are learned, out of which they gather, that combat is iust, and ought to bee permitted: especially in the first of his Rhetoricke,

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thoricke, where hee admitteth reuenge, which not beeing granted, saith hee, diuers inconueniences woulde ensue: and in the fift of his *Morales* hee saith, that Citizens must endeueour to repell offence, in that to suffer iniurie is a kinde of seruitude: And *Homer* whose poeme by opinion of the diuine Philosopher, is the seeing glasse of humane life, and author of combate, maketh *Paris* and *Mene-laüs* to fight hand to hand at defiance, as also *Hector* and *Aiax*, the which by *Virgil* & *Ariosto* hath bin obserued: neither wanteth there of the grauest authors, who writing, labour to make it iust, and worthy to bee admitted, as a thing profitable to preservation, and recouerie of honor, and to liue well in a Cittie amongst whom is Doctor *Paris de puteo*, and *Possenino*, neither are their arguments to bee dispised, and for my part, I esteeme them preualent.

If by others, and especially by most learned *Susius*, saide *Gualinguo*, it were not prooued against Doctor *Paris de puteo* and *Possenino*, that Combate is a thing most vniust, I would labour to make you conceiue the iniustice thereof, but this man hauing philosophically and learnedly entreated thereof in a booke of his owne, intituled of the iniustice of Combate, referring you ouer to that, I will speake no further of it. Although excellent *Susius*, saide *Beuelacqua*, hath plentifully spoken thereof, as you say, yet wil it be acceptable to vnderstand also something from you in this point, seeing at this instant we haue not *Susius* booke about vs. That you may not account me, luskish & slothfull, saide *Gua.* beholde I desire to giue you satisfaction. Combate, is repugnant to nature, & contrary to laws diuine, and ciuill: To Nature it repugneth, because shee entendeth generation and preservation; Combate to kil and destroy: it is contrary to lawes diuine, and ciuill, because neither by the one, or other law it is permitted, that a particular man shuld dispose, either of his own, or of another mans life: considering that the law respecteth a particular man, not as of himselfe, but as belonging to the country & Prince, vnder

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whose dominion he is subiect. Secondly it is vniust, because it contendeth to prooue the vertue of the minde, with force and dexteritie of body; which meane is by it selfe insufficient, for if with force of body the vertue of the mind, were necessarily conioyned, a country man or porter, or some other more base, might easily be more honorable & vertuous then one noble. Thirdly, in combate the knowledge of truth and equitie, is referred to the arbitrement of fortune, a Iudge most vncertaine, and to the sword, deprived of reason: therefore it is vniust: neither auaieth it any thing to saye, that in combate God fauoureth the iust; for if that were true, he should neuer ouercome that had wrong on his side, and yet we see by experience, that the lier by being more strong and fortunate, hath ouercome him with truth on his side: so that to ordaine combat, is rather a tempting of God, then by such a meanes to draw from God iust iudgement. Finally, it was neuer by any common wealth accepted, or approued of, neither by any auncient State, that for cause of honor, or wants of prooffe in investigation of truth, they should haue recourse to combate; nor *Aristotle*, *Plato*, or any other philosopher, or Law-giuer, did euer approue or so much as know this monstrous maner of conflict: and although *Aristotle* affirme, in the places by you cited, that reuenge ought to be made, & that supportation of iniury, is a kinde of seruitude, yet he meaneth not this should be performed by an vniust meane, but by a meane iust, & as the laws command: for as it is not lawfull to recover goods from the theefe by proper force, so ought it not to be lawful by the same meanes to recover honor: & no lesse in the one the other case, we ought to haue recourse to the magistrate. Of the same opinion was *Plato*, for hee decreed in the eleventh of his lawes, that the iniured by wordes, shoulde not offend the iniurier, but rather with modestie excuse himselfe, of the vice obiected vnto him: & in *Crito*: that we shuld not iniury others, thogh by them we had bin offended, for vpon what occasiō soeuer wee offend another, it is always euill done. In *Gorgia* hee sheweth

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sheweth howe wee shoulde serue our turnes with rhetoricall Arte, to accuse malefactors, that they might bee chastised. Out of which positions, this conclusion may be drawne, that the iniuried is not by himselfe to worke reuenge, seeing that would ever be but euill done, but to accuse the iniurier to the magistrate, who stands to preferue vniuersall good: What wil you answer, replied count *Scand.* to *Paris de Puteo*, who proueth the iustice of combate, from the vniuersall iustice of warre, by God permitted, as wee reade in so many places of the scripture by him cited: as also the reasons of *Possennino*, who affirmeth, that Combate is lawfull, seeing by that meanes a man may recouer the most pretious of al other goods, which is honor. *Paris de Puteo*, answered *Gualungno*, was a good doctor, in his profession, of the Lawe, although he were somewhat harsh in expressing his conceits, and was the first that aduanced this argument of Combate, giuing precepts thereof: notwithstanding, enclining to euill custome, hee laboured to shew, that combate had in it some poynt of iustice: but he reasoning from vniuersall warre, to this particular battaile, which wee call Combate, cannot formally conclude: seeing this, not only is not comprehended vnder that general kind, but is further from it, altogether diuerse: And therefore we must obserue, that generall warre is lawfull, for no other respect, but because men are not placed vnder the gouernement of one Prince alone, neyther are all states gouerned by the selfe same lawes; for if it were otherwise, it shoulde not be lawfull for one people, to warre against another: neither for augmentation of state or any other occasion, considering that by the highest Prince, Law, and Iustice, euery differēce would be determined, and if any people or cittie should attempt to right themselves by armes, as contemners of the Laws, and rebels to the Prince, they should be incontinently punished; but for that the dominion of the earth is diuided into diuerse principallities, they hauing no superiours, make *Mars* Iudge of their controuersies, and put ouer their right to Armes: Warre is therefore lawfull, for want of a

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publike reuenger of iniuries, & therefore God commaunded his chosen people, that they should take vp armes, for their defence, & slay their enemies, minding they should be ministers of diuine iustice. But this battell performed betweene two particular men, shall neuer be lawfull, which we do call Combate. Seeing particular men, haue a Prince, lawe, and magistrates, whome it concerneth to reuenge iniuries, and determine controuersies, which may fall out betwixt particular men. And if *Possenuino* had saide, that Combate is an vnlawfull and vniust meane to recouer honor, he had well spoken: For combatte offendeth the magistrate, and contemnes the lawes: they entring into combatte carrying this mind, to reuenge iniurie with their proper hand, & by a wicked and insufficient meane to attempt, the finding out, and prooue of truth, not considering that the lawes and magistrates, take order for men iniurious and liars. And yet combatte as a thing lawfull, said Count *Alfonso*, hath beene granted euen by the hie priest himselfe, as we reade of Pope *Martine*, who permitted that two brothers, who had broght into the field two armies face to face, should betweene them two performe the combatte, committing vnto the hand, sworde, and most vncertaine lotte, the title of that principallitie, whereof betwixt themselues they contended. And further, they which make Combate lawfull, are of opinion, that it may be granted, when by other meane we can not attaine to knowledge of truth, as if combatte were lawfull in the same nature, as are those kindes of torments, wherewith the Criminalists serue their turne, to make malefactors confesse.

Combat was iustly permitted by Pope *Martine*, between those brethren, said *Gualinguo*, as also that in *Spaine*, between two coosins allowed by *Scipio*, who contended about principallities: and no lesse iust were the conflicts of the *Horatij* & *Curiatij*, and it may euer be lawfull to put two mens liues in danger, for preservation of a thousand others: But it can neither be a thing honest nor iust, to search out truth, by way of combatte; for it is a most fallacious proof, in that the liar, may

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vanquish as well as the other with trueth on his side. What is to be done then, said Count *Guido*, when wee cannot attayne to knowledge of trueth? That which the lawes command, answered *Gualinguo*, which is, the Defendant to be free, when the Plaintife cannot prooue, either by witnesse, writings, or some other faithfull testimoniall; and these failing, other prooue is no way requisite, or vpon this to vndertake Combate. Put we the case, replied *Calcagnino*, that one call an other traitor, or obiect vnto him, that he hath committed some one of those malefacts, that deprive of honor, and the other denieth it with a lie, what ought the iniurier in this case to do? He is bound, answered *Gualinguo*, to auerre his saying, as before you haue vnderstood, and not so doing, he remaineth infamous, as a liar, vniust, and an impeacher of another mans honor: and the Defendant standeth stil in his first degree of honor: neither neede he vpon this to enter the listes: and if he answered (added *Calcagnino*) to the lie, with a box on the eare, or any other blow, would not this be sufficient prooue of his saying: He should not onely (said *Gualinguo*) not prooue it, but auouching it by no other testimoniall, shoulde remaine tainted with double infamie: For besides being a false slanderer, he shoulde be an iniurier by deedes, and before I shewed you, that they which iniurie others, faile in iustice, and are infamous. They notwithstanding that intreate of Combate, saide Count *Hercules*, haue set it downe for a certaine rule, that iniury in words is taken away by the iniury of deed, and that a lie is satisfied with a box on the eare, or any blow with what thing else soeuer, they alleaging this proposition for a maim, vnto which no answer can be made, that one iniury, by another greater than that is clean taken away, and that the iniurie of deedes is greater then that of wordes: and this in such a sort is obserued for custome, that it is impossible, or at the least very difficult, to introduce any other lawe, amidst these termes of honor. It is no maruell, answered *Gualinguo*, if those that intreate of combate, cannot speake with any foundation of reason: for necessarily
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from a matter vniust, many poynts vniust, and vnreasonable must needs proceede: wherefore these men desirous to manage points of honour with combate, and euil custome, haue supplanted the lawes of honor, and multiplied abuses. I say therefore, that this supposition, that the iniurie of deedes is greater than that of wordes, is not onely, not alwayes true, but further for the most part false, seeing one may bee more diffamed by burdensome and opprobrious wordes, than by the iniury of deedes. As for example: he shal remaine more dishonored that swalloweth vp the terme of Traitor, murderer, or any such like brutish speach, without making reuenge, then shall another that takes the Bastanado, a box on the eare, a blow, or any such like iniurie of deede: for not to attempt reuenge of a blowe or bastanado, notes smal valour, and impotencie, but yet is without vice: but closely to digest the name of a traitor or murderer, carrieth with it, not onely note of vility, but supposeth the vice in him iniured, objected vnto him by the iniurier, and therefore such an one shalbe much more infamous. It may be prooued also by this other reason, that contumelious wordes are apter to impeach another mans honor, then deedes. For as they affirme, who entreate of combate, there is not so grieuous an iniurie indeed, which with words may not be lenified: which could not be, if wordes were not much more effectuell, as wel in ablation, as restitution of honor. It should seeme to be a common opinion, said Count *Scandiano*, that the iniurie of deedes cannot be remooued by wordes: as also it carrieth some reason: for can wordes take away a bastanado or blowe, and howe shuld they effect, that the scarres remain not in the receuers visage, to his perpetual dishonor? Wherefore there be some, who in making peace perswade the iniuriers by deede, that they make no account to vtter some submissiue or dastard like speach, for conclusion of peace, and satisfying of him iniured: they alleadging, that feathers and wordes, are carried away with the winde, but deedes continue everlastingly. Such like men little vnderstand the lawe of honor, answered

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like men little vnderstand the law of honor (answered *Gualinguo*) seeing there is not so greiuous an iniurie of deed, which by words may not be mittigated, the which wordes, though they cannot take away scarres in the body or face, yet are they of force to wipe out the spot of infamie, and to returne it vpon the iniurier, as for example: if the iniurying in deedes, shall alleadge vnto the iniured: I confesse I haue committed an vniust act, in strikeing you, seeing you are not a person worthy of contempt, and I humbly require pardon of you, with other such like wordes: who seeth not that the iniured (in respect of honor) by such wordes, remaineth in farre better condition then the iniurier.

And what thinke you of that other conclusion (saide *Turcho*) that one iniurie is taken away by another greater then that? This other conclusion (answered *Gualinguo*) hath beene an occasion to multiplie insolencies in men, making them prooue rather infamous then honorable. Wherefore I say vnto you, that iniurie in wordes, is properly by words remooued, and improperly by deedes: and in like manner, he which iniurieth by wordes, properly taketh it away by wordes and witnesse, and improperly by deedes: as if one should call me traitor, with the lie I properly take away the iniurie, but if without the lie, I strike or wound him, I improperly returne the iniurie: for by this meanes I deny not that I am a traytor, neither vrge him to prooue his saying, although after a certaine manner, I manifest him a man worthy of contempt: and therefore he may leaue the first, and betake himselfe to the second quarrell as iust, by saying: I will proue vpon thee that I am not a man of contempt, & that thou hast vniustly done to strike mee, in which quarrel ouercoming, the other shall be also conuincd of treason: in like manner he improperly, and foolishly retourneth the lie, with a box on the eare, the which, or any other blow, though in a certaine sorte, it noteth him stricken, worthy of contempt, yet doth it not proue or verifie the saying of him, who hath iniured by wordes: in that a box on the eare, or a
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blowe, is not sufficient prooffe to shew that one is a traitour : but rather it plainly testifieth, that the committer of suche an act, is a most vniust man, a great iniurier, and wounder of another mans honour : so that they which sette downe these conclusions, haue spoken, not altogether sincerely, following rather, as I haue saide, wicked custome, than direct reason, and haue beene, as also now are, the occasions of great inconueniences : for if it were not in vse, to retourne the lie with a blowe, there would be but few iniuriers by wordes, it being hard to find words enow, to auerre wordes iniurious, and not proouing them, he should continue infamous.

You sir Knight, said *Benelucqua*, haue with sufficient sinceritie declared, that Combate is an vniust thing, contrary to humane felicitie : as also, that it is not grounded vpon true, but imperfect honor : and that the Philosopher in polittike customes, cannot intreate thereof, but as of a vice, to the end, that by the vertuous man, it may be abhorred. It resteth that you here declare, whom the treatie heereof did concerne, if it were in vse : and this wil serue greatly to purpose, seeing in doubtfull cases of honor, we shall know whither to haue recourse for counsell. Without doubt (answered *Gualinguo*,) and (bee it spoken with leaue of your countrieman *Pigna* and *Possenino*) the argument of Combate is proper to the Ciuilian, and not to the morall Philosopher, as hee is a Moralist : and this I wil manifest vnto you, by infallible arguments : And first, the Ciuilian intendes that honor, whereof euery one maketh profession, vpon which Combate is grounded : For the lawes punish detractors from other mens honors : and in like manner, declare who are infamous, chastising many offences with the punishment of infamie : Secondly, combate is either by law (as it appeareth by the law of Lombardy) or else by custom : the Ciuilian is he which intendeth laws and customs, and ruleth and ordaineth them : Thirdly, the termes which in combate are vsed and expressed, are proper to the Ciuilian, and by him are defined, and considered, as assailant, defendant, quarrel, billes of challenge,

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to prouoke, maintaine, and such like, therefore combat is proper to the Ciuilian: Fourthly, the bill and quarrel which by meane of Combate direct to the tribunall of armes, hath the selfesame proportion, and like rules, as hath the Booke and action, which direct to the seate of Iustice: the Ciuilian therefore being he that censureth the Booke and action in place of iudgement, it is as conuenient that he frame the bill, and order the quarrel by combat, in it expressed: Fifthly, the Ciuilian determineth all maner of iniuries, as well by deede as word, hauing respect to the condition of the persons, place, and time; for repelling of which iniuries, Combate is introduced, therefore Combate is a subiect appropriate vnto the Ciuilian: Sixtly, the Ciuilian is he that pronounceth and decideth, whether the quarrell deserueth to be put to triall of armes; for when we may vnderstand by other meane, who is honorable, and who dishonorable, it is not lawfull to come to combat: Last of all, the Ciuilians be they, that intreate and ordaine, touching all sortes of torments vsed for inuestigation of trueth; combat therefore being (as the same writers thereof affirme) a kind of torment to find out the truth, when by other mean it cannot be knowne, it wil follow, that to intreate & order wel combat, belongeth to the Ciuilian.

Though so many and firme reasons were not sufficient to perswade, yet common vse & experience might serue the turne; seeing ordinarily in occasions of combat, the Combatants were wont to be aduised by Doctors of the lawe, as appeareth by the sundry opinions of most excellent Ciuilians, which are yet in Print; besides those good Authours that haue intreated of combat, were Ciuilians, as doctor *Paris de Puteo*, and *Mutius*, who alwayes vsed iuridicall termes, propositions, & suppositions, agreeable to the proper argument and matter by them handled; so that *Possennia* and *Pigna* needed not haue saide, that the Lawyers vsurped to themselves this matter of Combate, belonging properly to Politicke customes; for, besides that wee haue conuincd them, they themselves intreating of it morally, haue runne into inexcusable

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fable errors, and infallibly prooued, that the argument of
 combate, concerneth not the Moralist, but the Ciuillian.
 Me thinkes saide Count *Scandiano*, that this treatise more
 befitteth a Souldier then a Roabed man, seeing vnto him
 bookes bee proper, and the management of armes to the
 Souldier; first because combate is borne between the sound
 of trumpet and drum: secondly in that the souldier deter-
 mining of generall warre, and discipline militarie, he may
 the better likewise, dilate of warre single, and particular,
 for so is combate: considering that vnder the vniuersall the
 particular is comprehended. Souldiers according to their
 principles can not discourse of combate, answered *Gualinguo*,
 because the precepts, wherewith warre generall is iudged, are
 wholly contrarie to combate. Art militarie, in generall war,
 ordaineth all aduantage, approoueth all oddes and inequi-
 tie, as well in the number of men, as of armes, and places
 vantagious for battaile: and commendeth him that can sub-
 due, by all manner of stratageme, policie, and deceit; wher-
 as in single fight, we detest all aduantage and subtiltie, and
 seeke equalitie, to the ende, victorie may only depend on
 proper valor; but further, combate not only doth not aduāce,
 but iniurieth also profession militarie, and therefore by it
 ought not only, not to be directed, but further wholly ex-
 cluded: for combat causeth seditions, maketh souldiers in-
 solent, and disobedient to the magistrates of the field, which
 by the same militarie art, were ordained for to determine all
 differences and brawles, which fall out among souldiers: to
 the end, that peace maintained betwixt friendes, they might
 with greater valor make warre vpon the enemy; and there-
 fore the Romanes did not onely punish those, which durst
 fight singly amongst themselves, but the also, who without
 consent of the magistrate performed combat with the ene-
 mie, as we reade of *Manlius Torquatus*, who caused his victo-
 rious sonne to be stricken with a cimeter, hauing performed
 combat with an enemy, without licence from the magi-
 strate. But leauing examples, & comming to common prac-
 tise

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Use and vse, lette vs see whether the problemes and conclusions, which by combate are determined, haue any similitude with the other of profession military, and generall warre.

In combate it is determined betwixt the assailant and defendant, of iniuries and oppression, as wel in words, as deeds: of the lie, of the forme of bills, of the maner of sending these bills, of challenge, of laying out the field, according to forme of patent: and further, many other questions are discussed, as, whether the quarel deserue to be referred to proof of armes, if after the defiance vpon any sodaine occasion wee may refuse to come to battel, whether a man halfe subdued, and by a lie hauing the better of the field, may demanda a new day: who ought to be admitted to combate, and who not, of the election of Armes, whether one may fight by his champion, of the difference of nobilitie, as well in priuate men, as in great states and princes, with other such like poynts. In generall warre, it is principally discussed, how to set an army in order to fight, the maner of arming it for obtaining of victory, in what order they are to mooue forward, and march with the army, and how, and in what situation they are to take vp their lodging, and after what manner to fortifie and entrench, to prepare and conuoy victuall, to raise fortifications, of the manner how to defend and assaile, of stratagemes, or as we may say, of militarie deceits, with other like poynts, the which are altogether diuerse from those which in Combate are decided; and therefore we must conclude, that souldiers, as beeing souldiers, may well manage armes and performe combate, but not dispose of it, according to principles of military profession. Fortitude being the principall vertue of souldiers, said *Benelacqua*, & in combate aswel the fortitude of the body as munde beeing exercised, I woulde also haue thought, that it had properly appertained to souldiers to define of combate, especially, hauing scene in Print, diuerse opinions touching the same, of famous and woorthy Captaines, who are reputed amongst the chiefeest and best:

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and further, I saw in *France* while I was residēt in the court, that vpon question and difference of honour, Gentlemen rather repaired to souldiours then Doctors, accepting of their opinions, as they had beene oracles. That fortitude practised in Combate (answered *Gualinguo*) is not the same which is the proper vertue of *Arte Militarie*: beecause that with vertue, and this being farre remote from iustice, is accompanied with vice: and therefore wee may truely say, that in combate wee rather practise force and dexterity of bodie, then that fortitude, which is a vertue of the minde. Touching your hauing seene Captaines write, discourse, and intreate of poyntes of honour and combate, yeelding therein their iudgements, this concludeth not that it is a proper office belonging to that Art; for they do this by a certaine practise and naturall iudgement, or peraduenture, as men not only in warre, but also in other disciplines experienced. By those reasons therefore wee haue alleadged, and others which to them wee mind to adde, the error of *Possenuino* shall be cleare vnto you, who vainely excludeth Lawyers from the subiect of combate: and you shall obserue, that by Lawyers or Ciuilians, I vnderstand not law giuers: for they being most wise, and creating lawes, as inspired by a diuine spirit, cannot make any one law, which shall not bee most iust and godlie: and therefore these ought, not only, not to discusse of Combate, but euen wholly to exclude it, as Vniust: But by Lawyers, I meane, those that interpret, counsell, and iudge according to the lawes, vnto whom the treatie thereof out of doubt appertaineth, as also to dispose of Combate, if it were in vse: and likewise to counsell in poyntes belonging to that honour, whereupon Combate is grounded.

And this shal be the better known vnto vs, if we do but consider the termes, questions, & rules, which about Combat are frequēted: For we shal find thē either the self same, or altogether like them, which the lawyers haue euery day in hand. And as for the persons that enter into combate, who can denie

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ny that the termes of assailant & defendant (as we haue said) be not properly belonging to Lawiers? and that the Lawier doth not declare, who is the assailant, and who the defendant, as also what is the office of the assailant, and what belongeth to the defendant. And comming to the billes; who will deny, that they carying, with them the similitude of those bookes that aduocates carry in their handes, belong not to Lawiers to be prescribed and framed, they differing in no other respect, but that in the bil, honor is demaunded, and in the booke, goods, and many times also honour: and that the bill citeth the defendant, to the tribunall of armes, and the booke to the tribunall of the lawes and magistrate? then passing ouer to laying out of the fielde, what is this laying out of the fielde, but the electing of some spacious place, where the strife is to bee determined, about which if any question arise, who is to decide it but the Lawier? who likewise is alwaies he, that giueth sentence, whether the Iudge be competent or no. In Combate iniuries are debated, which be opprobrious, and which not: And who can better distinguish of this then the Lawier, who hath iustice for his proper obiekt, and whose proprietie it is to consider all kindes of iustice, and iniustice, and consequently of iniuries, which bee the principall part of iniustice? Neither *Possessio* nor *Pigna* would deny me, if they were liuing, that it concerned the magistrate, to distribute punishment towards those that are iniurious: and if this bee true, how could hee make iust distribution if he knewe not, and did not distinguish all kindes of iniury. In combate the lie is discussed, and question mooued, which is a preualent lie, and which none: & this appertaineth to the lawier; for the magistrate punisheth lying, and especially that which to another mans losse and reproach, is tolde, and therefore it is necessary hee vnderstand which is preualent, and which not, for the preualent lie is giuen as stirred vp by an iniury, and therefore is exempted from punishment, if hee to whom it is giuen, proue not his objection true: and the insufficient lye is that which

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is not giuen vpon receipt of an iniury, and because in this case it saoureth of iniurie, as accusing his aduersarie of slander, is ought therefore to be punished.

In combat the first of any other thing, it is debated, whether the quarrell deserue to be put to trial of armes; and this is proper to the Ciuilian: first, because the determination of such questions is contained in the Lombard law: secondly, for that the Lawyer is he that iudgeth, whether the ciuil triall of the cause made, were sufficient or no: for if it were sufficient prooffe of armes ceaseth: in combat, the disparitie and inequality of the combatants is called into question, and who may be admitted, who refused: and this is also a discussion belonging to the Lawyer: For he being conuersant, not onely about iustice commutative, but also concerning that distributive, being no other but to distribute punishment, and rewardes, with geometricall proportion, of necessitie he must needs know those offences that make an other worthy of chastisement and infamy: as likewise the actions, that are meritorious of reward and honor; and consequently, that he determine who ought to be refused as infamous, and who as honourable to be admitted to the triall of armes: in combat also is debated the distinctions of Nobilitie, as well of private men as of Princes: and this also belongeth to the Ciuilian, who respecteth the degrees and qualities of persons, to distribute iustly and with proportion, reward, and punishment. Those rules also, which in combat are obserued, are proper to the Ciuilians, being the selfe-same that are obserued in ciuil iudgements. In combat this is obserued: that after the challenge is accepted, it is not lawful for the combatants to offend one another, but in the determined day of battell: this precept is like to that which saith, during the sute let there be no innouation of any thing, and whosoever disturbeth the possessor, the sute stil hanging, is intended to be fallen from all his right and title: in combat is this other poynt: that he which appeareth not in the field on the day prefixed for battel, is intended to haue lost his whole interest;

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est : and this also is decided by the Ciuilians, who say that all lawes exclaime against the man stubburne and contumacious.

This other rule is also auerred , that the day and time of battaile expired , and the assailant not proouing, the defendant is intended to be victor, this being likewise a maxime with the Ciuilians, the lawe affirming, that the assailant not proouing, in the prefixed and instant time , the defendant is absolved. To conclude, there is not any thing in combate, which doth not resemble those poynts handled in the lawes. Proceede no further, saide Count *Alfonso Turchi*, becaule now wee are sufficiently satisfied, that in doubtres, I will not say, appertaining to Combate (seeing God bee thanked) it is no more in vse, but pertaining to the honour, whereof euery one maketh profession, wee must haue recourse to the Ciuilian, and not to the Moralist, the honour whereof hee entreateth, beeing from this very diuerse. Notwithstanding the vse of combate bee taken away, sayde Count *Guido*) yet are neyther brawles, nor tumultes remooued, which euery day bee stirred vppe , with great effusion of bloud : the which, in that by combate they can not bee defined, there is an other inuention diabolicall enough found out, which is not Combate, and that is the field, whither Gentlemen of honor oftentimes runne to decide their quarrels with armes : And this manner of fighting is now in such vse, as I am doubtfull , whether a man of honor offered the field, may refuse without presumption of cowardise. As in Ciuil iudgements (sayde *Gualinguo*) the defendant is not bound to answer the plaintife, except there be competent court and Iudge assigned him, so that defendant, who to the Tribunall of Armes is cited, neede not there appeare, without a secure field and Iudge : and refusing, hee ought not onely, not to be held as a Coward, but further, a man of honour : For it is proper to theeues, murtherers, and ruffians to fight in wooddes and solitary places, and for Gentlemen of honour, to performe battaile, in the presence

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of Princes, and many knights, to whose iudgement the Combatants referre themselves. And from those Lordes in the field, they receiue (as from competent Iudges, the patent of their victorie, and in what maner they haue subdued. Necessity maketh many things lawfull which are vnlawfull, (added *Calcagnini*) and there is no doubt, but if combate were in vse, the field might lawfully be refused: but not being able by other meanes then this to ende quarrels, it seemeth the iniured, which is Assailant, hath in a certaine sort discharged his honor, when hee hath vrged the fielde of his defendant, & the defendant not accepting of it, he incurreth suspicion of timidity and slender valour: and touching the circumstance of a secure iudge and field: what better iudge, or truer testimoniall of victory can there be, then the sword? For to returne from Battaille with the sword bloody, and vnwounded, noteth that Combatant victorious: and on the contrary, to remaine dead, or greeuously wounded, is a signe of vanquishment: Moreouer, combatants go not into the fielde alone by themselves, but for securitie, each one carrieth with him a confident friend, of vnspotted fidelity, or some Gentleman of honour, who after performance, giueth testimony of the valour and victory of the Combatants.

The sword (replied *Gualingno*) cannot be a sincere testimony, nor a iust iudge, for we see, that he mortally wounded, hath first before his death taken prisoner his enemy, and the Confidants, by being each of them partial to their Champion, are not faithfull testimonies of valour and victorie: and we see by experience, that seldome times they carry in mind the circumstances of the conflict, in recounting the fact: vpon which afterwards questions haue risen, and fresh quarrels, both betwixt them, as also betweene the Champions: So that in any wise the field is to be auoyded, being contrary to all law, and ancient custome of Knighthood, apt rather to frame new, then to take vp old quarrels. What must we then do, sayd *Benelacqua*) is it necessary we continue alwaies in Bralles, finding no meane to determine them? Not so
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(answered *Gualinguo*) but they must be decided, as diuine and humane lawes commaund, that is, peaceably, and so, as honour by them may be restored, who haue vsurped it. As this is a most singular and religious mean, so comprehendeth it verie great difficulty, saide *Scandiano*; for in peace nothing else being sought after, then to reduce the parties to equalitie, or that such a peace should be effected, as that the iniured, and the iniurying, might remaine equally possessed of honour: bee it not therefore troublesome vnto you Sir knight, discoursing yet somewhat further, to deliuer also in this poynt your iudgement and opinion.

Of the meane how to make peace, and take vp quarrels.

IN that he iniurying (answered *Gualinguo*) as before I haue said, cannot in honor be equal to the iniured, no more can he not in reconciliation, & coming to peace, obtaine with him equal condition. For the iniurier shal euer be taxed, hauing by iniurie failed in iustice, & he iniured not hauing extremitie, offended against any vertue, especially when in receiuing it, hee hath performed his part, shall not haue lost his honour, & therefore the iniurier making peace, cannot absolutely recouer his honor iustly lost, nor be equall to him iniured. This is a plaine paradox (replied *Calcagnino*) altogether contrarie to a common opinion, for in concluding peace, it is helde for certaine, that the vantage remaineth on the offenders side, especially when he hath performed some notable iniurie, as that of deede: this being confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher, in the first of his *Ethikes*, where he sayth, that the iniurier hath in him more good then hee iniured. This

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(saide *Gualin*.) is the foolish vulgar opinion, which holdeth for couragious, valiant, and honorable, the proude, insolent, and those readie to iniurie others; and conceiue not, that the greater the iniurie is they offer, be it by word or deede, the more vniust and wicked the iniurier is: and that it is true, the lawes seuerely punish such like iniuriers, not chastising them iniuried, as those without vice, and who wil denie, that they are not also infamous, which are by the lawes and magistrate punished? Touching the authoritie of the Philosopher, you shal consider that good is of three natures, good profitable, pleasant, and honest: when it is said, the iniurier hath in him more good, it is intended by profitable & pleasant, and not that honest good, which also comprehendeth honour: for of this the iniuried hath better store, hee hauing no waies failed in iustice: wherefore, if the iniurier reioyce in himselfe, that in force, riches, and friends, hee is more mightie then the iniuried, the other may comfort himselfe, in that hee is more participant of honour, beeing without vice. I see not how it can be, (added *Calcagnino*) that the iniuried should haue more honour, then hee iniurying, considering the lawes and magistrates commaunde and enioyne the iniuriers to restore honour to the iniuried. And they that challenge Combate, or come to question and debate, be no other but those iniuried, who by this meanes as say to recouer that honour, which by the iniuried hath been vsurped: & in intreatie of peace, it is euer required, that the iniurier restore honour, this being a manifest signe, that hee hath not onely his own, but that he also retaineth that of another mans, being of the iniuried: and consequently that he hath the vantage in honour: what say you to this? Before I make you answer (saide *Gualin*) I will put you in minde of what I saide, entreating of honour: for honour is lost, by failing in iustice and valour: vnto which I adde, that the offence of iustice is farre more grievous, and that which is more accompanied with vice, and by the lawes punished, then is the offence of vilitie or cowardize, seeing the not reuenging

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reūenging of an iniurie, is after a certaine manner without vice, and therefore not punishable. Further, you shall note, that he iniurying, in offering iniurie, not onely looseth his honor by failing in iustice, but moreouer, staineth the reputation of him iniured, by bringing him in suspition of vilitie, and making him to be esteemed a man woorthie of contempt: obserue that I say by bringing him in suspition, seeing if it were manifest that the iniured in the same instant he receiued it, performed his part and endeour, hee could not be reputed vile, although through inequality or some other aduantage, he were wronged: but contrariwise, the iniurier in such a case should remaine noted, with double reproach, that is, both with iniustice and cowardize, for to offend with aduantage, discouereth vilitie and want of valour: and therefore the iniured is vrged as well in ciuill iudgement, as before the Tribunall of armes, to prooue that hee iniurying, hath offended him by aduantage & inequality, or by some bad meane, for iustification of his own selfe, that he hath not failed in valour, and that the iniurier hath failed both in one and other. Now from this I haue spoken, it followeth that the offerer of iniury, remaineth absolutely infamous, and the receiuer somewhat toucht and blemished: but bicause it is in the iniuriers hand, to wipe out the blot of him iniured, by manifesting his owne iniustice, and the innocency of the other, therefore it is said, he retaineth the honor of the iniured, and that to him it belongeth, to make restitution thereof.

Whereupon the Magistrates and lawes enforce the iniurier, to restore honor with his tongue to him iniured, which is no other, but to confesse himselfe culpable, and the iniured innocent, as also in making of peace, the selfe same is sought after, which is, that hee iniurying acknowledge, that hee iniured is not woorthie of contempt, and that hee is a man of valour: in which act questionlesse, the iniurier remaineth with the disaduantage of honour: and therefore as I haue sayde, the Magistrates compell them who im-

The meane to make peace,

peach other mens honour to make restitution thereof, after this manner, to the end that for penaltie of their offence, they may receiue infamie: considering that the iniurier cannot restore honor, but he himselfe must rest somewhat attainted. If this truth were as well knowne touching iniurious men (saide *Gualinguo*) as in this point I am fully satisfied, they would not be so hard, to conclude peace: for men finding themselves offended, thinke it vnpossible, especially being by some iniurie of deed, that any means may be found out, whereby in capitulating peace, they should not rest far inferior in honor to the iniurier. And if the selfe same (saide *Benelacqua*) were by the iniuriers foreseene, they would neuer bee brought to peace: and so necessarily there would be continuall quarrell, to the special discommodity of the common-wealth. And *Gualinguo*: Although in working peace, honor cannot equally bee ballanced, betweene the iniurier, and iniuried, yet for all this the offender must not refuse to restore honour to him offended, when this by an honest meane may be done, and it shall be a meanes honest, when he by such an action resteth not infamous: & not doing this he declareth himselfe vniust, no otherwise then he, who forcibly retaineth other mens goods: wherefore those that sollicite peace, ought by all industrie, to finde a meane, through which, with all the equalitie possible, honor may bee distributed betweene the iniurier, and iniuried: neither can there be a better meane found out for perswasion of peace, then when it is made knowne both to the one and other, as also in my iudgement, those men are not to bee hearkened vnto, who setting downe courses for procuring of peace, respect not, so that peace may ensue, though the one rest with honor, & the other with reproach, by perswading the iniurier that he cannot commit a thing more vniust or dishonest then to retaine another mans honor, and as in offending he shewed him selfe superior, so he ought not to refuse, for satisfaction of him offended, to manifest himselfe inferior, as also that this meane is conuenient for a man penitent and
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and take vp quarrells.

sory for his fact. Yet this course is not honest for them that esteeme the honor of the worlde, or that woulde preferue their good opinion.

Therefore I am not of their opinion that say, there be offences so extreme and grievous, as that no meane can bee found to satisfie him offended, except he freely remit and forgive them: For, to come to peace by such an act, is rather the part of a rash and foolish man, than of one honourable. This free remission, is blamed by *Possentino, Matio, and Attendolo*, said count *Alfonso*, and therefore I am doubtful to commend it: There commeth a doubt to my minde, said *Scandiano*: You said that he iniuried, was touched in honor, thorough the suspition that he had failed in valor, or was worthy of contempt; and therefore that he is bound, for disburdening of himselfe (as by the other vrged) to cause debatement in ciuil iudgement, or combate, of the inequalitye, euil mean and iniustice of the iniurier. Put we the case, that one performe an iniurie hand to hand, and without inequalitye, or aduantage, in this point, who shall remaine with aduantage of honor? You must obserue, sayde *Gualinguo*, that there are and may bee two sortes of iniuriers, in themselves very different: which diuersitie is gathered from diuerse endes; for one is principally intentiue to pleasant good, and the other to good, honest. He intentiue to pleasant good, is the first in offending by wordes, deedes, through malignitie and enuy, or to shew himselfe the more mightie and gallant: And this man offending whomsoever, resteth in worse condition of honour, then he iniuried: notwithstanding it is certaine if they offend with inequalitye or aduantage, and by euill meane, he remaineth double infamous: because he commeth to faile, not onely in iustice, but also in valour. He intentiue, one good honest, is not first offending: but being prouoked, maketh reuenge with his owne valour, returning to the first iniurier, the burden and wrong. Now and if so be hee doe reuenge wythout aduantage, his condition is much better than that of the iniuried: For hee sheweth

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sheweth himselfe, truly valiant, and vnworthy of contempt, committing no vniust act, but in contemning the lawes, and Magistrates, at whose handes he is rather tyed to seeke reuenge, then of himselfe; to the end Magistrats (as wee haue said) in a Cittie be not in vain: but this enormitie is so by custome admitted, that such an iniurier (although he reuenge in colde bloud) is esteemed farre more honorable, then is the other that hath recourse to the Magistrate: considering that this repairing to the Magistrate, breedeth suspicion of small valor, & impotencie: and to reuenge of himselfe, noteth the contrarie. You will then inferre said *Scandiano*, that he which offendeth without manifest occasion, or not being prouoked, in what manner soeuer he iniurieth, by himselfe alone, or otherwise accompanied, resteth more dishonorable then he offended: for in him is discovered that defect, which principally dispoyleth of honor, being want of iustice: and in the iniuried only want of valor appeareth, which is without vice, but yet so, as he that hande to hande offendeth by an honorable meanes, & for reuenge of a manifest iniurie, remaineth honorable, and his aduersarie infamous, because he sheweth himselfe valiant, and vnworthy of contempt, being no more vniust then he, who by his proper force wil rather take his goods out of the theefes hand, then acknowledge it from the magistrate: And this your opinion pleaseth me so much the more, in that it swarueth not from the common custome of gentlemen, and of those who make profession of honor, who should seeme in their honor interessed, nay and vnworthy to beare armes, if they sought reuenge of a receiued iniurie rather from the lawes and magistrates, then of themselues.

Thus much I will inferre (saide *Gualinguo*) and further therewith conclude, that in according peace, honor cannot be equally ballanced, betweene the offender and iniuried. Not withstanding by the solicitor thereof it may so be counterpoised, as that there shall be no true difference, or at least wise very apparent, that may import so much as once more

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or lesse, and I say apparant, because sometime it is necessary, to deceiue and outshoote them, that to peace would be reduced, neither for this shall one demerite the blame of a deceiuer: For the end of the best Cittizen is, the felicitie of his common wealth, therefore it shall be permitted him to deceiue some particular man, for the taking away of sedition, which disturbeth the generall quiet of a whole Cittie; as also this deceit will be commodious to them deceiued, no lesse then are those pilles, which the Physition sweetneth, to the end the patient, not displeasing his taste, may bee reduced to health. Nowe vouchsafe I beseeche you, sayde *Scandiano*) seeing wyth so effectuall reasons you haue excluded combate, to dilate somewhat concerning peace, instructing vs, howe wee may or ought to deceiue the seditious, for reducing of them to peaceable condition. As there is not (answered *Gualingno*) a thinge more impious and preiudiciall than combate, so I am of opinion, that in the whole worlde (as the giuer of health well sheweth) there is not any thing that bringeth with it greater felicitie, than beautifull peace: as likewise there is not an action more worthy, or beseeming a Gentleman, as by *Plutarch* it was thought, than to sollicite peace: It shall not therefore greeue mee vppon this poynt to deliuer some generall rule: For it would be difficult for mee, and to you very tedious, if I should touch all those particular occurrences, wherein, and for which, peace is to be treated of. Supposing therefore, which otherwhiles I haue shewed, that the first offender looseth his honour through the offence of iniustice, as also the iniuried thorough suspition of hauing failed in valour, or to be worthie of contempt, it is necessary, that in treatie of peace, both the one and the other of these offences bee diminished, and after such a sorte excused, that through them the offenders rest not manifestly dishonoured.

It seemeth that the offence, especially of the iniurier, is mitigated, or at least excused by twoo meanes: one is,

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when in accusing him, wee blame any one of those passions and sodaine motions of the minde, vnto whose force it is hard, or in a manner impossible to resist, as are anger, disdain, loue, iealousie, feare, and such like forcible affections. The second meane is, when the iniurier chargeth himselfe with ignorance, not that ignorance, which is proper to wicked habite, but with the other particular, which rather deserueth the name of error, then of offence, being the same which is conuerfant, about the circumstances before by vs recited, as if hee shall confesse to haue offended, not knowing the qualitie of the person, or his desert, and not imagining in such an action to haue iniuried, as also hee did it not to overcharge him, or as wrongly informed, and such like: suspicion of vilitie in him iniuried shall bee diminished or taken away, by shewing the sodaine lighting of the blowe, that either for some former or present maladie, hee was weake: by being at the same instant he was iniuried, in the presence or priue chamber of the Prince, or of some others, where he was bounde to reuerence, for doubt of inequality in party or such like.

It should not appeare (sayde *Scandiano*) if that it bee true which they intreating of Combate affirme, that the act of cowardize is excused by suspicion of vnequall partie: wherupon if one accompanied, prouoke or assaile another alone, hee by himselfe shewing cowardize, cannot be excused by inequality of partie, except hee see himselfe fight against the armes of two seuerall men: And this their reason is grounded vppon that your inwarde supposition, that euery man is honest, if no action appeare to the contrary.

Being therefore to imagine, that the companions of the assailants are iust, there shall be no reason to feare their offending, except it appeare manifestly. And yet in this I am verie doubtfull, for as in generall battaile it is great aduantage, to daunt the enemy at the first sight, with great number, so will it be in any brawle a speciall aduantage,

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at the first meeting, by a multitude of complices, to strike terror into an enemy alone.

Say it whosoever will (answered *Gualingno*) but to assault, or challenge, being accompanied, one alone, is an unjust act, and noteth small valour, although no other draw their swordes then the assailant: neither can hee defiled or assailed, presume vpon such honestie in the others companions, as that the doubt of their iniustice shall not be greater: so that in such a case, hee offended may alwaies excuse himselfe, with probable presumption of inequality. That this is an action scarcely besitting an honourable Gentleman, *Ariosto* declareth (said Count *Alonso*) in his three and twentie *Canto*, saying.

They would full faine have gone, but of their companie

The Count accepted not: though honest were and good:

And with this reason straight, hee did them satisfie,

That in a warriour no disgrace was understood:

Like as, when to the field his foe hee doth defie,

And brings for aide and helpe, a friend, or stander by.

But to returne to our purpose of peace, although the generall rule you haue sette downe, concerning entreatie of peace bee good, yet rest I not satisfied, except you also proceede vnto poynts particular, the which (though vnto you Sir Knight, it seeme impossible to comprehend, the accidents beeing in a manner so infinite) yet in my iudgement, they may bee reduced vnder twoo principall heades, as likewise all iniuries and offences. For either they bee iniuries of woords, or deedes: displease it not you therefore to answer, and deliuer your opinion, to such demands as shall bee propounded, touching the conclusion of peace: And *Gualin*: Although this argument requireth longer and

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deeper consideration, notwithstanding, as taken sodainelie, I will endeavour to giue you satisfaction, and if I do no other good, yet shal I giue you occasion, to meditate better thereon. Put case (added *Turcho*) that one had iniuried by words, reprooing another of iniustice or vility: and if that he iniuried, returned it not with a lie, but swallowed vp this iniury: in what word could the offender restore honour, so as hee himselfe might not be touched? The generall rule in this case, as in al other, may serue the turne (answered *Gualingno*). For if the offender offered not iniurie in colde blood, which is called an innocent and unexpected chance, as manie times it happeneth, playing, talking, or discussing any matter; in such a case we may attribute the fault to anger: for anger, as the Pholosopher affirmeth in the first of his Ethicks, mitigateth greatly the offence of iniustice, in that it seemeth the beginning of action, proceedeth not from him angrie, but from the other, giuing the occasion of anger: but if hee did it in cold blood, which is termed a case premeditate, it may be excused by ignorance. In the first case the offender, shall say to the iniuried, I overcome with the furie of anger, and being without the bondes of reason, iniuried you thus, or thus in wordes: now taking you for an honest man, and vnworthy of contempt, penitent for whatsoeuer I haue spoken to your dishonour, I requesting you to be my friend: The iniuried may answer: Seeing you know mee for an honest man, and repent you of what you haue spoken to my dishonour, I accept you as my friend. The first words disburden the offender, in that the sinne of incontinence, though it absolutely deserue not pardon, yet neuerthelesse, it is woorthie of excuse, being a verie difficult matter to resist affections, but especially anger.

The last remooue suspicion of vilitie from the iniuried: in the seconde case, the offender shall say, I through false relation, or probable coniecture, entred into opinion, that you were such or such an one: but now assured of trueth, I know you to be an honest man, and vnwoorthie of contempt: where-

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wherefore repenting me of whatsoeuer to your dishonor I haue spoken, I desire that you will be vnto me a friend: the first wordes shewing, that the offender erred, excuse his iniustice: and the last worke the like effect, as in the first case, that is, they cleare and discharge him iniuried.

And if he slandered, (added *Benelacqua*) answer the calumnation with a lie, howe would you introduce peace: for according to *Faustus*, it seemes this cannot be done, except the iniurier eat his words: & thus doing, he accuseth himselfe to be malignant & a liar, and so resteth infamous. And *Gualingo*: The opinions of *Faustus* in the subiect of honor are so strict, as standing on his foundations, there can no peace be introduced, but that one must remaine infamous, which is false: for whensoeuer in peace it is manifested, that the offence was not voluntarily performed, neither by election, but rather through humane fragility, the offender resteth not infamous, although the lawes suffer not offences through ignorance to scape unpunished, or whosoever vpon any other affection of the minde committed. This shall take no place betweene particular men, to whom the recovery only of honor, is sufficient. Therefore we will affirme, that such a like quarrel may after this sort be accommodated. The giuer of the lie, shall say thus: being certified, that you euill informed by one that hateth mee, spoke thus iniuriously of me, I confesse, that notwithstanding you haue reported that of me, which is not true, yet haue you not lied, wherefore perceiving you to be a man of valor, and honor, I request you to be friends with mee. Hee offered the lye shall answer, I truly wrong informed, and beleeuing that you were such an one, vttered of you these iniurious speeches, but now confessing my errour, I knowe you for an honorable and honest man, contenting my selfe to bee your friend.

● Declare vnto mee (saide *Benelacqua*) how in this the honour of the one and other is satisfied: And *Gualin*: The wordes of the first lie-giuer, haue satisfied him offered

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the lie, because they declare, that hee spoke that which in his conceit hee beleeued to bee true, although through ignorance as euill informed hee spoke slaunderously : And the woordes of him offered the lie, remooue the calumniation objected to the Lie giuer, seeing confessing, that hee is an honest man, he secretly, and by an honest meane, reuoketh his saying. Me thinkes, saide *Calcagnino*, that in accomodating this quarrel, you proceed contrarie to that you ought : for as from the slaunderer the quarrell had originall, so ought hee also to bee the first, in speech of reconciliation, yet you set downe the contrarie. And *Gualinguo* : You must obserue, that in the action of making peace, they proceed contrarie to that course in combate; for in combate, the first aduancement or setting forward commeth from the assailant, as hee that seeketh to recouer honour; but in effecting peace, the first to mooue and speake, ought to bee the defendant, as hee, that hath to restore honour : further then this, if the slaunderer should first speake, it would follow, that he of himselfe shoulde come to giue satisfaction, and reuoke his speeches, which could not but turne to his great shame, as *Faustus* saith. And if hee first iniurying (sayd *Turcho*) should answer the lie with a boxe on the eare, or other blow, what plaister might bee founde out fit for the ripening of this impostume?

Although a blowe on the eare, answered *Gualinguo*, improperly taketh away the lie (as hath beene sayde) the iniurie of deede not being sufficient prooffe to shew, that another hath committed a particular offence, notwithstanding generally it noteth him stricken worthie of contempt: yet not swaruing from this common abuse which raigneth, according to which, hee that suffereth such an iniurie, resteth infamous, peace (in my opinion) may by these wordes be laboured and procured. Lette vs therefore imagine, that the iniurying hadde saide to the iniuried : Thou art a traytour : and after, hauing receiued the lie, hee had
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giuen a box on the eare, or offered some offence of deede, and desirous to restore honour againe, hee shall say thus: I beeing wrong informed, entred into wrong opinion, that you were a traitour, and therefore the other day I told you that you were the same, as also I stricke you: now being perswaded of the trueth, I confesse that you are no Traytour, wherefore esteeming you for an honest man, and as one that will vrge some reuenge vppon mee, as well for my iniurie doone vnto you in wordes, as also for the other in deede, and repenting my selte heartily in hauing so sore offended you, I do request, that you will be vnto mee a friend.

May it therefore please you, (sayde Count *Iulio*) to make knowne the force of all those simples that doe compound this playster; for when the vertue of the simples shall bee vnderstoode, it will afterwarde bee the more easie to apply them to other infirmities: It is not sufficient for a good Physition (answered *Guatlinguo*) to knowe the simples, but further, it is requisite and necessarie that hee doe vnderstand the infirmitie, minding to heale it: and therefore before wee proceede any further, lette vs first of all examine the quarrell; which is the note of infirmitie in the offender, and also in the iniuried: In this quarrell therefore, on the offenders parte there is a great want of iustice, and on the parte of him iniuried, defect of valour, not wythout suspition of iniustice: out of doubt it is great want of iustice to iniurie an other, first, with wordes full of vntrueth, which by the other mans lie is manifested, and afterwarde with deede for sustentation of his slander.

And to support such an iniurie, is want of valour, for by not attempting iust reuenge, it is further suspected lest the defect of iustice by the iniurier to him objected be true; it is therefore requisite to find out simples, which together compounded, may haue vertue contrary to these infirmities, considering that contraries by contraries are oft times

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times cured: and these former recited, shal be the wordes of him first offending, which correspondent to the quality of the dogs skinne, shal be of force to heale this wound and biting: and to the ende wee may distinctly consider of them, let vs diuide them into three partes.

The first wordes therefore vttered, are of vertue to cure the lie: for they make known that the iniurier hath spoken vntiuth, he beleeuing otherwise: and that he notwithstanding erred spoke but according to his minde, yet being de-
ceiued. The second, which beginne: now perswaded or satisfied of the truth, are of force to remooue suspicion of the treason to him iniuried objected: the rest of the words, wipe out al suspicion of vility in him iniuried, and manifest, that he is not worthy of contempt, as also that the offender, is penitent for his vniust fact, through error committed. There is no doubt replied *Turcho*, but the offender, by saying, that he iniuried, was a man likely to reuenge any iniurie, did free him offended from suspicion of pusillanimitie: but thus doing, I can not perceiue, how the iniurier should not remain greatly preiudiced in honor; for after a close manner hee confelleth, that he iniuried, is a man ready to redouble the blows: the which is confirmed by his last words of submission, seeing he requesteth him to be his friend: and as for me, I thinke it as much, as if he had saide, because I knowe you will bestow vppon mee some bastanadoes, or blowes, I request, you not to offend me, but to be my friend. If to be reuenged, said *Gualinguo*, were alwaies the selfe same, as to g^{ue} bastanadoes or blows, you should conclude well; but the matter standeth not so, for it may further bee thought, that to carrie an iniurie in minde, is to seeke reuenge of the receiued wrong by his own proper valor, shewing vnto the worlde, that he iniuried is not worthy of contempt, and because this is an action of fortitude, which principally is a vertue of the mind, & not of the body, it sufficeth in such an action, to shew animositie and crouage, accompanying it with that force, which nature to the body hath administred,
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how great or little focuer it bee : and therefore such an one shalbe saide to haue attempted iust reuenge of an iniurie, speaking according to common vse, and that by his owne proper valor he hath by al meanes contended after reuenge, although either in force inferior to his aduersary, or by some other sinister accident, he could not performe his wished desire : for the action of fortitude consisteth not in ouercomming, but in fighting resolutely for an honest cause: the offender therefore affirming, that the iniuried is a man sufficient enough to seeke reuenge of the receiued iniurie, doth not for all this priuely confesse, that hee is a man that will redouble vpon him the blowe, or giue him some wound; for it may further be vnderstood that he confesseth, and knoweth him a man sufficient to call in question, or make trial of reuenge, with his owne proper valor through the vertue of fortitude which is in him : so that these words, though they restore honour to the iniuried, yet cause they not the offender to be infamous, as also it no waies toucheth his credit, to entreat at his handes, peace : for he may bee therevnto moued, not so much for feare, as through the common desire euery wise man hath, to purchase vnto himselfe rather friendes then enemies.

Wee therefore supposing, that in compounding peace, honor cannot equally be dispenced, and therefore it is necessary, that some fallation be vsed; these wordes are most proper, for in that they may bee interpreted with diuers sence, they are the apter to satisfie, each of the parties, making a construction according to their purpose : and note thus much, that in procuring peace, it is of speciall importance, to find out words of like significatiō, for with their plausibilitie manie times, they make that bitter venime, infectious, which infecteth honor: and therefore whosoever desireth to bring peace to a good end, it is necessary he contend more in this, then in any other thing. This is an excellent aduertisement (saide *Turcho*) but how would you appease a quarrel, where the iniurie of wordes is not retourned with a lie, but

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with deede? as for example, if the offender saying to the injured, Thou art a murderer, he injured at the same instant shoulde answere him with a blow, and not with a lie.

Although this bee an improper meane of returning such a like iniurie (answered *Gualinguo*) yet desirous to make peace, he that gaue the blow shal say thus: I hauing vnderstood, that you rather subdued by force of anger, then by any euil disposition of mind, called me murderer, repent my selfe that I strooke you, seeing I acknowledge you for a man of valour, and sufficient to seeke reuenge of the iniurie I did you: and therefore request that you will be my friend. The other shall thus answere: I confesse, that overcome by anger, I wrongfully called you murderer, & seeing you acknowledge me for a mā of valor, & sufficient to make reuēge of the iniury you did me, requesting my friendship, I am contented to come to peace, & to be your friend. Questionles these words are of great force (added *Turcho*) in that they can appease so great a quarrel. And *Gua*: to the end you may conceiue their force, you shall note, that hee first iniurying, hath put his honor to compromise, through suspition of two defects, the one is that of iniustice, because hee offendeth another in word, and the other is by defect of valor, because he putteth vp a blow: & the first injured being the second iniurier, resteth in suspition of some murder: for the blowe, though it note the first offender worthie of contempt, yet doth it not deny his obiection of murder, nor tie him any waies to auerre his saying, although by putting vp the blow, it vrge him to chalenge & assault, enforcing him necessarily to make known to the world, that he is not a mā worthy of contempt: It is requisite therefore, for the taking vp of quarels, to find out a meane, & words as apt as may be, for dissipation both of the one and other suspition: & therefore the first words excuse the iniustice of the first offender, because it declareth that the offence was not committed by election, but rather through incōtinency, he injured not hauing had the power to resist anger, amongst al the affections of the mind, the most violent and furious. The second words vttered also touching the self-

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same first offender, annihilate the suspicion of vilitie in him, in that they affirm he is a man of valor, & sufficient to reuēge himselfe of the iniurie. Then those words which by the first offender and last iniuried, are for answer produced, take away suspicion of the murder objected; So that by this mollification, the impostume is lenified, & finally, healed, which seemed at the first sight altogether incurable, except with fire or sword. I iudge the quarrel far more grievous (said Count *Guido*) when the lie-giuer answereth the boxe on the eare, with a wound or blow, because iniuries then redouble of each partie, although the first offender and last offender remaineth with vantage of honor. And *Gualinguo*: Although this infirmitie seem incurable, notwithstanding this shall bee a conuenient remedie, if the giuer, of the lie, being also he that woundeth, shall say thus, after this manner: I being perswaded that you euill informed, vttered of me such an iniurious speech, confesse that you haue not spoken against your mind, yet I entend not that the lie I gaue you, should any way prejudice you in your honour, and knowing you for a man of valor, and sufficient to be mindful of the wound I gaue you, or of any other iniurie I haue done you, penitent for my offence, I humbly request you to bee my friend. The other shal say thus: It is true that euill informed, I spoke so iniuriously of you, but seeing you confesse I haue not lied, & acknowledge me for a man of valour, & sufficient to reuenge my selfe of the wound you gaue me, as also penitent for offending of me, you hūbly require peace, I am cōtent to bee your friend. Now I comprehend the vertue of these words (said *Turcho*) & beleue that we haue in a maner satisfied al occurrences in these contentions, if you would but only shew how a quarrel might be taken vp, where onely an iniurie of deed hath hapned. In this quarrel (answered *Gualinguo*) the honor of the iniurier standeth doubtful, for the suspicion there is of his failing in iustice, as also the honour of him iniuried, through presumption of cowardize: or that he is worthy of contēpt; it is requisite therefore to excogitate words, that may excuse or remoue the suspitiō of the one & the other defect:

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and in my iudgement, they may be of this tenour : when I did you such an iniurie, I tooke you for a wicked man, and worthy of contempt : Nowe sufficiently perswaded of your integritie, and knowing you to be a man of valour, as also sufficient to reuenge the iniurie by me receiued, penitent for what I haue doone vnto you, I desire that you will bee my friend. He iniuried shall aunswer : Seeing acknowledging your errour, you repute me for an honest man, and sufficient to reuenge the iniurie by you receiued, as also penitent for offending mee, request that I will bee your friend, I am content to haue peace with you. By the words which you haue declared in other quarrelles (saide *Bene-lacqua*) it is easie to comprehend the force of these other : notwithstanding I am desirous you would shew the reason, why in these treaties of peace, you neuer vse this worde, to Pardon, considering, that vnto him iniuried, it would bee greater satisfaction, when the iniurier should say, I request that you would pardon mee, than to say, I pray you be my friend. It is true (saide *Gualingno*) that to him iniuried, it would be greater satisfaction, but so it should be too great preiudice to the iniurier; because it is supposed, that setting downe of punishment is in the Pardoners hand: whereupon the offender should priuily come to confesse, that hee iniuried were farre superiour vnto him, and that at his pleasure he could chasten him, hauing no other remedie but to craue pardon : and therefore equalitie in peace by all meanes possible being to be procured, that other maner of speach is farre more conuenient, considering that to contend after friendship with his enemy, suppoeth neither cowardize nor feare.

Me thinkes, sayde Count *Scandiano*, wee haue left out one kinde of quarrell, which peraduenture should haue bin the first according to order, and it is that, where the offences are like : for sometimes it falleth out, that betwixt the one and other party, iniurious words passe without any lie giuen: or else that the one and other resteth equally stricken

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ken or wounded, so that I pray you, fayle not, to accomodate also this quarrell. Some men holde opinion (answered *Gualingus*) that in such like brawles there is no impediment, but to make a good peace, considering that honour by them is so counterpoysed, as the one remaineth not in the others debt: Notwithstanding I holde this for a firme conclusion, that by exchange there can no honourable peace bee made, and much lesse in this quarrell, wherein, as the iniuries be equall, so is the dishonour betweene them equall, and therefore I iudge it necessary, that as they haue dishonoured one another, so that interchangeably by wordes, they restore honor: therefore in comming to peace, hee from whom the brawle had his originall shal say thus: In that I know you for an honest and valiant man, it grieueth me of whatsoeuer hath passed betwixt vs, and I request you to bee my friend. The other shall answer: I hauing also of you the like opinion, and minding well vnto you, grieued for what betwixt vs hath happened, I am content to bee your friend. In my iudgement, this is a good meane to take vp such a quarrel, (said Count *Alfonso Turcho*) but to the purpose of these iniuries: there yet commeth into my minde one doubt, whether one challenged to the triall of equall armes, may with his honour refuse, knowing himselfe in force and skill of weapon inferior to his aduersarie: By one reason me thinkes hee should; for God and nature not hauing equally dispensed their graces: but vnto one man giuen greater perfection than to an other: a man as hauing reason ought to measure himselfe, and giue place to the other in that, wherein he knoweth himselfe inferior, the which not doing, he performeth not a vertuous action, and consequently, doth not preserue, but looseth his honour, as rash and arrogant: on the other side, if that be true, which *Possessino* affirmeth, a man is bound to manifest as great force and pollicie as the other, and enioyned to defend himselfe from the same enemy, in all other circumstances hauing indifferencie: I therefore in this, sir Knight, expect

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The meane to make peace,

your opinion. And *Gualin*: Supposing that the challenger haue iust cause so to do; for being otherwise, any one, as insolēt, is to be refused, & supposing, that he challenged be an Armiger, intending by such an one, not only a souldier, but any one that beareth armes by his side, I holde opinion that he challenged, cannot with his honor, refuse the triall of armes with his aduersary, although in force and knowledge he know him to be superior; for as *Zenophon* a Philosopher, and most excellent warriour affirmeth, the sword and fortune maketh in battaile all force equal!. And this opinion taketh not place only in general battaile, but also in combat, betweene particular men: in which, by diuers examples, both ancient and of these daies it hath beene scene, that the weake hath obtained victorie against the strong, either by hauing more mortally wounded them, or by some other accident. This other reason is annexed; that the challenged by al reason hath euer prouoked the challenger by some offence; wherevppon as the other hath beene bolde in prouoking him, so he challenged must not shew himselfe cowardlike in refusing: & therefore I conclude, that one bearing armes, cannot refuse with honor the challenge of any one whomsoever, although he know himselfe in force and knowledge inferior to his aduersarie.

Your conclusion pleaseth mee (saide Count *Alfonso Turcho*) becaule it is conformable to the rules of knighthoode, and common vse, notwithstanding from it, me thinks there groweth an inconuenience, for the vnarmed touching honour, shall bee of farre better condition then he bearing armes, as he that iniurying, is yet free from challenge: and by this meanes the way of recovering honour with proper valor, will be shut vp to him bearing armes, as further then so, the tearmes of iustice, would not bee equally obserued: For the bearer of armes shall bee tied to the tryall of armes, and the vnarmed free. When *Gualingno*: if that law which commaundeth the plaintife to appeare before the tribunall of the defendant be true, there is no inconuenience will enlue of my conclusion: for he bearing armes, shall be tyed to

and take vp quarrells.

to leaue his own tribunall, being the prooffe of armes, & haue recourse for recouerie of his honour, to the magistrates, and seat iudicial, it being the proper tribunal of those, that make no profession of armes, and doing otherwise, hee shoulde rather diminish then augment his owne honor, and though the Armiger bearing of armes cannot refuse, neither seate of iudgement, nor tribunall of armes, yet is not his condition for this the worse: First because the seat of iudgemēt is common to all men: secondly, for that the tribunall of armes, is proper to himselfe. Put wee the case (said *Beuelacqua*) one vnaccustomed to beare armes, shoulde challenge another of vnlike condition, could he challenged, with his honour refuse the defiance, or should he bee bound, vpponequall termes, to come to prooffe of armes? Iudgement seate (answered *Gualin*.) belonging both to the one and other, the defendant is not onely, not bounde to the challenge, but accepting of it, hee shoulde performe an act vnworthy of a vertuous or honorable man, and shew himselfe no lesse insolent, & foolish, then his aduersarie: therefore those quarrels that fall out between such like men, are to be determined, either with peace, or before the magistrates, & as the lawes commaund; for though honor be common to all men, as also the preservation of it, by meanes honorable is as common, yet bee those means very diuers, according to the sundry conditions and professions of men. The gentlemen were not yet well satisfied, with reasoning of those things pertaining to honor; when the duchesse dwarf came running in, who by order from his highnes, went calling of the Ladies & Knights to a comody prepared by the *Gelosi*. The discourse therefore ended, *Gua.* with foure other knights wēt into the hall where was his highnes, with all the ladies & gentlewomen of the court: And after hauing attended, with much laughter and solace a most pleasant comedy, it being now late, the tables were spred; & supper ended, certaine measures once troden, the duke rose vp, & euery one went to his lodging. The day following, being fair wether, & a calm sea,

His

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His highnesse with the excellent Duchesse, & part of the court, went to the sea side to see a draught with the nets, and the vsuall company, with the most noble Lord *Don Casare*, and the marquesse of *Carrara*, who had taken great contentmēt in the discourse of honor, went to the chāber of madame the Countesse, where according to accustomed solemnity, the Lady *Sylvia Villa* was crowned Queene: euen nowe lately married, & a yong Gentlewoman exceeding gracious, who causing the Ladies and Knights to sit round about her, spoke in this manner.

Vndoubtedly my error should be verie great, if I (in a manner being but a child) by imposing newe lawes to our contentments, should withdraw my selfe from the accustomed manner. For this would be no other, but by too much presuming of my selfe, to eclipse the commendation of these three Queenes my predecessors, whereof deseruedly they may boast and vaunt, who in their Empire procured no lesse profitable and honest, then delightfome and pleasing entertainments: whereupon by their most happie furtherance, wee haue learned what thing beautie is, and where it consisteth: wee also know what Loue is, and how we ought to loue: wee haue in like manner vnderstood what Honour is, and how it is lost, how acquired, and how preferued: which things ha- uing wel considered with my self, I cannot but greatly commend their wonderful iudgement, seeing they haue laboured, with our great contentment, to giue vs knowledge in those things, whereof aboue all others, they discusse and argue in Courts, amongst Ladies & Gentlemen nobly instructed: I therefore desiring by imitation of their famous vertues, not to manifest my selfe altogether vnworthie of this Empire, haue considered, that after honour, it befitteth well to intreate of Nobilitie, to the end, that wee neuer erre in discerning those Noble, from the Ignoble. For it seemeth that riches and sumptuous vestments, are the principal characters of Nobilitie, we seeing euerie day, that the riche appearing in costly Robes, make profession of Gentilitie.

And

and take vp quarrells.

And with bold audacitie, (not to say presumption) establishing themselves in Princes Courts, are sodainely without any other vertue, as Noble, reuerenced, called, & accepted: I commaund you therefore Signior *Hercole Varrani*, that in fauour of me, as also of all these Ladies and Gentlemen, you vse some discourse vpon Nobility, withal, prouiding your selfe to resolue all the doubts, and answer al the demaundes that in such an argument shall be made vnto you: And certainly Signior *Hercole Varrani*, is a Gentleman adorned with al those qualities, which in a perfect Courtier are principally required. He hauing therefore done reuerence to the Queen, said in this manner: I shoulde repute my selfe too happie and fortunate (most excellent Queene) in that with singular fauour you haue thought mee worthie to intreate of so worthie a subiect, as is Nobility, if I knew not that in your highnesse mind, a false image of my vertue were deceitfully impressed, I being verie priue to my selfe, that my slender sufficiency wil greatly frustrate your good conceiued hopes of my performance. Notwithstanding, seeing your maiestie so commaundeth, I wil accept of the enterprise, holding this for infallible, that disobedience bringeth farre greater reproach then ignorance, and pusillanimitie, then boldnesse.

The fift dayes Discourse:

Wherein is discuffed of Nobilitie,



Here were some most graue and ancient philosophers, thrise excellent Queene, so great contemners of Nobilitie, as they constantly affirmed it to bee no other, then a light blast of ambition, wherewith some Citizens more mightie then the rest, were puffed

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vp:and if notwithstanding there were any such thing, in the worlde, it was no whit at all distinguished from vertue, but that the man vertuous and noble, was all one and the selfe same thing: vpon which point hauing meditated, and being to discusse of Nobilitie, not to perplexe the minde and vnderstanding of the attendant, I will deuide this my brieue discourse into three partes. First, I will shew what Nobility is, and where it consisteth; in the second, I will set downe the principall reasons of those philosophers, who contemne it as a thing vaine and fantastical: and in the third, I will make answere, and resolue them, to the end our Nobilitie may remaine most noble and apparent. I supposing therefore, that in certaine indiuidualles of humane kinde, there shineth an excellent qualitie which is termed Nobilitie, affirm, that it is, no other, then a good of fortune, that happeneth to man in his first originall and birth, procured vnto him, by the honorable reputation of his predecessors, and glorie of his countrie: by meanes of which it is worthily supposed, that he is much more capable and appliant vnto vertue, then another can be, borne of mechanicall parents, in a countrie obscure. This by a most proper terme, was by the Grecians called *Eugenia*, which signifieth liberall and good birth, or originall; conformable to that worde, wee vse also, to call them noble, well borne. I haue affirmed nobilitie to be a good of fortune, not because nature therein hath no part, but in that, as the Philosopher teacheth, fortune of those thinges is saide to be the occasion, which fall out contrarie to the intention of the worker; being therefore natures intentiō in framing man, to make a reasonable creature, & not one noble, of reasō nature is the cause, & fortune of nobility. And I haue placed in the definition, that other clause, honorable reputation of his predecessors, as a difference specificall, which distinguisheth this good called Nobilitie, from all other goods externall, as likewise the last wordes of all, are by me set downe, to expresse in this definition, not only the cause materiall, formall, and efficient,

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cient, but also the finall: in that Nobilitie, is for no other respect, by all men had in price and estimation, but only because he noble seemeth borne with a better inclination, and disposition vnto verrue, then a plebeyan, or one extracted from the common sorte. He therefore shall bee esteemed more apt vnto vertue, and shall be called truly noble, who legitimately descendeth, from men, and women excellent, & famous, either for riches, or those things that most among men are esteemed, & that shall haue had many of his race in euery age, & of each sex, honorable & renowned, or that shall bee borne in a Cittie built and replenished, with men heroicall, and glorious: wherevpon the greater haue beene the number of his commendable progenitors, the more noble shall he be. Neuerthelesse, hee may bee called absolutely noble, who shall haue lost the memory of his ignobilitie, which memorie remaineth, during the reuolution of three generations: and let this spoken suffice, to make knowne, that neither riches, nor sumptuous vestimentes make a man noble, but further it is necessarie, that the renowne of his progenie, therevnto concurre: for hee borne of mechanicall parentes, although neuer so rich, cannot come within the compasse of this definition: which definition, notwithstanding it bee well grounded, yet by some Philosophers, and especially by the Stoickes, it is altogether derided, whose reasons hauing foundation vpon great probabilitie, are in no sorte to bee contemned; They say therefore, that all wee springing from a common roote, which is God, principall goodnes, and highest nobility; euery one, though vulgarly extracted, is noble, when not degenerating from his first progenitor, hee practiseth vertue: whereas on the contrarie, hee is truly ignoble, who, notwithstanding hee descended from the auncient Heroes, degenerating, addiceth himselfe to vice: as Boetius affirmeth in some of his verses: which in our tongue sound after this manner,

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*All humane kind on earth, that draw their pace,
From one beginning come, and selfesame race:
For one of all things Father is, and guide,
By whome is gouerned the world so wide:
He to don Phœbus gaue his beames of light:
And to the Moone her silver hornes so bright:
The heauen with starres, he hath adordnd throughout:
And earth with creatures, hearbs, and plants which sprout
From whence proceedes this rumor of high blood?
And vaunts of our great grandfathers so good?
If first originall and birth we way:
Of each thing maker, God we finde alway,
So that none vile, can well accompted be
But those that follow vice, and vertue flee:
Abandoning the stocke of their degree.*

And Seneca principall of the family of Stoickes, writeth these formal words: All men haue the same originall and beginning, none is more noble than another; but hee that hath the better disposition, and apter wit to Artes, and Sciences liberall: They that place vppon the gates, or forefronts of their houses, for prospectiue, the armes, and colours of their ancients, are rather by these noted, than made noble. And the same Author saith: Vertue found not Plato, either noble or reuerend, but it so made him. Of the same opinion was Epycharmus the Philosopher and Poet, saying:

*By nature who inclined is to good,
To be a gentleman is understood,
Though from an Indian mother he deriue his blood.*

And Euripides:

*An honest man is truely noble found:
But he vniust, from Ioue although he ground:
His high descent, with vice his birth doth quite confound.*

And Socrates demaunded who was noble, answered: he that is temperate of minde and body. Vnto which saying Dant being conformable, affirmeth:

Where vertue is, there Gentrie sure takes place.

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Furthermore they alleadge: Nature is a kind mother to all, and a stepmother to none, neither shutteth shee vp the way of vertue, more to one than another: but maketh euery one apt to attaine to his proper end, which is felicity: neither doth *Scythia*, or any other barbarous region, preiudice mans soule; but which is more, if the world were eternall, we are equally placed, in the same course and way of eternitie. If that had his beginning from our first Father (as no doubt but it had) we al likewise from the same first father haue our beginning and originall: which being true, it is madnesse to affirme that one offspring is more noble then another: and they who puffed vp with vaine ambition, boast of Nobilitie, may rather be called fooles, than men noble; they argue also from the inconueniences that would ensue, if nobilitie were grounded on the honor of progenie: for first it would follow say they, that the first vertuous man of a familie, he remaining ignoble, should be the foundation of an other mans nobilitie, a thing repugnant vnto reason; for then that axiome, by al the Vniuersities confirmed, should be false, which is this: Whatsoeuer is the cause, that any other thing is as it is, must much more be the same it selfe: as for example: if fire be the cause that all things haue heate, that of al other must needes be hote. Neyther preuaileth it to alledge, that the like happeneth to him who is the beginning of Nobilitie, as doth to the poynt with vnitie: considering, that thogh the one being the beginning of quantitie continuall, and the other of discrete quantitie, yet is there neyther continuall quantitie found in the poynt, nor quantitie discrete in vnitie: for nobilitie which is a qualitie of humane excellence, hath nothing to doe with poynt, nor vnitie, which are in a diuerse kinde: as further than this, vnitie is comprehended in number; considering that without, one, there can not be twenty, neither can the line, superficies, or body, be without poynt, whereupon in the number of many men noble, that cause nobility, he first must necessarily be comprehended, who ought to be so much more noble than others, in that he

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was the author of nobilitie, & renowne of al the others. And moreover, it would followe quite contrary to the rule of the Civilians, that one might giue to another, that which he hath not himselfe: and that he being obscure, might reach honor to another, a thing altogether disproportionable, and dissenting from reason: It is not therefore to be said, that nobilitie proceeds from antiquity of bloud: for if that were so, the saying of that holy man should be true, that nobilitie were alied to bricke and tiles, seeing our originall also is of the earth. Last of all, they urge that saying of *Aristotle*, that the beginning is the halfe of the whole; which being true, how should not he be noble, that is the beginning of an other mans nobilitie, if on him alone depend the scope and end of all nobility? with these & other such like reasons, those wise men conclude, that nobilitie cannot be the renowne of progenie: but that by vertue of it selfe it is fashioned: in confirmation of which opinion *Dant* sayth:

That only he is excellent, who by himselfe doth shine.

But notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that our conclusion, and definition of nobility is true, and the reasons of these Philosophers vaine, and sophisticall, which at the first sight appeare to be of no small moment. First therefore obserue we, that as terms and bounds manifest that to sense, whereof any one is possessor, so definition (called of the Græcians by a most proper name *Orismi*) which in our tongue importes bounds or termes, procure intellect distinctly to conceiue the proper essence, of euery thing, vnto which the Peripateticke hauing had an eye, of all Philosophers the most sedulous, laboured, vndoubtedly with admirable methode, of al things to finde out the definitions, considering that this is the true foundation of Sciences, it administering the middle terme to perfect demonstration, as the Logicians very wel effect: As therefore al things in our mind by definition, are wel ordained, & distinguished, so from the same minde definition remoued, there is procured a most notable
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confusion altogether like that, which in the beginning of the world, the Poets fabulosly called *Chaos*: Therefore it was an opinion of the diuine philosopher in *Phedro*, aproued by *Cicero*, in the first of his Offices, that they who would entreate of any thing, should beginne from the definition: which being true, as it is, so they that haue intreated of matters without defining them, haue rather bred in the mindes of others grosse ignorance, then distinct & absolute knowledge. Seeing that from good definition the solution of all doubtles which occurre in science springeth. Into this error many ancient Philosophers, and diuers moderne writers are fallen: and amongst others, touching this subiect we now haue in hande, the error of *Mutius Iustinopolitane*, (a witte questionlesse verie rare) is inexcusable: who refusing the Philosophers definition of Nobilitie, hath himselfe thereof giuen no definition at all, which may make it distinct in kinde, from other things: wherefore, labouring to shewe contradiction and error in *Aristotle*, hee hath discovered himselfe to bee but vaine, and rather a professor of the lawes, then a good Philosopher. But further, lette vs obserue lines, which beginning from one center, extende to the circumference in the same center, & are both one thing, and diuers: so al things created, as from God they take their beginning, bee all one, but in respect to diuers formes they be ordained, they bee diuers. If wee therefore consider things created in their beginning, which is God, not only men, as these wise men affirme, but all other thinges also, are equally good, noble, and excellent: but if wee consider them according to their exterior formes and kinds, they are betweene themselves verie diuers: and therefore the Philosopher in his Diuine Philosophie, sayth, that kindes bee like numbers, minding to inferre, that as numbers in vnitie bee the selfe same thing, neither dooth the one excede the other in perfection, but when from vnitie they are seperate, and fashioned in kinde, one is then more perfect and excellent then another. So all the
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kindes of things, in their beginning are the same, but once framed into forme, are diuers : furthermore let vs note (and from hence groweth the error of the Stoicke, and his followers) that this bountie, excellence, and this their originall Nobility, as by proper vertue it cannot be acquired, so may it not by vice bee lost, and therefore *Lucifer* considered in his first instant nature, is no lesse perfect and noble then other angels : for his sinne doth not procure, but as other angels, so he hath had his originall from God. Which error they had very wel preuented if they had beene circumspect, and sought after the definition of Nobilitie, which is an esteemable condition, that in some indiuidualles of humane kinde is found : for willing to haue defined it, they should not haue saide, that Nobilitie was an excellent qualitie in all things created, depending on their beginning which is god, the father of all thinges, and that in those thinges it is preserved, when they abandon not the first roote and stocke, nor practise not Vice: for they might haue perceiued, that in this definition, there is a notable error, and most speciall inconuenience; the error is, that they hauing to define a particular qualitie, which in humane kinde is obserued, defined a common qualitie, which is not onely found in diuers kindes, but also in many things differing more the in kinde: the inconuenience is great, for if their definition were good, an Asse should bee of farre better condition, then man : in whom as neither vertue, nor vice can concur, so could he neuer degenerate from his first stocke & original; and so consequently, should euer bee noble: as on the contrarie, a man, sometimes vertuous, sometimes vitious, should now be noble, and anone after ignoble. *Mutius* saith, that Nobilitie consisteth in perfection in kinde, determining to inferre, that those thinges which in their kinde are perfect, bee truly noble: the which beeing true, that creature from whose flesh the Iews abstaine, being perfect, might be numbered amongst those noble: he addeth afterward, as greatly in himselfe perplexed, that although he descended from ancient
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linage be noble, yet is not he so discended, only noble, for by this meanes, saith he, we shuld infringe the power of nature and vertue, that they coulde not generate a new nobilitie. *Mutius* therefore contendeth to proue, that there be three sortes of nobilitie: of the first, conformable to the *Perepaticke*, hee maketh antiquitie of bloud the auther; of the second, nature, drawing neere to *Seneca*, who affirmeth in the place by mee cited, that he is more noble then another, whose disposition is better, and witte more apt to liberrall artes: of the third sort, he maketh vertue productresse, following the opinion of *Boetius*, that hee is noble, who degenerateth not from his originall, and applieth himselfe to vertue. This man questionlesse in his profession learned, did not marke, that he deuiding nobilitie into two diuers kindes, hath not shewed nor defined the neereft kinde, wherein they agree: for if he had examined his definition, he might easely haue foreseene, that they not being to bee reduced, vnder vniuocall kinde, and very hardly vnder analogie, no more could different kindes be fashioned, after such a manner as he framed them: hee hath therefore Vainly alleaged, that nature, or the intention of nature, may generate nobilitie, for as wee haue declared, nature of her selfe, is the cause of reason, and by accident of nobilitie: for if she distribute nobilitie, as well as reason, all men, as they are reasonable, so should they be noble; but in that the cause of nobilitie is fortune (being a cause contingent) of men wee see some noble, others ignoble. That vertue is the cause of nobilitie we grant, but not the vertue of one alone (as he affirmeth) but rather the vertue of many: we grant also, that nature in respect of her selfe, is to all a kinde and louing mother: notwithstanding let vs adde, that she working by seed, manifesteth herselfe a step-mother to some: considering seed from the heauens, places, nourishment, and fathers, receiue diuers disposition, sometimes good, sometimes bad: wherevpon indiuidualles of the same kinde (but especially in humane kinde) as they are of diuers temperatures, so in

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them diuers inclinations, and in their mindes different effects and affects are discovered: from whence it proceedeth in reason, that some are esteemed of noble race, and others of ignoble: some ingenious, others stupide: some preuaile with force of mind, and are truely worthy to command, and others be as it were lumpish sturdy, with whome seruitude better befitteth: Vnto which the diuine Philosopher alluding saith, that in the generation, of men, there is a mixture in some of gold, and those are alwaies worthy to command. others haue commixtion with siluer, and these are fit, sometimes to obey, sometimes to commaund; the third and last sort, participate with yron. Wherefore, as of al others, most vile, they are euer fit to serue, and neuer to command. Conformable to his master was the great Perepatitian, who shewed by most euident reasons, that by nature the Lord and seruant was allotted: Nobilitie therefore is not contrary to the lawes of Nature: Because Nature made all thinges necessary, common to all, and those which are accidentall and contingent, shee left them subiect to instabilitie: for if wee see by experience, that in the sonnes bodies oftentimes, the similitudes of fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers are represented, why should we not graunt, that in the mind with the body conioynd the like may com to passe? & that in them the like inclination & facilitie, sometimes vnto vertue, and otherwhiles to vice, may appeare. This for the most part falls out, whether the world be eternall (as the Perepatetiks falsely affirm) or by the omnipotent God created (as the Diuines soundly hold) for that in the course of this mortal life, the variety of reasons, customs, maner of life, nourishments, & such like, make neere causes differēt, out of which afterward diuers effects are produced: notwithstanding, in my iudgement, the opinion of *Aristotle* is worthy to be approoued, that nobilitie by all men is to be had in estimation: for it is conformable to reason, that from better the better shuld spring, the which by *Horace* was confirmed in these verses:

*Strong men doe oftentimes children of force vpreare,
The fathers vertue in yong heifars doth appeare:*

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And horses fierce and stowt: for seely fearesfull Dore.

Had not the Eagle sure for fire, that mounts above.

But to proue the contrary of these arguments, I affirme, that it is, not onely no inconuenience, but further it is necessary, that the first vertuous of a progeny, without he himselfe being absolutely noble, should lay the foundation of an other mans Nobilitie: and to the end my conclusion may be manifest, we must consider, that as to procure the transmutation of any thing into fire, it is first requisite, that it acquire eight degrees of heat; so to make one noble, it is necessary, that besides his owne excellencie, he ioyne vnto himselfe the glory at least of iii. other lights, that is, that he be enobled by three other of his predecessors: whereupon, as that shal not be fire which retains only two or three degrees of heate, although there shalbe fire kindled & begun, so shall not he be noble, that hath onely his owne priuate renowne to stand vpon, although he be the beginning of nobility: neither hath that axiome here any place that saith, whatsoever is the cause, that another thing is as it is, must much more be the like it selfe: for it hath annexed vnto it many limitations; and it may be verified in these causes, which of the Logicians & Philosophers are called, causes total, that is, which are of themselves, and only causes: but he which is the beginning of nobilitie, is not alone the cause of nobility, but concurrerh therein, with many other. Let vs graunt, that he as the point in continuall quantity, & vnity in discreet, is cōprehended amongst those noble, yet not as absolutely noble, but as he that onely hath one degree of nobilitie, being as it were the beginning: confes we also, that one can not giue what he hath not himselfe; and that the first vertuous can not giue vnto an whole race, nobilitie: but adde wee this thereunto, that hee may giue what he hath, which is that first degree, with his own vertue acquired: and affirme we, that the vertuous son of a vertuous father, is more noble, he inioying, not only his own, but also his fathers glory; though this man also, standing but vpon ii. discents, cannot be said to be absolutely noble, as that cannot

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termed fire, which hath onely foure degrees of heate: lastly, that saying of the Philosopher impugneth not our definition, that the beginning is the halfe of the whole, because it behooueth, wee vnderstand it truely: hee minding to inferre, that to giue beginning to any thing, is of such importance, as it seemeth whosoever hath begunne, is at the middest of his worke: But graunting them that this proposition is true, wee may conclude against themselves, that he which is halfe partaker of Nobilitie, is not wholly noble: so that to such an one, our definition cannot be applied: which remayneth firme and immoueable, that is: that perfect nobilitie is a good of fortune, deriued from the vertue of our progenitors, together with the countrey wherein we were borne: through which it is supposed, that hee noble borne, is more apt and disposed vnto vertue than an other ignoble. For if we esteeme the goodnesse of diuers creatures, by their races, how much more ought wee to prognosticate the vertue of men by his stocke, and progeny, considering that not onely secret vertue of seede, but also reason doth instigate a man, to immitate the reuealed vertue of his progenitors, not to shewe himselfe altogether vnworthy of their splendor and glory.

Heere *Varano* stayed, imagining that hee had sufficiently declared, what manner of thing Nobilitie was, when the *Queene* made a signe to *Signior Francisco Patritio*, that he should vtter somewhat, for the drawing out a little more at length, this begunne discourse. *Patritio* therefore turning himselfe towardes *Varano*: You *Signior Hercules* explaining the definition of Nobility sayde, that he shall be truely noble, who lawfully descendeth from famous men and women, or that for riches, or such thinges amongst men are most esteemed, so that, not onely vertue, honour, magistracie, and glory, for those be the things most reputed of: but also riches, be the authors of nobilitie: a poynt (in my opinion) dissenting from all reason: For if riches produced Nobilitie, riches beeing the lawfull begotten
of

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of auarice, who seeth not euidently, that Nobilitie should spring from a verie corrupt generation. Shewe vs therefore howe it may bee that men through riches, shoulde become famous, and be foundation of Nobilitie. And *Varano*: As vertue without riches can very hardly appeare: hee which is poore, as the philosopher affirmeth, not being able to accomplish magnificent actions: so those riches which are not the companions of vertue, cannot be founders of nobilitie: wherefore the couetous man, vsurer, and he which addicth him selfe to sordide gaine, although hee shoulde heape vp together more riches then *Crasus*, yet could he not of himselfe, be beginning of Nobilitie: although the first descendant from this man, might well acquire this beginning, if with his receiued wealth, hee should couple vertue. Notwithstanding al this Signior *Hercole* (added *Patritio*) you make me suspect this your noble born babe to be infamous, I fearing, that hee is rather an imaginatiue, then a true and lawfull offspring, seeing you are of opinion, that vertue without the seede of riches, sufficeth not to better him: but if that were true, it were a wonder to poynt out one Noble, considering how hard a matter it is, that riches shuld accompanie vertue: and therefore good *Diogenes* was wont to say, that Vertue could not inhabite in a Citie nor in a house where was riches: and the selfe same Philosopher demaunded what sort of men were most noble, made answer, the contemners of riches, glorie, and pleasures: and *Plutarch* said, that the appetite of nature was of it selfe incorrigible, but if aboundance of riches thereunto were added, it became altogether wilde and vnbridled: and if wee shall imitate the wiser Philosophers, but especially *Seneca*, wee may rather terme riches the mother of pride, insolence, ambition, intemperance, then of Nobilitie: And if wee respect the founders of ancient Nobilitie, wee shall find many more examples of men poore and vertuous, who despising riches, by vertue onely made their progeny illustrious, then of the rich vertuous: For beginning from the ancient Romanes, *Fabri-*

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tius although he were poore, rather desired triumphs, then the riches of the Samnites, hauing with maruailous greatnes of mind, reiected both the gifts, and giuers: *Menenius Agrippa*, who was of so great authoritie, that many times hee tooke vp the discordes betweene the Senate and the people, liued so poorely, as after his death, if there had not beene a common collection made amongst the people, there had not beene sufficient left to burie him. *Attylius Regulus*, a man renowned for his vertues, was so poore, as that he being to maintaine the warre, it was necessarie his wife and children should liue at publike charge: and for this occasion was a daughter of *Cneius Scipioes* married with a publike dowrie. But to make recitall also of the Grecian Histories, *Phocyon Athenian*, when hee might haue made himselfe rich with those gifts offered vnto him by king *Phillip*, would not accept of them: and being put in minde by the Kings Ambassadors, that hee should doo well to accept of them for his children, who without riches, could hardly preserue theyr fathers glorie. If they prooue like mee (answered hee) the selfesame little field will bring them vppe, which hath raised mee to this dignitie, and if they resemble me nothing at all, I desire not that their intemperance should be nourished and augmented at my charge and expence. *Lysander Lacedemonian*, who made *Athens* Tributarie to *Sparta*, was so poore, that after his death, his Daughters Husbände, not hauing receiued their dowries, would haue refused it, but that by the Magistrates they were compelled to holde and keep them: *Epaminondas*, who depriued the Lacedemonians of the principalltie of *Gracia*, and made his countrie free, which, before, and after him, was alwayes in seruitude: of all the victories hee obtained, neuer tooke any thing for himselfe, content onelie with Glorie, and was so indigent, that not sufficient being found after his death for perfourmance of his obsequies, hee was buried at publike charge: I could bring forth infinite other examples for demonstration, that riches

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ches hath no part of nobilitie: the which for to auoid prolixitie, I passe over with silence: onely I will alleage, that the Philosopher in his Rethoricke, amongst noble families, numbred the descendentes of *Socrates*; and *Socrates* as hee was esteemed for a Vertuous man, so was hee not rich, nor from a rich father extracted: we must necessarily therefore affirme, that these men, adorned onely with vertue, were ignoble, in that they were not rich (which would be an exceeding paradox) or else that onely vertue, and not riches is shee, that maketh a familie noble. The definition I haue set downe of Nobilitie (saide *Varano*) as it is true, so will it resolute all difficulties, and not being sinisterly interpreted, will not be altogether discrepant from your opinion.

These two conclusions therefore are inferred: the first is, that vertue is properly shee, that bringeth forth Nobilitie. The second, that Nobilitie cannot bee nourished, nor brought to her perfection, without riches. The first conclusion is manifest of it selfe, the second is prooued by this reason: for as the practise of mechanickall and vile trade, is proper to him ignoble, so belongeth it to him noble, to vse freely liberall artes; and therefore the Philosopher affirmeth, that the life of mechanickall artificers is base, degenerating from vertue, and vnworthy a ciuill man: considering, that to acquire vertue, quiet, and leasure is requisite: wherevpon it may bee noted against the Stoicke, that Nobility taketh not his beginning, so much from abandoning of vice, as from giuing over base practises, and mechanickall artes, and applying ones selfe to those liberall. And because these cannot be freely exercised without riches, therefore are Riches necessarie for the preservation of Nobilitie; in that, one oppressed with pouertie, cannot haue a quiet peaceable life, hee being inforced to gaine his liuing by manvall arte: And therefore the Philosopher in his Politickes, if I remember well, saith; Nobilitie consisteth of auncient richesse and vertue: minding to inferre, that
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though Nobility hath vertue for foundation, yet can it not be nourished nor continued without riches; the which, the greater antiquitie they be of in a familie, the more speciall token giue they of Nobility and vertue, seeing ancient riches can, not be preserved without ancient vertue: that Nobility is by riches preserved, and through want thereof lost, experience and reason manifesteth it: for principalities and riches once lost, wee see most noble families come to contempt, and loose their Nobilitie, those Noble being constrained through want, to applie themselves to base courses, and mechanicall arts: wherein, as the body is contaminate, so is Nobilitie stained. Lette vs then auerre, conformable to your iudgement, that the poore man through singular vertue, may bee foundation of Nobilitie: but then wee must adde also, that it cannot be nourished and reduced to due & proportionable stature, nor in a family be preserved without riches: whereupon as *Fabritius*, *Menenius*, *Agrippa*, *Attilius Regulus*, *Cneius Scipio*, *Phocyon*, *Lysander*, *Epaminondas*, and *Aristides* the iust, being poore, were for their notable vertue, a sufficient beginning of Nobility: so by defect of wealth, it was quickly annihilate in their discendants. And if the offspring (said *Patritio*) were as vertuous as the first founder, might not nobilitie be nourished, and take propagation without riches? And *Varano*: Noble race would either bee verie rare, or none at all, if segnealate and heroicall vertue, were as necessary for the nourishment, as generation of Nobility, this beeing a thing so admirable and rare to bee found. Therefore I say, that as by excellent and singular vertue shee is generate, so is shee fostred and maintained by riches and indifferent vertue. Declare vnto vs I beseech you (replied *Patritio*) before wee proceede any further, what is segnealate and excellent vertue, & what vertue indifferent: for I did not thinke that in vertue there could haue beene any defect, mediocritie, or excesse, the Philosopher hauing tolde mee, that there can neuer be too vertuous a man.

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I am sure, signior *Patritio*, answered *Varano*, you faine ignorāce, to the end that others may the better vnderstand, as he that no lesse desireth to assist others, than helpe himselfe; I therefore, to satisfie your good intention, wil faine also to instruct you, to the end others may learne: and therefore I say, that if we consider vertue in her selfe, shee being a mediocritie equally distant, betwixt twoo extreames, cannot participate of more or lesse: but if wee respect the subiect into which vertue is receiued, shee shal not be in all points equall: For, as in men, complexions, exercises, and studies be diuers: so will some particular vertue, in one, bee more splendant than in another: as for example: in a man of war, he being alwayes conuersant about things terrible, the vertue of fortitude shall be more noted, than in a ciuill man, who applieth himselfe to the gouernement of the common wealth: For in him the vertue of iustice wil bee more famous, as in the Philosopher the vertue of temperance. The excesse then of vertue, according to the Philosopher, is after this maner expressed: the which excesse is of such a nature, as it cannot passe into vice, but rather is properly that which maketh a man magnanimous; and it is called vertue Heroicall, as that which participateth both of humanitie and diuinitie: and this is either excellencie in profession of armes, accompanied with morall vertues, or great wisdom, and ciuill vnderstanding: insomuch as from these two vertues, cities receyue cheefest good and benefite. But becaule these excellencies are not graunted to euery one, neyrher is it generally giuen to all men, to be apt to warfare, or enclined to the study of good letters, I will count him possessed with indifferent vertue, in whom shall appeare gentle customs, that shall be continent, modest, not enuious, no euill speaker, a keeper of promise, a friend to right and equitie: faithfull in preieruing things committed vnto him, as wel mony, as secrets, a louer of trueth, that through deprauation of mind consents to no brutish action, nor through temerity enacteth no vndecent thing: and that aboue all the rest, shall

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be religious and liberall. And to conclude, an enemy to all vice, and a friend to vertue: when it is therefore sayde, that they also shall be noble, whose predecessors through riches haue beene renowned, indifferent vertue is not excluded: for then the proposition would be most false, but rather that vertue heroycall, the which of it selfe without riches is honorable: whereas the Philosopher in his Rhetorike hath numbred the offspring of *Socrates* amongst those noble, supposing, which yet may be doubted, that *Socrates*, and those that came of him were poore, we must obserue, that hee in his Rhetorike entreating of things, which in the eie of the people be apparant, he doth not always philosophically, but sometimes, after a certaine manner, speaketh and discourseth particularly, tying and accommodating himselfe, rather to vulgar opinion, than pure veritie: and there is no doubt, but if that excused him not, hee should many wayes contradict himselfe: for there could not also be any antiquitie of blood, nor of spring of *Socrates* in *Aristotles* time. Seeing that, as *Ammonius* affirmeth in the life of *Aristotle*, he at 17. yeres of age, went to heare *Socrates*, and was his disciple for three yeres. Considering for my sake (saide *Patritius*) you confesse that vertue is the mother, I am content, in fauor of you, that riches may be the tutresse of nobilitie: which ought to nourish and reduce her to perfection. Then signior *Alfonso Turcho*, desirous to heare further of the matter: Me thinkes said he, signior *Hercule*, your opinion is very conformable to trueth, which is, that Nobilitie taketh originall, rather from giuing ouer mechanickall artes, and base practises, than from abandoning vice: the philosopher confirming the same, where he saith, that he which is employed in base practises, cannot exercise vertue: and there is no doubt, but all common wealths, as well ancient, as moderne, distinguish by this Character, the noble from the vulgar sort: And the Philosopher would, not only, that the plebeian should be free from vice, but further alloteth vnto him a certain portion of vertue, saying, in the mechanickall man so much vertue sufficeth,

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as wherewith he may iustly practise his trade and professions; but for all this, I am doubtfull, for if Nobilitie should haue her originall from leauing trades mechanically, and not from abandoning of vice, this inconuenience would follow: For the professor of mechanical artes, being without vice, should be ignoble, and he practising liberall Artes, though vitious, must come to be noble, and so consequently, any wicked man, applying himselfe to liberall artes, might be author of Nobilitie.

This your doubt ariseth (answered *Varano*) from not ha-
uing well vnderstoode, all the circumstances, from which
Nobilitie is deriued, although I described them vnto you
because it is necessary, that the first founder of Nobilitie,
giue not ouer, only arts mechanically, and apply himselfe to
the studie of artes liberall, but further, that hee vertuously,
and with decencie practise them; which doing, he can neuer
be vitious. You wil then inferre, added *Turcho*, that he who
wil be truly noble, or beginning of nobilitie, ought, not only
to abandon mechanically professions, but also to flie vice. E-
uen very so, saide *Varano*. And what vnderstand you, re-
plied *Turcho*, by those words, to exercise liberall Arts ver-
tuously? And *Varano*: These wordes declare, that it is pro-
per to one noble, to practise liberall Arts without vice: be-
cause he is bound to vse them, not for auarice, or ambition,
as many doe, but onely for honestie. And what vnderstand
you by liberal arts, said *Turcho*? And *Varano*: By liberal arts,
I generally intend al those exercises, as wel of the minde, as
body, which are worthy of a vertuous and ciuil man, as are
al the Sciences, as wel diuine, as humane, and the arts which
vnto some Sciences are annexed and subalternate, but a-
boue all others, the Arte of Warre, and studie of the
Lawes: For the one preserueth, and the other govern-
eth a Common-wealth: And therefore al those, who
addict themselues to these exercises, not to reape thereof
benefit and gaine, but in fauour of themselues, their friends,
and of honestie, cyther they are the beginning of nobilitie

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to their discendants, or else not degenerating from their predecessors, may bee recounted amongst those noble. You impose too feuer a law, added Count *Scipio Socrate*, vppon Nobility, you holding opinion, that they noble, are enioyned to practise liberall arts, without hope of drawing from them any benefit: so that Doctorshippe, which by Emperors is so priuiledged, should verie seldome bee the beginning of nobilitie, we continually seeing, that the multitude of doctours, especially of Lawyers, is alwaies ententive to gaine. And *Varano*: He that hath a generous & noble mind, shal easily obserue this law, but to the degenerate and base mind, it may wel seeme rigorous. Therefore I reple, that those doctours, who sel words al the day long for gain, yea & for lies also, cannot but accidentally be authors of Nobility, notwithstanding they should acquire greater wealth, then *Crassus*; but their inheritors, by imploying this obtained wealth, and exercising decently liberall arts, might well lay the foundation of Nobilitie to their progeny. And if a doctor, reading or instructing (said *Socrate*) should receiue some publike stipend, would it any thing preiudice him in Nobility? And *Varano*: Publike stipend being in a nuber of things honourable, & honor of an honest man desired, as an ensigne of vertue, to receiue it inward, especially through her beneficence, doth not only, not preiudice, but moreouer exalteth to Nobilitie: By the same reason also, a stipend which the Prince bestoweth on those noble, to serue him vpon occasion in the warre, or in any other honourable action, doth not a whit blemish, but rather maketh nobility the more to shine and be resplendant, in that the stipend of a Prince, who representeth the Common-wealth, is a publike stipend, & noteth vertue in him noble, & that hee either hath, or is fitte to perform some benefit to the prince or common-wealth. But Count *Hercole Tassone*, who saie by him said: I would willingly vnderstand, if to practise marchandise wer any obstacle of Nobility: For if that should be true, the Venetian Nobility, so highly esteemed of, wold be nothing worth, in that there

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there be feldome any of their nobles, which are not also marchants, they being of opinion, that Nobility can hardly bee preferued without marchandise, being the meane to hold & augment wealth. And I haue, and do know some princes, that are giuen to trade of marchandise, and yet amongst others noble, those princes are most noble: and *Varano*: Although the Philosopher affirmeth, that the life of marchants is base, and contrary to vertue, as also the Thebanes made a law, that none might be capable of honors in the commonwealth, except they had giuen ouer trade, for the space of ten yeares before: notwithstanding, I make this distinction: For marchandise may be practised two manner of waies, the one, by causing to be brought out of farre countries, those commodities which are not in their own, to their owne gaine, and for benefit also of the common-wealth, the other, by not respecting publike benefit, but onely to enrich himselfe, buyeth vp the commodity of his owne country, whereof there is aboundance, expecting occasion to sell them againe at a greater price, and this being grounded vpon avarice, and a sordide gaine, as it is from vertue farre remote, so dooth not that other blemish at al Nobility, especially, if it be practised with Decorum. And howe may it be practised with Decorum (added *Tassone*?) He noble in vsing trade, shall obserue Decorum (sayd *Varano*) if for all this he giue not ouer liberal artes, but shall vse the other by the hand of his agents, & not sell his commoditie by retale, setting forth shoppes with it, but vtter it in grosse, and for a reasonable price, hauing euer his eie no lesse to publike benefit, then vnto priuate gaine: with this Decorum the Venetian Nobilitie practise it: For they noble, not forsaking profession and arts liberall, as also not neglecting affaires, and publike magistracies, procure with their ships, commodities to be transported out of other countries, for which cause they maintain their factors, selling altogether in grosse, helping by this meanes, not onely their country, but also many other neighbor prouinces, & therefore in this maner preserving and increasing wealth, they do no

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whit infringe their nobilitie. Those Signiors vndoubtedlie are noble (added *Tassone*) for besides their being most opulent both in publike & priuate, & lords of so miraculous & great a city, as is *Venice*, & most mighty also by land & sea, they may further be esteemed the only nobles of *Italy*, Nobilitie in their ancient families hauing neuer bin detaced, the original wherof is reckoned from nine hundred yeares, by the Barbarous nations, the which by their Cities of *Italie* cannot be affirmed, wherin some of the nobles vaunt themselves to come out of *Germanie*, others out of *France*, & many out of *Spaine*. But to returne to our purpose, seeing he noble may traffick, I wold also vnderstand, if without touch of nobility, he may heape vp treasure or no: for of this I doubt, especially hauing read, that amongst the Romanes it was highly commended, neither to deminish nor augment a patrimony, that generous people imagining, that it was a hard matter to accumulate gold & treasure without vice. To gather wealth (answered *Varano*) is in the number of those actions, which of themselves are termed neither good nor bad, but by the circumstances, mean, & end wherfore they are performed, they become either good or depraued; it shalbe lawful therefore for him noble to store vp wealth, so often as in this he obserue a mediocrity, & do it to good & honest end, & this mean may by him be kept, if considering himself, & his wealth, he liue with that decorum, which for his nobility & faculty shal be conueniēt, endeavoring that euery yeare of his reuenues there may rather auance, thē come short, to the end, that by sinister occasion of fortune, he fal not into some distresse: for ther is not a greter indignity, nor any thing that more preiudiceth nobility, then for one noble, through wāt, to go led, as we commouly say, by another mans hand, as on the contrary, there is not any point that giueth greater reputation, or that nearer appeareth to magnanimity, thē not to be in want or necessity of any thing. The end shalbe honest, in gathering wealth for our childrē: which is also by the Euāgelical law permitted, as likewise to be mindful of our friēds, & that we may honor, & succor our cuntry in hir necessities,

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a thing which the Venetian nobility is wont to perform, who
 bring into the common treasury, the particular treasures hea-
 ped up by industrie, and frugality, offering it with their sin-
 gular reputation to the service of their country: and there-
 fore by fooles, who respect no further then a certaine vaine
 exterior apparance, this their frugality is fondly taxed, as
 those, who in apparrell and diet, consume not their wealth:
 whereyppon they call the nobles of Venice miserable and
 couetous, although notwithstanding throughout their whole
 cittie, they may see manifest signes of their magnificence:
 but if we vse by the house, to measure, not only the condi-
 tion and state, but also the minde of the patrone, that for his
 own vse hath built it: what is he, who beholding the stately
 & magnificent pallaces, consecrated to eternitie, which the
 Venetian nobilitie, for themselves, and publike ornament,
 questionlesse with heroycall charge do build, and may not
 perceiue in the a minde more then great, or will not terme
 them (vndoubtedly most worthy) by the titles of magni-
 ficent and excellent: and let not the scoffe at that nobilitie,
 who with notable vanity, are to no other thing addicted, the
 the excesse of pompous attire, & sumptuous fare; who being
 continually folowed by Parasites, & Sicophants, with shame,
 & losse to themselves, & their childre, vtter their wealth down-
 warde in the priuies. The honest frugality and moderate li-
 uing of the vertuous (said *Tassone*) is rather to be attributed
 to those excellent lawes, & good customes, wherewith that
 most prudent commonwealth is gouerned, the to the vertu of
 particular men: for diet, by the laws is moderated, and sum-
 tuous apparrel, as wel in women, as men forbidden: for the
 magistracie of Censors, which is a place of great dignitie
 in the common-wealth, is principally intentiue about this,
 seuerely chastising those, who contemning the laws, exceed
 the meane set down, in their apparrel, diet, or other super-
 fluities. This law (added *Varano*) is of so great impor-
 tance, that by it principally, the commonwealth flourisheth,
 and is maintained: for riches by this meanes, is not onely
 prefer-

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preserved (the props of Nobilitie) but also pride is abated, all occasion of enuie taken away, of hatred, disdain, and consequently of all seditions: In that those men, equall in Nobilitie, but in riches inferior to others, not being able to tollerate, the pompe and pride of them more opulent, in apparrell, & other exterior apparances, excelled by these discontented with their owne estate, they would easily labour after innouation of state in the common-wealth: and there is no doubt, but if the prince with lawes bridle not the subiects follie, that men in citties shall liue scarce happily, seeing men by nature, are so vaine and ambitious, as the vulgar sorte, by apparrell strue to seeme noble; as they noble, also contend to appeare like princes: & setting their whole desire vppon no other then an exterior apparance, they respect not to be seene beggers in their houses, so that in the market place they may appeare rich. Seeing you haue here made it knowne (saide count *Cesar Tassone*) in what manner it is lawfull for one noble to trafficke and enrich himselfe: displease it not you also to declare, whether a Prince, without blemish to his Maiesty, may heape vp treasure: by one reason it seemeth hee may not, for as the Philosopher affirmeth, accumulating of treasure is proper to a Tyrant: honor and glory belonging to a right & good Prince; and considering, that a Prince may at his pleasure, dispose of his subiectes and wealth, he maketh a farre better reckning, by laying vppe his treasure in the purses of his subiects, and friends, then euer gleaning from them, to locke it vp close in his owne treasurie: in that by there hiding the, he alienateth from himselfe his subiectes mindes, making himselfe only Lord ouer gold: but contrariwise, laying them vp in their purses, he becommeth tyrant both of their golde, and mindes: then which minde, there is nothing more difficulte to bee gouerned, as that, which not by force, or violence, but only with beneficence may bee acquired: but further, what need a prince hoard vp treasure, when by the same meanes hee can neuer become poore, how royall and magnificent

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nificence soever hee be, in that at his pleasure he might furnish himselfe with his subiects wealth. It is not onely lawfull (answered *Varano*) but also is necessarie that a Prince should gather riches, seeing he representeth the cōmon wealth; considering that the treasure of the prince is publike treasure, wherwith he defendeth the Cittie in time of war, & in time of peace supplyeth the peoples wants, & which most importeth, by them the greatnes & reputation of principallitie is maintained, not being any thing that maketh a Prince more highly esteemed, then to bee rich of treasure, mony being as it were the nerues and sinewes of warre: wherefore aboue all other matters, a Prince ought to be respectiue of falling into want of treasure: for he no sooner discovereth himself needy, but, though a verie great prince, hee sodainly groweth into contempt, and easily becommeth a pray to his enemies. A good Prince therefore, ought in gathering of wealth, to haue an eye alwayes to honestie, contending to increase his treasure, rather by auoyding superfluous & excessiue expences, then by imposing new and vnwonted exactions, to the end he shew not a desire to enlarge his own royalty, by diminution of his subiects store, for this shuld be no other, then of a good Prince, to become a tyrant: the true Prince no otherwise differing from the tyrant (as the Philosopher teacheth) but that the prince rather seeketh to enrich his subiects, then himself, & a tirant, as he that considereth not that a prince is ordained for his subiects good, & not the subiects in fauor of the prince, not a whit respecting the good of his people, performeth all things for profit, & to please himself: and therefore the object of a true prince is honestie, and of a tyrant, his owne wil and contentment. He then that shal store vppre treasure in such sort as is conuenient for a true Prince, preserueth his reputation in peace, and maketh himselfe strong for war, and by not oppressing the minds of his subiects, hee shal euer be a true and lawfull potentate. The answer of *Varano* was by the whole assembly commended, as if in that, secretly were expressed the wisdom or vertue of

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their Prince. And count *Cesar* replying no further, signior *Guilio Cesar Brancaccio*: I well remember, saide he, Signior *Torquato Tasso* in one of his dialogues, which he intituled *Forno*, intreating of nobility, holdeth this conclusion, that a man of valor, though he be not honest, is properly he, that giueth beginning to nobilitie, by acquiring power & riches, leauing them to his progenie: which conclusiō, he verifieth by the example of *Cesar*, who though he was not an honest man, yet because hee was most valorous, left his posteritie great, and mightie: From this conclusion, there arise in me two doubts, the one is, whether from one not good, nobilitie may take originall, the other is, whether vice and valor may stand together: vppon these difficulties, Signior *Hercules*, I expect your opinion. And *Hercules*: Before we proceed any further, it will be good, that the first discoursing search out the true signification, and from whence these termes, a man of valor, bee deriued, the which, neither with the Latines, nor Grecians I neuer finde exprested, and I do not beleue that they can be set downe in such manner, and with that grace as they sound in our language: for my part, I should think that this word valor, were deriued from the vulgat word *Valere*, which wee commonly vse in those thinges that are solde for price; and that speaking properly, it importes as much to say, as this thing is of great value, as to say, it valueth, or is worth so much: or the price of it is so rated: and further, I am of opinion that those thinges are absolutely of value, which in their kinde (be they artificiall, or naturall) are good, and apt to that end, wherevnto art or nature directeth, & not being such, although they may well serue to some such vse, yet may they not absolutely bee teamed of value; which being true (as it is) so cannot he be absolutely a man of valor, who is not honest, considering hee is not apt to that end, wherevnto nature and the author of hir, hath directed him, which is felicitie: & I say absolutely of valor; because it is not to be otherwise thought, but that he being expert in some arte, or science, may be of indifferent estimation.

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mation. This is conformable to the Philosopher, where in treating of wisdom, and wise men, he saith, that this name properly agreeth with those, that of all humane actions performe ever the best: but for all this, those also, who in some one Arte are excellent, do vsurpe this terme: wherevpon we vse to say, that *Praxiles* and *Phydias* were expert and excellent Grauers. Nowe to our purpose: If *Tasso* vnderstand, that a man not good, may be called absolutely of valor, in my iudgement, he is deceiued: but if he intendeth, that valorous may be applied, after the same maner, as *Phydias* was said to be wise and excellent, which was only in the art of Grauing, he spoke well: In like maner, he is deceiued if he beleue that the man valorous, accompanied with vices, may of himselfe bee founder of Nobilitie, and I say of himselfe, in that by accident he is not forbidden, such an one leauing riches & power to his posterity, by meane of which, they may with honor exercise vertue, and liberal Arts. Your opinion, said *Brancaccio*, is conformable to my humour, and grounded vpon preualent reasons: For if by nobilitie wee suppose an inclination vnto vertue, in him noble, it beeing likely, that from the better, better still springs; if he first had beene wicked, both supposition and proposition would be false: For from one not good, another good should take his originall; but according to my obseruation, this worde valor, seemeth properly to be vsurped in those vses appertaining to warre; so that when we say, he is valorous, or of valour, presently we vnderstand it in Armes. Arte Military, answered *Varano*, as it hath euer beene, of all others the most noble and honorable, so those who make profession of bearing armes, notwithstanding for the most parte, they be menquellers, and most wicked, vsurpe, not onely the name and title of valorous, but also of honest men: as though it were all one, to be valiant with armes in hand, and be an honest man: but as it is false, that one wicked by being valorous may be good, so is it as false, that he may be termed a man of valor. Signior *Guilio Cesare* confirmed this saying, &

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the Count *Scandiano*, doubted after this maner: You signior *Hercules*, amongst the principall properties of Nobilitie, haue placed, not onely renowne of auncesters, but also of Country: as though the property of anciēt & famous bloud, were not sufficient, notwithstanding one were borne in a small village, to illustrate and make noble a progenie: but if we turne ouer ancient and moderne Recordes, we shall finde most noble and famous families, to haue taken their originall, in base and humble place: and to discourse somewhat further, the same heauen couereth all things, and heateth them; the selfe sunne illuminateth; and to man of al other creatures most excellent, there is not limited one earthly habitation only as to the other, but through diuine fauor the whole worlde, hee being in his life time an inhabiter of the whole earth; and being worthy, after death to be a citizen of heauen: wherefore good *Diogenes* demaunded of what countrey he was, a citizen of the world, answered he: minding to inferre, that not a mans country, but vertue administreth honor and glorie, and that a man ought to boast, not of his country, but only of vertue: the which of it selfe is sufficient, to illustrate the obscurest countrey whatsoever, as *Anacharsis* the Scithian Philosopher expresseth very wel, who to a foolish Athenian, that objected vnto him the basenesse of his countrey, answered: My base country I by vertue ennoble, and thou thy country noble, obscurest by vice: And we reade, that the vertue of *Homer*, mooued emulation amongst seauen of the principall citties of Græcia, each of them vaunting, that hee was borne their originall citizen, doing this for no other cause, but to make themselves famous, with the renowne of this mannes vertue: by which it is manifest, that the vertuous man giueth, and receiueth not honour from his countrey: As I beleue therefore the definition of nobilitie woulde be much more perfect, if it wanted this clause: notwithstanding I expect that you lay open my error.

And *Varano*: As Nature and G O D haue made
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manne Lorde of the earth, and cittizen of the worlde, so hath he not in the globe of the whole earth, one place more then another, appropriate for his birth, and habitation; in that as experience teacheth, he might liue, and inhabite in all places: notwithstanding by fortune hee hath his birth more in one, then in another, and the place where hee is borne and nourished, wee call his country, and native soyle: A man therefore by nature is a cittizen of the world, and by fortune of the land and prouince where he was borne: neither can it bee denied also that citties and places of a land, are greatly different, as also I will not heere moue consideration, of diuersitie of climates, which (as appereth also in vnreasonable creatures) ordinarily make wonderfull difference, in the stature and complexion of the body, & affections of minde, as the Philosopher affirmeth, speaking of the nature of the people of *Asia*, and *Greece*: but diuersity of lawes, manners, and customes, are such, as what in one cittie seemeth vniust, and impious, in another is admitted, as honest, and iust: which being true, wee must of necessitie confesse, that one borne, and nourished in a cittie built and augmented by men heroycall, grounded by excellent lawes, where prudence, sapience, and all other liberall artes, are practised, is reputed much more vertuous, then another borne and brought vp in a countrie, where barbarous laws, vnciuill customes, and no other artes be professed and practised, but those mechanicall, and base: with which reason moued, the Philosopher saide, that Barbarians neuer were, nor could bee called, perfectly noble. Country therefore importeth so greatly, as without the glory of it, no perfect nobilitie can bee framed; I say perfect, because he may also bee called noble, who is descended of ancient and vertuous parentage, although in meane and humble place. You haue so well resolved my doubt (saide *Scandiano*) as that I cannot but reple, and confesse that honor of country, is necessarie to perfect nobilitie. Signior *Varano*, must needs satisfie me also (saide *Guirino*) for it will not sinke into my head, that

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Nobilitie is an externall good, or of fortune, especially hee hauing affirmed, that nobility is euer ioyned with vertue; the which vertue, as it is neither of Fortune, nor by Fortune, the Philosopher so teaching, so can it not be an eternall good: For vertue being an habite, and perfection of our minde, is cannot but be numbred amongst those goods, which in vs be intrinsecate: loose therefore my doubt, and this your manifest contradiction. And *Varano*: Signior *Guirino*, propoundeth an excellent problem, whether nobility bee in the number of those goods internall, or that it be externall, and of Fortune: and to shew the dexterity of his singular wit, as though he conceiued not the truth, hee concludeth by our own position, that nobility is not a good externall, nor of Fortune, we hauing affirmed that in it vertue, as also other poynts precious and honourable were contained. To which we easily make answer, if wee shal but consider what before I haue said, for it is true, that nobility may be placed amongst those goods of Fortune, as that which happneth beyond the intention of Nature, and is by the Philosopher numbred amongst those goods which are not in our selues: for although it haue originall from vertue, yet dependeth it not of the onely vertue of him that possesseth it, but rather of the vertue of his many predecessors, which is truely that, that produceth glorie in him noble, being termed Nobility. Whereupon as the vertue of the most glittering sunne-beames, is of force to make things obscure visible, so the vertue of many descendants of a most bright beame, may illustrate an obscure lineage, how base or vile soeuer; & as the sunne-beames are not in the thing illumined, as in proper object, so the glorie of predecessors is not in him noble, as in his particular subject, but hee, together with others of the same blood, do enjoy the resplendant brightnesse of their predecessors. Is Nobilitie (replied *Guirino*) bee a vertue of stocke or kinde, as the Philosopher sayth, & dependeth on antiquitie of blood, wee receiuing blood from the bodies of our predecessors, I cannot see howe it should rather bee a gift of Nature, then Fortune:

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Fortune, beeing to be recounted rather among those goods within our selues, then amongst other externall. And *Varano*: A man noble is begotten, by Nature, seed, & Fortune; for Fortune is no other, but a concourse of diuers causes, whereof the most neare, is a cause vndetermined: Man, as man, is deriued from nature and seede: but in respect of nobility, from Fortune: for it is a thing contingent, and no wayes knowne vnto Nature, that a man shoulde bee borne, whose predecessors haue beene renowned and glorious.

Tell me in earnest (added *Gairino*) is it not the intention of nature to make man, as all other things, in such perfection, as that hee may easily attaine his proper ende. This proposition (sayde *Varano*) is necessary and alwayes true, that nature guideth by infallible prouidence, maketh euer the best of all things, if shee bee not hindered. And *Gairino*: If therefore in him noble, there is greater perfection then in all other conditions, and that Nature alwayes intendeth that perfect, me thinkes, it necessarily followeth, that hee should bee borne Noble, not, by Fortune, but by intention of Nature, and consequently, that Nobilitie is the gift of Nature, and not of Fortune.

You may perceiue Signior *Gairino* (sayde *Varano*) that this your conclusion is not necessarie: for all propositions of a syllogisme, are not euer true and necessary: for though in him Noble, greater perfection is supposed then in others, yet many times the contrarie falleth out, as euery day experience plainly teacheth, and therefore I deservedly found fault with *Mutius* his definition, that is, that Nobilitie is not the perfection of euery thing in his kind, but rather, an inward supposition of vertue, as hath bin said, which dependeth on the glory and fame of his predecessors.

Gairino replied no further: And Count *Haniball Turcha*: You, Signior *Hercole*, if I carry wel in mind, said: that he cannot be noble, who is not borne legitimate, if that were true, it would follow, that the son of a noble father & mother, might
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be ignoble, this seeming inconuenient: for if it be true, that Nobilitie, as the Philosopher affirmeth, is a vertue of kinde, it hath originall from seed, and not from marriage: for marriage in respect of nature, is a thing accidentall, neither can it augment or diminish perfection in seed; and to stand vpon naturall example, as to generate a couragious horse, it sufficeth to put together a noble Stallion, and a goodly Mare: so to make one noble, without other marriage, the vnion of a noble man, and woman, shall be sufficient. And *Varano*: Although matrimonie is not essentiall, hauing respect to generation, and that the vnion of male and female sufficeth, yet is it necessary, for the framing of one perfectly noble: considering that one perfectly noble is he, that hath had all his predecessors renowned, and famous, as also with vice immaculate: In that therefore it cannot be denied, but the bastard hath had his father and mother, contaminate, with the vice of intemperance, as those who came together contrarie to honestie, and repugnant to that, the lawes both diuine, and humane command, although many of his predecessors were noble, yet must he needs confesse, that himselfe is not perfectly noble: but that he wanteth an ounce of arriuing to perfect nobilitie: and I say perfect nobilitie, because it is not denied, but that bastards also may haue some part in nobilitie, and in vertue bee like to their grandfathers, and great grandfathers.

And if bastards were legitimate (added Count *Hamball*) should they not supplie the ounce they want, and become perfectly noble? Wise Lawgiuers (sayd *Varano*) to auoyde the vice of intemperance, hauing deprived bastards, as well from succession of their fathers goods, as of any other good of fortune, beeing those, who contrary to the disposition of the lawes and commandements of God, were begotten, it was prouided to mitigate severity of lawe, that by cheefe Princes, who bee the lawes superiours, they might by priuiledge bee admitted to succession. So that legitimation may make them capable of riches, but not of perfect nobilitie

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I am satisfied, saide Count *Haniball* : And Count *Hercules Beuelacqua* : I haue seene, said he, while I was in the French Court, priuileges of nobilitie giuen by that king, to persons ignoble, yet deseruing well of the crowne of France; as also, other men most noble, to be depriued of nobilitie, for their contrary demerites, how which should bee done, I cannot see, if nobilitie were restrained to those families, who pretend themselves descended of ancient blood: declare vnto vs therfore, if Princes may giue, or take away from another nobilitie. And *Varano* : It is a conclusion approoued by Doctors of the law, that Princes by their authoritie, may not onely giue nobilitie by writing, and priuileges, but may also secretly giue vnto another those degrees, which appertain to men noble, by inuesting him with some noble infeofment, as also that it is in their power, to depriue nobles of their degrees of nobilitie. And *Bartolo*, a principall doctor, writeth : that if a man should liue a thousand yeares replenished with chiefe vertue, yet could he neuer be noble, while by the Prince, some dignitie or nobilitie, were bestowed on him, by which he might be distinguished, from the common people : Notwithstanding, I am of opinion, that this Doctor, together with others, haue greatly erred : & in no other respect, but that speaking and discussing of nobilitie, they haue neuer defined it, but confounded it with titles, magistracies, dignities, and other preemenencies; all which bee partes of honour, and rewardes of those actions, which depend on the vertue, of one alone : And I cannot but wonder at *Mutius*, a man certainly both learned, and iudiciall : who, after hauing confounded diuers kindes of nobilitie, mooueth this question, who is more noble, hee that is descended of ancient blood, or another enobled, by his Prince? and he answereth it by these formall wordes : If the Prince giue nobilitie to another for true testimonial of vertue, he shall be most noble : but if it be placed through humor, or appetite, he borne of ancient blood, shall be more honorable : we must therfore affirme according to *Mutius*,

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that to bee noble and worthy of honor, is the selfesame, being most false: for vertuous actions, and not nobilitie, is woorthie of honour: and if nobilitie bee honoured, it is not in respect of it selfe, but as it is presumed, that shee is with vertue conioyned: But if to bee noble, is a thing diuers from being woorthie of honour, who seeth not, that *Mutius* in his demaunde, hath begunne (as in prouerbe wee say) a gallon pottle, and turning the wheele, like an vnskilfull potter, hath finished a cruse: But leauing *Mutius*, with all the other Doctours of the lawe, in their confused *Chaos*, I affirme that a Prince, how great soeuer, cannot giue nor take away nobility, if it be such as either we haue, or ought to be defined.

A Prince may well giue titles, magistracie, enfeoffments, place, dignity, and other such like most speciall honours, but hee can neuer effect, that one borne of the vulgar sort, should be discended from illustrious familie, nor that he noble, by the renowne of his predecessors, should be borne of base and ignoble parents, although he dishonoured him neuer so much. In your foundations (added Count *Hercole*) you discusse, as though yours were the true definition of Nobilitie, which neither *Mutius*, nor the other doctors by you named, would euer grant you, for they vnderstande this terme nobilitie, much more amply, then doth that Greeke word *Eugenia* sound: If they should not belecue mee (sayde *Varano*) yet would they giue credite to authoritie of their Emperours, seeing *Frederick* the second, who beside his dignity had the name to be greatly learned, demanded what nobility was: made answer, ancient riches, and excellent customs: as also *Sigismund* the most wise Emperour, whom a man of the vulgar sort, by him verie well esteemed, entreating that he would create him noble, made this answer, I may make you rich, and grant you all manner of immunitie, but noble I can no wayes procure you to be. Leauing authoritie, and comming to reason, either nobilitie is in the world from other things distant, or else with others the selfe

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selfe same, as with vertue, riches, prayse, honour, and with other goods internall, or external. If it be the selfe same with others, then is the distinct discussion thereof superfluous: If it bee from them separte and apart, as particular treatie is necessrrie, so is it as behoouefull to finde out definitions, and essentially differences, by which the nature thereof may bee knowne, to bee from other things different.

The definition being giuen, conformable to the doctrine of the Philosopher, is such, as that it sheweth this excellence which wee terme Nobilitie, to bee of different nature from all other goods and properties, therefore it is sufficient and good. But the definition of *Mutius* and other Doctors, can neither be blamed, nor commended, they neuer hauing defined, or given any signe thereof, whereby wee might distinguish it from vertue, prayse, and honour, but haue so obscured it, with the colours of other things, as that there is no sight so quicke, which is able to comprehend it. Me thinkes (sayd Count *Hercole*) that from *Mutius*, which I haue also seene, the definition of Nobilitie may verie well bee drawne: for hee affirming that Noble signifieth one woorthie to be knowne, it may be sayde, that Nobilitie is a good, which maketh another man woorthie to be knowne.

See you not (answered *Varano*) that by this definition, vertue, riches, honor, and other goods, which make another man woorthie to be knowne, are not a whit distinguished from Nobilitie, which the Philosopher sheweth, saying, That there be three sortes of Cittizens in a Commonwealth, worthy to be knowne, those be the rich, noble, & vertuous, and there is no doubt, but one may be rich, popular, and vertuous, and yet not well borne: and for all this, hee shall be woorthie to be known. But to return to our purpose, they greatly abuse themselves, who baselie borne, growe proude of receiued Nobilitie, as though the authority of the prince had made them regenerate & borne anew. But what

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say you of the Nobilitie, added count *Hercule*, which the Signory of *Venice* vsually giues to them, that haue performed any singular benefit to their common-wealth? is not that true Nobilitie? as they did to *Giacomo Cauallo*, of *Verona*, who was created a noble man of *Venice*, with all his posteritie, for the egregious vertue, and valorous attempts, that he performed; in that most dangerous warre they hadde with the *Genowayes* at *Chioggia*, and together with him for the selfe same occasion, they made thirtie pleibean families of the City of *Venice* noble: ennobling those that then liued, as all theyr discendants perpetually: and they being the first, were gentlemen, without attending any third or fourth generation. If *Giacomo Cauallo* were in his owne Citie noble (sayd *Varano*) hee acquired not nobilitie in the Venetian Commonwealth, but by being made a member of that commonwealth vnto which hee was vassaile, hee attained some title and preeminence of great honour and benefit, in that hee like other Gentlemen, might stand for all honours, magistracies, and dignitie. And by the reasons aboue, by vs alleadged, those first who of common people were made noble, were truelie honoured: but yet not ennobled with true and perfect nobility: whereupon they were rather a beginning of Nobilitie to their posteritie, then truly noble: and to conclude, Princes may by their authority, giue beginning of Nobility to a familie, as likewise of disgrace and ignobilitie, and especially, when through desert of vertue they honor good men, and for vice, reproach those wicked. Your conclusion (said count *Hercules*) is so cōformable to truth, as I am out of al doubt. I haue good cause to doubt also (said Count *Guido Calzag.*) neither wil it euer sinke into my head, that nobility (as *Varano* hath set down) is in the kind of good things, being rather to be nūbred amōgst those euil, which hinder felicity: in that nobility in him noble, doth no lesse poyson and corrupt his sweetest contentments, then an other may be, who is reiected. Behold a fine paradox (said *Varano.*) That is a paradox (replied *Calagnini*) which is not with sound reason accompanied,

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panied: for how can that be a good, which deprieth of libertie, and bindeth with hard knots of seruitude? and who seeth not that nobilitie is such, seeing he noble, can neither do nor say any thing without consent of nobilitie? he being continually enioyned, to his great discontentmēt, to speake, walke, stand still, bee apparrelled, vse wealth, and to performe all his operations not as he would, but in such sorte as his nobility vrgeth him, with hauing an eie euer to decorum, and not to obscure the glory of his predecessors: the which cannot by ignobilitie be affirmed, in that full of most pleasant libertie, it giueth licence to the ignoble to liue not only after his own minde, but licentiously to cease vpon al thoe contentments, which best please him, without hauing respect, to time, place, or the dignitie of his predecessors. To this truth, these illustrious Princes, most noble Ladies, and honorable Knights, will readily giue testimony, who neuer more sweetly tast their delights, then when dispoyling themselves of that prosopopeia which this beast of nobilitie carrieth about with her, they are apparrelled with that liberty, which to pleasing and iocund ignobilitie is euer annexed: From hence it proceedeth, that to vs gentlemen in Carniuale time, masking is so acceptable, in that at our owne pleasure, wee may transforme our selues, sometimes into the habit of a porter, other whiles, of a country man, and sometimes into any other person more base and vile, taking incredible pleasure, in immitating their speach and gait, and practising their mechanical and licentious customes, sometimes freeing our selues from the insolencie of seruants and boys, which continually run gaping at our tailes, we proue how sweete it is to go alone, nowe running, then leaping, sometimes skipping, by and by laughing: as also that wee may enter into any place, without being noted, & execute any knaueries. Surely if we well consider, we shall finde, that this glorie which is termed nobilitie, is no other but a light, which maketh the defects of men noble to euery mannes eye apparant. How many may wee say, haue bin, & are the

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men of base condition, who haue run a life no lesse brutish and dissolute, then *Sardanapalus* Lidian, *Philopater* Aegiptian, *Heliogabalus* and *Comodus* romaine Emperours, and yet hauing beene of base qualitie, by the eye of the world, they haue not beene discouered: whereas on the contrary, of the intemperate, and vicious life of those in noble estate, bookes and whole volumes be replenished. But what saye you of nobility, she being found (as many times it happeneth) coupled with pouertie? what burthen is more intolerable?

The poore gentleman, not content with that which is necessary for sustentation of humane life, superfluous things wanting, wherewith nobilitie is puffed vppe in pride, hee yerneth inwardly, and grieuing a thousand times a day, at his noble birth (as he that is ashamed, to apply himselfe to base course of life) languisheth in great miserie: whereas contrariwise the poore mechanickall man, accustomed to labour, & an homely life, no whit carefull for things superfluous, by arte or mechanickall industry, preparing those onely, which are sufficient for humane liuing, leadeth a pleasant and contented life: many other reasons might be produced, to shew, that nobilitie, is rather in the kinde of thinges wicked, then good, which not to appeare a Rhethoritian, I will passe ouer: being well assured, that there is not any of these most noble gentlemen, which to themselves are not priue, of the truth of this my conclusion, and that repent not themselves a thousand times the day, to haue beene noble borne. It befitteth not (*signiour Counte*) answered *Varano*, your noble minde, nor these most gentle creatures, which here giue eare round about vs, to enter into so sinister opinion: For Nobilitie is not only, not to be recounted amongst things wicked, but is a most pretious good, by al qualities and conditions of men, honored and esteemed, & so far off is it from depriving of libertie, that rather it reacheth a helping hand to deliuer from seruitude, there being no greater seruitude then vice, as before I haue saide, and the Diuines affirme

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firme, Nobilitie as a most cleare seeming glasse reflecting continually on the eyes of him noble, the glorie of his ancestors valor inuiteth to illustrate his mind with vertue, to resemble them, as also to shun vice. Whereupon *Q. Fabius Maximus* and *Scipio* were wont to say, that beholding the Images of their predecessors, they found their mind wonderfully inflamed vnto vertue. I confesse signior Conte, that Nobilitie is a cleere lampe, which causeth wicked actions, no lesse than good to appeare, and in this respect, is principally worthy to be placed in the kinde of things good, for shee spur-reth and enflameth vnto vertue, as wel with feare of infamy, as with hope of commendation, wherefore this glorie of Nobility not discovering it selfe, in the operations of them ignoble, they want this pricke of feare and reproach, neither thinke they themselves bound to proceed further then that their predecessors haue performed: and to men noble it seemeth great opprobry, not to attayne at least to the boundes, set downe vnto them by their first founders, and therefore in al manner it alwayes falleth out, that in armes, and vertuous actions, the most singular and excellent men, be of nobility: For Nature hath inserted a certaine secret vertue, in the seede of all things, which giueth them force and property, to be like the beginning, from whence they are deriued: The which is manifested, by that wee euerie day see in men, who are borne of shape and proportion, not onely like to their fathes, but also resembling many times, their grandfathers and great grandfathers.

The like is perceiued also in the race of horses, bullocks, and other creatures, as further euen in trees, that the boughes and braunches doe alwayes in a manner resemble the stocke and trunk of the tree: And if at any time they degenerate, it proceedeth from the Husbandmans negligence. The like whereof happeneth to menne, who being borne, if with good education they bee manured, are alwayes in vertue like those from whome they do proceede, and oftentimes better too. But if they want good pruners,
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and those that of them should haue a care, they become wild and sauage, neuer bringing forth good fruit: I grant also, that nobilitie in the end sinketh vnder that ponderous weight of pouerty; notwithstanding, if he noble, together with riches, hath not wholly lost his generositie of minde, there can not want meanes, and honorable courtes for his raising vp, three of which, in my opinion, are of great moment; one is, by consecrating himselfe to God, and euen as he by fortune is abandoned, so with heroycall vertue, to shew himselfe a contemner of the world and fortune: another is, by dedicating himselfe to the honorable seruice of princes: the third is, by practising the most noble profession Military. And there is no doubt, but that he noble, hath neuer a special aduantage ouer him ignoble, although in vertue they be equall. For, if there should be two men, who had not by good or bad actions, giuen any former trial of themselves, presently as it is knowne that the one is nobly borne, and the other not, with euery one he ignoble shal be lesse esteemed, than the other, noble; and it is necessary, that one ignoble, by many endeouours, and in long time, imprint in the minde of men, a good opinion of himselfe, which the other in a moment, and only by being a Gentleman, hath acquired. Al the standers by, confirmed this opinion of Signior *Hercule*. And Count *Palla Strozzi*, seeing that *Calcagnino* replied no further, I would willingly vnderstand, said he, from whence this word Gentleman hath had his originall; as also if it be al one, to be noble, and to be a gentileman: in that by these last words you vttered, wherein you confound these termes, it seemeth they are the selfesame things. Notwithstanding I see many, who though of meane qualitie, yet being but well apparelled, they professe gentilitie; and euer they confirme their speeches, by swearing by the faith of a Gentleman, this making mee doubtful, and sometimes absolutely to belecue, that to call a Gentleman dooth not properly signifie noble, but rather, an honest man, and of gentle customes. And *Varrano*: Touching your first demand, I am of opinion, that this word

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word Gentle was deriued from the Latine, as also the greater part of those termes, which in our vulgar tong wee commonly vse: For gentle, among the Latins, signifieth as much as, of the selfesame familie; and in like maner, they were called gentle, who had the selfesame name, as we reade in *Cicero*, who speaking of *Tullius Hostilius*, calleth him gentle, and writeth in his *Topickes*, that they be gentle, who amongst themselves are of one name, and haue their originall from free men, whose predecessors haue neuer indured seruitude. Whereuppon wee may gather, that this woorde gentle, agreeth with no other, but with persons of noble families: And therefore I iudge, that this worde, which in olde time signified thus much, that this man was noble, together with him of such a familie, and these men were noble with those of another familie, enlarging now somewhat his signification, generally noteth vnto vs, that one noble is somewhat more, and as amongst them they were called gentle, who descended of noble familie, so now those noble are called Gentlemen: so that wee may conclude, the name of gentleman to be proper to him noble, and that to one ignoble it can no wayes be applied. To the second demand, notwithstanding, *Dant*, *Petrarch*, and *Boccace*, haue indifferently vsed these two terms, Noble and Gentle: yet do I make some difference betwixt them, and holde opinion, that the name of gentleman hath a farre more restrained signification than this word, noble, and that a gentleman is he, who by the Philosopher is called *Geneos*, as much as to say, gouernours, in whom appeares, not only the vertue of kinde, but also that of his proper selfe: for though as I saide, the name gentle is proper to him noble, yet without vertue, he shal euer be an vnworthy possessor thereof: and therefore I thus conclude, that the man noble without vertue, and he vertuous without nobilitie, can neuer properly be termed a gentleman. Then, as your conclusion standeth with reason (said *Strozza*) so doe I coniecture, that the number of true Gentlemen is very small, whereas on the contrary the multitude

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of them is infinite, who vsurpe this title : (being not onely men noble vitious, and the ignoble vertuous, but also, who-
 soeuer by meane of wealth can liue idly, although hee bee
 most ignoble and vitious, professeth himselfe a gentleman,
 so that if any man should obiect vnto him, Thou arte not a
 Gentleman, presently, as if hee had receiued some notable
 iniurie, he would make answer with the lye: neither would
 he refuse combate vpon this quarell, as being perswaded, that
 hee fought in a iust cause. Your opinion, sayd *Varano*, is
 conformable to that the Philosopher sayeth, which is, that
 all men, in wordes, vsurpe vertue, and nobilitie, but of such
 as be truely noble and good, there is not twentie, in any one
 place, to be found. This demaund of Count *Palla*, pleased
 al the knights and gentlemen very well: and the answer,
 thereunto, of *Varano*, was highly commended. When *Ca-
 ualiere Gualing*: You hitherto Signior *Hercules*, haue so plen-
 tifully and particularly discoursed of nobilitie, as from this
 day forward we may thinke that there remaineth not any
 thing further, which vpon this argument can bee produced:
 yet for al this shall I not bee fully satisfied, if you set not
 downe, some distinct information of the degrees of Nobili-
 tie: for that is no true nor sufficient cause, of ones beeing
 more noble than another, in that the antiquitie and number
 of his predecessors is the greater, as in the beginning it ap-
 peareth you would haue inferred: for being so, it would fol-
 low, that a priuate gentleman, whose bloud were more aun-
 tient, than that of a King, or Duke, should then either king
 or duke be more noble: the which as an inconuenience to
 me, wold neuer be yeelded you. I desire you therefore tou-
 ching this point to runne ouer the degrees of nobilitie *Va-
 rano* made answer, It appeareth to be a subiect proper vn-
 to the Ciuilians, for a parte of iustice, being conuersant in
 in distributing punishments, rewards, and honours, it is re-
 quisite that the Ciuilians vnderstand distinctly, and discusse
 of degrees of nobilitie, to the end that with geometrical and
 equall proportion, they may conferre their dignities, titles,
 and

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and preeminences, whereof Nobilitie seemeth principally worthe. Notwithstanding, to giue you satisfaction, building vppon my foundations: I diuide nobility into five degrees or orders. The first ascending, is them noble, who hauing taken original of riches & indifferent vertue, neuer encreased nor diminished, are called priuate Gentlemen. The second is, of those who are honored further with noble enfeoffments, as also with iurisdiction and title of Counts. The third haue equall iurisdiction, with title somewhat more eminent, and are called Marquesses. The fourth is the dignitie of Dukes: the fift and highest is that of Kings. These degrees, haue amongst themselves like proportion of nobilitie, as in them of vertue there is supposed. Seeing honours & prerogatiues, are imparted to nobilitie correspondent to the vertue, which in their kind is presumed to bee: the first degree therefore grounded on indifferent vertue, is inferior to all the rest: and the last, wherein vertue heroycall is supposed, being that of kings: (called for the same reason by *Homer*, shepheards of people) is most superiour: the other three bee part inferiour, part superiour: seeing the second more noble then the first, must giue place to the third, fourth, and fift: the third superiour to the first and second, shall giue preeminence to the fourth and fift, the fourth, before the other three inferiors, shall yeelde preeminence to the fift.

If I conceiue you rightly (added *Gualinguo*) you would say that priuate Gentlemen must giue place to Countes, Countes to Marquesses, Marquesses to Dukes, Dukes to Kings, and this standeth with reason. Although in *Germany* it may bee through abuse, Countes goe before Marquesses: as also in the kingdome of *Naples*, Princes before dukes. To this title of Prince (said *Varano*) I haue ascribed no particular degree of nobilitie, considering it is an attribution to al great Lords, & that distinguisheth not one potestate from another, but the prince from his subiects: & if it be particularly ascribed, it agreeth as seemes, to the eldest sons of kings

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and Dukes: I beleeeue also (said *Gualinguo*) that not without some special reason, you haue omitted the principallest degree of Nobilitie, whereunto all those noble, and most noble, doe willingly giue place, and that is the degrees of the Emperour and Pope. The Emperour as Emperour, and the hie priest as Pope, cannot concurre (answered *Varano*) with the definition of nobilitie, nor make any order of nobilitie: and I say, as Emperor, or Pope: For there is no impediment, but that one chosen Emperour, or Pope, may come of royal and most noble stocke, which may manifestly appeare vnto you, seeing a man brings nobilitie from his mothers womb, but so can he not bring with him, either the Empire, or Popedom, ech of these degrees being disposed by election and not by succession: but a man may be borne, a Marques, a Duke, or a King, speaking of such principalities and kingdoms as come by succession. And though Emperours goe before Kings, and the Pope not only before Kings, but also, before the Emperour himselfe: of this, nobilitie is not the cause, but their dignitie, the which noteth in those subiects so great excellencie of vertue as is woorthy of all supereminencie. Howe can it be, replied *Gualinguo*, but if the Emperour and Pope, haue prerogatiue to distribute the greatest titles of nobilitie, considering they may make, Counties, Marquestes, Dukes and Kings, that they should not be noble, yea and most noble themselves? And *Varano*: I proued vnto you by liuely reasons, that no Prince, how mighty soeuer, can giue nobilitie, although he may adorne, and amplifie it, with titles, enfeofments, and honors, which be the rewards, not so much of nobilitie, as vertue: but if I shoulde graunt you, that the Emperour or Pope, might make another man noble, yet coulde you not conclude for this, that they were to be recounted in the number of those noble: for the Sunne also is of power to produce heate in these inferior bodies, yet the Sunne (if wee will giue credite to the Philosopher) is not hote himselfe. Very wel (said *Gual.*) I now vnderstand you, your meaning is, that the Emperour and Pope be

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be noble virtually, but not formally (to vse these scholastical termes) which hath no other signification, but that they in one sort more excellent the those noble themselves, possesse nobilitie, as they that haue the authoritie to create & augment Nobilitie: and for this I rest satisfied, although I desire yet to vnderstand somewhat further, whether in euerie one of these orders of nobilitie, there bee degrees of more and lesse, or if all those that are of the selfe same degree and order, be equally noble: so that amongst them no precedence occurreth. In that those noble of the selfesame order, (answered *Varano*) when they meete together, cannot set all vpo one seat, nor be comprehended in one place & circuite, being necessarie, that one must needes sit on the right hand, another on the left, one aboue, and another vnderneath: so is it requisite for the giuing of due place to euerie one, that some circumstances of better and worse, bee considered, which circumstance and difference for all this, shall not bee specificall, nor change the nature or substance of the thing, but rather be vniuersall and general, to all the orders of Nobilitie: And surely it is verie conuenient, that amongst priuate gentlemen, there be no account at al made of this difference, or precedence: for besides the decency for yong men to giue place to the elders, it is further liberal education, and noble courtesie, for one Gentleman to honour another, labouring euer to assigne him the superiour place, but amongst great princes, there is speciall returning made of it, and often times question is mooued, touching preeminence. And what is the difference? (sayde *Gualinguo*.)

In my iudgement (answered *Varano*) the differences are of two sorts, which in al orders of Nobilitie, be worthie to be equally counterpeased, and whereunto in al reason, preeminence is to be giuen: one is, antiquity of bloud, that is, the number of worthie predecessors, the other is, that Nobility which is termed the foure discentes, that is, of those who discend from foure generations, not onely of men, but also of women noble, and this kind of nobilitie is so highly

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esteemed in *Spaine*, as that the Catholike King giueth the Knighthoode or order of Saint *James*, to none but such noble, as besides the demerite of their owne proper vertue, proue also this lineal discention. *Gualinguo* replied no more, and signior *Hercules* now weary of discourting, thinking he had sufficiently satisfied the *Queenes* commaundement, would haue giuen place to some other recreation, and contentment; but the *Queene* beckened to Signior *Antonio Barisano* called the Greeke, to come before her, who being arriued that day, stood by in a corner of the roome to heare this argument, and smiling commanded him, that hee also should moue some doubt, and oppugne Signior *Hercules*. This man is an honorable Cittizen of *Scio*, who after the *Turkes* occupying of that Iland, not being able to endure the hard seruitude of these Barbarians, came into *Italie*, and knowne in *Ferrara* for one learned, hee was intertained by his highnes, with a stipend, and had the publike reading of the greeke tongue committed vnto him: and further, being of pleasant and iocund conuersatiō, as one that taketh great delight in facet iestes, being audacious to vtter his opinion in any argument, hee is therefore most acceptable to all the nobilitie of the cittie, but especially to women: hauing therefore done dutie to the *Queene*, he spake after this sort. It were easie for me (most famous *Queene*) it hauing beene very doubtfull, to contradict, whatsoever hath beene deliuered by signior *Hercules*, but because it wanteth not much of supper time, I will only alleadge, how I cannot tollerate, that women, being most imperfect creatures, should haue any part in nobilitie, as he rather like a sicophant and flatterer, then a sincere approouer of truth, without any shame at all hath affirmed; he to himselfe knowing very wel, that he speaketh both against reason, and common vse: which acknowledge nobilitie from no other but the man, and that deservedly: for the female (if the philosopher be worthy of credit) is no other then an imperfect male, framed through the error of nature; who intendeth euer to fashion male, &

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a woman compared to a man, hath the like proportion, as there is, betwixt sence, and reason; and to argue somewhat more effectually, it is a thing certaine, & by the same philosopher affirmed, that in generatiō of mā, male giueth forme, and female matter: this conclusion also in al vniuersities is receiued, that al deformitie, and imperfection, in any thing generate, proceedeth from matter, as on the contrary, all good properties depend on forme: neither for any other respect, are incorporeal substances excellenter than those corporeal, but that these with matter are conioynd, & the other from it altogether separate; which being true, how can it be affirmed, that a woman, who by administering matter, is the cause of al imperfectiō, should giue to a man the least shadow of nobilitie? That a woman hath no part in nobility, & that she wholly dependeth on the man, the lawes and records of Roman Emperors do confirme: and amongst other, there is a text in *Vlpine*, where we reade, that husbandes bring their wiues, excellent dignitie, as also their fathers doe the like, while they com to be married with men of common sort: besides this, there is a record of *Antony*, that the women born of Consolar, or Pretorian fathers may retaine the gentilitie of their stocke, being married to noble men, and not of priuate condition, as also there is another testimoniall of *Valente* and *Valentino*, that wiues may be honorable, though ignoble, & be enobled according to the nobilitie of their husbands, but afterwards, if they take an husband of meaner condition, deprived of their dignity, they follow the quality of their husbands: who seeth not that from these lawes and recordes, a most infalible conclusion may be drawne, that women haue not any part in nobilitie: but follow the nobilitie & quality of man, as the shadow doth the body: So that of themselves if they haue no nobilitie, how can they place it vpon an other? Wherefore Signior *Hercules*, laying aside adulation, and the ouer great desire you haue of their grace, and fauour, sincerely confesse the trueth, and exclnde women, as most imperfect creatures, from this esteemed and embraced

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embraced condition, which we cal Nobility: Signior *Barisano* (most excellent Queen) (said *Varano*) putting confidence in a poetical & vaine fable, that women naturally loue where they are not beloued, & esteeme greatly of such as cōtemne them, by reiecting women openly, laboureth to satisfie the great desire he hath of them to be beloued and regarded: But as in censuring the natural dispositions of womē, he is deceiued, and as he boldly produceth flaunder for truth, so hope I, that in vaine he desireth their grace and fauor: I affirme therefore, that women most beautiful and perfect creatures, may, not only enoble themselues, but further with their proper vertue, make another partaker of Nobility, & that they, as to forme man, so to accomplish him entirely noble, are most necessary: I yeeld that nobility principally dependeth on man; but so I adde withall: that the nobility of a woman so greatly importeth, as that he cannot be counted perfectly noble, who shalbe borne of a base woman: neither wil I vse any other armes in subduing you, then your owne: For it is true, that in the seede of man, life is potentially contained, which is forme: & bloud in the womā's wombe is the matter, wherof the body is formed, so that the soule from man, and the body from woman, haue their original: But further also I auerre, that if noble forme, shalbe brought to noble matter the thing compounded wil be perfectly noble: but if the matter be base, notwithstanding the forme be noble, the compound wil not be absolutly noble, but shal want one degree of nobility being that of matter. Tell me in earnest, signior *Antonio* would you not more respect the image of *Cesar* in gold, then the same, & by the selfe same hand, engrauen in lead, or brasse? and this would you do, neither for the form which is the same, nor in respect of the artificer being al one, but only for the matter which is more beautiful, and excellent. I graunt you that material, and corporal things be lesse excellent then those immaterial and corporeal: as also that matter is a cause of imperfection, as she is the subiect of alteration, transmutation, and instabilite in things not permanent; not-with-

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withstanding comparing of the materiall and corruptible thinges one with another, they which haue more pure, and better disposed matter, do questionlesse proue the much more worthy and excellent things; which the Philosopher here confirmeth, saying, that in all thinges wherein matter is required, the better matter shalbe the more beautiful, and excellent will they fall out: and to prosecute their purpose, if it be true, that the soule followeth the temperature of the body, as the learned sort affirme, and as wee our selues haue experience, how can you denie, that the temperature of the body, giuen by woman, should not be of great moment to the framing of nobilitie, as well as celestiall influence, seeing the minde, if it haue a body euill tempered, and inclined to vice, can hardly be resplendant by those vertues, wherevpon nobilitie is grounded: You cannot denie, and I know it assuredly, but that the body made by woman, hath parte in nobilitie (although it administreth matter) seeing wee perceiue, that dayly from the qualities of the body, as from manifest characters and demonstrations, we vsually prognosticate another mans conditions, in that the shape, countenance, gestures, and motions of the body, many times procure vs to know a man or a woman, not so much as euer seen by vs afore, to be noble, or ignoble. You say, that womā is an imperfect man; admit I should grant you this, which notwithstanding is false, yet would I affirme that this imperfection is not substantiall, but accidentall: for the Philosopher intendeth not, that she should be lesse reasonable, then man; but calleth her, imperfect man, in that she wanteth but one thing only to be man, and this thing is of no importance to humane perfection: so that as the being more then woman, giueth not perfection to man, so doth not the being lesse then man, bring imperfection to woman: although I thinke it as far off from truth, that woman is a defect of nature, or formed against her intention, as I iudge it false and vntue, that nature mindeth not the preservation of humane kinde, which no lesse by womā, then by man, is made perpetual,

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tual: whereof the philosopher aduising himselfe, in the selfe-
same booke, he addeth, that nature, intentiue to vniuersall
good, with special prouidence, fashioneth, sometimes male,
and sometimes female. The defects of nature, bee no other
but monsters, and seldome are produced; women are so far
off from being monsters, that of all things vnder heaven,
there is not any one more excellent or beautifull; who not
seldome, and in small number, but in farre greater multitude
then men, are produced into the worlde, through singular
grace and fauor, of louing and gentle nature, and by the au-
thor himselfe of nature. Confesse therefore your offence, sig-
nior *Antonio*, and demand pardon; for your *Vlpian* in those
imperiall recordes by you cited, shal not be sufficient to mit-
igate the least dramme of those punishments, which from
these Ladies hang ouer your head, in defence of whom a-
gainst the lawes and recordes by you alledged, I will intro-
duce the authoritie of *Virgil*, and a decree, of the most pru-
dent *Venetian* commonwealth, for manifestation, how great
a portion women haue in nobility, *Virgil* speaking of *Dranes*,
saith: *This man his noble race, by mother tooke most sure,*

For by the fathers side, base was he, and obscure.

Who seeth not, that by these verses, *Virgil* intendeth, that
women should, not only haue a part in nobilitie, but fur-
ther, that by themselves they are sufficiēt to giue noble def-
cent. The *Venetian* decree, commandeth, that the sonnes
of a base woman, although borne in lawful matrimony, shal
not be accepted to the trial of nobilitie, neither in any sorte
be admitted to their magistracies, and counsels; those most
prudent and noble Signiors imagining (as truly they may)
that without the nobilitie, and generositie of mothers, no-
bilitie in children cannot be preserued immaculate. If wo-
men, added the Greeke, be incapable of those vertues, that
make men noble, & famous, how can it be, that they should
haue any part in nobilitie? except peraduenture, you think,
that the practise of needle and spindle, deservedly ordained
to women, are amongst all liberall artes, the most noble.
And *Varano*; The needle, and spindle vsed of women with-

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out auarice, as they are noble and commendable exercises, so be they no impediment, but that they may proportionably be capable of al those vertues, as wel to customes appertaining, as to the minde which concur with men: seeing they want none of those faculties, nor any of the instruments, which the mind imploiet in vertuous operations. But if God and nature, neuer made any thing in vaine, as all the wise affirme, then we cannot suppose, that vnderstanding senses as wel interior, as exterior, and also the corporeall instrumentes that women haue like to men, bee made in vaine, and that they as wel as men, may not vse the same instruments for the acquiring of prudence, knowledge, wisdom; and finally, for the practising of any liberall art: therefore the diuine Philosopher, in fauour of women, in his common wealth, by liuely reason, laboureth to proue, that women are apt to al those things, whervnto men accommodate themselves, as also are capable of heroicall vertue: and *Plutarch* made a book of the vertu & excellency of women. And although the Philosopher affirmeth, that betwixt women and men there is the like proportion, as betweene sense and reason: yet intendeth he not by this, that a man should be reasonable, & a woman deprived of reason: but hee dilating of domesticall societie, minding to inferre, that as sense naturally must obey, and reason command, so in the best gouernment of an house, a woman naturally should obey, & a man command. And this iurisdiction which a man hath ouer a womā, saith he, ought to be a ciuil, & not seruile dominion: and a little afterwards, he addeth, that though a woman haue not mortall vertues in that perfection as hath a man, yet notwithstanding, that shee also is indued with fortitude, iustice, temperance, & with that prudence, which of it self is sufficient to obey well, towards him that knoweth as well howe to commaunde. Although women, replied the Greeke, haue in them those poyntes by you deliuered, yet are they with so many other euill qualities accompanied, as that hardly they can effect any thing good.

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As they that are naturally cold, of bodiest tender, soft, & ouer delicate, nature hauing framed them, rather for procreation of man, than for any other effect: seeing in all other respects, they are but impedimēts: therefore *Cato* said, that if the world could be without woman, our conuersation should be like vnto God: this great wise man, by this minding to inferre, that man liuing in the company of so imperfect a creature, he could not but leade a miserable life. But that you signior *Hercules* belecue not, that I vtter as we prouerbiably say, nothing but wind, and that I am rather a slaunderer, than a reporter of trueth, heare what the Philosopher saith, describing the nature of women: Woman is apt to mourning, lamentation and despaire: she is enuious, slaunderous, bitter, obstinate, pensive, impudent, a liar, slouthful, fearful, and easie to be deceiued: And the Philosopher in the sixt of his lawes affirmeth, that feminine sex is so wicked, and by nature so malicious, as that hardly it can be brought in subiection vnder the lawes. What thinke you of the commendations these Philosophers attribute to women? are they not sufficient to shew, how worthy they be, to haue any part, or preeminence, in nobility? Defend them as much as you wil, for you shal neuer make me belecue, that of an asse, may be made a gallant courser. If at this day (answered *Varano*) all writings were not replenished, with the praises of women, I would contend with magnificent phrase to set foorth the greatnes of their vertue: seeing the exāples of heroical vertue in women, ancient, and of these times, is no lesse to be obserued, then in men, but considering their commendations are already well knowne, it is not now my intention to play the Orator: onely as a defender of equitie, I will affirme so much, as may suffice for the brideling of your maledictions. It is true, and I denie it not, Signior *Antonio*, that the author of nature, minding to place, the flower of beauty in women, fashioned them, with a beautifull, soft, and delicate body, to the end that, together with the sense of sight, giuing delight to feeling, they might inflame in man that desire which causeth

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seth eternitie: whereupon, as in woman, beauty is a great ornament, so to be soft and delicate, procureth in her no imperfection: but if that be true which the Philosopher affirmeth, that those delicate of skin & flesh, are the more pregnant of wit, we may conclude, that women are more apt than men, to science, sapience, and all those vertues, which most of all in men appeare. It is also true, that Nature intentiue to general preseruatiō, in all kinds hath placed a female sex, & male, or the vertue of the one and other; but so is it false, that woman is produced to no other end, than for the fourming of man: for to beget their owne likes, is the proper end, of plants and creatures vnreasonable; but of the reasonable creature, felicitie is the proper end, which man in this life can neuer enioy without woman, which by testimony of the Philosopher is confirmed, who in his *Oeconomiks* saith, That man, as other creatures is not made onely to bee, but to be well, and therefore the naturall conuersation of woman, is necessary for him, not so much to generate, as from her to receiue great benefit, which being true, as doubtles it is, so shal it be a speciall heresy to affirm, that a woman is any burden, or that without the woman our conuersation could be happy, for this repugneth to reason, experience, & to the authoritie of this great Philosopher, who also affirms, that the family can not be perfect without woman: & that as a woman is the halfe of a family, so be women the halfe of a Cittie: and further, in his *Oconomy* he saith, there can not be any thing more holie, or worthier of a wise man, than to seeke coniunction with an excellent and commendable wife, and by her to bring forth children: as also that to a man of sincere minde it is no waies befitting, rashly to conuerse with euery woman, to the end that of a corrupt wife, he beget not children like their mothers: by which words, it may easily be imagined how highly the Philosopher esteemed the mothers nobilitie & generosity in procreation of children. Further with the authority of *Homer*, he affirmes, that in this life, there cannot greater felicity befall men, than when the husband, and wife gouern

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their familie with one wil and consent. And *Hesiodus* contrarie to *Catoes* seueritie, sayd, that three things to a man were Verie necessary, an house, a wife, and a yoke of oxen, minding to testifie, that domestical conuersation with a woman, was necessarie for the good and happie life of a man. And the Philosopher in his *Oeconomikes*, saith, that the husbände who esteeneth not his wife, is no lesse ingrate, then hee, which contemneth his benefactor: by this inferring, that woman is not only a comfort, but also to man a special benefit. Seeing the honest & chaste woman is, not only a companion to her husband in his bed & contentments, but further, an ease to his labors, in his afflictions, a comfort, in his infirmities a medicament, full of louing and affectionate seruitude, neither can man, without the assistance of the woman, gouerne well his house, seeing whatsoeuer the man getteth abroad, she faithfully disposeth & preserueth in the house. But whom will wee belecue, if we giue no credite to experience? Do not we our selues find, that without women, there is no pleasure or sweete contentment to be tasted, as they, who with their sweetnes, temper the bitter of this our life, the which without women would be more rusticall and inculte, then that of the most wilde & sauage beasts, they remoouing from our hearts, vile and base thoughts, ease vexations, miseries, and those turbulent cares, that often accompanie vs, and with their great beautie, euer representing before our eies, the image of diuinity, so far off are they from withdrawing vs frō worthie enterprises, that rather they stir vp our wits, & exalt thē to knowledge of greatest & highest things. But this your deprauatiō is exceeding great, Signior *Antonio*, seeing, to procure credit to your calumniations, you vse the Philosophers authority, in sinister sence, who thogh describing the nature of womē, he placeth in thē, the excellence of some wicked inclination, yet doth he not altogether free men from them: but which is worse, you a prodigal dispēser of their rebukes, & in their commendations, most couetous, spend many superfluous wordes, in discovering their vices,

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malignantly concealing their rare vertues: and yet your own conscience knoweth, that in the same place by you cited, he describeth women to be more merciful than men, better retentive of memory, more vigilant, more sober: And *Plato* in *Menone*, and in the fifth of his *Commonwealth*, esteemes woman, in a maner equall in vertue with man, who ordained, that the gouernment of the Citie, the magistracies, as well of warre, as peace, and all other offices, should be common betwixt men and women: and the Philosopher, although he esteeme not woman in euery respect, equal with man, notwithstanding, proportionable, he attributeth vnto them, temperance, iustice, & fortitude: but if without prejudicing truth, I should grant you, that womē naturally were inclining to some vice, I would also affirme, that they are so much the more to be recommended, by how much subduing their wicked inclinations, they liue vertuously. Here *Varano* stayed: The Greeke being about to reply, as hee who wanteth no words, the lady *Tarquima Molza* smiling said, Now for gods sake proceed no further, Signior *Barisano* but bee contented with what you haue hitherto spoken, in reproch of women, to the end these Ladies, who heere round about attend, deservedly prouoked against you, after the maner of *Baccides*, make you not a new *Orpheus*. The Greeke laughed & said, these Gentlewomen, most gracious Ladie, haue rather cause to thanke me, than to be offended: For if I had not contradicted Signior *Hercules*, they shoulde neuer haue heard so great commendation, as hee hath bestowed on them: and I am assured, that the more I had charged the with blame, the more had their praises like the Palme tree, reached vp euen vnto heauen. With these wordes the discourse was concluded, and the Queene perceiuing, that it would not be long ere the Court returned, commaunded the Lady *Camilla Mosti*, and the Lady *Camilla Benelacqua*, that they shoulde dance: when they sodainly taking hands, trod two measures to the sound of the lute, and danced the Canaries with good grace, & to the contentment of those that beheld them: but
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the Duke, with the rest of the Court arrived: the Queene rising vp, all departed to the Duchesse lodging, where was prepared a most melodious Consort, of diuers muscall instruments & sweet voyces, which consort continued a good part of the supper: the tables taken vp, some time was spent in diuers sports, & other pleasant relaxations: whē the duke perceiuing the aire ouercast with most obscure cloudes, and that the windes with violent blasts, threatned continual and powring raines, in preiudice of their pleasures, in hunting and fishing, gaue order to set forward the morning following. His highnes therefore rising betimes, and hearing the ordinarie diuine seruice, embarked himselfe with the excellent duchesse, the Lady *Donna Marfisa*, the Lady *Donna Bradamante*, with the dames of the Court, in a most sumptuous Barke, causing the *Buccintore* to be appoynted for the Ladie Countesse of *Sala*, and the rest of the Court. This is a great vessell built with such art & workmanship, as than that there could not any haue beene made, either more beautiful, or sumptuous, considering it hath Hals, Chambers, Galleries, and seates, so that to the beholders it seemeth a most admirable sight: and I am certaine, that if it had beene in the time when *Iason* sailed to fetch the golden Fleece, this, and not that of the *Argonautes*, should thither haue set saile: The Knights and gentlewomen therefore accomodating themselves in this barke, after that with most delicate vonds they had broken their fast, the Lady Countesse of *Sala*, made a motion that there might a Queene be chosen by election, & not by lot, whose Empire should not further extend, then the Barke they were in, and was to continue for the whole passage, to the ende that she by mouing some pleasant discourse, might cut off the tediousnesse of the voyage: Each one therefore beginning to whisper in the eares of another, by little and little, with the generall applause of all, the Lady *Tarquinta Molza*, a Gentlewoman of *Modona*, was chosen Queene, for her rare and extraordinarie wit, by the duchesse wonderfully beloued, and of all the Court reuerenced,

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ced, who after modest refusall, in the ende accepted this honour and Empire: Euerie one stoode doubtfull, expecting what the new Queene would command, for entertainment of that euening, when she, after some indifferent meditatio, said: Amongst al the goods termed external, or of fortune, me thinks, that after honor, riches holdes the chiefeft place, we seeing by experience, that riches in a maner of al men are desired, they iudging, that nothing is more proportionable to humane felicitie, than riches: I therefore considering, that the other day honor, and yesterday nobilitie was very well discuffed, provided, I thought, that this shuld be acceptable to the company, I would make election of him, who to day should discourse of riches: and I beleue this would not bee greatly from the purpose, Signior *Hercules Varano*, hauing by liuely reasons auerred, that riches are the supportance, & stay of Nobilitie. Then all the standers by began to say to the Queen & among theselues, that this could not but be a most pleasing and profitable discourse: and they were very instant, that she would commaund, who might thereof intreate. The Queene therefore turning to Counte *Hercole Tassone*, a Gentleman of good customes, and with good letters adorned. You Signior Conte, said she, shall be the man, who must vndertake this enterprife, to discourse of riches: provided, it may bee lawfull for any that will, to contradict you in all those things, which to them shall not seeme allowable or conuenient: as also, that you in like maner be enioyned to make answer, according to the begun methode and course. Seeing it so pleaseth your Highnesse (renowned Queene) said Count *Hercole*, that I, among so many of greater worth than my selfe, should be he to vndertake this burden & charge, not to oppugne your Highnesse iudgement, which I esteeme far aboue my owne, I neither can, or wil in any sort refuse it: and so much the more willingly wil I accept of it, by how much it is permitted any one to contradict me: For I hauing (as the reward of my barren inuention) little or nothing at al to bring forth, riches in my hands may

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easily fall into pouertie, and become beggarly, if these abundant wits by plentiful contradiction, do not sustain & reduce them to their proper end. Heere *Tassone* musing to himselfe, began afterwards in this manner.



The sixt daies Discourse:

*Wherein is contained, a discussion
of Riches.*



Here be some (thrice excellent Queene) who hauing imployed their whole endeuer in acquiring of riches, and afterwarde, either through hard fortune, or by their own proper defects, finally constrained to liue poorely, not knowing how to bee reuenged, play the hypocrites; and shewing themselues contemners of riches, by filling other mens eares with their blame and reproach, terme riches, the mother of arrogancie, insolencie, and intemperance: affirming last of all, with *Diogenes* the Cinicke, that vertue cannot abide with riches. I both euer was, and am now more then euer, farre off from their opinion, and holde this as a firme conclusion, that a man in this worlde, cannot enjoy a perfect and good life, without riches: conformable to which my opinion, assigning the proper definition of riches, I affirme, that it is no other, but an heape and collection of all such instrumentes, and meanes, which to the sustentation, benefit, and ornament of an house, and ciuill life, are necessarye; without which, man cannot be called perfectly hap-

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pie : & therefore I say, it is an heape of al those instruments, because any of these failing, a man canot absolutely be counted rich : as also I affirme, that without riches a ciuill man can not bee happy : it beeing the principall instrument wherewith to exercise vertue; and therefore riches is no lesse worthy, by men to be esteemed, than it is: these instruments, which gathered together, make that heape, which we call riches, is diuided into seauen partes, that is, possessions, cattell, houses, mony, iewels, rich furniture, and seruants: possessions & cattell, serue for sustentation of humane life : houses, mony and seruants for benefit : pretious iewells, and rich furniture for ornament. He then may truely be said to be rich, who hath sufficient, land, mony, heards, flocks, and of al other sorts of creatures, as wel commodious as delectable : hee that hath a conuenient and faire house, rich furniture, as well in vestments as ornaments of the house : and that possesseth al these things securely and iustly, being his after such a propertie, as that he may sel or bestow them at his pleasure, and shall generally vse all these things, partly for commoditie, allotting some of the other onely to ornament and contentment : Let him haue therefore, his farmes and possessions both fruitfull, and beautifull : seeing fruitfulness shal turne to his benefit, and beauty to his pleasure, and contentment: It is then requisite, they be planted and graffed with goodly rowes of vines, and fruitfull trees, and neare vnto them, a fine summer house, with gardens, faire orchards, pleasant, and shadowy groues, of which orchards, and gardens, he shall not make any emolument of importance, but onely vse them for pleasure and delight : I conclude therefore (most excellent Queene) that who in so many commodities shal be abundant, may be termed fortunate and happy, if hee be also of them a faithfull distributor and dispenser.

Heere *Tassone* making some pawse, the Greeke, eyther beleeuing he had no more to say, or at the least, very hasty, to contradict, stepping forward : Your discourse saide he, Signior Conte, hath had in it this one thing good,

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that it was but short and breefe : touching the rest, the conclusion you inferred. is altogether false, contrarie to diuine and true Philosophie, the which by liuely reasons I hope to make knowne to this most famous Queen, all these gracious Ladies, and most noble knights. Soft and faire (saide *Tassone*) peraduenture you will not find it so easie to prooue my conclusion false, as you haue beene ready to cutte off my discourse. Pardon mee (replied the Greeke) if I haue bin somewhat too forward : for ielous of publike good, I could not tollerate, that you should further proceede, deliuering false doctrine : not being any thing more contrarie to truth, then to place riches in the number of those goods, which are proportionable to humane felicitie, it being in effect no other then a masse and heape of those externall euilles, which of themselues are sufficient to breake and discipate all internal goods, whereof whosoever is possessor, hee is woorthie to bee called happie. The truth of which my conclusion, I hope to prooue vnto you, by the reason and authoritie of the wisest Philosphers. And beginning firste from the verie birth and originall of riches, it cannot bee good, seeing they spring from a corrupt and pestilent generation, they being the infamous offspring of Couetousnesse, and guilty euen of the same flagition : and therefore the Philosopher sayth : euerie rich man is wicked, or the heire of a wicked man : this man hath beene enriched by vsuries, he by spoyles, another by treason : one is made rich by flatterie, another gaineth by incest and adulteries : a third sort aduance themselues by lyes : there be such as make benefit of their owne wiues, daughters, and sisters, as also to others, bloudshedding is profitable : Finally, it is but verie rare that wealth is gathered together iustly, and with honestie, so that if it should bring felicity to man, wee might conclude, that felicitie were no other but a reward of iniquity. I further alleadge, how that is not good, which maketh not good the possessor thereof, but riches do not only, not make good, but procure the possessor of them to be wicked. That riches cannot

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cannot make their possessor good. *Seneca* testifieth, saying, What do riches aduantage a foole, seeing by them he cannot become wise? but that they make a rich man to be wicked, it may by the testimony of the Philosopher be proued, who after this manner describeth the properties of the rich: the rich saith he, are proud, great iniuriers, insolēt, delicate, & intemperate. And *Seneca* conformable to this sayth, that riches puffeth vp the mind, hatcheth insolence and pride, acquireth enuie, disturbeth the minde, and induceth feare, whereas on the contrarie, modest pouertie maketh a man modest, industrious, secure, & is as it were a whip, that scourgeth one to vertue: therefore *Arcefilas* said, that though pouerty were bitter, yet brought it forth excellent children. And good *Diogenes* called pouertie, the wisdom that by it selfe was learned: minding to inferre, that pouertie, & not wealth, maketh a man wise: Thirdly, I will alleadge, how that it is no true good by an honest man to bee esteemed, whereof the man wicked may as well bee possessor as the good, yea, be he neuer so odious or contemptible a mā. And who seeth not that a ruffian, bawd, or any other common Vintner, may not bee a possessor of riches. Fourthly, amongst humane kind, that is no conuenient or proper good, which cannot be possessed without the wrong of many, but such is wealth, in that one cannot bee rich, but many must therefore become poore: therefore riches is no true good: Finally, that cannot be good, which to humane generation is an occasion of infinite euill. But riches are of this nature, for from them spring discordes, contentions, wars, enmities, rancors, and other such like euilles, therefore they are not good. Signior Count affirmeth, that this beatitude which we terme riches, serueth both for profit and ornament to humane life: and if hee liued commodiously that had need of many things, this conclusion should bee true: but who seeth not, that the richer any man is, of so many thinges the more hee hath need, hee not being able to vse or preserue wealth without many instruments and helps? and therefore

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that sometime is true, that whosoever possesseth much, wanteth much: and contrariwise, hee that measureth his abundance, not by superfluitie, but by natural necessity, hath need of litle: But what commoditie so great may riches bring, as may recompense the iealousie and care they minister vnto man, or requite that danger, which putteth to compromise the soules health, and bodily securitie of him rich? The rich, & not the poore, are a prey to murderers, theeeues, menquellers, against these be poysons practised, and these be the men, who in strongest castles fear trecheries: O happy riches may we then wel say, seeing they art no sooner possessed, but securitie faileth them. And what shal we say of ornaments? It cannot be denied, but that costly garments, pretious iewels, sumptuous pallaces, magnificent furniture, are a speciall ornament and glorie to the possessor thereof, that to haue a chest replenished with gold and siluer, to be euer accompanied with a great traine of seruitors, make a man worthy of great estimation. But O most transitorie kinde of glorie, seeing man, by darkenesse it selfe, seeketh after light, not considering, that in faire apparrell, and sumptuous pallaces, men admire the nature of matter, arte, and the architects inuention, rather than the possessor of al these, and that the brightnesse of iewelless is their owne proper splendor, and not of the man that weareth them: as also gold & siluer, is no other but red, and white earth, esteemed of only, through mens error; finally, to be enuironed with many seruants, is nothing but to be beset with many enimies, which be so much the fitter to offend, as the other be externall, and these domestical enimies. If all these commodities gathered together, most renowned Queene, serue for benefit, and ornament to humane life, or whether they make a man happy or vnhappy, anyone of iudgement may discern: for my part. I would rather affirm, that if felicitie (as saith *Aristotle*) is our own proper good, & cannot by any accident whatsoever be taken away, then that riches therein shuld haue no part, as it that by fortune giuen, may by her also, in a moment be taken away:

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As further I would affirme, that cheefe good in this humane life, were no other, but a stable and constant tranquillitie of minde, which despising al those goods whereof fortune is proude; and aboue all others, insolent riches, to bee onely confident in vertue: Notwithstanding, I attende my answere.

Beholde (most illustrious Queene) answered *Tassone*, one of that erronious crew, who iniured by fortune, in reuenge, contendeth to proue, that she hath not, so much as the least interest in humane felicity, & that the goods she courteously administred, amongst which, riches are of no small esteeme, are not to bee recounted in the number of humane goods, as disproportionable vnto that, which of it selfe being sufficient, is called cheefe good: notwithstanding, I hope by so liuely reasons, to discouer this hypocrisie, as that there shal not be any of so simple iudgement, who giuing credite to his allegations, will become a contemner of riches. I say then, that man, as hee is in forme from other creatures different, so is his end from theirs, verie diuerse: the ende of other creatures, is no other, but liuing, to generate those like themselves. Man borne in the Kingdome of Nature and Fortune, is not onely to liue and generate, but to liue well and happily: Nature of her selfe prouideth for other creatures, thinges sufficient vnto life: Nature procurereth man to liue, but reason and Fortune cause him to liue well: creatures liue after the lawes of Nature, man liueth by Reason, Prudence, and Arte: liuing creatures may liue a solitarie life, man alone, being of himselfe insufficient, and by Nature, an euill creature, without domestical and ciuill conuersation, cannot leade other then a miserable and discontented life: and therefore, as the Philosopher sayth very wel: That man which cannot liue in ciuill companie, either he is a God, or a beast, seeing only God is sufficient of himselfe; and a solitarie life best agreeth with a beast. Want therefore, and naturall desire of companie, and not fire (as others falsely affirme)

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gaue beginning to houses, villages, and Citties, which houses, villages, & citties, as without their necessary instruments, they cannot be sustained, so without wealth are they of themselves insufficient, wealth beeing the principall of those instruments, that maintaine houses & cities: now a city being nothing else, but a body of men vnited together, sufficient of it self to liue, it is necessary, that like to a humane body it be compounded of vnlike mēbers, the which in goodnesse and dignitie, among themselves vnequall, all notwithstanding concur to the good establishment of a City: wherevpon as it would be a thing monstrous; & incommodious, to see a humane body wholly compounded, of heads, armes, legs, or of other members vniforme in themselves; so would it be altogether as disproportionable, and a thing of it selfe insufficient, if all men in a Cittie, were artificers, husbandmen, souldiers, iudges, or of one selfe condition, & qualitie: There cannot therefore be any so vncircumspect, but he may perceiue, that for the preservation, and living wel of a city, it is requisite, there be artificers, mercenaries, husbandmen, marchantes, souldiers, Iudges, Magistrates, Princes, and Priestes: which being (as it is) true; so is it likewise conuenient, that there should be poore, rich, noble, & ignoble. And therefore they, who laboured to bring in a commonwealth, al men to one condition and qualitie, created a policie rather of celestial, thē terrestrial men: hauing no lesse erred, then did that Phisition, who sought to make harmonie of notes vnifone: for as of diuers notes and tunes it is compounded, and reduced onely to one note, ceaseth then to be harmonie, so of the diuers qualities of men is a cittie ordained, and reduced to one condition of citizens; onely, is not then any more a cittie, nor of it selfe sufficient. If therefore all these allegations bee true, you can neuer Signior *Antonio*, banish riches out of a cittie, seeing they are a necessary instrument for her sustentation, and well imployd, be the supporters not of vice, but of vertue, and liberall artes: as contrariwise pouertie is the proper nourishment

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ment of artes mechanically, which artes haue had their originall, from nothing else, then from humane indigence. And if you, admitting riches to be in a cittie, should but be thereof a iust distributor, I am sure you would rather bestow the on those, who exercised liberall artes, and were capable of vertue, then on mechanically, mercenarie, or husbandmen; seeing these being vnapt to vertue, and rather instruments, then partes of a commonwealth, their sordide liues requirereth it not, whereas otherwise it is requisite, that vertuous men should liue with some liberal and commendable decencie. Speake not therefore, Signior *Antonio*, against your owne minde, but yeelding to reason, freely confesse, that riches in themselves are good, & worthy to be placed, among those goods wished for: & though sometimes, they appeare wicked, yet is not this their owne defect, but rather the fault of his depraued minde, that possesseth, and badly vseth it: for as Signior *Varano*, yesterday shewed, they are the mother of liberall artes, the proppe of Nobilitie, good education, and gentle customes. And therefore the Philosopher saith, that doctrine, & nobilitie, rather accompanie the rich, then poore, in that hee cannot haue leasure, that wanteth commings in: affirming likewise, that from hence it proceedeth, that the rich abounding in those thinges, for want whereof, others commonly are vniust, and iniurious, rich men are better, then poore, and worthy to be called noble. I confesse, Signior *Antonio*, that vertue onely is the artificer that frameth felicitie, but as the Artificer cannot work, without conuenient instruments, so vertue, without the gifts that nature and fortune ioyned vnto her, cannot bee perfect, nor true felicitie: but what need wee vse authoritie, and argumentes, to perswade this our Greeke, to fauour riches and rich men, seeing by his owne example, if not testimony, wee may prooue, that riches are good, and rich men vertuous, and well instructed, wee seeing dayly, that hee as a vertuous man, and well brought vppe, so doth hee alwayes conuerse with the rich, and altogether shunne the

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familiarity of them poore, as seperate from vertue, and all good customes: as also that he, by those rich, as louers of vertue, and men vertuous, is better beloued and esteemed then the poore. It is true (saide the Greeke smiling) that I frequent the houses of the rich, and not of the poore; But yet, as doth the Phisition, who visiteth the sicke, and not the whole: as also, the selfe same Phisition is more by the weake desired, then the whole. But for all this, you not hauing ouerthrowne my reasons, I assure you, they standing firme, I minde not to change my opinion. I am sure indeede (answered *Tassone*) that you will neuer change the houses of the rich, for the poore: for the poore enuie your vertue, and the rich loue, and strue to imitate it: and therefore it will be no difficult matter for mee, seeing you affect the rich, to make you also restore due honour to riches. Beginning therefore at your first opposition, it is false, that riches either haue, or may haue, euill spring or originall, as those that borne with the world, and with the same coeternall, in respect of themselues, are good, and so knowne vnto you, by whom in fauour of felicitie, they are desired and sought after: but in that they may bee heaped vp together, both by meane lawfull, and vnlawfull, yea, and through humane malice, for the most parte, they are by vnlawfull meanes acquired: hereuppon it seemeth, that riches grow from that corrupt stocke you haue spoken of: notwithstanding, the defect is not in the riches, but in the man wicked, that badly acquireth, possesseth, and vseth them: yet may they for all this, as I say, haue a good originall: For often times, together with honour, they are given in rewarde of vertuous actions, as also further good Fortune, sedulous industrie, honest frugalitie, may to another heape vpper riches, as *Hesiodus* in these verses teacheth,

A little to a little, adde thou still,

And to this little lesse, by art and skill.

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*By doing thus, thou shalt soone drine away,
Unhappy want, and povertie, I say.*

I yeeld vnto you, that riches cannot make good the possessor of them, ne yther can they make a foole, wise: seeing that onely internall goods, which be the perfections, and vertues of the minde are of force to make a man good: riches being a good external, can neither make the possessor of the, good, or wicked: It is true also, that the Philosopher describing the customes of the rich, termeth them, insolent, proud, iniurious, and by such like titles: yet so we must obserue, that in his Rhethorike, discoursing of the customes, and inclinations of all qualities, and conditions of men, thus describeth them, as enclining to vice, to the end the orator, according to the disposition and inclination of the auditor, might the sooner moue him to that affection wherevnto he was bending, & after this manner easily perswade him: but he neuer affirmeth in any place, that riches is not to be placed among those goods, that assit to humane felicitie, seeing both houses, and citties, languish and consume without riches. It is no lesse true also, that euery wicked and vile man, may possesse riches, & yet is this no obstacle, but they may be good, & by a vertuous man esteemed: for if this reason shuld preuaile, health, strenght of body, & beaurie, shuld be goods vnworthy of a vertuous man, seeing likewise in men contemptible they are many times found. Signior *Antonio* further alleadgeth, that riches to humane kind, is not profitable or good, seeing without the wrong of many, they cannot bee possessed, in that one cannot bee rich, but many through the same must become poore, and herein he is not aduised, howe hee contradicteth his owne selfe: for supposing pouertie to bee euil, he comes to confesse, that riches, contrary to pouerty, is good: he addeth moreover, that riches is not good, because it is occasion of many euils, which amongst men fall out, as controuersies, discordes, warres, murders, thefts, rapines, and such like. This

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opposition, is a most preualent prooffe for vnderstanding, that riches is a principal good, seeing they moue euerie ones desire and will, to endeouour by all meanes to attaine vnto them: and therefore hee had assigned a truer cause, in saying, that humane malice and pertinacie, and not riches, were the cause of all the abouenamed euilles: wee might also prooue by more reasons, that pouertie were rather the cause of thole inconueniences, seeing the want of those things wherewith the rich men abound, kindleth desire and greedinesse in the poore, that afterwards is the cause of all those euils, which euerie day are committed: And therefore the Philosopher, contrary to your *Arcefilans*, sayth, that pouertie bringeth forth seditions, and maleficences. Our Greeke yet further affirmeth, that riches is not commodious, saying: that the richer any one is, the more things hee hath neede of: but if the definition of riches be true, of necessity his position must bee false, for where is the heape and collection of all necessarie instruments, for sustentation, benefit, and ornament of humane life, there can bee no defect, or want of any thing: and though riches procure a man to bee iealous over him selfe, and sometimes putteth him in daunger, yet from this reason can wee not conclude that they are wicked: but rather the contrarie, seeing there is no feare of loosing badde, but good thinges, which of their owne nature, bring the possessor into no danger, but rather is procured by mans couetousnesse and deprauation: as in like manner, lust is the cause, that the chastity of a faire woman is hardly secure, and yet must we not therefore say, that beaurie is a wicked thing. I grant vnto you also Signior *Antonio*, that in faire apparel & sumptuous pallaces, the nature of matter & Architects wit is rather admired, then the rich possessor of these things: & that splendor & brightnes, is proper to the iewels, & gold, and not to the man rich, who therewith adorneth himself, but notwithstanding this, if the rich man had not made this rich apparel, or built a sumptuous house for his own & publike benefit, neither could the
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nature of matter, nor the Architects wit, & inuention of the-
 selues, procure admiration: as also the beauty & splendor of
 iewels shuld remain buried in the inwardmost caues of the
 earth, except the rich man, discovering as it were the trea-
 sures of Nature, should not offer them to the beholders eies:
 beside this, in all these ornaments, the beames of magnifi-
 cence shine, which is numbred amongst the principallest
 vertues heroycall. To possesse therefore, and vse all these
 things, both how, when, & with conueniēt measure & quan-
 tity, bringeth vnto man a singular decency, being truly wor-
 thie to be placed in the numbers of goods desired; and to be
 sought after, as in like maner al other kind of riches: I say
 likewise, that felicity is proper to vs, & cannot be taken a-
 way: as also, that riches being a good of Fortune, remaineth
 in the power of the same fortune. But we must obserue, that
 felicitie may be considered two maner of wayes, the first, as
 it dependeth of his proper efficient cause, which is vertue:
 the second, as it dependeth not only of the efficient, but also
 of al causes instrumentall, and the circumstances necessarily
 conioyned with the cause efficient, in the first maner con-
 sidered, it is our own proper, & cannot be taken away, because
 vertue true productresse of felicitie, is not subiect to blowes
 of fortune, neither haue honour, riches, nor any other
 externall goodes in it any part. In this manner the Philo-
 sopher obserueth felicitie, in the first of his Ethikes, when
 hee distinguisheth the felicitie of *Platoes Idea*, from Ri-
 ches, honour, and those contentments that the vulgar
 sort esteeme. In this manner also did hee consider it in the
 seuenth of his Politikes, where hee sayde: Felicitie hap-
 peneth not vnto vs through the goods of Fortune, but eue-
 ry one, the more hee posselleth of vertue and prudence,
 and after them frameth his opperations, the greater is his
 felicitie: and this is prooued by the testimonie of God him-
 selfe, who not for any good externall, but of himselfe, is
 happie and blessed. Felicitie considered after the seconde
 manner; it beeing no other but a collection, and heape of

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humane goodes, as well internall, as externall, which ioyntly together concurre, by meane of vertuous action, to the enioying of perfect and chiefest contentment: although it can not be wholly taken away, yet notwithstanding in many circumstances it may be hindred. After this maner the Philosopher considereth it in the first of his Rhetorike, where he doth not only place, the goodes of the minde, amongst the parts of felicitie, but also the goods of the body, and those externall: In this sort also doth he obserue it, in the seuenth of his Ethickes, where he plainly affirmeth, that an happy man, hath neede of goodes externall, and of fortune, to the end, that in his operations hee may not be hindred: which thing, saith he, being very wel knowne, prosperous fortune, and felicitie, by many come to be termed, the selfe-same things. We must further note, that the Philosopher in the place by you cited, vseth these formall words: Chiefe good is our proper owne: being such, as that hardly it can be taken from vs: He denieth not therefore, but that felicitie may be taken away, but yet he saith, very hardly, minding to inferre, that it could not bee absolutely remooued, but may peraduenture bee defrauded of his circumstances. Out of which, wee may very well conclude, that felicitie should be depriued of her principall instrument, wanting riches: and that hee which is not rich, can not be perfectly happy, considering that he cannot exercise the Vertue of liberality, beneficence, and magnificence, which make a man woorthie of honour.

Me thinkes, Signior *Antonio*, saide the Queene, your cause is in such sort ouerthrowne, as that it booteth you litle to replie any further: and I am assured, that from these Signiors, you should not receiue the least suffragation of pouertie, if you were to gather their voyces by scrutanie.

It would not be a iust and indifferent scrutany (most excellent Queene, saide the Greeke, smiling) if the number of the rich were not equally ballanced, with as many poore: because

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because passion, which is euer in the rich predominant, and not equitie, would giue sentence: Notwithstanding I will accept your Maiesties iudgement, as a firme decree: neither will I further reply, expecting that one day I may be made to conceiue, by one that with effects, and not words, shall prooue, that riches are good, and worthy of a vertuous man.

And although other perswasions were not sufficient, saide Count *Guido Galeagnini*, yet might experience manifest it vnto you, which euery day sheweth, that riches is not onely a necessary instrument of felicitie, but further, that among all worldly goodes, it holdeth chiefest place: seeing riches without labour, dispenseth liberally to him rich, of all other goodes, which the poore man by vertue, can not with great industrie attaine vnto: And it seemeth he richly borne, is in like manner borne gracious, vertuous, woorthie to be beloued of euery one, and commended: the which by you learned, being wel and rightly vnderstoode, you dedicate your labours, not to the vertuous, but vnto the rich: And furthermore, wee see that Titles, and honours, are by Princes, rather dispenced, to the rich, than to the poore, as likewise for one vertuous, that they retaine in their Courtes, wee may reckon tenne rich: as those that are reputed, much more profitable and honourable to the commonwealth and Prince, with their riches, than are the vertuous with their vertue.

Howe greatly wealth exceedeth vertue, (added Count *Palla Strozzi*) in my iudgement, that wise aunswere giuen by *Sophocles*, to the wife of *Hiero* tyrant of Syracuse, manifesteth: For hee by her demaunded, whether it was better to be rich or vertuous. I see the vertuous (aunswered hee) euery day at the rich mens gates, but neuer did I see the rich at the gates of the vertuous, being an euident signe, that riches holdeth vertue as mercenarie.

Signiour Counte (aunswered the Greeke) and if the
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rich would but look into their own defects, as they conceiue the necessities of the vertuous, the contrary would happen: for then the rich would resort to the virtuous mens houses, neither would they euer from them depart: for another can not giue iudgement, in that he himselfe knoweth not: The wise and vertuous know what gold and siluer is, & to what vse their dispensation serueth. But of the rich questionlesse many not knowing, what sapience and vertue is, buried in the darkenes of their ignorance, they make thereof the like account, as did *Aesopes* Cocke of the pretious stone: but seeing, in fauor of riches, you haue cited the example of a flatterer, for so may *Sophocles* with that foolish woman be termed sufficient for my part in fauor of vertue, to recite vnto you the beginning of a Letter, which *Antigonus* the most mightie king of *Asia* wrote to *Zeno Citico* a most wise Philosopher: I, sayd he, as I excede thee in fortune, and glorie, so in sapience, liberall studies, and perfect felicity, which thou possessest, I know my selfe far inferior vnto thee. The King knew himselfe by the Philosopher exceeded in perfect felicitie, reputing riches & glorie for things most vain: King *Antigonus* knew wel what he had neede of, and therefore he drew neare vnto him, one that was wise: the which if many other rich men knew also, they woulde hunt after the vertuous, much more than they doe, neither would they so swell, or be puffed vp with their riches wanting sapience: for they might conceiue, that the rich without vertue are no other, but sheepe that haue their fleece of gold, as the magnanimous king *Alfonso* of *Aragon* was wont to term the: further alleadging, that rich men, like tapistrie hangings, serued rather for ornaments, of halles and chambers, than for any other purpose: they being in effect, not much vnlike to paynted images; but in his affaires hee vsed those vertuous, who as they bee rare, so of necessitie, in Courtes they must needes bee the lesse in number. But peraduenture I haue saide too much.

Speake what you please, saide Count *Alfonso Turcho*,
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For my part, I make no doubt, but that riches is one of the greatest goods, that may befall a man in this life: yea, and I hold opinion, that the more riches increase, the more humane felicitie is augmented: so that hee most rich, may be saide to be also most happy. In this last part, Signior Conte (saide Tassone) you are deceiued, seeing felicitie rather consisteth in indifferent than excessive riches. You hauing pro- ued (replied Turchio) that riches is a good, I cannot see, but that riches increasing, good is thereby augmented, and consequently felicitie.

Goodes (answered Tassone) as hath otherwise beene affirmed, are of diuerse sortes, that is, of the body, mind and of fortune. And betweene the goodes of the minde, and those of Fortune, there is this notable difference, that excesse in the goodes of fortune, as are riches, either hurt, or help not him that possesseth them: but goodes of the minde, to the greater height they attaine, so much the more make they their possessor happy. And if Signior Barisano had tied himselfe to this conclusion, that not riches, but immeasurable riches, were rather impediment, than furtherance to liue well, and happily, I should haue beene conformable to this opinion: For superfluous riches bring often times vpon him rich, those inconueniences, which hee hath recounted: and peraduenture in this respect, those seuerer Philosophers blamed riches, therefore the Philosopher saith, that prosperitie of fortune, when it exceedeth, it is an impediment to felicitie, so that in such excesse, it cannot in reason bee termed prosperitie. And in another place, likewise he affirmeth, that indifferent possession of the goods of fortune, is woorthie to be counted best, the which easily obeyeth to reason, as doth excesse the contrary: And further he addeth in prayse of mediocritie, that all those indifferent rich, are apt to preserue themselves: in that they desire not other mens goods, as doe the poore, neither are theirs by the poore desired, so much as the goodes of them rich: wherevpon they themselves neyther circum-
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cumenting,

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circumventing others, nor by others layed in waite for, or circumvented, they live without danger. In like manner *Phocitides* affirmed, that for the happie state of a Commonwealth; it was to bee wished, that Citizens should haue indifferent, yet sufficient riches: minding to inferre, that so much riches sufficed, as wherewith vertue might with decencie be practised: and that those, who in riches, power, or friendes do superabound, are good Citizens, because they neither can, nor will support another mans dominion: that meane wealth is not onely sufficient of it selfe to felicity, but also to the happie state of a common-wealth: by this it may be comprehended, that the Lawgiuers were indifferent rich: for *Solonas* wee reade in his verses, was indifferent rich, & so was *Lycurgus*, *Charondas*, *Faleus* Carthaginian, *Hyppodamus* Milesian, and Finally, the greater part of all the others: so that it is euident, that moderate, and not immeasurable riches, are the furtherance to happie life. I shall remaine satisfied, if to this you haue deliuered, you adde but some firm & sound reason, said count *Alfonso*. And *Tassone*. I commend your wit, seeing you relie not on bare authority, but behold the reason: It is a thing most certaine, that the instrument wherewith the artificer exerciseth his trade, ought to be proportionable, both to the same artificer and arte: for if it bee diminished, or too exceeding great, neither to the artificer, nor the worke it selfe, will it succede well. Riches therefore, being the instrument, wherewith a vertuous man practiseth vertue, it is necessarie that after such a sort, they be vnto vertue proportionable, and the man vertuous, as neither through defect, nor excesse, vertuous actions (wherein felicitie consisteth) bee hindered: and in that moderate riches is betweene the defect and excesse, this of necessity must needes bee the sufficient and proportionable instrument: and excesse shal either be hurtful, or no whit at all furthering felicity. But moreouer, if from increase of riches felicity should take augmentation, considering riches may multiply infinitely, it wold also follow, that felicity, which is the ende of man, should bee infi-

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hite: whereupon man, not being able euer to attaine vnto it fully, of all other things created, he onely should faile of his proper end: I conclude therefore, that as without riches, there can bee no perfect felicitie, so the excesse of riches either hurteth, or helpeth not at all: and that mediocrity is an apt instrument vnto vertue, and an happie life. These reasons, are so well grounded, said *Turcha*, as that in them I remaine fully satisfied. Out of doubt added *Gualinguo*, whofoeuer cannot practise vertue with moderate riches, will much lesse practise it with excesse: seeing superabundance of riches is farre more proportionable to vice, then vertue: And ordinarily in them most rich, those euil dispositions are discovered, which by the Philosopher are ripped vppe in his Rhetorick, seeing in that place he vnderstandeth it by them superabundantly rich, and not by the other, rich with mediocrity, considering that in them, insolence, pride, intemperance, & many other vices abound, wherof immeasurable riches is the proper nourishment. I beleeeue (sayd Count *Hercules Benelacqua*) that so it is: but yet further I desire to vnderstand, whether hee is rich that possesseth, or he that vseth them, for of this I am doubtful, in that I see diuers, who notwithstanding they make thereof no vse, yet are they esteemed most rich. Vain is possession without vse (answered *Tassone* (as the diuine Philosopher affirmeth in *Euimedo*) therefore to be rich consisteth, not only in possession, but also, in vsing riches: & he that shuld say, more in vse then possession, might not peraduenture speak much amisse, in that he which maketh no vse of them, is in no other respect different from one poore, but that the poore man is poore through necessity, and hee through will and election: and therefore many not knowing, that to bee rich, consisteth principallie in vsing of wealth, are deceiued: & not foreseeing thus much, by forbearing the vse of them, impouersish themselves. Nay, and I promise you, I am of opinion (sayde Counte *Hercules*) that these sorte of men are much more miserable then the poore: for the poore desire Riches to sup-

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plie their wants, and these men hunt after them, to the end, that in abundance, they might yet liue in want: neither can I imagine the cause and reason, of so great follie. Auarice (saide *Tassone*) springeth from a firme hope, of long life, and neuer thinking to die: for who is so foolish, that would spare to day, if he beleued to die to morrow? But a man promising vnto himselfe, long life, as if hee were to liue euer, storeth vp riches & mony infinitely, hoping that one day he shal reioyce in them, and in this vaine hope, feeding himselfe with aire, he liueth like a *Camelion*, and finally, in the midst of abundance, dyeth in want. How can it be, saide count *Scipio Sacrat*, that to be in hope of long life, should make a man couetous, we seeing by experience, that auarice, is a particular vice to old men, who houely expect death? Olde men (saide *Tassone*) do not expect, but feare death, as they that are much more desirous of life, then yong men, and therefore *Marcus Tullius* saide, that there was not any one so decrepite, which did not yet promise vnto himselfe some yeares of life: but for another cause also old men are couetous, for bloud in them comming to refrigerate, & not being able to ioye any more in those contentmentes, wherein youth is commonly prodigall: as also hauing many times proued want in times past, fearing the like should happen to them againe, they addict themselves to the heaping vp of mony, reposing in it all their ioy, and contentment. Hauing obserued (saide the Count of *Scandiano*) these men, that greedie of riches, are called couetous, I finde them after such a manner intentiue, to the heaping vppe of mony, as that it excepted, all other riches seemeth vnto them nothing worth, which maketh mee beleue, that in the possession of mony consisteth true riches: seeing by the meanes of mony, wee may iuioy all other riches, yea and it appeareth, that they who are monied, be in a certaine manner Tyrantes ouer others, as though all thinges shoulde obey vnto mony: And therefore *Phillip* the father of great *Alexander* was wont to saye, that there was not any for-
tresse

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resse so great and well munished, but if an asse laden with golde might but approach it, woulde bee expugnable. It cannot be denied, (saide Tassone) but that mony is very commodious, and in a certaine maner, necessary, to liue well, being impossible, or at least wile very difficulte, to liue in common societie, without exchange, or permutation of thinges: considering that oftentimes one hath need of that, whereof another aboundeth, now in that there can be no iust permutation, but by meanes of mony (as the other day Cavalier *Guatlingus* declared) it being that which maketh all contracts iust & equal, in this respect mony is truly worthy to be esteemed, and placed in the number of riches: notwithstanding in it selfe considered, it is no true, nor sincere riches, as that which of it selfe, supplieth not the wants of nature, considering that one possessing it, may die for hunger, thirst, colde, or any other want, no lesse then hee that hath not, which is confirmed by the fable of *Mydas*. And thereupon it proceedeth, that the riches of mony is of all other insatiable; yea & the more the heap thereof augmenteth, the more likewise increaseth desire, for mony serueth nature to no vse at all, as doth bread, wine, fruite, and al other riches, wherewith humane life, is sustained, and ordained: the superfluitie of which things causeth lothsomnesse and facietie.

Thinke you not (saide Signior *Guatlingus*) that mony of it selfe, without other helpe, deserueth to be esteemed, being compounded of so noble a matter as is gold or siluer? The which gold is so resplendant and beautifull, as therefore it was consecrated to the Sunne: as also that being most secure and temperate from all corruption, it was in like manner dedicated to *Iupiter*: whereupon, no maruaile if any one beholding it, hee remaine surprisid and taken. Although siluer and gold (answered Tassone) of al other mettals, be the fairest and most beautifull, yet are they least profitable: wherfore, hauing respect to that, which more benefiteth humane life, wee may make better account of iron, although of all other

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mettall it be the grossest: seeing of iron, and with iron, the instruments of all trades are made, and iron maketh men valiant amidst the most cruell wilde beasts: finally, in the cittie, and within our owne houses, it maketh vs secure: which beeing knowne to wise *Solon*; he aduised *Cresus* to change his aboundance of golde (shewed vnto him by that foolish King, for ostentation) into iron, prognosticating, that if he presently did it not, his golde, kingdome, & selfe, would be a prey to *Cyrus*; who emptie of golde, but laden with yron, and full of valour, came to assault him. I conclude therefore, that mony in it selfe, is of small or no assistance at all, to humane life; as that which by the Lawgiuers was inuented, to proue equalitie in bargaines, & contracts: for a mason could make no exchange with a shoemaker, seeing the building of a house, is of farre greater value, then a paire of shooes, if mony were not, which ballanceth the contract: And therefore mony by the Græcians was called *Numisma*, as it were by the lawes ordained: for *Nomos* signifieth law, and the Latines for the selfesame cause, called it *Nummus*; and there is no doubt, but mony cometh to be esteemed, through the opinion only of men, who as hitherto they haue esteemed thereof, if for a little while, they should but beginne to holde the same (as indeed it is) but base and vile, we should finde it, no question, but an vnprofitable waight and burden. That inuention of mony (saide Signior *Patritio*) serueth for no other vse, but for permutation of thinges, it appeareth by another reason: for hauing respect only to domestickall societie, within the limites of an house, where permutation is not requisite, it is altogether vnprofitable. And how is permutation vnnessearye, or at leastwise vnprofitable in a house (replied Signior *Hercules Varano*?) Because betweene husband and wife (saide *Patritio*) betwixt father and children, seruants and maisters, and brothers, while they remaine together in one familie, that permutation is not requisite, where vnto mony concurrereth for equalitie of bargaine and contract; and therefore

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mony, within the limites of an house is altogether vnprofitable, but only serueth abroad in ciuill company, & sometimes for contract, and exchange. Me thinkes (saide Signior Scipion Gilioli, that general rule should haue an exception: seeing in the house betwixt master and seruant, there is permutation, and mony taketh place; the seruitor offering his labor and seruice, to his master, and the master due hire to such a seruant in exchange: obserue (sayd Patrius) that by a seruant I intend not these, which go about euery day, seruing sometime this man, otherwhiles that for hire: For these sorte of people, be rather similitudes, then true seruantes, as they that acknowledge not their master, for their head, neither feare by him to be punished, for the insolencies, they dayly commit in the house: wherefore they are altogether vnworthy to be placed in the number of those, which make a domesticall societie: being for the most part, vagabonds, and dooseners, directing their actions, rather to some other end, than to serue their maisters. But I meane that seruant, the vse of whom not onely, but euen of his goods and substance is in the maisters power, which by vs at this day is called a Slave: for such an one is a true seruitor, and one of the principall instruments wherewith a master gouernes his house. This man, partely for feare of his maister, as also through hope of liberty (the reward of good seruice) serueth his master most faithfully: and betwixt this seruant and his master, occurreth no permutation, wherein mony is requisite. Nowe I conceiue (saide Gilioli) that your rule hath no exception, and that money is no riches, which passeth betwixt them of one familie, although it be necessary for maintenance of the house, as Signior Conte hath very well explained, who in the argument of riches, hath giue so good satisfaction, as peradventure litle remaineth wherof we may doubt. The which likewise, being by all the rest confirmed, the discourse ended, and his Highnesse with the thise excellent Duchesse, euen now landed at the village of Cosandoli, the

Queene

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Queene rose vp, with al the rest of the companie; and lea-
uing the Barge, they followed the Court, which went to a
lodging, prepared in a most sumptuous pallace, not farre
distant from the bankes of *Poe*, built sometimes with mag-
nificent charge, by the ancient Princes of *Este*. Here, after
euerie one had taken a little repose in their particular par-
titions, being euen now night, all went to the Chamber of
the renowned Duchesse, where with musick and other plea-
sing sports, they passed the time while supper: which en-
ded, and the tables taken vp, they vsed diuers formes of dan-
cing, but being very late, al departed to their rest, expecting
the morning light. The morning following, his highnesse,
the excellent Duchesse, and all the rest of the Court, ha-
uing heard with deuotion, ordinary diuine seruice, they
went foote by foote to the riuers side, where each one
entred into their barge, except the Secretaries, Counsellors,
and other Magistrates; who invited by the Lady Countesse
of *Sala*, the Lady *Tarquinia*, and by the most illustrious Lord
Dox Cesare, accommodated themselves in the *Buccontore*,
imagining discourse would fall out vpon some noble subiect
and argument: and amongst these, was Signior *Antonio*
Montecatini, of all Philosophers of our age, the most princi-
pal, Signior *Gambattista Landerchi*, the renowned of the
Lawes, Signior *Benedetto Ragnaldi*, Signior *Achilli Fantini*,
Signior *Gian Maria Crispo*, and Signior *Cati*, men, not onely
in the profession of the lawes most excellent, but in all other
kindes of excellent and choyce studies, learned and iudiciall.
There were in like maner placed vpon the side of the bark,
diuers companies of Musicians (of which in his Court, there
be many rare and excellent, to the end, that playing & sing-
ging together to sundrie instruments, they might with their
melody no lesse delight the sence of hearing, then did the
dames with their beuty, content the eyes & sence of seeing.
But after that with pleasure they had made some reasonable
way, dinner time being at hand, by the Queenes order, the
tables were couered in the hall, and on the one side, the
Dames

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dames, & those roared: oueragainst whom sate the Knights
 and men of order, the Queene her self being placed at the
 end of the table, in regal maiestie vnder a canopie. Dinner
 ended, which throughtout was accompanied with most melo-
 dious musicke, there was by prouident officers, as on the
 water the custome is, brought forth cardes, tables, & chesse
 boordes. But the Queene with a signe hauing imposed si-
 lence, spoke after this maner. As there be two cōditions of
 men esteemed worthy of true honor, one of those, learned,
 and the other of them, that make profession of Armes, so is
 there many times disputation, to whither of these preemi-
 nence is due: Considering therefore with my selfe, that in
 this noble assembly, of one side, here be the flower of the
 learned of our age, and on the other part, Knights, that in
 military profession are most excellent: taking holde of this
 good oportunitie, I determine that to day, for entertainmēt
 of our passage, by way of argument, it be discussed; which
 is most worthy of honor, the man learned, or the Souldier:
 and to the end, that in grappling together, there grow no con-
 fusion, I minde it shal be fought out by seuerall champions,
 which may be done, they learned choosing out one for their
 parte that may speake, as also the other, another: And be-
 cause no controuersie can bee determined without a iudge:
 I will, that both partes being hearde, they shal stand to the
 sentence, of Madam Countesse of *Sala*. This iudiciall order
 of the Queene, highly pleased the Lord *Don Cesar*, and all
 the rest of the Ladies: and they attended the Champions
 comming forth: for those learned, after a low muttering and
 consultation, they denounced Signior *Patritio* for Cham-
 pion: and of the Knights parte, the Lord *Guilio Cesar Bran-
 caccio*, not onely amongst all the rest, the oldest Souldier,
 and in knowledge of Armes most excellent, but further, a
 gentleman, very learned, eloquent, and with all manner of
 vertue adorned. This electiō once made, the Queene brea-
 king silence, commaunded *Patritio*, that he should first en-
 ter into the field, who smiling: Although (most renoued

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Queene saide he) it is no small preiudice to the learned in this action to be assailants, but is as it were halfe a confirmation of precedence to armes: notwithstanding, seeing your Maiesty so commandeth, I will not refuse to bee the challenger: yet with this condition, that in this conflict, there be no other armes vsed, then those wherewith the learned accustome to subdue their aduersaries: for if souldiers shuld but draw their swordes, out of doubt syllogisms, inductions, euthememes, examples, and the learneds Champion himselfe, would be ready to flie the fielde. Then Signior *Guilio Caesar* smiling: Although election of armes belongeth vnto vs as defendants, yet to the end our victorie may bee more glorious, wee accept of combat with your owne armes: so now Signior *Patritio*, frame your tongue to this warlike assault; for as equitie and reason standeth on our side, so hope I by my valor, couragiously to sustaine it. *Patritio* therefore hauing a while pawsed with himselfe, begun in this sorte.

The





The seuenth daies Discourse:

Wherein is determined the Precedence of Armes and Letters.



Tis a verie deepe and doubtfull question (most famous Queene) which you haue propounded to be disputed of this day, seeing that Armes and Letters are both of them so Noble professions, and so excellent, as that it is difficult to iudge, to whether of them the Palme is due: Considering by armes wee defende and amplifie kingdomes, and by Letters wee preserve and gouerne the same, so that the one of the other standeth in such neede, that neither this without the other, can be iustly extended, nor the other without the first, be securely maintained: Notwithstanding, seeing it so please your Highnesse, that the tediousnesse of our iourney, be passed ouer with some ingenious and pleasant discourse, I wil contende to manifest, as a valourous Champion of the learned, that the ballance fitteth on our side: and in that the souldiour and scholler cannot sit both on the same stoole, the Souldiour must giue place to the scholler. Now to come to the knowledge of truth, which we seek after, I think it necessary, that to discoursing briefly, we first of any other thing intreat of those perfections, which of theselues are sufficient to bring a man to his true ende, which is felicity, to the end, that seeing in what degree and perfection

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Letters stand, and in what art militarie we may draw out an infallible iudgement, to whome the first degree of honour ought to be giuen, whether to the Souldior, or Scholar. I say therefore, that man for no other cause, of all other Creatures, is onely capable of felicitie, but in that beyond vegetatiue, and sensatiue faculties, hee is endued with vnderstanding, by meane of which, working vertuously, he may come to cheefe good, and enioy highest delight. In this humane intellect, twoo most principall faculties are founde, the one of which is called by the Philosophers, vnderstanding speculatiue, whose obiect is truth, the other, practike vnderstanding, which is conuersant about that good in humane opperations consistng. By all reasons these twoo faculties are placed in humane vnderstanding, considering that of all things which this vniuersall frame containeth, some bee the workes of the greatest god and Nature, other be humane opperations: In the works of God and Nature, truth is sought after, in humane opperations, good. By meane of these two faculties, man acquireth two sorts of perfections: one of which is called Habite speculatiue, the other, Habite practike. Habite speculatiue is no other but a knowledge of all those things, that comprehend the vniuersall frame, the which, as they are of three sorts, so be there three seuerall speculatiue habites: seeing that some are by their owne proper essence, seperate from sensible matter, as is the omnipotent and most excellent God, the Intelligences assisting the Celestiall Spheares, and those, which of the Metaphisicks themselues, are called Transcendentes, as *Ens*, good, truth, the thing, & such like, the knowledge whereof, is deseruedly called Wisedome: some again by their essence, are wholly drowned in sensible matter, and with motion conioyned, and these bee the heauens, elements, & bodies mixed: the knowledge of these things, is called natural Philosophy. There be yet some other, which in effect can neuer be seperate from sensible matter: notwithstanding naturally they are such, as by part imaginatiue, and

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with the minde, they may be considered, or imagined: without consideration or imagination of matter, and this is mathematicall knowledge, diuided into Geometric, which handleth continuall quantitie, that is, line, superficies, and body: and arithmetike, beeing conuersant about discrete quantitie, which is number: there bee further some speculative habites comprehended vnder these three heades, by the Logicians termed, sciences subalternall, or halfe sciences: for in respect of the subiect, whereabout they are conuersant, they participate of naturall knowledge, but considering the manner, by which they proue their conclusions, they are mathematicall, as those, that embrace mathematicall conclusions, for their beginning. Amongst these, is Astrologie, considering bodies, and motions celestial, the like also naturall knowledge doing, but in a diuerse manner: then perspective, which intreateth of visible line, Stereometric, being employed touching solide bodies; & musicke, respecting number harmonically, with other such like: And these be all the sciences and habites, wherewith intellect speculative is adorned, in inuestigating, and finding out of truth. Practicke habite, is no other, but the knowledge of all those thinges, whereof man is the beginning: and they be diuided into two heades, actiue, and doing, part actiue, is a firme vnderstanding of those thinges, which appertaine to the good gouernment of himselfe, his house, and finally of the common weale. The doing or performing habite, is that knowledge, which is called arte: this being diuided into those mechanical, and liberall. But leauing apart mechanical art, as impertinent to a ciuil man, we wil affirme, that amongst liberall artes, Grammer is numbred, Rhethorike, Dialect, Poetrie, Musicke, both of voice & instrument, painting, Architecture, and the art of Physicke, and amidst all these, we wil allot the principallest place to art Militarie, as of all other the most excellent, which by the Philosopher was placed in the number of artes, it hauing belonging vnto it, all those conditions, which in an art are required, that

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is, materiall subiect, end, and the instrument, which to the end conduceth, neither wanting there also firm beginnings and principles wherewith every day, great souldiers serue their turne: materiall subiect is battel, victorie the end, and armes the instrument: These are all the perfections (most famous Queene) which may bring a man to his end, beeing felicitie: of which no doubt, those are the most excellent, and worthy of greatest honor, that more readily may make a man happy. If therefore I shall shew, that learning and habites speculatiue, haue greater parte in felicitie, than art Militarie, I beleue the learned shall haue wonne the day. If that be true, which all the prudent affirme, that of things created, the same exceedeth all others in perfection, which draweth nearest to diuine bountie, and dooth of it most participate: Out of question the man learned, in bountie and dignitie will be superiour to the souldier; in that hee learned, is endewed with that vertue, which maketh a man like to things diuine. For science and sapience which be incident to the learned, by meane of contemplation, make a man companion with God, vniteth him with chiefe good, and true felicitie: The Philosopher confirmeth the same in the tenth of his Ethickes, where hee sayeth, that those, who busie their mindes in contemplation, addict themselves to the studie of good letters, and are, than all others, by God better beloued; because they adorne that parte of the minde, which hath greatest similitude with things diuine: whereuppon God kindleth the light of his diuine grace in their soules, comforting them with highest ioy, and true beatitude: As also otherwhere commending Metaphysicke, hee saith, that though it be not profitable, yet notwithstanding it is worthy of supreme honor, as that which raiseth our vnderstanding from earth to heauen, exalting it to the knowledge of high & diuine things: and therefore he worthily affirmeth, that the wiseman governeth the starres: as he that far remote from a vulgar life, being of himselfe sufficient, liueth most happy. *M. Tullius* in the first

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first of his *Tusculanes* sayth, that Philosophie is a gift giuen by God, and that in this world there can bee nothing more sweete or excellent: what thing is to be desired more excellent or worthier of a man, then sapience: this by administering the knowledge of al things diuine and humane, procureth the mind to be settled and replenished, with cheefe ioy: if this be not a thing worthie of commendations, what is to be commended? And *Architas Tarentine* sayth, that wisdom, amongst al other things humane, is most excellent, and is as sight among the senses, vnderstanding in the same soule, and as the Sunne amongst the stars, sacred. Philosophie procureth not the felicitie of one particular alone, but further, assisteth the happie living of an whole Cittie, as diuine *Plato* affirmeth in his *Meneseno*, saying: to the Philosopher, and no other, appertaineth the gouernment of a Cittie: and in the fist of the Common-wealth: Those Cities cannot be happie, where Philosophers doo not gouerne, and the gouernours sufficiently know Philosophie: but hee saide not, where art Militarie, and excellent warriours gouerne: For the arte of warre hath not onely no parte in felicitie, but rather is contrarie vnto it, considering that it destroyeth humane generation, and is so much the more imperfecter then science, in that the ende of arte Militarie, may bee preuented by fortune, as often times it falleth out, which in science taketh no place: and it is most certaine, that where Fortune swayeth, vnderstanding little preuaileth, and where vnderstanding preuaileth not, there is a manifest signe of imperfection. Further I alleadge, that by howe much the minde is more excellent then the bodie, by so much are the actions thereof more excellent then those of the bodie, which beeing true, euen so must they learned needes be more excellent then Souldiours.

Considering the actions of the learned haue no need of any corporall vertue, and those of Souldiours are most principally exercised with bodily force; the philosopher proueth
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that our mind is diuine, and immortall, in no other respect, but because it hath his operations distinct from the body: The learneds operations therefore, beeing from the bodie disioyned, they must needs haue in them something diuine, and be truly worthy to be placed amongst the things most honourable: the which notwithstanding by Souldiers cannot be affirmed: whose actions beeing wholly intermixed with the body, haue in them that imperfection which the body bringeth to the minde, and all matter to his proper forme. I could produce many other arguments, to shew, that Armes euer ought to yeelde to Learning (as good *Marcus Tullius* affirmeth) and grant the Laurel garland to the tongue and eloquence of the learned, which notwithstanding for breuitie sake I passe ouer; And onely in our behalfe, I will set downe some examples, for manifestation, that good letters are of force, to exalt men vp, euen vnto heauen, and to place them amongst the Gods. *Lisanius* a Noble man of *Arcadia*, as *Leontius* the Greeke declareth, beeing in Sciences most profound, went to *Athens*, and stirred vp such admiration in those people then rude and barbarous, as that they made him not their King, but worshipped him as a god, and hauing dedicated vnto him a Temple, was the first that was called *Iupiter*, *Apis*, the sonne of *Toroneus* and *Niobe*: he passing from *Argos* to *Egypt*, by meane of the Sciences, he attained that reputation, as besides, being made king, he was helde and worshipped for a god: And so great was the reuerence towards him, as that by publike Edict there was a capitall punishment sette downe against whomsoever should be so hardy as to call him a mortall man. *Belus*, who as *Paulus Orosius* declareth, seigniorized in the vttermost confines of *Egypt*, for being an Inuenter and teacher of celestiall doctrine, was iudged so worthy, as vnto whome there should be built a Temple in *Babylon*, and it was called, the Temple of *Iupiter Belus*. *Hermes* sonne to *Phylo*, a meane man of *Arcadia* and *Proserpina* his owne daughter, to auoyde the infamie of his incestuous originall going into *Egypt*,

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Egypt, and being in the sciences profound, but especially in Geometry, Arithmetike & Astrology, was held for a God, being called the sonne of heauen, and day, as he that descending from heauen, in the daye light came to bee noted and known. I (most illustrious lady) with these few & simple reasons, authorities, & examples, haue endeououred to confirme our cause: which of it selfe is so firme, and secure, as there is no need of Rhetorical arte, for sustentation of it. I assure my selfe, Signior *Brancaccio* in his own conscience wel knowes, that he defendeth an vniust quarrell: although like an honorable Knight, hee entred now the field, not to loose his honor. I can be wel content, Signior *Patritio* (said *Brancaccio*) that you may confirme the possession of honour: seeing that can not be lost, which hitherto is not possessed. It is now long since (answered *Patritio*) that reason stood to the arbitrement of Armes, against whose violence learned men could make no resistance: but now brought to the tribunall of Iustice, I hope the matter wil otherwise succeed: and that at last the learned shall be established in their proper place and dignitie.

Then the Queene: It is hie time you vse your armes, Signior *Brancaccio*, for otherwise I perceiue you in very eminent danger. The affection which your Highnesse deservedly beareth towards souldiers, (sayde *Brancaccio*) is rather an occasion of your feare, than any eminent daunger: for if that be true, which the other daye Signior *Gualinguo* shewed, that honour is the reward of vertuous actions, and signe of beneficence, the learned shall not onely, not haue precedence of the Souldier, but further in honor haue little or no interest at all: Considering honour to science improperly: and to Art Militarie it properly belongeth, in that from Arte Militarie those actions proceede, whereof honor is a reward, and from the learned there proceedeth no exterior action, wherby he may be iudged worthy of honor. But behold another reason, Signior *Patritio*, grounded vppon the words of your owne Philosopher, in the first of his *Ethikes*,

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where cōparing publike with priuat good, he said: that is to be beloued which is profitable to one alone, but much more diuine & excellent is that which benefiteth nations, and ci-ries; but this being trueth, beholde what a good Logitian I am: Arte Military is a perfection which doth not help one alone, but is a furtherance to Nations and Citties: whereas science profiteth none but the possessor of it: Therefore Arte Militarie is more excellent and honourable than Science.

That it is such an helpe and furtherance, it is a thing very manifest, in that by his Arte, Nations and Citties are defended from rauinous and insolent enemies, libertie is preserved, and religion protected: this causeth obseruance of the Lawes, without which the Common wealth would be, as a body without a soule. Wherefore it was wisely set downe in the Proeme of Institutions, that imperiall Ma-iestie ought, not onely to bee garnished with Lawes, but also with Armes to be adorned. Considering that (as the Ciuilians doe affirme) right and equitie smally preuaile in a Cittie, and if the sworde procure not obseruance thereof.

And Cicero in his Oration for *Anulus Cluentius Albi-
nus* doth affirme, that warriors are the defenders and mi-nisters of Iustice: And the Philosopher referreth one of the principallest partes of a common wealth, to Soul-diours: As also *Paulus Orosius* writeth; the selfesame bee-ing by the Philosopher in his Politickes confirmed, that the first Common wealth amongst the Gracians ordained, consisted of none other than warriors. In like manner great *Lycurgus* knowing, that to a common wealth there was not a more excellent or more profitable thing than this most noble Arte, directed all his Lawes which hee gaue vnto the Spartaines, to the perfection and greate-nesse of the Arte Millitarie: through which Lawes, the Spartaines becomming most excellent warriors, they defen-ded & maintained, not only their owne libertie, but further,
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all Greece, from the innumerable armie of *Xerxes*: that vniuersall good is to be preferred, before the felicitie of one alone, and Arte Militarie before science : *Marcus Tullius* plainly sheweth in the first of his Offices, saying in this manner: who is he so curious to vnderstand the nature of things, that a danger hanging ouer the head of his countrie, will not sodainely leaue contemplation, though he thought to measure the greatnes of the world, or number all the starres, and runne to succour? We may and ought therefore to conclude, that art Militarie as an vniuersall good, ought to preceede science, being but good particular, and consequently Souldiours, the learned: but aboue all others, before them, which are called Philosophers, and wise men, who not content with matters terrene, like the Giants, endeavour to ascende vppe into heauen, and make themselves equall with God, as also nourished in idlenesse, and knowing themselves vnapt to action: attaining to Magistracie, or honours, swelling vppe themselves in pride, they retire from ciuil companie into a solitarie life: and after hauing beene mewed vp to theyr studies and Bookes, they become leane and macerate, and not able to determine in what manner the Sunne heateth, wholly confounded, they waste themselves in melancholie humours. But leauing them apart, and comming to the excellencie of Arte Militarie, it is truely an heape of all those perfections, which make a man heroycal in an eminent degree: and beginning from the vertue of fortitude, this is most proper to Art Military, and is no lesse from it inseperable, then light from the Sunne.

By this vertue *Horatius Cocles* was woorthie of eternall praise, who alone vpon the bridge opposed himselfe to the power of al *Tuskans*, for the safety of his countrey. And no lesse worthie of honour was *Leonidas Spartane*, who fighting for his country, yea, & for the libertie of al the Greeks, with three hundred valiant souldiers, sustained at *Thyrmopylis*, for

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the space of three daies, the force of *Xerxes* armie. Temperance, as the preseruer of prudence, is necessary to the perfection of this arte: In that he can hardly subdue his enemy, which hath not first an habite in conquering himselfe: The act of temperance towards the faire women of *Darius*, was no lesse glory vnto *Alexander*, then were the two victories obtained, by valor, and fortitude: by this vertue, *Scipio Affricane*, brought principall glorie to himselfe, and benefite to his country, who in *Spaine*, being a young man of foure and twenty yeeres of age, and without a wife, restored vnto her husband, a most beautifull and noble young woman, returning vnto him for her dowrie, the money of her raunsome: and by this most vertuous action hee tamed the fierce courage of the *Celtyberians*, which peraduenture by fortitude he had neuer subdued. Finally, the *Romans*, as we reade, triumphed over the whole world, no lesse by being temperate, than valiant. The vertue of liberality is altogether necessary, in warrelike Arte: for by this the generous Captaine, alluring the mindes of his souldiours, maketh them prone to battel, and obtaining of victory. By this vertue, great *Alexander*, drew the *Macedonian Phalanx* into the yttermost parts of the East, through whose valor he triumphed ouer *Asia*. By this *Julius Caesar* subdued, not only the barbarous nations, but also drew vnto himselfe the minds of his own souldiers, to spoile themselves and their own country of liberty, to make him lord and monarch: and certainly liberty may be said to haue bin only proper to *Cesar*: magnificence also is no smal ornament to this our Arte, seeing the magnificent captaine, by this, not onely with his owne men, but also amongst strangers, acquireth reputation & glorie. *Octavian* euer coueting to exceed *Mark Antony* in those spectacles, the one and other presented to the people, as in all actions of magnificence, so in battels was he euer against the selfesame man victorious: and *Alcibiades* rather by this, than any other vertue, obtained honours in his owne countrey, and abroad: magnanimitie is no lesse an adiunct of milita-
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ry profession, then is whitnes of snowe: for that warrior who hath not a loftie and magnanimous minde, shall neuer accomplish glorious enterprises: *Cesar* was of so great a minde, as passing by a little obscure village, hee saide vnto a souldier that discommended the place; vnderstand thou, O friend, that I would rather chöose to be cheefe in this place, then second in *Rome*; and *Alexander* for this vertue, surnamed the great, was of so haughtie a minde, as hauing vnderstood by some, that there were diuers worlds, sighing, greatly lamented, that being now seauen and twentie yeares of age, he had not yet conquered nor gotten one. As vaine glory and ambition, oblcure the actions of this arte, so doth the vertue of modestie, cause it to bee wonderfull resplendant: the good *African* acquired no lesse glory in refusing with modestie, the superfluous honors offered vnto him, by the Senate, and people of *Rome*, then he did in vanquishing and subduing the proud forces of the *Carthaginians*: As on the contrary, *Alexander* obscured his famous acts, by the vice of ambitiō, he accepting, by sycophāts to be called the sonne of *Iupiter Hammon*, and finally, with all those honors, to bee honored, which rather agreed with the supernall gods, then any mortall man. Clemencie also moderatrix of anger, is in a manner necessarie to the managing of this arte, in that anger is an obfuscation to the vertues of the minde, and impaireth bodyly force, and vigor: wherefore an angry Captain forgetting his arte, and stratageme, easily becommeth a prey to his enemy: *Cesar*, as he was, and euer shall bee the warrior of the world without peere, so of al others was hee most curteous and gentle; neither can wee finde, that hee fought at any time with his enemy being in furie: and by being much more ready to pardon, then reuenge, he remained finally betrayed, and staine. Whereas on the contrary, *Alexander* by the vice of anger, obscured his great victories, for in fury he deliuered *Lysimachus* to the Lion, pearced the breast of *Clito* with a launce, and put *Calisthenes* to death. Affabilitie, and curtesie, though to the seueritie of this art,

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they seeme little befitting and conuenient: yet are they profitable, as the thinges that procure a Captain to be acceptable, and beloued of his souldiers, by this vertue *Scipio African* obtained great honor, and profit: for he was so affable and domestical amongst his souldiers, that although he had an exceeding great armie, yet saluted hee them all by their names. As vertue cannot be practised without iustice, so also without iustice cannot arte militarie consist: by this the valorous Captaine procureth himselfe to be beloued for hope of iust reward, as also to be feared through expectation of deserued punishment: And not onley moral vertues, but some liberall artes also seeme necessary to the perfection of this arte: and amongst others Rhethoricke produceth most admirable effects, which the lesser *Scipio* manifested in *Spaine*, who finding his armie very licentious, & corrupted altogether with depraued customes, by a most eloquent oration, without any other meanes, reduced them to the Romaine discipline: and *Iulius Caesar* by this arte of speaking, confirmed his Souldiers mindes in *France*, astonished with the hugenes of the duch mens bodies, and therefore he obtained a most glorious victorie against proud *Ariouistus*: Finally the ancient Captaines so esteemed, as also those of these daies, holde the force of eloquence to bee so great in arte militarie, that seldome or neuer, they enter into battail; but first they confirme the mindes of the Souldiers, by a Martiall Oration, enflaming them vnto battaile. And being of most notable importance, and a singular precept of arte militarie, to preserue an armie healthfull, I will also affirme, that to haue knowledge in some thinges, which appertaine to the arte of Phisicke, cannot but be a speciall assistance: for it shall wonderfully import a skilful Captaine, to vnderstand the quality of the aire, the goodnes of waters, & wines, the properties of meates: as well in choosung out situation for his encamping, as for the nourishment of his armie: & we may read, that Romaine Captaines contended no lesse in this, then in other martiall practises. Architecture further

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is necessary to this arte, especially that parte, which appertaineth to fortification; for wanting this knowledge, a capitaine can neither defend, offend, nor expugne a citie. In this point *Julius Caesar* was so excellent, as that of himselfe he brought admiration to the world, through the towers, bridges, fortresses, and engines, whereof euen yet to this daye, there appere diuers monumentes, and representations. In my opinion (most illustrious lady) I haue manifestly enough declared, that this our noble arte, is a consent, & harmony, of al the worthiest perfections, and an heape of all the vertues: being an arte truly worthy of those men, who for participating of deuinitie, and mortalitie, are termed *Heroes*: wherefore no meruaile though *Curtius*, most valiant of any other Romane Knight, was by the Oracle of *Apollo*, approved worthy to fill vp that huge gulfie, in the market place of *Rome*, as the most excellent and pretious thing which in that citie could be found, neither can it bee alleadged, but that there were also at the same instāt in *Rome*, men in learning most excellent, *Pythagoras*, & *Numa* hauing there plac’d their golden philosophie, I could further by infinit examples make demonstration, that militarie arte, is of al other perfections, aptest to exalte a man, euen to the highest degree of glory, but all volumes and writings being heere-with replenished, I refer my selfe ouer to that which the historiographers affirme. Notwithstanding to open the eies of the learned, I will affirme, that amongst the ancientes, armes were euer in greater estimation, then letters, which may be conceiued by the statues, & images, framed of their cheefest gods, and painted, not with books, or scroules of paper in their hand, but with instruments of warlike arte, they minding to manifest, that without armes, there could bee no perfect deitie: they gaue therefore vnto *Ioue* lightning, to *Neptune* and *Pluto*, a tridentall mace, to *Saturne*, a sickle, or sithe, to *Apollo*, a bowe, arrowes, and a darre, to *Hercules*, a clubbe, to *Pallas* a shielde, a lance, and helmet, to *Diana*, a bowe, shafttes, and a darre, vnto *Cupide* a bowe, and

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and fatall arrowes. And further, the ancients esteemed this art of so great excellence, as that it could not continue without the protection of some particular deity. And therefore they esteemed *Mars* and *Bellona*, gods of war, adorning their Statues with warlike instruments, which instruments, they also thought worthy to be made by diuine hand and workmanship, and therefore they beleeued *Vulcane* to be the Gods armourer, which *Plutarch* sheweth, saying,

Vulcane at his hot worke, doth sweate and blow,

To make the piercing shaft for Ioue his bow.

Finally, the holy scripture calleth the great God, the god of Armies, & not of the learned: so that Signior *Patritio*, you may yeeld your selfe vanquished, and not put your soule to compromise, for you well know, that you defend an vniust cause. *Patritio* laughed, & said: You Signior *Brancaccio* shew your selfe ingrate, yea, and trecherous towards the learned, seeing the Armes, and art of speaking, from the learned obtained, you vse against themselves. And I am out of al doubt, that if you were not as great a scholler, as a souldiour, you could neuer in this conflict, haue shewed your selfe so aduenturous a Champion: and yet for al this, the victorie shal not remaine on your side, though you haue lightly wounded mee, for with more mortall blowes I haue pierced you. I vnderstande you (sayde *Brancaccio*) you would inferre, that your arguments remaine yet firme and vnshaken, wherevnto I haue not yet made any answer: and by commending Armes, that I haue not a iotte obscured the glory of Letters: Therefore from that I haue alleadged, it may be gathered, that your first foundation goeth to ground: for honour is not a reward of perfection, which procureth the felicitie of him alone that possesseth it, but is a reward of beneficence, that helpeth others: and that it may appeare, howe your reasons conclude not against Souldiours, I will sette downe the difference, which your Philosopher maketh betweene prayse and honour, touched the other day by *Cassander Gualinguo*. Prayse (saith hee) is that speech, which noteth

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teth singularitie of vertue, and is proper to habite, whereupon wee vsually commend *Praxiteles* and *Phydias* for the habite of sculpture which they had in excellencie: but honour agreeth not properly to habites, but vertuous operations, For it is the true reward of excellent action, in that if one had vertue, and should bee idle, hee might rather bee prayed, then honoured. Nowe vertuous operations beeing in two kindes, some internall, as to contemplate, and others externall, as to practise armes: it is a thing manifest, that honour cannot belong to internall operation, for internall action, being knowne to none but to him onely that worketh, it cannot stirre vp any to honor it: It must needs therefore bee the reward of externall action, which beeing manifest, not only to the worker, but also to others, moueth, and vrgeth the honourer, who knoweth it, to giue honour thereunto: And therefore the Philosopher saith well, that honour rather consisteth in him honouring, then in him honoured, minding to make knowne, that to attaine to honourable action, it is necessarie that the action bee knowne for vertuous by the honourer. The actions therefore of men learned, Signior *Patritio*, as your selfe haue concluded, being actions intrinsecall, and only of the minde, as by you learned only they are known and vnderstood, so you by your selues may inwardly honor them, but these not manifest to others, you shall rather, bee worthie of praise then honour: And on the cōtrarie, the operations of vs Martialists, grounding their internal beginning in the mind, and discovering themselves to the eyes and cares of others by meane of valor and vertue of our bodies, as well of prayse, as likewise of highest honour, wee are thought worthie: neither can fortune bee an impediment of our glorie, although sometimes shee hinder victorie: For art Militarie, as diuers others also, hauing two endes, the proper ende thereof is victorie. And therefore *Haniball* obscured not a whit his warlike honor, by the last battaile hee lost in *Affricke*, hee (according to *Scipioes* iudgement) not hauing failed to performe all that, which be-

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longed to a most expert warriour for the obtaining of victory: neyther vnto you Signior *Patritio*, will it be any blemish, to haue beene subdued by me this day in combat: for though you haue not perswaded, yet notwithstanding haue you spoken in all excellencie touching perswasion. Signior *Patritio* further alleaged, that arte Military had no parte in felicitie, and much lesse in honor, seeing it is a conseruer of humane kinde: and in this hee is deceived, hauing beene by vs declared, that it is a good which vniuersally assisteth nations, and citties, by procuring vnto them obseruation of lawes, and defending them from enemies: and therefore *Marcus Tullius* saith well: that of necessitie warre must be made, to liue in peace. Your Philosopher also commendeth the making of war, vndertaking it for defence of our countrie, & to procure safetie to them, with whom we haue war. This is conformable also to the holy scripture, where wee reade that God permitteth, yea and commaundeth war, saying to the Hebrew people, Arme you, and confound these Philistines, enemies to the people of God: and in *Jeremy* also we may obserue, that God said, Prepare your shields and helmets, put on your breastplates, ride your horses, and take vp your lances against your enemies, gathering your selues all together to battaile, and accursed be he who shal not shed bloud against the enemies of the people of Israel. And in the *Machabees* we reade, that God euer moued and stirred vp the people to battaile against the enemies of Israel: And therefore *David* in the Psalmes writeth, Blessed bee the Lord, who instructeth our handes to battaile. And in all the Bookes of the Kings, wee finde, that God commaunded battaile for the chastisement of rebelles, ouerthrowing of tyrantes, and for the occasion of peace in the worlde. Wherefore it would be both a lawfull and commodious war, if christian princes did arme their people against the cruell sword of the East, and enemies of the elect and chosen people, endeavoring to abate the pride of so outrageous a tirant, and by force of armes to reduce those nations to better life,
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& worship diuine, then as they now liue with all sauage customs. And although it cannot be done without effusion of humane bloud, and some acte of iniustice, notwithstanding, of it no reckoning were to bee made, seeing without fire and sword, such a Phisition could not heale the like impostume. And not to passe ouer any thing whereof our aduersarie boasteth, I say, that *Lysanias*, *Belus*, *Hermes*, *Apis*, and other such, were deified, not so much for the knowledge wherwith they were adorned, as through the action of beneficence. For as these opperations may by euerie one bee comprehended and conceiued, so inter-nall actions, especially to luskish and stupide people, being concealed and hidden, they cannot bee honoured. And this is a thing so manifest, as it booteth not herein to make any other or further replication. Signior *Brancaccio* ha-ving thus argued, it seemed to the Queene and all the standers by, that the victorie remained on the Knights parte: when Signior *Renato Cati* standing vp on his feete: Bee it lawful for mee (sayd he) most famous Queene, to defend our cause, seeing Signior *Patritio* (rather a partialist, then faithfull Champion of al the learned, contemning the preualent armes of Ciuilians, hath onely drawne out against him the weak tempered sword of contemplatiue Philosophie, & yet hee infallibly knoweth, that these sort of learned, though worthie of praise and commendations, yet neuerthelesse are they poore, naked, and contemptible. This indeede we see euerie day (saide *Patritio*) for no other cause, but because the foolish multitude is intentiue on base gaine, and discerneth not the vertue and demerite of honour. It is proper to the Ciuilians, (thrise excellent Queene (saide *Brancaccio* smiling) to confound the lawes, wherefore no maruaile though Signior *Cati*, a most famous Ciuihan, hath broken the Law of combate by Champion, & sodainly as a warriour fresh in breath, cometh to assaile, iudging that I am alreadie wearie, and sore wounded: but he is deceiued, for I wante neyther voyce, tongue, nor woordes, to aunswere,

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not onely two, foure, or fixe, but euen to the whole rowte, and troupe of learned, and if they haue any thing to say to me.

It is proper to Ciuilians (saide *Cati*) to reforme the lawes, reducing extreame seueritie to termes of equitie, for vttermost rigor and seueritie, is no other but extreame iniurie: and it might worthily be thought an iniury, if wee without audience or any attention, should loose our action for another mans defect: Be it therefore lawfull for mee to defend the right and prerogatiue of Ciuilians, and to giue the attendant to vnderstand, that by great oddes wee ought to haue precedence of Souldiers. And because Signiour *Branaccio* groundeth his intention vpon the definition of Honour, which is the reward of beneficence, not swaruing one iote from it, but to ouerthrowe this argument with his owne armes, I meane thus to argue: whether is of greater moment to humane kinde, Armes, or Letters: It is manifest, that Lawes by the great God were produced together with the world: an infallible Law mooueth and gouerneth the heauens: And firme and iust lawe, tempereth the violent contradiction of elementes, seeing whatsoeuer in one parte, the one vsurpeth of an other, in some other respect at the same instant it restoreth and recompenceth: To the inuiolable lawe of Nature, plants giue place, and creatures obey. Finally, lawes descended from Heauen, rule this inhumane globe. Armes not from heauen (although the Poets fabling, and Painters faining adorne therewith the Images of the gods) but from the profound centre of the deeps, by some most malignant spirit brought to light, so far off are they from helping and benefiting the world, that rather they waste and teare the Image of God, consume the workes of nature, and ouerthrow humane inuentions. He that should take armes out of the worlde, so shoulde hee remooue iniuries and oppressions. For not remaining anie one, who by force would vsurpe vpon another, all things, by the wholesome administration of lawes should be governed

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in peace : And therefore good *Agessilaus* was woont to say, that if all were iust, there would be no neede of Armes, nor of valour.

Hee that shoulde remooue Lawes out of the worlde, not onely citties woulde remaine as a body without a soule, but al things being left to arbitrement, of violent armes, and being none who might prescribe iust and vpright warres, with the maner how with iustice to put them in execution, euery thing woulde goe hand ouer head, and iniuries should neuer haue end, and this would be nothing else but to remoue out of the worlde that felicitie which mortall men in this life may enioy. Here peraduenture Signior *Guilio Cesare* will alledge, that without armes, the world should want a great ornament: and that armes (as experience teacheth) are much more apt to make men great and glorious, than any kinde of learning: as also, that statues, crownes, triumphs, and all supream honours, are appropriate to vanquishing warriors, and not to Ciuilians or Lawyers, and hee will further vrge, confirming the same before he spoke, that armes iustly vndertaken, are no other but good. But I against all this will auerre, that armes are greater trouble, than ornament to the world, they being the beginning of vsurping other mens goods, and bringing free cities into intollerable seruitude, forcing many times wise men, to obey the follie of flagitious and cruell tyrants : I affirme that vniustly, and through abuse, they erect statues, giue crownes, and triumphs to conquering Souldiers: For what greater abuse or thing more inhumane can there be, than to seek greatnes and glory, from slaughters, deuastations, incests, sacrileges, rapines: and finally, to triumph in humane miseries? I say further, that there can no iust warre be extended, but that which in defence of our countrey is made : and all other warre, (with the Philosophers leaue bee it spoken) is contrarie to lawe of Nature: which, as it permitteth that others may defende themselves, and recover their owne, so suffereth it not, that for desire of raigning, one shoulde v-

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surpe that wherof another is lawfully possessor: nature not minding, that one should performe to another, what hee would not haue done to himselfe: but further supposing, that one might moue warre against another, how great be the iniquities, that insue of that iniustice? the innocent people, whom it concerneth not to examine, whither the war bee iust, or vniust, who are inforced to obay their Princes, vnder paine of disloyaltie, and rebellion, and the greater part of them hauing neuer taken sword, or weapon in hand against enemies, are taken prisoners, hewen in peeces, slain, there houses robbed, wiues violated, and finally, Townes, Castles, and Cities put to fire and sword, so that what nature, arte, and humane wisdom, in many yeares haue compassed, by force of armes, in very short space cometh to be defaced. Signior *Gulio Cesar* affirmeth, that vertue little preuaileth in a citie, if there be not thole, that may procure the obseruance thereof: and that vaine is counsell in the Senate, if there be none to put it in execution: as also that armed Knights, be the ministers of iustice: and in all this, as he saith well, so vnawares, he secretly confirmeth precedence of honor, to the Ciuilians, if peradventure hee doe not minde to holde a paradox: that they who execute, are more worthy of honor, then those that commaund. Wise Ciuilians, first iudge, whether the warre bee iust, or vniust, neither moueth the Captaine, or the armie without his decree, and commission, commaund him: and therefore the diuine Philosopher saith, that the science, which debateth of warre, should sway and rule ouer the other, which executes it, minding to inferre, that the Ciuilians should, not onely haue precedence, but further, euen command souldiers: And the Philosopher himselfe was of the same opinion, subiecting arte militarie, to imperiall arte, and ciuill science. Our aduersarie seeketh to preuaile by an opinion confirmed of the Philosopher, that the vniuersall must bee preferred before the particular: which beeing true, armes out of doubt, will giue place to the lawes; for
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the lawes without any detriment, bring vniuersall benefit to the whole worlde. and armes, though they helpe, so is it but onely one people, and one Prince alone, whom they further: and yet cannot they effect this, without prejudicing of many. I would faine finde out a Prince, who by his souldiers helpe, had euer performed such a benefit to the worlde, as did the Emperour *Iustinian* by the Lawyers assistance, in ordaining of lawes: this question elle, was an vniuersall benefit, whereof the whole world might haue vse, through infinite ages: but if honour bee measured from beneficence, so much more worthy of honor was *Iustinian* then *Cesar*, by howe much hee without detriment, did good vnto all; And *Cesar* by winning foure and fiftie battailes, benefiting only the people of *Rome*, and rather his owne selfe, caused the death of many hundred thousandes of menne, and defaced an infinite number of Citties and Castles. Signior *Brancaccio* further in fauour of Souldiers alleadgeth, the authoritie of *Lycurgus*, the diuine Philosopher who placeth warriors amongst the principallest members in his common wealth. Touching *Lycurgus*, I referre my selfe ouer to that which the Philosopher affirmeth in his Politickes, seeing hee by most effectually reasons sheweth that the lawes of *Lycurgus*, & comonwealth of the Spartanes, is in the number, of dishonest, & euill ordained comonwealths: As for *Plato*, he in his second, and fourth bookes of his commonwealth, setting downe the duetie of Souldiers, speaketh thus: Wee haue placed in the Cittie, Souldiers as dogges, who to the principall Cittizens are to obay, as to Pastors of citties: and there is no doubt, but by principall Cittizens, those are intended, who administer equitie, and iustice, as the Lawyers doo, and to noble and generous dogges; this diuine Writer resembleth the souldiers, saying, that like good dogges, they should be vigilant to obserue the enemies, ready to prosecute and follow them, and hauing overtaken, valiant to set vpon them. Out of this place of *Plato*, may be gathered conformable to my opinion

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opinion, that all other warre is vniust, but that which in defence of our countrie is vndertaken: seeing hee ordaineth souldiers for no other end, but to garde the citie, and he that of them maketh other imployment, abuseth them: and our mortall enemy *Cato*, animating vnto the vertue of fortitude, saith: fight in defence of thy countrie: and not to acquire another mans dominion and empire. As therefore it cannot be denied (most famous Lady) but that armes are for behalfe of the lawes, and vnto them subiect, so must wee conclude, that souldiers are farre inferior to professors of the lawes, considering that in a cittie, the one be as pleaders, & Rhethoricians, the other as porters, and guardians: and this vnto me seemeth so manifest a thing, as that it cannot bee contradicted. But because I perceiue by the gestures & motions of his person, that our obstinate aduersary, long since, impatient of attention, is most desirous to speake, I will here pause, assuring my selfe, that he, considering he wanteth neither voice, tong, nor wordes, wil neuer giue place to manifest reason: but confident in his eloquence, he will attempt to retort, the vpright and sincere iudgement, of our most gracious Queene. Eloquence preuaileth greatly in lawyers (saide *Brancaccio*) and so far, that many times it hazardeth the good conscience of a sincere & equal Iudge: whereof I doubting, to the end that the entire & impartial indgement, of our illustrious moderatrix, may remaine vnspotted, and immaculate; I will make it knowne, that Signior *Cato*, hath done like that incircumspect Greek, who to terrifie the Troians, putting off his own, armed himself with the armes of feare *Achilles*. Notwithstanding, before I laye open his sophistications, it is necessary, that somewhat more amply discoursing, of that which to a warrior appertaineth, I play the Philosopher searcheth out the secrets of Nature, and infallible providence of God: it cannot be denied most famous Lady, but that Nature is vnto man a stepmother, and to the other creatures a most kinde and tender mother, for she hath not onely made them strong of body, but with naturall

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turall garments so couered, and naturall armes so fortified
 them, wherewith most fierce, they proudly go forward,
 without fearing offence: and such creatures as shee hath
 produced them, weake and vnarmed, so hath shee prouided
 them swift feete, or light feathers and wings, to the ende,
 that flying or running away, they might withdraw them-
 selues from danger. Man should haue been naked, vnarmed,
 and of al other creatures weakest, and exposed to all kinde
 of iniurie, if by singular grace of the heauens there had not
 beene granted vnto him, the excellent gift of the minde,
 and light of reason: the which, what Nature hath denied
 him, it doth doubly suppeditate. This at one instant ador-
 ned him with armes, and armed him with lawes, to the
 ende, that by armes, hee might securely walke amongst the
 most cruell beasts, and by lawes leade a perfect & ciuill life.
 It is therefore to affirme, that lawes descend from heauen:
 and armes were drawne from the deepe, for both the one
 and the other were woorkes of reason and equitie; and con-
 sequently, were both celestiall inuentions. And as it is
 true, that laws without armes cannot consist, so is that false
 which the aduersarie affirmeth, that to take armes out of the
 world, were a bringing in of that felicitie, which most of all
 in this mortal life is desired: for without armes, the lawes
 would not onely bee vaine and friuolous, but a man, borne to
 rule ouer Creatures, beeing weake and vnarmed, shoulde
 bee a prey to more terrible beastes; neither should they a-
 gainst them haue any greater defence, then haue the little
 Pigmeans against the Cranes. But admit wee grant with-
 out preiudice to truth, that Lawes are more noble then
 Armes, yet for all this cannot Signior *Cari* conclude, that
 the Ciuilians Doctrine is of greater esteeme then Arte
 Millitarie, nor that Generals of Armies are to giue place
 to Doctours of the Lawes. For if such a prerogatiue should
 bee graunted, it must not concurre with the Ciuilians or
 Lawyers, but with the Law giuers, considering that those
 who establishe Lawes, be great Princes, or commonwealths

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most prudent men, or for some heroycall vertue most excellent as were *Draco* and *Solon*, who gaue Lawes to the Athenians, and *Lycurgus* the Lacedemonians Lawgiuer, *Numa Pompilius* that prescribed lawes to the Romaines, *Faleus* to the Carthaginians, *Mercurius Trismygistus* to the Egyptians, *Zoroastres* to the Persians, and *Bactrians*, *Minos* to the Cretans, *Charondas* to those of Tyre, *Zalmoxis* to the Tartarians, *Hippodamus* to the Milesians, *Plato* to the Sicilians, and other such like: But to dilate a little touching that doctrine, whereof the Ciuilians do so insist, as Signior *Patritio* numbring vp the Sciences, and Artes liberrall, hath not placed it in his Catalogue, so thinke I it a thing very difficult, to find any place for it amongst habites speculative & actiue. Among the Sciences it cannot be recounted. For Science beeing nothing else, but to vnderstand the thing by his proper and infallible cause.

The Ciuilian demaunded of that he knoweth, can alledge no other cause, but that the Lawes say so, or Doctors thus affirme: It cannot also properly be termed an Art, except after the same manner as *Petrarch* calleth it, that is, an Arte of selling words and lies: For though she be conuersant about the Lawes, as the proper argument of her doctrine, yet can she not alter nor transforme them into diuers formes, as other Artes doe their matter and subiect: For Lawes by the Ciuilians cannot be transmutated, but by great Princes and Lawgiuers: which the Lawyers observing, and not knowing with what other title to honour this their science, haue termed it knowledge of equitie, or *iuris prudentia*, which signifieth no other, but that wise dome which is conuersant in administering equitie and iustice, according as the Lawes command. Nay but I will further affirme, that this their facultie cannot likewise be numbered amongst the morall vertues: For the Philosopher discussing of that particular vertue called Iustice, saith, that it is conuersant about iustice distributiue and commutative, that is, in placing rewarde and punishments, and reducing contractes

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and permutations to equalitie. And this vertue beeing well considered in her foundation, is not proper to Lawyers; but vnto Law-giuers: For the Lawyer or Ciuilian is about three things conuersant: To interpret the written lawes, To answer according to Lawe, And to iudge answerable to the Lawes, or according vnto those customes, which by inueteration are of like force and vigour as the Lawes. Out of this wee may drawe a conclusion conformable to the Philosopher, that the written Lawe, is a silent Lawe: And the Lawyer is no other, but the liuely or speaking Law: and so consequently, that the vertue of Iustice dependeth not on him, but on the Lawgiuer and Law. The Philosopher affirmeth, that there be three conditions or qualities of men: some distrusting authoritie, yeeld onely to reason: Others not Very capable of reason, easily reftsatisfied in authoritie: And a third sort, who incapable of reason, do likewise contemne the authoritie of the wise; and as these last, of all other be the worst, and the second giue proof but of a dull conceit, so the first note a most eminent and pregnant wit, and such are the Philosophers speculative, who seeke after truth, and not authoritie. And the Captains in war be those, who despising other mens authoritie, are gouerned only by reason; among the second sort, lawyers are recounted, whose doctrine is wholly grounded vpon authoritie, & therefore they were wont to say, that one is not worthy to be heard, that speaketh without authority; and out of this a maxime may be gathered, that Lawyers of themselves know nothing, but that their knowledge dependeth vpon other mens opinions, so that many times when they woulde answer, or determine, wythout hauing any eye to the force of reason, where there is no written Lawe, they fall a reciting their opinions, who haue scribed a number of Booke cases, and for the most part, tie themselves thereunto, as to a most certaine and infallible rule. And the confusion of these Doctourshippes is so great, who haue written rather for gayne and ostenta-

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ration, then through any zeale of iustice, as that often amongst themselves, they pleade not what is most reasonable and iust, but what is most vsuall and common: a thing surely worthy of diuision, and also compalsion, as though the opinion of ten ignorant were more to be esteemed, then the sentēce of foure wise mē: whether these sort of learned (most renowned Lady) shoulde precede warriours, who with notified valour adorne their countries, with a thousand Troupes, administer argument to writers, to immortalize themselves, and consecrate vnto memorie martiall proceedings, and magnanimous attempts, it is easie to iudge. By that which hath beene spoken, it is clearely manifest, that Signior *Cato* setteth foorth lawes with the person of the Lawgiuers, vnto whome they bring princes and men heroycall, it shall not bee greatly inconuenient, that armed men giue place, seeing these determine and command the wars, as also determine the place of Generals in an armie, and not Ciuilians, as hee constantly affirmeth, except peraduenture hee meane, that it is all one to commaunde ouer Souldiours, as ouer executions, or the minister of iustice, this being a proper office of ciuilians. This truth may be conceived by the description the philosopher maketh of his excellent & wel ordained commonwealth, wherein he diuideth the Citizens into foure orders, that is, Warriours, Senators, iudges, & priestes, and describing their offices, he calleth not the souldiers by this brutish terme of dogs, but maintainers, defenders, and ministers of iust warres: and to the Senator, hee allotteth administration and gouernment of things publicke: And these men it concerneth to determine of warre or peace, & to these souldiours giue place, for in such a degree they are to be reputed as Lords & princes. And to Iudges, who are no other then ciuilians or lawyers, belongeth the office of determining and deciding controuersie. The priestes who are the ancientest, reduced as it wer to their last & most perfect end, he assigneth the care of things holy. And wee must obserue, that althogh to frame a city of it self sufficient, there

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there be many cōditions of men required, notwithstanding, to fashion a commonwealth, the philosophers minde is, that these foure orders should suffice: and hee altogether excludes those mechanical degrees, which practise sordide, & base professions, as those, who of vertue are incapable, the rather being instrumentes, then parte of a cittie. If therefore authoritie grounded on effectuall reason, bee worthy of credit, it cannot bee true, that ciuilians in a cittie, are as Rhethoricians, neither that their office is to command ouer Warriors, although their authoritie stretcheth to command ouer sergeantes and executioners: for they sit to iudge and determine controuersies, & not to gouern publike affaires: yet is this no impediment, but that a Lawier may haue place in the Senate, & be in the number of Rhethoricians, when he shal not only vnderstand that which *Vlpian* teacheth, but shal further possesse a part of those singular vertues, wherewith Signior *Cati* is adorned, and al these most excellent Ciuilians, out of doubt most worthy counsellors, of our thrise illustrious Prince. Seeing vnto these the name of Lawgiuers, rather agreeth, then ciuilians or Lawyers: Signior *Cati* further inferreth, that of lawes, & lawyers the benefit is much more vniuersall, then that of armes, and souldiers: seeing Lawes asist the whole world, and armes benefit but one cittie, or a Prince alone: and that the benefit of the lawes, is euer without other detriment: but armes cannot pleasure without others offence: we haue sufficiently declared, that armes vniuersally are beneficial, if they be moued & vnder-taken with iustice, & that God him self, by his owne mouth commandeth warres: as also that iust victorie is no lesse profitable to the vanquished thā victors: For they vanquished, are by it reduced to a better life, for if armes were wicked, because of offending others, the like should the lawes bee, which cannot bee executed without blood: The lawes command that menquellers bee slaine, quarrellers, and wounders, to bee recompenced with the like measure, that theeuers, adulterers, sacrilegious, and finally all malefactors,

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be bitterly punished: notwithstanding, because this is done through zeale of iustice, and that the good may enjoy peace, those laws are good, as also the Lawyers, if with iustice they execute them: but if they bee vniust, they doo more hurte then wicked souldiours, for souldiers preserve their friends, and by all euill meanes offende their enemies, whereas covetous and auaricious Lawyers, by giuing hope of safetie to their friendes, haue no other drift or intention, but to gnaw them euen to the bones. And to speake truth, of all sortes of men, the vniust Lawyer is most pernicious. I could alleadge (most illustrious Ladie) many other reasons, to manifest, that Lawyers, though they bee woorthie of honour, yet are they not therefore to be preferred before souldiers: but because I see my ship now approaching neere her port, passing ouer to custome & common vse, I affirme thus much, that Dukes, Kings, and Emperours themselves, are called Knights, but neuer Doctors: and armed in Iusts, Turneyes, and also in the midst of the fieelde, in Battaille they shewe themselves amongst warriours, but in assemblies and Courts of Ciuilians, Lawyers, or other learned, they neuer present themselves for disputation sake: and this for no other cause, but in that the exercise of armes is proper to great and mightie men, and more honourable then that of Letters. Do we not further see, that in solemnities and ceremonies, where precedence is specially regarded, that great Captaines and men of warre, go neerer the person of the king or Emperor, then Secretaries, Chancellors, or Councellors, although they bee great Doctors, and maruailous learned men: this beeing a manifest signe, that of the same Kings or Emperours, Armes are farre more highly esteemed then Letters, and Souldiers then Doctours. But if nothing els sufficed, the iudgement of women euer infallible, might serue for certaine prooffe, that warriours are more to bee esteemed then Doctours, we seeing that the greater parte of women are rather carried away with the loue of knights, then men learned, neither can the ioy be imagined, which they feele in their hearts, when they

Letters or Armes.

see their louers appeare in Iusts or Turneyes, armed with their embleames and fanours by them giuen : and for their sakes to arme themselves, breake launces, and runne theyr gallant steedes and Coursers. So that greue it you not, Signior *Cati*, to rest content in common sentēce & approbation, and to leaue vnto vs warriours the highest degree of honor, seeing wee haue both obtained and preserued it, not with writings or vaine words, but with true valor, labour, and bloud, putting your selfe in mind of *Milciades* answere, who demaunded which was worthiest of greater estimation, *Homer* the great learned man, or *Achilles* the noble warriour, so much more, sayde he, is *Achilles* to be valued aboue *Homer*, as is the Conquerour more then hee, who with sound of trumpet publisheth his victorie. Here Signior *Giulio Casare* stayed : and Signior *Cati* minding to replie (whome preualent reasons failed not for defence of Lawyers, the Queene with her finger imposed silence, and commanded the noble Ladie Countesse, that shee should pronounce her sentence, who after a little meditation, censured in this manner ; We hauing heard, and well considered the reasons both of one and other partie, do determine that Ciuill honour, which is the reward of excellent and heroycall actions, ought more specially to be yeelded to men of martiall profession, and that veneration, proper to things diuine, befitteth the wise and learned: but reforming better this our definitiue sentence, lette vs enact, that warriours be esteemed honorable, and doctours reuerend. This deepe iudicial sentence of the Lady countesse, was by al the standers by, admired. And with this, issuing out of the Barge, and mounted in sumptuous Coaches, the Ladies and Knights hauing accompanied the Duke and Ladie Duchesse to the Pallace, they all departed to their seuerall houses.

FINIS.